THIRD DIVISION
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GENEROSO A.
JUABAN and FRANCIS M. ZOSA, Petitioners, - versus - RENE ESPINA
and CEBU DISCOVERY BAY PROPERTIES, INC., Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 170049 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the late Generoso A. Juaban
(Juaban), now substituted by his heirs, and Francis M. Zosa (Zosa), assailing
the Decision[1]
dated 31 January 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60721, wherein
the appellate court (1) made permanent the Writ of Preliminary Injunction it
had earlier issued, enjoining petitioners from exercising rights of ownership
over Lots No. 6720-C-2 and 6720-B-2, respectively, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 36425 and No. 36426 of the Registry of Deeds
of Lapu-Lapu City; (2) set aside the Decision of the Lapu-Lapu City Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, in Civil Case No. 4871-L which ordered the
dismissal of the case; and (3) directed the RTC to undertake further
proceedings in Civil Case No. 4871-L insofar as the issue of damages was
concerned.
The present
Petition stems from the proceedings in Civil Case No. 4871-L before the
Lapu-Lapu City RTC, Branch 54, but is still directly related to two other
cases, particularly, Civil Case No. 2309-L before the Lapu-Lapu RTC, Branch 27,
and (2) A.M. No, P-02-1580 before this Court, which we cannot simply
overlook. The direct antecedent of the
present petition, Civil Case No. 4871-L before the Lapu-Lapu City RTC, Branch
54, is the last of the three cases we are presenting hereunder:
CASE No. 1:
Bancale v. Paras, Civil Case No. 2309-L, Lapu-Lapu City RTC, Branch 27
The Heirs
of Conrado Bancale filed before the Lapu-Lapu City RTC, Branch 27, a case for
the recovery of the properties subject of the present Petition against a
certain Eva Paras and other persons, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
2309-L. On
The Heirs
of Bancale later entered into a
That after the
title is transferred to their names, the First Party [Heirs of Bancale] will
execute an absolute deed of sale in favor of the second party [herein
respondent Rene Espina] or whoever will be designated by him as the vendee for
the consideration mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof. The amount of P2,000,000.00 advanced
by the Second Party shall form part of said consideration.[2]
In
accordance with said Agreement, respondent Espina paid petitioners P2,000,000.00
as an advance on the purchase price for the subject properties for the benefit
of the Heirs of Bancale. Respondent
Espina then designated the other respondent in this case, Cebu Bay Discovery
Properties, Inc. (CDPI), as the vendee of the said properties.
Later, on 1
September 1997, respondents learned that petitioners, counsels Juaban and Zosa,
had filed on 26 August 1997, at around 1:10 p.m., a Motion to fix their
attorney’s fees in Civil Case No. 2309-L.
They also learned that the Lapu-Lapu City RTC, Branch 27, had issued an
Order on the very same date of P9,000,000.00. The Heirs of Bancale filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied in an Order dated
Considering that
the Order of this Court dated
Let a Writ of
Execution issue to satisfy the Order dated
Sheriff Juan A.
Gato of this Branch is hereby directed to implement the Writ.[3]
The Heirs
of Bancale filed another Motion for Reconsideration, this time, of the P9,000,000.00 in favor of
petitioners.
On
On P500,000.00.
On P9,000,000.00. The sale was registered on
On
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing premises, this Court hereby sets aside the order issued
in this case on October 10, 1997 which considered as final and executory the
August 26, 1997 order and, in its stead, hereby gives due course to the appeal
filed by the [Heirs of Bancale] from the order issued in this case on September
22, 1997, which in effect is an appeal from the said August 26, 1997 order.[4]
This
On
CASE No. 2:
Espina v. Gato, A.M. No. P-02-1580, Supreme Court
The second
case is an administrative complaint filed against Sheriff Gato by respondents,
for allegedly acting with manifest bias and partiality in Civil Case No. 2309-L
while it was still pending with the Lapu-Lapu City RTC, Branch 27. On
Firstly, the
haste with which respondent levied upon the plaintiffs’ property is
unexplained. Furthermore, despite a third-party claim filed by complainant
Espina for CDPI on
Secondly, as
stated earlier, the trial court ordered in the writ of execution that the P9
million to be paid to Attys. Juaban and Zosa as attorneys’ fees “be taken from
the money due from the buyer to the sellers under the agreement to buy and
sell.” Nevertheless, respondent levied
upon the aforementioned property in blatant disregard of this order. It is a well-settled rule that the duty of a
sheriff is merely ministerial. When a
writ is placed in the hands of the sheriff, it is his ministerial duty to
proceed to execute in accordance with the terms of its mandate.
