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THIRD DIVISION |
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MA. WENELITA TIRAZONA, |
G.R. No. 169712 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. |
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COURT OF
APPEALS, PHILIPPINE
EDS-TECHNO SERVICE INC.
(PET INC.) AND/OR KEN KUBOTA, MAMORU ONO and JUNICHI HIROSE, |
Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Assailed in
this Special Civil Action for Certiorari[1]
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the Decision[2]
and Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals dated
The factual and procedural antecedents
of the case are as follows:
Private respondent Philippine
EDS-Techno Services Inc. (PET) is a corporation duly registered under
Philippine laws and is engaged in the business of designing automotive wiring
harnesses for automobile manufacturers.
Private respondents Ken Kubota, Mamoru Ono and Junichi Hirose are all
Japanese nationals, the first being the President and the latter two being the
directors of PET.
On
On
Upon receiving the letter, the PET
management directed Tirazona to file her comment. Tirazona replied accordingly in a letter[6]
wherein she denied the accusations against her.
Tirazona stated that her only intention was to orient Balonzo about the
latter’s rights as a sick employee, i.e., that under the law, if the
latter planned to resign, the company can give her separation pay. Tirazona likewise asked for an independent
investigation and threatened to file a libel case against Balonzo for allegedly
trying to destroy her reputation and credibility.
After weighing the situation, PET
director Ono sent a memorandum to Tirazona, which reads:
To: Mrs. W. Tirazona
Re: Letter-Complaint of Fe S. Balonzo
This is to advise
you that Management is satisfied that you did not intend to humiliate or
embarrass Ms. Balonzo during the incident on
Nonetheless, Management finds your handling of the situation less than ideal. Considering the sensitive nature of the issue, a little more circumspection could have readily avoided the incident which it cannot be denied caused unnecessary discomfort and hurt feelings to Ms. Balonzo. Certainly, you could have discussed the matter in private and allowed her to first deliver her piece rather than pre-empt her declaration. As it turned out, your assumption (that Ms. Balonzo would request for a leave extension) was in fact wrong and she had a medical certificate attesting her fitness to return to work.
Management therefore would like to remind you of the high expectations of your position.
Management considers this matter closed, and finds it appropriate to convey to you that it does not view with favor your notice to file legal action. Management believes that you share the idea that issues regarding employee relations are best threshed out within the Company. Resorting to legal action is unlikely to solve but on the contrary would only exacerbate such problems.
We trust that, after emotions have calmed down, you would still see it that way.
(Sgd.)
Mamoru Ono
Director[7]
On
MR. MAMORU ONO
Director
PET, Inc.
20/F
Dear Mr. Ono:
We are writing in [sic] behalf of our client, Ms. MA. WENELITA S. TIRAZONA, Administrative Manager of your corporation.
We regret that on
As a result of the foregoing, Ms. Tirazona’s constitutional right to due process was violated and judgment was rendered by you on mere allegations expressed in a letter-complaint to an unknown addressee.
Considering the position and stature of Mrs. Tirazona in the community and business circles, we are constrained to formally demand payment of P2,000,000.00 in damages, injured feelings, serious anxiety and besmirched reputation that she is now suffering.
We are giving you five (5) days from receipt hereof to make favorable response, otherwise, much to our regret, we will institute legal procedures to protect our client’s interests.
Please give this matter the attention it deserves.
Very truly yours,
By:
(Sgd.)
PEDRO S. PRINCIPE
(Sgd.)
GLICERIO E. VILLANO
The letter sent to Balonzo likewise
sought the same amount of damages for her allegedly baseless and unfounded
accusations against Tirazona.
Because of
Tirazona’s obstinate demand for compensation, PET sent her a Notice of Charge,[9] which
informed her that they were considering her termination from employment by
reason of serious misconduct and breach of trust. According to the management, they found her
letter libelous, since it falsely accused the company of finding her guilty of
the charges of Balonzo and depriving her of due
process.
On
The PET
management replied[11] that the
Balonzo incident was already deemed a closed matter, and that the only issue
for consideration was Tirazona’s “ill-advised
response to the Management’s disposition to the Fe Balonzo incident,” for which
an administrative hearing was scheduled on
On
The PET management rejected Tirazona’s demands
in a letter [13] and
informed her that the hearing was reset to
On
Tirazona’s written explanation[15] dated
After
finding the explanations unsatisfactory, PET sent Tirazona a Notice of
Termination,[16] which
found her guilty of serious misconduct and breach of trust because of her
demand against the company and her invasion of PET’s
right to privileged communication.
