CATHOLIC
VICARIATE,
CITY,
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO,
J.,
Acting Chairperson,
- versus
- CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
*
TINGA, and
VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
HON.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS,
Secretary
of the Department of Labor
& Employment, and GEORGE Promulgated:
AGBUCAY,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
For consideration is a Petition
for Review[1] filed by petitioner Catholic
Vicariate of Baguio City, seeking the annulment
of the
Decision[2]
and Resolution[3] issued
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83518.
First, the antecedents.
Petitioner contracted Kunwha Luzon
Construction (KUNWHA) to construct the retaining wall of the Baguio
Cathedral. KUNWHA, in turn, subcontracted
CEREBA Builders (CEREBA) to do the formworks of the church. The contract
between KUNWHA and CEREBA lasted up to the completion of the project or on
On
On P1,029,952.80 or P12,560.40 for
each employee.[7] During
the pendency of its motion for reconsideration, KUNWHA voluntarily settled the
deficiencies due the 23 affected workers amounting to P84,544.00 as
follows:
|
1. Edwin
Balaoro |
|
|
2. Jay Araneta |
2,448.00 |
|
3. Renato
Beado |
3,128.00 |
|
4. Edgar
Cortez |
3,128.00 |
|
5. Cesar
Cuenta |
3,128.00 |
|
6. Redentor
Espiritu |
3,128.00 |
|
7. Abelardo
Galvez |
3,128.00 |
|
8. Ireneo
Galvez |
4,352.00 |
|
9. Jose Galvez |
3,128.00 |
|
10. Roland
Galvez |
2,448.00 |
|
11. Rommel
Galvez |
3,128.00 |
|
12. Mamerto
Nadela |
3,128.00 |
|
13. Lito
Nazareno |
3,128.00 |
|
14. Orbel
Nerida |
2,448.00 |
|
15. Roy
Padilla |
3,128.00 |
|
16. Roy John
Padilla |
2,448.00 |
|
17. Randy
Sibayan |
2,448.00 |
|
18. Raymund
Sibayan |
2,448.00 |
|
19. Reynald
Sibayan |
2,448.00 |
|
20. Ronnie
Villarino |
3,128.00 |
|
21. Fernan
Villarino |
2,448.00 |
|
22. Felix
Padilla |
17,000.00 |
|
23. William
Pitlongay |
3,200.00[8] |
On
On appeal, the Secretary of Labor
reversed the ruling of the Regional Director and held that pursuant to Articles
106 and 107 of the Labor Code, the liability of KUNWHA, CEREBA and the Catholic
Vicariate is solidary notwithstanding the absence of an employer-employee
relationship. The Secretary of Labor ruled, however, that there existed an
employer-employee relationship between the parties since the records show that
the subcontracting agreement was terminated only on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Motion to Set Aside Judgment/Order, herein treated as an Appeal, filed by
appellant George Agbucay is hereby GRANTED. The Order dated P1,029,952.80)
Pesos. Any legitimate payments earlier
made by respondents to the twenty-three (23) complainants may be deducted from
their individual claims only upon proof of actual receipt. Let the entire records of this case be
remanded to the Regional Office a quo for proper execution. [11]
Petitioner moved for Reconsideration[12]
but it was denied on
On P84,544.00 be
deducted from whatever amount still due each of them.[14]
On appeal, petitioner raised three
issues, namely: (1) whether the Secretary of Labor acquired jurisdiction over
the appeal considering that this case falls within the exception stated in
Article 128(b) of the Labor Code; (2)
whether the quitclaims signed by affected employees are valid; and (3) whether
the appeal interposed by petitioner inures to the benefit of the other affected
employees.[15]
The appellate court held that
petitioner was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Labor, it having attended the initial hearing and therein manifested that it had
in its possession the retention fee of KUNWHA sufficient to answer for the
deficiencies due the affected workers. The
appellate court noted that it was only when the judgment imposed joint and
several liability that petitioner began to question the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Labor. The appellate court further sustained the finding of the
Secretary of Labor that the settlement is not legally acceptable as it defied
public policy for being unconscionable. Moreover,
the appellate court succinctly stated that parties who did not appeal may be
benefited by the judgment of said court insofar as it is favorable and
applicable to them. [16]
There is no cogent reason to disturb
the assailed judgment.
Petitioner contends that the question
of jurisdiction may be raised at any time and even on appeal. It alleges that its participation in the
hearing before the Regional Director could not amount to estoppel because it
did not have sufficient information at that time as to the factual basis of the
presence or absence of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor or his authorized
representative.[17]
In resolving this jurisdictional
issue, the Secretary of Labor relied on the limitations set forth in Article
128(b)[18]
of the Labor Code and ruled, thus:
It is worthy to note that as regards the power granted to Regional Director by Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, only two (2) limitations are set forth: first, where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer, and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection, and second, where the employer-employee relationship no longer exists.
x x x
Both
of the above-stated limitations are wanting in this case. Records show that, when this case was filed
on
x x x
Succinctly
put, since no written notice was served to respondent CEREBA Builders
terminating the Subcontracting Agreement, the employer-employee relationship
between KUNWHA and complainants existed until the completion of the
subcontracting agreement on
x x x
It
is also equally important to note that, during the initial hearing of this case
at the Regional Office, the respondents failed to contest the findings of the
Labor Employment and Enforcement Officer.
