Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
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JOSELITO
RANIERO J. DAAN, |
G.R. Nos.
163972-77 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., |
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- versus - |
Acting Chairperson, |
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TINGA,* |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN |
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(Fourth
Division), |
Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
March 28, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Joselito Raniero
J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-24196,[1]
questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of
his plea bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid
down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
Said accused,[2]
together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three counts of malversation of public funds involving the sums of P3,293.00,
P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively, which they purportedly
tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period
making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new
municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte
and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact,
they did not. Thus, in addition to the
charge for malversation, the accused were also
indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document
by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to
withdraw their plea of “not guilty” and substitute the same with a plea of
“guilty”, provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt
and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such
proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their
plea of “not guilty” to the crime of falsification of public document by a public
officer or employee with a plea of “guilty”, but to the lesser crime of
falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation
cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of “not guilty” thereto with
a plea of “guilty”, but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable
officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the
prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead “guilty”
to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private
individual. The prosecution explained:
“With respect to the falsification cases earlier
mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a
lesser offense of falsification by a private individual defined and penalized
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal code will strengthen our cases against
the principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal
acts.”
Insofar as the malversation
cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of said
accused to plead “guilty” to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because:
“x x x
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial
government of
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,[4] dated
The Sandiganbayan
likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer on the
following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he
merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a “routinary
basis,” negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only P18,860.00, which he already restituted.[6]
The
petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.[7]
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before
trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said
lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (sec.
4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily,
plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the
pre-trial conference,[8]
viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In
all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court
shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period
is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a
pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the
charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of
the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial
agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
accused. The agreements covering the
matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even
after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.
Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was
not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the
prosecution already presented several witnesses.[9]
Section
2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea
bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor,[10] and
that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The
rules however use word may in the
second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial
court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.[11] Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind
that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not
supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the
convenience of the accused.[12]
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,[13]
the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser
offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court,[14]
viz:
x x x
In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the
trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which
their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462,
x x x
(A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the
only basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing
the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to
the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than the
evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that Section 4 of
Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is
allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise,
much less bargaining.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
However,
Villarama involved plea bargaining
after the prosecution had already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as
in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its
discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and
whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or,
in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[16]
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan
rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and the
prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the
benefit of the public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal
would “only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and
send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties
they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have
merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their
criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus,
setting to naught the deterrent value of the laws intended to curb graft and
corruption in government.”[17]
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan
has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and higher
interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should
be accepted. The present case calls for
the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction -
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do
complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules
and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of
cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity
regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the
substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by
different courts.[18]
and of its power of
control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts,[19]
in order to afford equal justice to
petitioner.
In People
of the Philippines v. Estrada,[20]
the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution
dated P25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement,
the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the
timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the
requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan
noted that the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of “not guilty”;
and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense;
and the lesser offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to
Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is
Plunder.[21]
The
Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan
to Estrada should not be applied to the present case. Records show that there was a favorable
recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's
motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated
In the cases at bar, there is no
dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount
of P18,860.00 as per
official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte
dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already been restituted by the accused.
There
is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant
cases. Moreover, the accused is also
willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits
consideration.
With
respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act
of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by
private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the Municipal
Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who
appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely
designated as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the
Moreover, the lesser offenses of
Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render
Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the
crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public
Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally
charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public Documents through an untruthful
narration of facts to be established, the following elements must concur: (a)
the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d)
the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful
intent of injuring a third person.[23]
On the
other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has the following elements: (a) the
offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did
not take advantage of his official position; (b) the offender committed any
of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or
commercial document.[24]
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with which petitioner was also charged,
the elements are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds
or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds
or property involved are public funds or
property for which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken
or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence
permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or property.[25] Article 217 also provides that the failure of
the public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a
duly authorized officer, “shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use.” In this regard, it has been ruled that once such presumption is rebutted,
then it is
completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never
deemed to have existed at all.[26]
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer, the
lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following
elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the
offender must be an accountable officer
for public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law or regulation
to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and
(d) the offender fails to render an account
for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.[27]
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an
offense includes or is included in the other, to wit:
SEC. 5. When an
offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.
An
offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or
information constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said
to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.[28]
In this
case, the allegations in the Informations filed
against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser
offenses. Thus, in the charge for
Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser
offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that
petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the
Given,
therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise
constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser
offenses.
Finally,
as
propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the
nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession
or custody of local government funds,[29]
not to
mention that petitioner has already restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada which
involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,[30] and a
whopping P25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case
tremendously pales in comparison.
Under
the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will
result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court will not hesitate
to intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE
CONCUR:
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice
|
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
* In lieu of
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, per Special Order
No. 497 dated
[1] Entitled, “People of the
[2] Herein petitioner and Rosalina T. Tulibas.
[3] Rollo, pp.
15-18.
[4] Penned by Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong
with the concurrence of Associate Justices Norberto Y. Geraldez
and Efren N. de la Cruz.
[5] Rollo, p. 26.
[6] Rollo, pp. 8-10.
[7] People
of the
[8] Ladino
v. Garcia, 333 Phil. 254, 258
(1996); see also A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC dated July 13, 2004 (RE: PROPOSED RULE ON
GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED BY TRIAL COURT JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT IN THE
CONDUCT OF PRE-TRIAL AND USE OF DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY MEASURES).
[9] People of the
[10] People of the
[11] People of the
[12] People of the
[13] G.R.
No. 99287,
[14]
[15]
[16] People
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159261, February 21, 2007,
516 SCRA 383, 398.
[17] Rollo, pp. 20-21.
[18] Poso v. Judge Mijares, 436 Phil. 295, 324
(2002).
[19] Madrigal
Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,
G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 134-135.
[20] Sandiganbayan
Criminal Case No. 26558.
[21]
[22] Rollo, pp.
42-43.
[23] Enemecio v. Office
of the Ombudsman, 464 Phil. 102, 114 (2004);
Lumancas v. Intas, 400 Phil. 785, 798 (2000); Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 364 Phil. 890, 909 (1999).
[24] Reyes,Luis B.,
The Revised Penal Code (1981); see also Adaza
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154886, July 28, 2005,
464 SCRA 460, 472.
[25] Revised Penal Code, Article 217; see Rueda, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
400 Phil. 142, 153-154 (2000).
[26] Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, 414 Phil.
86, 98 (2001).
[27] Revised Penal Code, Article
218; see Campomanes v. People of the
[28] Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111399, November 14, 1994, 238 SCRA
116, 136; Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 134,
141.
[29] Local Government Code,
Section 340; see Frias, Sr. v.
People of the
[30] Republic
Act No.
7080 (1991), Sec. 2. (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (1993).