Tirazona
then instituted with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
salaries, and damages against PET, docketed as NLRC-CA No. 034872-03.
In the
Decision[17] dated
The Arbiter
declared that there was no breach of trust when Tirazona sent the demand
letter, as the same was against Ono in his personal capacity, not against the
company. The decision also ruled that
PET failed to discharge the burden of proving that the alleged breach of trust
was fraudulent and willful, and that the company was careless in handling its
communications. The Arbiter further
stated that Tirazona was deprived of her right to due process when she was
denied a fair hearing.
On appeal by PET, the NLRC reversed the
rulings of the Labor Arbiter in a Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated
Contrary to the Labor Arbiter’s
findings, the NLRC concluded that Tirazona’s termination from employment was in
accordance with law. It ruled that
Tirazona’s demand letter addressed to Ono constituted a just cause for
dismissal, as the same was “an openly hostile act” by a high-ranking managerial
employee against the company.[19] The NLRC likewise found that PET complied
with the notice and hearing requirements of due process, inasmuch as Tirazona’s
demand for a special panel was without any legal basis. Furthermore, petitioner breached the
company’s trust when she read the confidential legal opinion of PET’s counsel without permission.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Tirazona was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated
WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, Complainant-Appellee’s Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and our Decision dated
Aggrieved,
Tirazona instituted with the Court of Appeals a Special Civil Action for Certiorari
under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
85065.
In a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the
petition is perforce dismissed.[21]
Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by
the appellate court in a Resolution
dated
I.
WHETHER THERE WAS BREACH OF TRUST ON THE PART OF PETITIONER TIRAZONA WHEN SHE WROTE THE TWO MILLION PESO DEMAND LETTER FOR DAMAGES, WARRANTING HER DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT.
II.
WHETHER DUE PROCESS WAS SUFFICIENTLY AND FAITHFULLY OBSERVED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER TIRAZONA FROM EMPLOYMENT.
In
essence, the issue that has been brought before this Court for consideration is
whether or not Tirazona was legally dismissed from employment.
Prefatorily, the Court notes that
Tirazona elevated her case to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
appropriate remedy would have been for Tirazona to file an appeal through a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
For a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to prosper, the following requisites must
be present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions: (2) such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.[22]
There is grave abuse of discretion
“when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.”[23]
The Petition
for Certiorari shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration is
timely filed, the sixty (60)-day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of the said motion.[24]
On the
other hand, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pertains to a Petition for Review on Certiorari
whereby “a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals x x x may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.”[25]
The petition shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment.[26]
In the
present case, the assailed Decision is the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of
Tirazona’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Said Decision partakes of the nature of a
judgment or final order, thus, is reviewable only
through an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
As aptly
declared by the Court in National
Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals[27]:
[s]ince the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors committed
by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are
reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. If the aggrieved
party fails to do so within the reglementary period, and the decision
accordingly becomes final and executory, he cannot avail himself of the writ of
certiorari, his predicament being the
effect of his deliberate inaction. [Emphasis ours.]
Even just a cursory glance
at the issues raised by Tirazona before this Court readily reveals that these
pertain to purported errors of judgment committed by the appellate court in its
appreciation of the allegations, evidence, and arguments presented by the
parties. There is no question here of
the Court of Appeals acting on Tirazona’s Petition in CA-G.R. No. 85065 without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
A
review of the rollo of the Petition at bar
divulges even further that Tirazona’s resort
to a wrong remedy was not an innocent mistake but a deliberate choice.
On
In
a Resolution[29]
dated
From
the foregoing, it is fairly obvious that Tirazona was aware that she was
supposed to file an appeal through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45. That she filed the
instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and only after an
inexplicably long period of time leads to the inescapable conclusion that the
same was merely an afterthought, nothing more than a desperate attempt to
revive a lost appeal.
The special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action that
cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal,
including that under Rule 45, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned
by one’s own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.[30] It also bears to stress the well-settled principle
that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f) of the Revised Rules
of Court, a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal merits an outright dismissal.[31]
Tirazona,
in her Reply[32]
before this Court, even admits that although the instant Petition is one of
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, her petition is in
reality an appeal under Rule 45 as her petition raises pure questions of
law. Tirazona herself acknowledges the
formal defects of her own Petition and attributes the same to the haste and
inadvertence of her former counsel, who allegedly prepared the instant Petition
without her participation.[33] She thus urges this Court to suspend the application of its own rules on grounds of equity and
substantial justice, considering that it is her employment that is at stake in
this case.