Thirdly, when
Attys. Juaban and Zosa requested respondent to issue a Final Deed of Conveyance
to them, respondent already knew that he no longer had authority to issue the
same. He had already been appraised of
the fact that a subsequent order, dated
From all these
facts, it is clear that respondent showed manifest partiality in favor of
Attys. Juaban and Zosa, giving them unwarranted benefit, advantage and
preference and that, with evident bad faith, he caused undue injury to
complainants. Respondent thereby failed
to comply with the strict standards required of public officers and employees.
WHEREFORE,
respondent Sheriff Juan Gato is found GUILTY of grave abuse of official
functions and manifest partiality amounting to grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, and is hereby SUSPENDED FROM
SERVICE FOR THREE (3) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY, with the warning that repetition in
the future of the same or similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.[5]
CASE No. 3:
Espina v. Gato, Civil Case No. 4871-L, Lapu-Lapu City RTC, Branch 54
On
On
Respondents’
appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 60721. Respondents filed therein an Urgent Motion
for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated
On 1
December 1998, respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion dated 1
December 1998 wherein they tendered the amount of P10,962,347.20 as
payment for the redemption price of the subject properties, on the condition
that if the application for preliminary injunction was denied or if the case is
finally resolved in favor of petitioners, the said amount shall be considered
as valid tender of the redemption price of the subject properties retroacting
to the date of the filing of the Manifestation/Motion. In a comment dated
On 15 June
1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution stating that respondents’
application for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Sheriff Gato from
consolidating ownership over the subject properties in favor of petitioners had
been rendered moot in view of the 1 December 1998 Order by the Lapu-Lapu City
RTC, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. 2309-L setting aside its Order dated 10 October
1997 and giving due course to respondents’ appeal therein.
In the
meantime, petitioners were able to acquire the Definite Deed of Sale of the
subject properties from Sheriff Gato.
Hence, respondents filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration
to Cite [Petitioners] in Contempt.
Petitioners, however, proceeded to register the Definite Deed of Sale
issued by Sheriff Gato with the Register of Deeds in
In a
Resolution dated
On
WHEREFORE, the
Order dated July 30 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
Lapu-Lapu City, in Civil Case No. 4871-L dismissing the complaint, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction issued pursuant to the Court’s resolution promulgated on
The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 54, Lapu-Lapu City is directed to undertake further proceedings
in Civil Case No. 4871-L sofar as the issue on damages is concerned.
Costs against
appellees.[6]
Petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision was denied in a Resolution
dated
1.
Whether or not Rene Espina had a cause of action to file the Injunction
and Damages Case against petitioners;
2.
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the complaint
and over CDPI in said case;
3.
Whether or not only questions of law were raised in respondents’
appeal, which allegedly required the Court of Appeals to dismiss said appeal;
4.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the
records in another case which were not offered and admitted as evidence as
basis for its findings of facts;
5.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in issuing a permanent
injunction against petitioners considering that there was allegedly no prayer
in the complaint therefor.
We find no
merit in the present Petition.
Authority of Rene Espina to File the Case and the Jurisdiction
of the RTC
Only respondent Espina signed the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the complaint
in the third case, Civil Case No. 4178-L, before the Lapu-Lapu City RTC, Branch
54; and apart from him, there was no signatory of the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping on behalf of respondent CDPI. Petitioners claim that the complaint should
have been dismissed by the trial court since (1) respondent Espina had no more
personal interest in the case, having assigned his rights to the subject
properties to respondent CDPI; and (2) there was no authority or board
resolution authorizing respondent Espina to file the complaint on behalf of his
co-respondent CDPI.
Sec. 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that parties to a civil case must be real
parties in interest, to wit:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.—A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.
