SECOND DIVISION
GALO
MONGE, G.R.
No. 170308
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO,
Acting
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO
MORALES,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA, and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 7, 2008
x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
R E S O L U T I O N
Tinga, J.:
This is a Petition for Review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court whereby petitioner Galo Monge (petitioner)
assails the Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 2005 which affirmed his conviction as
well as the discharge of accused Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a state witness.
The factual
antecedents follow. On 20 July 1994,
petitioner and Potencio were found by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina in possession of and transporting three
(3) pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga
City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that
they be shown the requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce any.[3]
Petitioner fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio
was brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the
DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO).[4]
The DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber
indicating that the items, totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00,
had been seized from Potencio.[5] Later on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencio’s whereabouts had been unknown since the time of
the seizure[6]
until he surfaced on 3 January 1998.[7]
An information was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35
charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of
Section 68[8]
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[9]
as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of 1997. The inculpatory
portion of the information reads:
That
on or about the 20th day of [July 1994], at about 9:30 o’clock in
the morning, in Barangay Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with each
other, without any authority of law, nor armed with necessary permit/license or
other documents, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, transport and have in their possession three (3) pieces of
Mahogany of assorted [dimension] with a[n] appropriate volume of seventy-seven
(77) board feet or point eighteen (0.18) cubic meter with a total market value
of P1,925.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
DENR in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[10]
At the 26
November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea.[11]
Trial
ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the
circumstances of the apprehension but for failing to appear in court for cross
examination, his testimony was stricken out.[12]
On 16 January 1998, Potencio was discharged to be
used as a state witness on motion of the prosecutor.[13]
Accordingly, he testified on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed that
for a promised fee he was merely requested by petitioner, the owner of the log,
to assist him in hauling the same down from the mountain. Potencio’s
testimony was materially corroborated by Molina.[14]
Petitioner did not contest the allegations, except that it was not he but Potencio who owned the lumber. He lamented that contrary to
what Potencio had stated in court, it was the latter
who hired him to bring the log from the site to the sawmill where the same was
to be sawn into pieces.[15]
The trial court found petitioner guilty
as charged. Petitioner was imposed nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and ordered to pay the
costs.[16]
Aggrieved,
petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he challenged the
discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the
ground that the latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there
was no absolute necessity for his testimony.[17]
The appellate court dismissed this challenge and affirmed the findings of the
trial court. However, it modified the
penalty to an indeterminate prison sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor as maximum.[18] His motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence the present appeal whereby petitioner reiterates his challenge
against the discharge of Potencio.
The petition is utterly unmeritorious.
Petitioner
and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto
transporting, and thus in possession of, processed mahogany lumber without
proper authority from the DENR. Petitioner has never denied this fact. But in
his attempt to exonerate himself from liability, he claims that it was Potencio, the owner of the lumber, who requested his assistance
in hauling the log down from the mountain and in transporting the same to the
sawmill for processing. The contention
is unavailing.
Section 68
of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct
and separate offenses, namely: (a) the
cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or
timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (b)
the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing laws and regulations.[19]
DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of
1993 specifies the documents
required for the
transport of timber and other forest
products. Section 3 thereof materially
requires that the transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of lumber
origin duly issued by the DENR-CENRO. In
the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing timber or other forest products may be proven by the authorization
duly issued by the DENR. In the second
offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering,
collecting and removal of forest products are legal precisely because mere
possession of forest products without the requisite documents consummates the
crime.[20]
It is thus
clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio
of the subject mahogany lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the
requisite legal documents, taken together, has already given rise to criminal
liability under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act
punished thereunder. The direct and affirmative
testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness
on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioner’s
liability. Petitioner cannot take refuge
in his denial of ownership over the pieces
of lumber found
in his possession
nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio
to provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that
punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum. As
such, in prosecutions under its provisions, claims
of good faith
are by no means reliable as defenses
because the offense is complete and criminal liability attaches once the
prohibited acts are committed.[21] In other words, mere possession of timber or
other forest products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or
criminal intent, is illegal.[22] It would therefore make no difference at all
whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio who
owned the subject pieces of lumber.
Considering
the overwhelming body of evidence pointing to nothing less than petitioner’s
guilt of the offense charged, there is no cogent reason to reverse his
conviction.