In this regard, it needs to be emphasized that before the
Court may treat the present petition as having been filed under Rule 45, the
same must comply with the reglementary period for filing an appeal. This requirement is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional such that failure to do so renders the assailed decision final
and executory, and deprives this Court of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.[34]
Since the instant petition was filed after the lapse of the extended
period for filing an appeal, the same should be dismissed outright.
Nevertheless,
the Court finds it essential that we discuss the case on its merits, bearing in
mind that the paramount consideration in this case is an employee’s right to
security of tenure, and in order to provide Tirazona the amplest opportunity to
know how the Court arrived at a proper and just determination of her case.
Even if the Court were to ignore the conspicuous procedural defects committed by Tirazona and treat her Petition as an appeal under Rule 45, it still finds that the Petition must be denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner contends that, contrary to
the findings of the Court of Appeals, her dismissal from employment was illegal
for having lacked both a legal basis and the observance of due process.
In employee
termination cases, the well-entrenched policy is that no worker shall be dismissed
except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process.
Clearly, dismissals have two facets: first, the legality of the act of
dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process; and second, the legality
in the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process.[35]
Under
Article 282(c)[36]
of the Labor Code, loss of trust and confidence is one of the just causes for
dismissing an employee. It is an
established principle that loss of confidence must be premised on the fact that
the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This
situation obtains where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate
matters, such as care and protection, handling or custody of the employer’s
property. But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be “work-related” such as would show the employee concerned
to be unfit to continue working for the employer. Besides, for loss of confidence to be a valid
ground for dismissal, such loss of confidence must arise from particular proven
facts.[37]
Tirazona claims that her demand letter
was merely an expression of indignation by a disgruntled employee against a
director, not against the company and, by itself, cannot constitute a breach of
trust and confidence. The company’s
notice of charge allegedly insinuated Tirazona’s
guilt in the Balonzo incident; hence, the need to defend herself. Tirazona likewise asserts that she is an
ordinary rank-and-file employee as she is not vested with the powers and
prerogatives stated in Article 212(m)[38]
of the Labor Code. As such, her alleged
hostility towards her co-workers and the PET management is not a violation of
trust and confidence that would warrant her termination from employment.
At the outset, the Court notes that
the issues set forth above are factual in nature. As the Court is asked to consider the instant
Petition as an appeal under Rule 45, then only pure questions of law will be
entertained.[39]
A question
of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that
the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one
of fact.[40]
In the instant case, Tirazona would
have the Court examine the actual wording, tenor, and contextual background of
both her demand letter and the PET’s notice of charge
against her. Similarly, the
determination of whether Tirazona is a managerial or rank-and-file employee
would require the Court to review the evidence that pertains to Tirazona’s
duties and obligations in the company.
Also, in order to ascertain whether the breach of trust was clearly
established against Tirazona, the Court will have to sift through and evaluate
the respective evidence of the parties as well.
These tasks are not for the Court to accomplish.
The Court is not a trier of facts.
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over
again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are
totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion.[41]
In its assailed decision, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own the latter’s
factual findings. Long established is
the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are
accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial
evidence. When passed upon and upheld by
the Court of Appeals, they are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court
and will not normally be disturbed.[42] Though this doctrine is not without
exceptions,[43]
the Court finds that none are applicable to the present case.
Thus, on the matter of Tirazona’s
demand letter, this Court is bound by the following findings of the Court of
Appeals:
Clearly, petitioner Tirazona’s letter to respondent Ono dated
x x x x
A thorough and judicious examination of the facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case as could be found in the records, would clearly show that petitioner Tirazona has absolutely no basis for a P2 million demand, coupled with lawsuit if the same was not paid within the five (5) days [sic] period. Her justification for the demand of money is that she was allegedly found by the respondent PET through respondent Ono guilty of the charges filed by Ms. Balonzo. As the records would indubitably show, petitioner Tirazona was never charged of any offense with respect to the Fe Balonzo’s [sic] incident. She was never issued a Notice of Charge, much less a Notice of Disciplinary Action. What was issued to her by respondent Ono in his letter x x x was a gentle and sound reminder to be more circumspect in handling the incident or situation like this [sic]. As fully evidenced in the last paragraph of the said letter, it states that:
x x x x
Management considers this matter closed, and finds it appropriate to convey to you that it does not view with favor your notice to file legal action. Management believes that you share the idea that issues regarding employee relations are best threshed out within the Company. Resorting to legal action is unlikely to solve but on the contrary would only exacerbate such problems.