We quote
with approval the following ruling of the Court of Appeals on the issue of
respondent Espina’s personality to institute Civil Case No. 4178-L:
The personality
of appellant Rene Espina to sue in his personal capacity finds basis in the
Agreement to Sell and to Buy. It is
readily apparent in the Agreement that he has been designated as the “Second
Party”, in his personal capacity, and not as agent or representative of a
corporate entity. On the other hand, the
Deed of Sale which was subsequently executed, is based on the aforesaid
Agreement. Therefore, there is no
gainsaying that appellant Rene Espina has a personal interest in the case.[7]
Respondents’
right to the subject properties is based on the P2,000.000 to the Heirs of Bancale, which formed part
of the consideration for the ensuing
sale of the subject properties. There
was no proof that respondent Espina had already been reimbursed for the said
amount. Having paid part of the purchase
price for the subject properties, then respondent Espina has an interest
therein.
Having been
established as a real party in interest, respondent Espina has not only the
personality to file the complaint in Civil Case No. 4178-L, but also the
authority to sign the certification against forum shopping as a plaintiff
therein. We held in Mendigorin v. Cabantog,[8]
Escorpizo v. University of Baguio[9] and Condo
Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[10]
that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff
or any of the principal parties
and not by counsel.[11] We have also held in Cua v. Vargas,[12] that:
The general rule is that the certificate
of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a
case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. Nevertheless, the
rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert their own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict
compliance with the provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. Under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the
rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although
it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
Thus, when all
the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the rules.
In Bases Conversion and Development Authority
v. Uy,[13]
we held:
Signature of
a principal party sufficient for verification and certification
Anent the assailed verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, it is shown that it substantially complied with the
requirements of the Rules. Dismissal of appeals that is purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon. While only petitioner Ramon P. Ereneta
signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping such is not
fatal to the instant petition. In Calo, we agreed with petitioners
that the signature of only one petitioner in the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping satisfies the requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. In Calo, we relied on
Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc., v. NLRC—where we ruled that the
certification of non-forum shopping may be signed not only by the petitioners
but also any of the principal parties. In the instant case, Mr. Ramon P.
Erenta, a member of the Investment Committee of the Heritage Park Management
Corporation, is a principal party in the instant case having been impleaded in
Civil Case No. 99-0425 pending in the RTC.
More so, in Calo, we also cited Cavile, et
al. v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, et. al.—where we held that there was
substantial compliance with the Rules when only petitioner Thomas George
Cavile, Sr. signed in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of
non-forum shopping as the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the
properties in dispute, shared a common interest in them, had a common defense
in the complaint for partition, and filed the petition as a collective, raising
only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.
We reasoned that there was sufficient basis for Cavile, Sr., to speak for and
in behalf of his co-petitioners, stating that they had not filed any action or
claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, nor was there
other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same
issues. In the same vein, this is also true in the instant case where
petitioners have filed their petition as a collective, sharing a common
interest and having a common single defense.
Thus, the
certificate against forum shopping is not rendered invalid by the absence of
the signature of an authorized official of respondent CDPI. The signature of respondent Espina as one of
the plaintiffs therein suffices.
Furthermore,
the allegation concerning the defect in the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was raised for the first time on appeal.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioners was based only on the
following grounds:
I
- That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading
has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
II
- That there is another cause of action pending between the parties
for the same cause;
III
- That plaintiff Rene Espina has
no legal capacity to sue.[14]
The grounds
alleged by petitioners and ruled upon by the trial court are thus (1)
extinguishment, (2) litis pendentia,
and (3) lack of legal capacity to sue on the part of Rene Espina. Of these grounds, only litis pendentia is related
to the present allegation of petitioners concerning the defect in the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Forum shopping
exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. However, forum
shopping as a ground for the dismissal of actions is distinct and separate from
the failure to submit a proper Certificate against Forum Shopping. One need not be held liable for forum
shopping for his complaint to be dismissed on the ground of an absence or a defect
in the Certificate against Forum Shopping.
Conversely, one can be liable for forum shopping regardless of the
presence or absence of a Certification against Forum Shopping. The presence of a Certification in such a
case would only have the effect of making the person committing forum shopping
additionally liable for perjury. Thus,
we held in Spouses Melo v. Court of
Appeals[15]:
Indeed, compliance with the certification
against forum shopping is separate from, and independent of, the avoidance of
forum shopping itself. Thus, there is a
difference in the treatment - in terms of imposable sanctions - between failure
to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition
against forum shopping. x x x.
