AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., G.R. No. 170432
CECILIA P. FRANCIA,
and HEIRS OF BENJAMIN
P. francia, Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
AZCUNA
and
-
v e r s u s - LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ.
MUNICIPALITY OF
MEYCAUAYAN,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March
24, 2008
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R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
On
February 6, 2003, respondent Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a
complaint for expropriation[1]
against petitioners Amos P. Francia, Jr., Cecilia P. Francia and Benjamin P.
Francia[2]
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16. Respondent needed petitioners' 16,256 sq. m.
idle property at the junction of the North Expressway, Malhacan-Iba-Camalig
main road artery and the MacArthur Highway.[3]
It planned to use it to establish a common public terminal for all types of
public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks.
In
their answer,[4]
petitioners denied that the property sought to be expropriated was raw land. It
was in fact developed[5]
and there were plans for further development. For this reason, respondent’s
offer price of P2,333,500 (or P111.99 per square meter) was too
low.
After
trial, the RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose. The
construction of a common terminal for all public utility conveyances (serving
as a two-way loading and unloading point for commuters and goods) would improve
the flow of vehicular traffic during rush hours. Moreover, the property was the
best site for the proposed terminal because of its accessibility. Thus, on
November 8, 2004, the RTC issued the following order:[6]
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
after [respondent] has deposited with this Court the fifteen percent (15%) of
the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of
the property to be expropriated, it may take immediate possession of the
property upon issuance of writ of possession that this court will issue for
that purpose.
Further, the purposes of assessment
and determination of the area needed that will suit the purpose of
expropriation and just compensation of the lot sought to be expropriated, the
court hereby appoints commissioners to be composed of the officer-in-charge of
this court, Lerida Socorro E. Joson and one each from [respondent] and
[petitioners].
Notify all parties concerned.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners
moved for the reconsideration of the November 8, 2004 order but the motion was
denied in an order dated January 31, 2005.
Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA)
contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
November 8, 2004 and January 31, 2005 orders. They claimed that the trial court
issued the orders without conducting a hearing to determine the existence of a public
purpose.
On
July 28, 2005, the CA rendered a decision[8]
partially granting the petition. Finding that petitioners were deprived of an
opportunity to controvert respondent's allegations, the appellate court
nullified the order of expropriation except with regard to the writ of
possession. According to the CA, a hearing was not necessary because once the
expropriator deposited the required amount (with the Court), the issuance of a writ
of possession became ministerial.
Petitioners
moved for partial reconsideration but their motion was denied. Hence, this
recourse.
Petitioners
essentially aver that the CA erred in upholding the RTC's orders that, in
expropriation cases, prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was
not necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession.
We
deny the petition.
Section
19 of Republic Act 7160[9]
provides:
Section 19.
Eminent Domain. ― A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power
of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner, and that such offer was not accepted; Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession
of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making
a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of
the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of
the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That, the amount
to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property. (emphasis supplied)[10]
Before
a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to
be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at
least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax
declaration.[11]
The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition
precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.[12]
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify
that the conclusions in the above resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Docketed as Civil Case No. 296-M-2003. Annex “G,” rollo, pp. 146-152. The complaint was filed pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 2002-14 authorizing the Municipality of Meycauayan to institute expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of petitioners' property. The said ordinance was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Bulacan in Kapasiyahan Blg. 376-T on August 15, 2002.
[2] Petitioner Benjamin P. Francia was substituted by his heirs upon his death pursuant to Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.
[3] Covered by TCT No. 123604 (M).
[4] Annex “H,” rollo, pp. 153-160.
[5] Among its improvements were a Caltex gasoline station and a hollow blocks factory.
[6] Penned by Judge Thelma R. Pinero-Cruz. Annex “B,” rollo, pp. 124-126.
[7] Id., p. 126.
[8] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Santiago Javier Ranada (retired) of the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Dated July 28, 2005. Id., pp. 106-123.
[9] The Local Government Code of 1991.
[10] Cf. Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7160, Rule VI, Art. 36:
Article 36. Expropriation proceedings. (a) If the [local government unit (LGU)] fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose or welfare through purchase, LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.
(b) The local chief executive shall cause the provincial, city, or municipal attorney concerned or, in his absence, the provincial or city prosecutor, to file expropriation proceedings in the proper court in accordance with the Rules of Court and other pertinent laws.
(c) The LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated. (emphasis supplied)
[11] See Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Quitain, 373 Phil. 773, 794-801 (1999). See also Biglang-awa v. Hon. Bacalla, 399 Phil. 308, 317-325 (2000).
[12] City of Iloilo v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 154614, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 269, 283 citing City of Manila v. Serrano, 412 Phil. 754, 763 (2001).