But for reasons only known to
petitioner Tirazona, she treated respondent Ono’s letter as an affront to her
honor and dignity. This, instead of
seeking a dialogue with respondent PET on her felt grievance, petitioner Tirazona through her lawyer sent the questioned demand
letter to respondent Ono. Suffice it to
state, this act of petitioner bared animosity in the company and was definitely
not a proper response of a top level manager like her over a trivial matter.
x x x x
In fine, the confluence of events
and circumstances surrounding the petitioner Tirazona’s actions or omissions
affecting her employer’s rights and interest, would undoubtedly show that she
is no longer worthy of being a recipient of the trust and confidence of her
employer. x x x.[44]
Likewise
conclusive upon this Court is the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that Tirazona
is in fact a managerial employee, to wit:
The records would indubitably show that it is only now that petitioner Tirazona is asserting that she is not a managerial employee of respondent PET. From the very start, her dismissal was premised on the fact that she is a managerial and confidential employee, and she never denied that fact. It was never an issue at all before the Labor Arbiter and the public respondent NLRC. Therefore, she is estopped to claim now that she is [just a] rank and file employee of respondent PET, especially that she herself admitted in her pleading that she is a managerial employee:
x x x x
If the respondent Company has to
protect Respondent Mamoru Ono, the Complainant [petitioner] has also the right
to be protected from the baseless accusations of a Rank and File Employee for she [petitioner] is a part of the
management like Mr. Mamoru Ono” (par. 5, Complainant’s Rejoinder [to
Respondent’s Reply] dated 2 September 2002 (note: unattached to the petitioner
[sic]) [attached as Annex “1”
hereof]. (p. 263, Rollo).[45]
Tirazona next argues that she was
deprived of procedural due process as she was neither served with two written
notices, nor was she afforded a hearing with her participation prior to her
dismissal.
Tirazona’s arguments are baseless.
Procedural due process is simply defined as giving an opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered. The twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due
process, and neither of those elements can be eliminated without running afoul
of the constitutional guaranty.[46]
The employer must furnish the employee
two written notices before termination may be effected. The first notice
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, while the second notice informs the employee of the
employer’s decision to dismiss him.[47]
It is fairly obvious in
this case that Tirazona was served with the required twin notices. The first was embodied in the Notice of
Charge dated
Equally bereft of merit is Tirazona’s
allegation that she was not given the benefit of a fair hearing before she was
dismissed.
It needs to be pointed out that it was
Tirazona herself and her counsel who declined to take part in the
administrative hearing set by PET 10 April 2002. Tirazona rejected
the company’s appointment of its external counsel as the investigating panel’s
presiding officer, because her own demands on the panel’s composition were
denied. As correctly held by the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals, Tirazona’s stance is without any legal basis. On the contrary, this Court’s ruling in Foster Parents Plan International/Bicol v. Demetriou[48]
is controlling:
The right to dismiss or otherwise impose disciplinary sanctions upon an employee for just and valid cause, pertains in the first place to the employer, as well as the authority to determine the existence of said cause in accordance with the norms of due process. In the very nature of things, any investigation by the employer of any alleged cause for disciplinary punishment of an employee will have to be conducted by the employer himself or his duly designated representative; and the investigation cannot be thwarted or nullified by arguing that it is the employer who is accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. x x x Of course, the decision of the employer meting out sanctions against an employee and the evidentiary and procedural bases thereof may subsequently be passed upon by the corresponding labor arbiter (and the NLRC on appeal) upon the filing by the aggrieved employee of the appropriate complaint. [Emphasis ours.]
This Court has held that there is no violation of due
process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance to
explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the
opportunity to be heard.[49] Tirazona in this case has been afforded a
number of opportunities to defend her actions.
Even when Tirazona failed to attend the scheduled hearing, PET still
informed Tirazona about what happened therein and gave her the chance to submit
a supplemental written explanation. Only
when Tirazona again failed to comply with the same did PET terminate her
employment.
