THIRD
DIVISION
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THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY
DON MARIANO MARCOS, MUNICIPALITY OF BAYOMBONG PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISCAYA
represented by BARANGAY KAGAWAD JOSE CENEN SANTOS, MARIO BACUD, WALTER
FRANCISCO, ROSITA SEBASTIAN, LAURETA CABAUATAN, CECILIA ALINDAYU and MELY
SIMANGAN,
Petitioners, - versus
- PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 170626 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: March 3, 2008 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders dated
Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay is the legislative body of Barangay
Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, a local
government unit created, organized and existing as such under pertinent laws of
the Republic of the
On
1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste
management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from
composting.
2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable materials taken
from garbage collection.
3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes
like hauling sand and gravel for private persons without monetary benefit to
the barangay because no income from this source appears
in the year end report even if payments were collected x x
x.
4. Using/spending barangay
funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and other spare parts of the
garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said truck from the
garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project. x x x.
5. Unliquidated
traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003
because although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said
purpose, he, however, did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he
was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay.
x x x.
6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x.[6]
Upon his failure to file an Answer to the Amended
Administrative Complaint dated
On
The Decision dated
The
FOREGOING considered come
On
On
On
Hence, the
present petition was filed.
Although Martinez’s term as Punong Baranggay expired upon the
holding of the 29 October 2007 Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan
elections and, thus, rendering this petition moot and academic, the Court will
nevertheless settle a legal question that is capable of repetition yet evading
review.[15]
The pivotal issue in this case is
whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan
may remove
Section 60 of the Local Government
Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials
from office:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.—An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or
removed from office on any of the following grounds:
x x x x.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. (Emphasis provided.)
During
the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code,[16]
the legislative intent to confine to the courts, i.e., regional trial courts, the Sandiganbayan
and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of
elective local officials was evident:
Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue of whether or not the Department Secretary or the Office of the President can suspend or remove an elective official.
Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition, may I just add the following thought: It seems to me that instead of identifying only the proper regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan, and since we know that in the case of a regional trial court, particularly, a case may be appealed or may be the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this later on, I would like to suggest that we consider replacing the phrase “PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR THE SANDIGANBAYAN” simply by “COURTS.” Kasi po, maaaring sabihin nila na mali iyong regional trial court o ang Sandiganbayan.
Senator
Pimentel. “OR THE
Senator
Saguisag. “OR THE
Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr. President.
Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology that we will craft to capture the other ideas that have been elevated. (Emphasis provided.)
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[17]
the Court en banc categorically ruled
that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected
officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as
expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government
Code. It further invalidated Article
125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, which provided that:
Article 125. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. x x x.
x x x x.
(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.
The Court nullified the aforequoted rule since the Oversight Committee that
prepared the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its
authority when it granted to the “disciplining authority” the power to remove
elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper
courts. Thus, it is clear that under the
law, the Sangguniang Bayan
is not vested with the power to remove
Petitioner contends that
administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be filed with,
heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of
removal from office. It further claims that the courts are merely tasked with
issuing the order of removal, after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a penalty of removal is warranted.[18]
The aforementioned position put
forward by the petitioner would run counter to the rationale for making the
removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. In Pablico v. Villapando,[19]
the court declared that:
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (sic 125)[20] (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the “disciplining authority” to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. (Emphasis supplied.)
The rule which confers to the proper
courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended
as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining
authority. Vesting the local legislative
body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be
removed from office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to
implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from
the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the petitioner’s interpretation would
defeat the clear intent of the law.
Moreover,
such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to nothing more than an implementing
arm of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
or Sangguniang Bayan. This would be an unmistakable breach of the
doctrine on separation of powers, thus placing the courts under the orders of
the legislative bodies of local governments.
The courts would be stripped of their power of review, and their
discretion in imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left
to be exercised by political factions which stand to benefit from the removal from
office of the local elective official concerned, the very evil which Congress
sought to avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government Code.