The respondents failed to present employment records and any evidence to
controvert the findings despite the reasonable period of time afforded
them. It was only when respondent KUNWHA
filed its Motion for Reconsideration from the Order dated March 12, 2001 of the
Regional Director that it submitted documents which the Vicariate now alleged
to be not verifiable in the summary nature of the labor inspection[19]
Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction
is clearly intertwined with the existence of employer-employee
relationship. It is undisputed that the existence
of an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a question of fact.[20] Thus, it can be inferred that this petition
also seeks a review of the factual findings of the Regional Director, as
affirmed by the Secretary of Labor and the Court of Appeals. Such review is beyond the ambit of a petition
for review on certiorari.
Assuming arguendo the absence of an employer-employee relationship between
the parties, the Secretary of Labor, invoking Odin Security Agency v. De la Serna,[21] correctly
declared that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the Regional Director when it actively participated in the proceedings held
therein. In said case, petitioner also submitted
to the jurisdiction of the Regional Director by taking part in the hearings before
him and by submitting a position paper. Similarly,
it was only when the order of the Regional Director was modified did petitioner
question the former’s jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. This Court declares that petitioner is barred
by estoppel from raising the issue of jurisdiction.[22]
Anent the issue on the validity of
the quitclaims signed by 22 out of the 23 affected employees, petitioner avers that they
were signed voluntarily and executed under the supervision of the Regional
Director.
Not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy. A quitclaim is said to be invalid and against
public policy (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from
an unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on their face. In such
cases, the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.[23] The second exception obtains in the case at
bar. As succinctly put by the Secretary
of Labor:
As to the claim that this Office failed to show why the Quitclaims and Releases were unconscionable, despite the fact that it was executed before the DOLE-CAR Regional Office, the same is totally misplaced. Clear from the record is that, except for the quitclaim signed by complainant Felix Padilla, the monetary considerations indicated in the 22 Quitclaims and Releases were way below the total claims of each complainants. The presence and assistance of the representatives of the DOLE-CAR Regional Office in the execution and consummation of the same is of no
moment. This Office, pursuant to its administrative
supervision and control over the Regional Offices and the power to review
actions and decisions of her subordinates, can exercise corrective measures,
where the circumstances warrant and to prevent injustice.[24]
Indeed,
as ordered by the Regional Director, the 23 affected workers are entitled to
receive P12,560.40 each or a total of P288,889.20 for unpaid
wages and special and regular holiday premium pay.[25] KUNWHA however paid them only P84,544.00,[26] less
than half of what they are entitled to as computed by the Regional
Director. Therefore, this Court is not
inclined to sustain the validity of the quitclaims although apparently they
were signed voluntarily and in the presence of the Regional Director.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the
Secretary of Labor erred in granting affirmative relief to those who did not
appeal.[27] On the contrary, however, the Court of
Appeals properly affirmed the monetary award of the Secretary of Labor to the other
affected employees. While as a general
rule, a party who has not appealed is not entitled to affirmative relief other
than the ones granted in the decision of the court below, the Court of Appeals
is imbued with sufficient authority and discretion to review matters not
otherwise assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case or to serve
the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.[28] The doctrine in Maternity Children’s Hospital v. Secretary of Labor[29] is instructive. In said case, the award is extended to all
employees of the establishment concerned, including those who did not sign the
complaint. This Court explained, thus:
The
justification for the award to this group of employees who were not signatories
to the complaint is that the visitorial and enforcement powers given to the
Secretary of Labor is relevant to, and exercisable over establishments, not
over the individual members/employees, because what is sought to be achieved by
its exercise is the observance of, and/or compliance by, such
firm/establishment with the labor standards regulations. Necessarily, in case of an award resulting
from a violation of labor legislation by such establishment, the entire
members/employees should benefit therefrom.[30]
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible
error in the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for
review is DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Acting Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*As replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave per Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
[2]
[4]
[18] Art. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.
[20]Manila Water Co., Inc. v. Pena, 478
Phil. 68, 77 (2004); Sonza v. ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 138051, 10 June 2004, 431 SCRA 583, 594;
Fleischer Company, Inc. v. NLRC, 407
Phil. 391, 399 (2001).
[23]Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent. Inc.,
G.R. No. 167813, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 502, 515, citing Periquet v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91298, 22 June 1990, 186 SCRA 724; Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion,
G.R. Nos. 157696-97, 9 February 2006, 482 SCRA 87, 104.