EN BANC
ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, G.R.
No. 169931
ANTONIO FERNANDO, and
DR. ARELLANO T. SO, Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO,
C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO
MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
and
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ.
DR. EVANGELINE P. MORALES- Promulgated:
MALACA,
Respondent.
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO,
J.:
The Case
This
petition for review[1]
assails the
The Facts
The
present controversy stemmed from a complaint filed by Dr. Evangeline P. Morales-Malaca (Malaca) against Atty.
Emmanuel R. Sison (Sison)
and Antonio Fernando (Fernando) for grave misconduct and abuse of authority and
against Dr. Arellano T. So (So) for oppression, conduct prejudicial to the
interest of the service, and gross discourtesy.
In
her complaint filed before the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region
(CSC-NCR), Malaca alleged that on
Malaca further alleged that aside from depriving her of
subsistence allowance, So, without informing her, hired a locksmith to forcibly
open the door of her office in the hospital.
When Malaca confronted So, the latter
allegedly shouted at her, claiming that he opened the office following
Fernando’s order. Malaca
claimed that So and Fernando conspired in fabricating an ante-dated Memorandum
dated 5 April 1999, by making it appear that Fernando, as Manila City
Administrator, had directed So (1) to take over her office; (2) to employ a
locksmith to open the door; (3) to conduct an inventory of properties inside
the office; and (4) to solicit the help of two policemen to witness the same.
So
countered that (1) Malaca’s subsistence allowances
were all released; (2) Malaca had no right to occupy
her former office since she was relieved as Assistant Hospital Director; (3)
the opening of Malaca’s office was done in the
presence of two policemen; (4) they had to use force in opening Malaca’s
office because she refused to voluntarily surrender its possession despite
repeated demands; and (5) Malaca’s allegation that
petitioners clandestinely and constructively removed her from her permanent
position was misleading because it was Mayor Atienza
who relieved Malaca from her post.
On
the other hand, Sison and Fernando jointly alleged
that on
Fernando
further alleged that the Memorandum dated
The
CSC-NCR dismissed Malaca’s complaint, ruling as
follows:
x x x this office finds no evidence to substantiate the complaint of Dr. Malaca against Sison, So and Fernando for alleged Grave Misconduct, Abuse of Authority, Oppression, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Gross Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties.
x x x Absence of sufficient evidence to prove that the Orders were issued in excess of his authority, the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties as a public officer may not be disturbed.
x x x x
Complainant also failed to submit prima facie evidence to prove that damage was sustained due to the directive of the City Administrator for So to take-over the office intended for the Assistant Director and to employ a locksmith to open the door of the said office and conduct an inventory of both personal and government property found inside the same. On the other hand, considering that the office in question is a city property it is within the authority of the City Administrator to manage, maintain, and protect the same.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison, Dr. Antonio T. So, and Antonio Fernando is hereby dismissed for lack of prima facie evidence. However, Sison, So and Fernando are admonished to be more circumspect in the exercise of their official duties. Moreover, Dr. Malaca should be given all the benefits to which she is entitled as Assistant Hospital Director of Ospital ng Maynila regardless of the working station where she may be reassigned or detailed.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
On appeal, the CSC affirmed the
CSC-NCR’s ruling, to wit:
WHEREFORE,
the appeal of Evangeline P. Morales-Malaca is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Orders dated
Malaca elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals by filing a petition under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In
modifying the ruling of the CSC, the Court of Appeals held that while the
The
Court of Appeals ruled that there was no justification for petitioners’ failure
to furnish Malaca a copy of the Special Order
designating Dr. Zaide as OIC of the Office of the
Assistant Hospital Director. The Court
of Appeals further held that there was no reason for Fernando’s issuance of the
5 April 1999 Memorandum instructing So to enlist the aid of two policemen in
breaking open the door of and taking over the office formerly occupied by Malaca. Such
instruction was drastic and uncalled for considering that there was no showing
of Malaca’s defiance of a prior memorandum directing
the surrender of her office. That Malaca was not furnished again with a copy of such
memorandum shows a disregard by petitioners of her rights. The Court of Appeals also found evidence that
there was an attempt to deprive Malaca of her
subsistence allowance for the months of September, October, and November 1998
despite the fact that the papers had already been prepared.
The
Court of Appeals sustained the CSC’s finding that
petitioners failed to act with circumspection in the exercise of their official
duties. However, instead of affirming
the CSC’s admonition, the Court of Appeals penalized
petitioners for simple misconduct and discourtesy in the course of official
duties, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and Resolution No. 02-0307 of the Civil Service Commission is, MODIFIED to declare respondents guilty of the less grave offense of simple misconduct and the light offense of discourtesy in the course of official duties. Accordingly, respondents are each meted the penalty of fine equivalent to two months’ salary and reprimand.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners sought reconsideration,
which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of
Hence,
this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners
raise the following issues:
1.
Whether
the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioners administratively liable for
simple misconduct and discourtesy in the course of official duties; and
2.
Whether
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from a CSC
decision exonerating or absolving petitioners.
The Ruling of the Court
The
petition is partly meritorious.