There being
no allegation of a defect in the Certification against Forum Shopping on the part
of respondents, neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals was able to rule
thereon. Both courts only ruled on the
issue concerning litis pendentia, on
which the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Litis
pendentia is not present in this case
vis-à-vis Civil Case No. 2309-L. The
requisites of litis pendentia are:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (c) identity with respect to
the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the present case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata
in another case.
The appellants herein are not parties in
Civil Case No. 2309-L. There is no
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Civil Case No. 2309 is for recovery of
ownership and possession; while the instant case is for injunction and
damages. The judgment in one will not be
a bar to the other case. These cases
were conjoined only because of the incident in Civil Case No. 2309-L, i.e. the
fixing of the attorney’s fees and the subsequent execution on the subject properties
which were, in the meantime, sold to and purchased by the appellants pursuant
to an Agreement to Sell and to Buy.
Appellees’ charge that appellants are
guilty of forum shopping is without legal basis. It has been held that “where the elements of litis pendentia are not present or where final judgment in one will not
amount to res judicata in the other,
there is no forum shopping.[16]
Propriety of the Mode of Appeal
Petitioners
also claim that since only questions of law were raised in respondents’ appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy should have been a Petition for
Review filed directly with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners
cite the Assignment of Errors raised by respondents before the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 60721:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The court a quo erred in dismissing the
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.
II. The court a quo erred in dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the appellant Rene Espina has no legal capacity to
sue.
III. The court a quo should have issued a
temporary restraining order, and after due hearing should have issued an
injunction to enjoin appellee Sheriff Gato from erroneously levying on and
selling at public auction the Subject Property to satisfy the Writ of Execution
dated 14 October 1997 issued by the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 2309-L.
Petitioners
contend that since no evidence was presented by the parties in the lower court,
the complaint having been dismissed on the timely motion by the petitioners,
the appeal of the dismissal of the complaint required no determination by the
appellate court of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties.
The Court
of Appeals addressed this issue, thus:
Appellees
[Juaban and Espina] contend that since the assignment of errors raises only
questions of law, the proper course of action is a Petition for Review direct
to the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court. The appellees unduly limit themselves to the
assignment of errors in the appeal and close their eyes to the glaring fact
that, from the narration of facts above, certain acts taken by RTC Br. 27
before then Presiding Judge Risos, which are immoral, devious, and patently
illegal, has constrained the Court to take a second look at the circumstances
which gave rise to the instant appeal.
As succinctly observed by the Court in its Resolution on appellant’s
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
However, inspite full
knowledge that the appeal has been given due course and that therefore there is
no more basis for further action on the execution sale, appellees Zosa and
Juaban caused the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of new titles in
their names. Said appellees are even
aware that the redemption money for the properties in the sum of P10,962,347.20
has been deposited with this Court by the appellants. In fact, appellees when asked to comment on
the deposit, manifested that they have no objection to the deposit although
they disagreed that interest or the redemption price would stop running.
“It is therefore without
legal basis that notwithstanding those circumstances, the appellees, upon
expiration of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court, immediately
asked for the execution of a deed of sale in their favor ‘since no redemption
has been made’ and managed to obtain titles in their names. Such consolidation of ownership is patently
erroneous as the decision granting them attorney’s fees is not yet final and
executory and is in fact the subject of appeal in this Court under CA-GR CV No.
61696.”[17]
We have
held in Microsoft Corporation v.
Maxicorp, Inc.[18]
and Morales v. Skills International
Company,[19]
that:
The distinction
between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of law exists when the doubt or
difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers
on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
Though this delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and
extent of the distinction is sometime problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that
all cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically involve purely
questions of law.
There is a
question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need
of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on a given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is
factual.
In the
fairly recent case of First Bancorp Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,[20]
we discussed the implications of the allegation by a party of the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals based on the ground that the appeal was
based solely on questions of law:
If the aggrieved
party appeals by writ of error under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the CA
and it turns out, from the brief of appellant, that only questions of law are
raised, the appeal shall be dismissed:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of
Appeals. – An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to
the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues
purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by
notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment
of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken
to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but
shall be dismissed outright.