Petitioner’s
challenge against Potencio’s discharge as a state
witness must also fail. Not a few cases
established the doctrine that the discharge
of an accused so he may turn state witness is
left to the
exercise of the trial
court’s sound discretion[23]
limited only by
the requirements
set forth in Section 17,[24]
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty and
whether there is objectively an absolute necessity for his testimony are
questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being competent to
resolve issues of fact. The
discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect this highly factual
issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of
grave abuse of discretion.[25] No such grave abuse is present in this
case. Suffice it to say that issues
relative to the discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court as
they cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal.[26]
Moreover
and more importantly, an order discharging an accused from the information in order
that he may testify
for the prosecution has the effect of an
acquittal.[27] Once the discharge is ordered by the trial
court, any future development showing that any or all of the conditions
provided in Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not
affect the legal consequence of an acquittal.[28]
Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution, therefore, in moving for the
discharge and of the court in granting the motion—no question of jurisdiction
being involved—will not deprive the discharged accused of the benefit of
acquittal and of his right against double jeopardy. A contrary rule would
certainly be unfair to the discharged accused because he would then be faulted
for a failure attributable to the prosecutor.
It is inconceivable that the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal policy
of placing the fate of the discharged accused at the mercy of anyone who may
handle the prosecution.[29] Indeed, the only instance where the testimony
of a discharged accused may be disregarded is when he deliberately fails to
testify truthfully in court in accordance with his commitment,[30]
as provided for in Section 18, Rule 119.
Potencio lived up to his commitment and for
that reason, petitioner’s challenge against his discharge must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Acting Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*As replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave per Administrative
Circular No. 84-2007.
[1]Rollo, pp. 10-25.
[2]Docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 25249. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam and concurred
in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Japar B. Dimaampao, id. at 65-77.
[4]Rollo, p. 67.
[5]Records, p. 157.
[6]The warrant of arrest against Potencio
dated 10 March 1997 was returned unserved. The
sheriff’s return stated that Potencio “has escaped
from custody and was in Manila,”id. at 48.
[7]TSN, 30 January 1998, p. 16.
[8]SEC. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber
or other products without license – Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land or from private land whose
title has no limitation on the disposition of forest products found therein,
without any authority under a license agreement, lease’ license or permit shall
be punished with the penalty imposed under Arts. 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code : Provided, That in the
case of partnership, association or corporation, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering or collecting shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in
favor of the government of the timber or forest products so cut, gathered,
collected or removed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
used therein and the forfeiture of his improvements in the area: Provided, That the timber or forest
products cut, gathered, collected or removed from a license area shall be
delivered to the licensee, lessee or permitee in
whose area the forest products were cut, gathered, collected or removed, free
from claims of the illegal cutter, but subject to the payment of the
corresponding forest charges. Should the licensee refuse to accept the
products, the same may be confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed
in accordance with law, regulation or policy on the matter.
[9]REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 389, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
[10]Records, p. 1.
[11]Id. at 24-25.
The decision of the Court of Appeals stated that accused Edgar Potencio had been arraigned, contrary to what is kept in
the records as the Certificate of Arraignment and the Order of Arraignment
indicate that only petitioner Galo Monge had been arraigned.
[13]Id. at 76.
[14]Id. at 215-217.
[15]Id. at 217-218.
[22]Id.; Tan v.
People, 352 Phil. 724, 738 (1998); People
v. Que, 333 Phil. 582, 594 (1996).
[23]Yu v. Presiding
Judge, RTC of Tagaytay City, Br. 18, G.R. No. 142848, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 101, 116; People v. Armada, Jr., G.R. No. 100592,
26 August 1993, 225 SCRA 644, 647; Flores
v. Sandiganbayan, 209 Phil. 89, 84 (1983).
[24]Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more
persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of
the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of
the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses
for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the
sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that: (a) There is
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested; (b) There is no other direct
evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall
automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for
discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
[25]Yu v. The
Honorable Presiding Judge, supra note
23, 116; People v. Sison,
371 Phil. 713, 724 (1999).
[27]Rules of Court, Rule 119, Sec. 18 states:
Sec. 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal.—The
order indicated in the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the
discharged accused and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same
offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused
in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his
discharge.
[28]Rosales v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 80418-19,
23 October 1992, 215 SCRA 102, 108.
[29]People v. Mendiola, 82 Phil.
740, 746 (1949).