As a final plea for her case, Tirazona asserts that
her dismissal from employment was too harsh and arbitrary a penalty to mete out
for whatever violation that she has committed, if indeed there was one.
Tirazona
ought to bear in mind this Court’s pronouncement in Metro Drug Corporation v. NLRC[50] that:
When an employee
accepts a promotion to a managerial position or to an office requiring full
trust and confidence, she gives up some of the rigid guaranties available to
ordinary workers. Infractions which if committed by others would be overlooked
or condoned or penalties mitigated may be visited with more severe disciplinary
action. A company’s resort to acts of self-defense would be more easily
justified. x x x.
Tirazona, in this case, has given PET more than enough reasons to distrust her. The arrogance and hostility she has shown towards the company and her stubborn, uncompromising stance in almost all instances justify the company’s termination of her employment. Moreover, Tirazona’s reading of what was supposed to be a confidential letter between the counsel and directors of the PET, even if it concerns her, only further supports her employer’s view that she cannot be trusted. In fine, the Court cannot fault the actions of PET in dismissing petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-18;
dated
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring; id. at 20-46.
[3]
[4] CA rollo, pp. 25-35.
[5]
[6]
[7] Records, p. 62.
[8]
[9] The
Notice of Charge states:
To: Ma. Wenelita S. Tirazona
From: Management
Re: Notice of Charge
Date:
This is to inform you that
Management is considering your termination from employment, for serious
misconduct and breach of trust, arising from your counsel’s demand letter dated
27 February 2002 x x x
wherein you falsely accused the Company of:
·
Finding you guilty of the charges laid by Ms. Fe S. Balonzo
·
Depriving you of due process
-and demanding from the
Company P2,000,000.00 in damages with threat of an inevitable lawsuit if your
baseless demands are not satisfied within five (5) days from receipt of the
demand letter.
The Company finds your
letter libelous. Your rash action is a
serious misconduct and an open display of disloyalty. Being part of the management, you as an
officer is [sic] required not to assert any adverse interest against the
Company. Your position demands utmost
trust and confidence. Your ill-advised
action is a flagrant breach of your fiduciary duty and is highly prejudicial to
the Company’s interest.
You are hereby given thirty
six (36) hours from receipt of this memo to submit a written explanation and
justify why your services should not be terminated for serious misconduct and
breach of trust.
Be guided accordingly.
(SGD.) MAMORO ONO
(DIRECTOR)
Noted by:
(SGD.) Mr. Ken Kubota
President (Records, p. 67.)
[10] CA rollo, pp. 64-65.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Panado, G.R. No. 167118,
[23]
[24] Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 4.
[25] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
[26] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 2.
[27] 376 Phil. 362, 371 (1999) cited in San Miguel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 951, 955 (2002).
[28] Rollo, pp. 3-4.
[29]
[30] National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27, cited in Chua v. Santos, G.R. No. 132467, 18 October 2004, 440 SCRA 365, 373.
[31] Chua
v.
[32] Rollo, pp.
121-123.
[33]
[34] People
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156394,
[35] Shoemart, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 74229, 11 August 1989, 176 SCRA 385, 390, cited in Asian Construction And Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 142407, 12 March 2007.
[36] Art. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER. – An employer may
terminate an employment for any
of the following causes:
x x x x
c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative.
[37] Jardine Davies, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 370 Phil. 310, 318-319 (1999).
[38] Art. 212(m) partially states:
“Managerial employee” is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
[39] The rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 admits of certain exceptions, though none of which are present in the instant petition, namely: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the CA went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. [Rosario v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 139233, 11 November 2005, citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 834, 846 (1998)].
[40] Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 320, 329-330, cited in Binay v. Odeña, G.R. No. 163683, 8 June 2007, 524 SCRA 248, 255-256.
[41] De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
127857, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 325, 333, citing Potenciano v. Reynoso,
449 Phil. 396, 405 (2003).
[42] San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union-Alliance of Filipino Workers v. San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 143341, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 193, 205-206.
[43] Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408,
[44] Rollo, pp. 38-44.
[45]
[46] Cruz
v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 165586,
[47] Pono v. National Labor Relations Commission, 341 Phil. 615, 621 (1997),
cited in Landtex Industries
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150278, 9 August 2007, 529 SCRA 631, 652.
[48] 226 Phil. 421, 426 (1986).
[49] Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 87353,
[50] 227 Phil. 121, 127 (1986), cited in Villanueva v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division), 354 Phil. 1056, 1063 (1998).