The nature of
the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellant’s notice of
appeal filed in the trial court and in his or her brief as appellant in the
appellate court.
The provision
relied upon by respondent, Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, reads:
Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal.
– Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court
below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact
that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed
by the parties.
This rule, however, does not relate to the
nature of the issues that may be raised on appeal by the aggrieved party,
whether issues of fact or issues of law, or the mode of appeal of the aggrieved
party from a final order or resolution of the trial court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction; it merely provides the nature of the issues
appellant may include in his assignment of error incorporated in his Brief as
appellant. It may happen that the appellant may have raised in the trial
court errors of fact or law or both, and need not include all said issues in
his appeal in the appellate court. The appellant has the right to choose
which issues of law he or she may raise in the CA in addition to factual issues
already raised.
A question of
fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of
alleged facts. If the query requires a reevaluation of the credibility of
witnesses or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their
relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. On the other
hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.
In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue rests
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Ordinarily, the determination of whether
an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact is
best left to the appellate court. All
doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of the appellate court will be
resolved in favor of the CA unless it commits an error or commits a grave abuse
of discretion.
In case of
doubt, therefore, the determination of the Court of Appeals of whether an
appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact shall
be affirmed. As explained by the Court
of Appeals, it was only after the appellate court’s painstaking review of the
facts surrounding the dispute that the “immoral, devious and patently illegal”
acts which attended the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners were
brought to light. This Court finds no
error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in
making the aforesaid finding. No less
than this Court, in the second case, A.M. No. P-02-1580, found that Sheriff
Gato “showed manifest partiality in favor of Attys. Juaban and Zosa, giving
them unwarranted benefit, advantage and preference and that, with evident bad
faith, he caused undue injury to complainants [Espina and CDPI].”[21] Irrefragably, respondents’ appeal before the
Court of Appeals involved not only questions of law, because for the determination
thereof, the appellate court was first called upon to make its own findings of
facts which were significant to its complete and judicious resolution of the
appeal.
Taking Cognizance of Records in Another Case
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals, in resolving CA-G.R. CV No. 60721, the appeal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 4178-L by Lapu-Lapu City RTC, Branch 54, erred in taking cognizance of the records in another case as basis for its findings of facts. According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals based its findings of facts on the records of the first case, Civil Case No. 2309-L, pending before another Branch (Branch 27) of the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City.
In Bongato v. Malvar,[22]
we held:
Second, as a
general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same
court or before the same judge. There
are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily,
an appellate court cannot refer to the record in another case to ascertain a
fact not shown in the record of the case before it, yet, it has been held that
it may consult decisions in other proceedings, in order to look for the law
that is determinative of or applicable to the case under review. In
some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other
cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases “may be so closely interwoven, or
so clearly interdependent, as to invoke” a rule of judicial notice.
We find that the circumstances in Case No. 1 (Civil Case No. 2309-L) are too closely interwoven and so clearly interdependent with those in Case No. 3 (Civil Case No. 4178-L). Petitioners and respondents are claiming the very same subject properties. Case No. 3, the case at bar, calls for a determination of who has the superior right to the subject properties, petitioners or respondents. Petitioners are the ones who actually rely on Case No. 1 because their right to the subject properties is rooted in the proceedings therein. It should be recalled that they served as the counsels of the Heirs of Bacale in Case No. 1; they had the subject properties sold at a public auction to satisfy the award in their favor of attorney’s fees; and they were the successful bidders at the auction. Petitioners cannot insist on their right to the subject properties, yet prevent the Court of Appeals from looking into the basis or source of said right, as well as the circumstances surrounding their acquisition of the same. They cannot invoke orders, rulings or findings of the trial court in Case No. 1 which are supportive of their right to the subject properties but suppress those which are damaging.
Even
assuming for the sake of argument that the proceedings in Case No. 1 cannot be
stated in our narration of facts on the ground that said proceedings have not
yet been terminated, there is certainly nothing that prevents us from
consulting Case No. 2 (A.M. No. P-02-1580) wherein Sheriff Gato was suspended
by this Court for acting with “grave abuse of official functions and manifest
partiality amounting to grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice” in selling to petitioners the subject properties at
a public auction despite respondents’ third-party claim. It bears to emphasize that Case No. 2 has
already been decided with finality by this Court.
