THIRD
DIVISION
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VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO “JAKE” TAN and
GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS,
Petitioners, - versus
- THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN
HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC
CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 166520 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated
The factual
and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
Gerardo Tan
(Gerardo) died on
Private
respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator,
asserting the need for a special administrator to take possession and charge of
Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be resolved by the RTC or until the
appointment of a regular administrator.
They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be
appointed as the special administrator.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for
Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as
the special administrator since they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo
does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their
co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate
since his death.
On
b.1.)
requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the
fiduciary account of the Court all money and or cash at hand or deposited in
the bank(s) which rightfully belong to the estate of the decedent within five
(5) days from receipt hereof;
b.2.)
requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the
proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest, if any, done in the past
or is presently harvesting or about to undertake, which belong to the estate of
the decedent;
b.3.)
relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also
required to submit a financial report to the Commission as regards the
background of the cash at hand or deposited in bank(s), if any, the expenses
incurred in course of her administration and other relevant facts including
that of the proceeds of the sugarcane/crop harvest, which submission will be
done upon deposit of the foregoing with the court as above-required.[3]
More than a year later or on
Consequently,
on
Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment
of a special administrator is hereby GRANTED.
Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby appointed as Special Administrator and
shall immediately take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or
administrator afterwards appointed, upon his filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00
and upon approval of the same by this Court.[5]
Petitioners
filed on
On
Petitioners
instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition assailing the
On
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING and DISMISSING the petition
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special Proceeding No.
4014-0.[7]
On
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ PLEA TO BE GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR FATHER’S ESTATE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONERS’ PLEA FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.[8]
On
14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution[9]
denying the Petition on the ground of late filing, failure to submit an
affidavit of service of a copy of the Petition on the Court of Appeals and
proof of such service, failure to properly verify the Petition, and failure to pay
the deposit for the Salary Adjustment for the Judiciary (SAJ) fund and
sheriff’s fee. Upon Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioners, however, this Court issued on
Petitioners
contend[11]
that they should be given priority in the administration of the estate since
they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to
private respondents, who are purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that
generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who
is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedent’s estate.
Petitioners
also claim that they are more competent than private respondents or their
attorney-in-fact to administer Gerardo’s estate. Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo “Jake” Tan
(Jake) claim to have lived for a long time and continue to reside on Gerardo’s
estate, while respondents are not even in the
Petitioners
additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the administratrix
of the estate since Gerardo’s death on
As
regards the denial of petitioners’ plea for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or TRO, petitioners argue that such denial would leave Romualdo,
private respondents’ attorney-in-fact, free to enter Gerardo’s estate and
proceed to act as administrator thereof to the prejudice of petitioners.
The
appeal is devoid of merit.
The
order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted.—If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or
if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
However,
this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted
provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator.[13] The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment
of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not
appealable.[14]
Not
being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special
administrator is Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court
of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of
discretion, a term which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[15]
We
agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez’s appointment
of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner
Vilma for the position of special administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but
decided against her appointment for the following reasons:
Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court
appointed commissioner, directed oppositor Vilma Tan in the latter’s capacity
as de fact[o] administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the court
all money and cash at hand or deposited in the banks which rightfully belong to
the estate within five days from receipt of the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise directed to
deposit in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop
from the estate of the decedent. She was
likewise directed to submit a financial report as regards the background of the
cash on hand, if any, the expenses incurred in the course of her administration. The
directive was issued by Atty. Nuevo on
This
Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the
benefit of all heirs be that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the farthest
kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not satisfy the
requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially
administer the estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs.[16] (Emphases
supplied.)
Assuming
for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the
job as special administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually
appointed by the court as special administrator of Gerardo’s estate, the
latter’s appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of judgment and
would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error
is reviewable only by an appeal. On the
other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was
issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[17] The Court of Appeals could not have reversed
a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari
petition.
Furthermore,
petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their
co-petitioner Vilma would have been the more competent and capable choice to
serve as the special administratrix of Gerardo’s estate. Contrary to petitioners’ bare assertions,
both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of
petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the lapse of
a considerable length of time certainly militates against her appointment.
We
find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same
cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all,
the person appointed by the RTC as special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the
country and can, thus, personally administer Gerardo’s estate.
If
petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference
provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma
as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over administration of
Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a regular
administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of
a special administrator. The appointment
of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting
letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative
(in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at
bar) occasioned by any cause.[18] The principal object of the appointment of a
temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the
hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs.[19]
In
the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the
appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure
of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-appointed
commissioner. It would certainly be
unjust if petitioner Vilma were still appointed special administratix, when the
necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of the
lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner
Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with the
court the income of Gerardo’s estate and to provide an accounting thereof
because of the fact that Gerardo’s estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and
insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma’s non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income,
petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of
continuing to disregard the court’s orders.
Finally,
as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents, there is no
longer any need to discuss petitioners’ arguments regarding the denial by the
appellate court of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or TRO.
WHEREFORE, the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 July 2004 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying
reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo
D. Lim as special administrator of the estate of Gerardo Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Isaias
P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Ramon M. Bato,
Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 22-26.
[2] Issued by public respondent
Executive Judge Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr. Records, p. 130.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, p. 26.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Petitioners state in their
Memorandum:
Petitioner
Vilma Tan is Gerardo’s biological daughter; Jake and Geraldine Tan, together
with their late brother Christopher, are petitioner Vilma Tan’s biological
children who were adopted by Gerardo Tan via adoption proceedings docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 1386 at the Regional Trial Court Branch VII,
The late
Christopher Tan died on
[12]
[13] Ozaeta
v. Pecson, 93 Phil. 416, 419-420 (1953); Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407, 410 (1948); Heirs of Belinda Dalhlia Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No.
162934,
[14] Pijuan
v. De Gurrea, 124 Phil. 1527, 1531-1532 (1966).
[15] Perez
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 411, 416;
Banal III v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 167474, 15
November 2005, 475 SCRA 164, 174.
[16] Records, p. 113.
[17] Fortich
v.
[18] Section 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Section 1. Appointment of special
administrator.—When there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any
cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed.
[19] De
Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr., G.R. No. L-48585,