Congress
clearly meant that the removal of an elective local official be done only after
a trial before the appropriate court, where court rules of procedure and
evidence can ensure impartiality and fairness and protect against political
maneuverings. Elevating the removal of
an elective local official from office from an administrative case to a court
case may be justified by the fact that such removal not only punishes the
official concerned but also, in effect, deprives the electorate of the services
of the official for whom they voted.
As
the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the
procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official
before the Sangguniang Panlungsod
or Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official
from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section
60 of the Local Government Code. Thus,
if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty,
would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with
the regional trial court. Once the court
assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be
subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from
office is appropriate. On the other
hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension;
if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it
can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.
Petitioner alleged that an interpretation
which gives the judiciary the power to remove local elective officials violates
the doctrine of separation of powers.
This allegation runs contrary to the 1987 Constitution itself, as well
as jurisprudence.
The 1987 Constitution is explicit in
defining the scope of judicial power. It
establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action
the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of
duty.[21] Paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis provided.)
The doctrine of separation of powers
is not absolute in its application; rather, it should be applied in accordance
with the principle of checks and balances.
The removal from office of elective officials must not be tainted with
partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power
in a more impartial tribunal, the court.
Furthermore, the local government units are not deprived of the right to
discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing
the extreme penalty of dismissal.
Petitioner questions the Decision
dated
The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under
their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for
review. Non-observance of the doctrine
results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by
the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint.[22]
The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which is based on sound public policy and practical
consideration, is not inflexible. There
are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly
resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 3) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; 4) where the amount
involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where
judicial intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; 8) where the controverted acts
violate due process; 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot; 10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; 11) when strong public interest is involved; and 13) in quo warranto
proceedings.[23]
As a general rule, no recourse to
courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are essentially
judicial.
In this case, it is apparent that the
Sangguniang Bayan acted
beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated
In addition, this Court in Castro v. Gloria[25] declared
that where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not
exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. The reason behind providing an exception to
the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that issues of law cannot
be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer would
only be an exercise in futility. A legal
question is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an
administrative body.[26]
In the present case,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Bayombong
RTC in Special Civil Action No. 6727 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Judge Jose B. Rosales. Rollo, pp. 32-39.
[2]
[3]
[4] Section
61 of the Local Government Code states that:
Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring local
elective official shall be prepared as follows:
(a)
A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city,
an independent component city or component city shall be filed before the
Office of the President;
(b) A complaint against any elective official of
a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office
of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose
decision shall be final and executory.
[5] Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Id
at 48-63.
[14]
[15] Albana v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
163302, 23 July 2004, 435 SCRA 98, 105; Brillantes, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163193, 15 June 2004, 432 SCRA 269, 286;
and Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil.
482, 505-506 (2004).
[16]
[17] 326 Phil. 847, 904-905 (1996).
[18] Rollo, p. 133.
[19] Supra
note 16 at 860, citing Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., supra note 17.
[20] Petitioner
alleged that Article 124, and not Article 125, of the Rules and Regulations of
the Local Government Code was annulled by the Court in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Pablico v. Villapando. This hardly merits this Court’s
attention. In Salalima, it was categorically
stated that the power granted to the “disciplining authority” in Article 125
was clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that drafted
it. Citing Article 124, instead of
Article 125, in Villapando,
was clearly a clerical error committed wherein no mention was made of the
subject matter of Article 124 and particular portions of Article 125 were
quoted therein.
[21] Disomangcop v. Datumanong,
G.R. No. 149848,
[22] Castro v. Gloria, G.R. No.132174,
[23] Republic v. Lacap,
G.R. No. 158253,
[24] Section
67 of the Local Government Code states that:
Section 67. Administrative Appeals. Decisions in administrative cases may, within
thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:
(a)
The sangguniang panlalawigan,
in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang
bayan; x x x.
[25] Supra
note 22.
[26]
[27] Rollo, p. 67.