Lack of Prayer for the Issuance of a Permanent
Injunction
Petitioners
argue that the respondents did not make any allegation in their Complaint that
they were the owners of the disputed properties and there was no prayer in
their Complaint for the issuance of a permanent injunction against petitioners
prohibiting them from exercising acts of ownership.
An
inspection of respondents’ Complaint, however, reveals that petitioners
actually alleged ownership of the property in dispute:
The defendants
are doing, threatening, and/or attempting to conduct the said public auction
sale which is in violation of the rights of the plaintiffs, as the property sought to be sold now belong
to the plaintiffs, and not of Concordia Bancale et. al., and this tends to
render whatever favorable judgment the Honorable Court may grant to the
plaintiffs ineffectual.[23]
As regards
the alleged lack of prayer for the court to issue a permanent injunction
prohibiting petitioners from exercising acts of ownership, it is necessary to
examine the actual Prayer made by the respondents in their Complaint, which
reads:
WHEREFORE,
plaintiffs most respectfully pray this Honorable Court, that upon filing of
this complaint, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining defendants
from proceeding with the auction sale, or at whatever stage it is, of Lot
6720-C-2 of the subdivision plan Psd-07-05-012144, containing an area of 13,677
sq. meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36425 and Lot No.
6720-B-2 of the same subdivision plan, containing an area of 4,560 sq. meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36426, all located at Lapulapu
City, and upon notice to all the concerned, to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction for the same purpose;
After trial on
the merits to make the injunction permanent, and to order the defendants,
jointly and severally:
1. To reimburse
the plaintiffs, jointly and severally the sum of P35,000,000.00
representing the purchase price of the properties, subject matter of this case,
which were already paid by the plaintiffs to the Bancales;
2. To pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000,000.00 for moral damages;
3. To reimburse
plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus the sum of P2,000.00
per court appearance, and the sum of P20,000.00 for litigation expenses;
Plaintiffs
further pray for such orders as may be just, appropriate and equitable under
the premises.[24]
We hold
that the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a permanent injunction prohibiting
petitioners from exercising acts of ownership is included in respondent’s
prayer for such orders as may be just and
equitable under the circumstances.
Such a prayer in the complaint justifies the grant of a relief not
otherwise specifically prayed for.[25] More importantly, we have ruled that it is
the allegations in the pleading which determine the nature of the action and
the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and proof even if no
such relief is prayed for.[26] It is the material allegations of the fact in
the complaint, not the legal conclusions made in the prayer, that determine the
relief to which the plaintiff is entitled.[27] If respondents were seeking to enjoin the
sale of the subject properties, in effect, to prevent the transfer of ownership
of the subject properties to others, then such prayer must be deemed to
logically and reasonably include the prayer to enjoin others from exercising
rights of ownership over the subject properties, for if the ownership of the
subject properties are not transferred to any one else, then no one else has
the right to exercise the rights appurtenant thereto.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Pampio A. Abarintos, concurring; rollo, pp. 24-31.
[2] Rollo, p. 142.
[3]
[4]
[5] Espina v. Gato, 449 Phil. 7, 13-15 (2003).
[6] Rollo, p. 30.
[7]
[8] 436 Phil. 483, 491 (2002).
[9] 366 Phil. 166, 175 (1999).
[10] 380 Phil. 660, 667 (2000).
[11] See also San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, G.R. No. 149011, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 392, 411; Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 159674, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 218, 228.
[12] G.R. No. 156536,
[13] G.R. No. 144062,
[14] Petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, Records, p. 19.
[15] 376 Phil. 204, 213 (1999).
[16] Rollo,
p. 29.
[17]
[18] G.R. No. 140946,
[19] G.R. No. 149285,
[20] G.R. No. 151132,
[21] Espina v. Gato, supra note 5.
[22] 436 Phil. 109, 117-118 (2002).
[23] Complaint, Civil Case No. 4871-L; rollo, p. 273.
[24] Rollo, pp. 278-279.
[25] Primelink
Properties and Development Corporation v. Lazatin-Magat, G.R. No. 167379,
[26] Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 27 (2000).
[27] Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, 466 Phil. 173 (2004).