The
Court notes that Malaca charged Sison
and Fernando with grave misconduct and abuse of authority, while only So was
charged with oppression, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service,
and gross discourtesy in the course of official duties.[8] A civil servant charged with misconduct only
cannot be punished for both misconduct and discourtesy. Likewise, a government employee charged with
discourtesy alone cannot be penalized for both misconduct and discourtesy. In one case, the Court ruled that even in an
administrative proceeding, a government employee has the right to be informed of the charges
against him, as well as the right not to be convicted of an offense for which
he is not charged.[9] Accordingly, the
Court shall determine whether Sison and Fernando are
guilty of misconduct and whether So is liable for discourtesy.
As
the Court of Appeals found, the
On
the misconduct charge against Fernando, the Court finds insufficient evidence
to sustain such charge. Fernando’s
issuance of the Memorandum for the forcible opening of Malaca’s
former office was within his powers as City Administrator. Moreover, Fernando
issued the Memorandum to implement the Special Order of Sison. Admittedly, Fernando failed to serve a copy
of his Memorandum to Malaca. However, such failure to serve does not
necessarily translate to misconduct which
is a term denoting an improper conduct, or a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, that implies wrongful intent.[12]
There would have been no need at all for such Memorandum if only Malaca had turned over the keys to her office from the
moment she was relieved from her post as Assistant Hospital Director. Nevertheless, the Court admonishes Fernando
to be more circumspect in the exercise of his official duties.
The charge of discourtesy against So was based on his
behavior towards Malaca in following Fernando’s
instruction to employ a locksmith and to request the aid of the police in
opening Malaca’s office. In her complaint, Malaca
claimed that “So shouted at her” when she asked So what he was doing inside her
office. Malaca
also alleged that when her husband went to the hospital to retrieve her
personal belongings, So “with all highhandedness and in a scandalous manner”
questioned his presence and even called the guards to prevent him from entering
the hospital premises. As a result, her
husband was unable to bring out her things.
When Malaca was constrained to personally get
her belongings, she failed to gain entry to her office because its door locks
were changed by So without her knowledge.
When Malaca chanced upon So, the latter chided
her that he would prevent her from entering her office unless she secured first
a clearance from Fernando.
The Court finds So guilty of discourtesy. As a public officer, So is bound, in the
performance of his official duties, to observe courtesy, civility, and self-restraint
in his dealings with others.[13] However, So demonstrated callousness towards Malaca. That So was
merely complying with Fernando’s Memorandum did not justify his arrogant
gesture. Under Rule XIV, Section 23 of
the Civil Service Law and Rules, a first offense of discourtesy, which is a
light offense, in the course of one’s official duties shall be meted the
penalty of reprimand.[14]
Accordingly, the Court reprimands So for his disrespectful conduct, considering
that this is his first offense.
Malaca also asserts that So
deprived her of subsistence allowance.
The letter dated 4 November 1998 addressed to Melinda Magpao, Officer-in-Charge of the hospital’s Administrative
Services Department, states that Malaca was excluded
from the payroll of subsistence allowance.
However, the letter does not prove that So ordered Malaca’s
exclusion and the non-payment of such allowance. Lacking any clear and convincing evidence
showing that So arranged for and directed Malaca’s
exclusion from the recipients of the subsistence allowance, the Court cannot
accept the finding of the Court of Appeals that there was an attempt to deprive
Malaca of such allowance.
The Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the second issue
considering the foregoing discussion. At
any rate, petitioners raise for the first time before this Court the issue of
whether their exoneration by the CSC is subject to review by the Court of
Appeals. Well-settled is the rule that
“(a)n issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised
timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel.”[15]
Further, failure to invoke timely a procedural rule in favor of a party
constitutes a waiver of such rule.[16]
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the
petition. The Court SETS ASIDE
the 19 November 2004 Decision and the 27 September 2005 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69895. The
Court dismisses the charge of misconduct against Atty. Emmanuel Sison and Antonio Fernando for insufficient evidence. However, the Court admonishes Antonio
Fernando to be more circumspect in the exercise of his official duties. The
Court reprimands Dr. Arellano T. So for discourtesy.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice |
|
RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 40-56. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring.
[3]
[4] The pertinent provisions are:
x x x x
(b) The administrator shall take charge of the office of the administrator and shall:
(1) Develop plans and strategies and upon approval thereof by the governor or mayor, as the case may be, implement the same particularly those which have to do with the management and administration-related programs and projects which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for under this Code:
(2) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the administrator shall:
(i) Assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the local government unit, under the supervision, direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local government unit;
(ii) Establish and maintain a sound personnel program for the local government unit designed to promote career development and uphold the merit principle in the local government service;
(iii) Conduct a continuing organizational development of the local government unit with the end in view of instituting effective administrative reforms;
(3) Be in the frontline of the delivery of administrative support services, particularly those related to the situations during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;
(4) Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor and mayor, as the case may be, on all other matters relative to the management and administration of the local government unit; and
(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or by ordinance.
[5] Rollo, pp. 44-46.
[6] Id. at 47.
[7] Id. at 55.
[8] Id. at 139.
[9] See Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 603, citing Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486 (1999).
[10] Rollo, p. 50.
[11] See Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, supra note 9. See also Camus v. Civil Service Board of Appeals, No. L-13685, 31 May 1961, 2 SCRA 370, 375.
[12] See Alcuizar v. Carpio, A.M.-RTJ-07-2068, 7 August 2007, 529 SCRA 216, 229.
[13] Perez v. Cunting, 436 Phil. 618, 625 (2002).
[14] Id. at 626.
[15] Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 155, 186 (1997).
[16] See Concurring Opinion of Justice Melo in Floralde v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 146, 156 (2000).