Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
DOMINADOR C. FERRER, JR., G.R.
NO. 161067
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and
REYES,
JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. EDILBERTO
G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO H.
VILLARUZ, JR., and HON. RODOLFO G.
PALATTAO, as Members of the
Sandiganbayan, Second Division,
ANNA MARIA L. HARPER, Promulgated:
ESPERANZA G. GATBONTON, and
People of the Philippines, March 14, 2008
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Does a finding of lack of administrative liability of a respondent
government official bar the filing of a criminal case against him for the same
acts?
Before the
Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan,
Second Division (public respondent) dated
The following are the factual antecedents:
On
That on
or about August 20, 1998 or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, DOMINADOR C. FERRER, JR., being the Administrator of the Intramuros Administration (IA), Manila, while in the
performance of his official and administrative functions as such, and acting
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally give unwarranted benefits to Offshore Construction and Development
Company, by causing the award of the Lease Contracts to said company, involving
Baluarte de San Andres, Ravellin
de Recolletos, and Baluarte
de San Francisco de Dilao, Intramuros,
Manila, without conducting any public bidding as required under Joint Circular
No. 1 dated September 30, 1989 of the Department of Budget and Management,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Department of Public Works
and Highways, and by allowing the construction of new structures in said leased
areas without any building permit or clearance required under the Intramuros Charter (P.D. 1616) and the National Building
Code, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
and assigned to the Sandiganbayan's Second Division.
On
On
On
On
Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion
for Reconsideration.[10]
Again, he cited as his ground the alleged forum shopping of the private
complainants.
On
Petitioner
then filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 153592, which assailed the Resolution of public respondent dated
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[13]
which the Court denied with finality in its Resolution dated
On
On
The Court
resolves to deny the motion for re-determination of probable cause, the
argument advanced therein having been passed upon and resolved by this Court in
accused's motion to dismiss as well as motion for
reconsideration and where the resolution of this Court was sustained by the
Supreme Court.[17]
On
of administrative
liability, the criminal case that was pending against him should likewise be
dismissed.
The public respondent denied the motion in the other
assailed Resolution dated
Finding no merit in the accused [sic] Motion
for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Quash dated August 4, 2003 and considering
the Opposition of the prosecution, the same is DENIED.
Indeed, the dismissal
of the administrative complaint does not negate the existing criminal case
pending before the Court. Moreover the grounds and arguments raised thereat
could be considered matter of defense that is more
and properly to be considered during a full blown trial.
WHEREFORE, the Motion
for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Quash by the accused is denied for lack of
merit.
x x
x x
SO ORDERED.[19]
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari, seeking
to annul the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of and/or
without jurisdiction.
Petitioner insists that the Sandiganbayan
should have dismissed the criminal case filed against him, since the alleged
wrongful acts complained of in the case are the same as those alleged in the
administrative case against him which have been dismissed.
Both the public and private prosecutors contend that the
issues raised by petitioner have already been raised and passed upon; and that
the assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
merely reiterate its earlier Resolutions denying petitioner's motion for
reinvestigation and various
motions
for
reconsideration questioning
the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause.[20]
They claim that the issue became settled and final as early as the
The respondents cite jurisprudence, which states that the
dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts.[22]
The petition is devoid of merit.
In Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[23]
the Court denied a similar petition to dismiss a pending criminal case with
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of the
dismissal of the administrative case against the accused. The Court
ratiocinated, thus:
Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint
against petitioner Honrada was dismissed. They invoke our ruling in Maceda v.
Vasquez that only this Court has the power to oversee court personnel's
compliance with laws and take the appropriate administrative action against
them for their failure to do so and that no other branch of the government may
exercise this power without running afoul of the principle of separation of
powers.
But one thing is administrative
liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Our
determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public
documents is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec, the
dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the
administrative complaint.[24] (Emphasis supplied.)
It is
clear from Paredes that the criminal
case against petitioner, already filed and pending with the Sandiganbayan,
may proceed despite the dismissal of the administrative case arising out of the
same acts.
The same rule applies even to those cases that have yet to
be filed in court. In Tan v. Commission on Elections,[25]
it was held that an investigation by the Ombudsman of the criminal case for
falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and an
inquiry into the administrative charges by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) are entirely independent proceedings, neither of which results in or
concludes the other. The established rule is that an absolution from a criminal
charge is not a bar
to an administrative
prosecution, or vice versa.[26]
The dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of
a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of
the administrative complaint.[27]
The Court
finds no cogent reason to depart from these rules.
Petitioner argues that the criminal case against him
requires a higher quantum of proof for conviction -- that is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt -- than the administrative case, which needs only substantial
evidence. He claims that from this circumstance, it follows that the dismissal
of the administrative case should carry with it the dismissal of the criminal
case.
This argument, however, has been addressed in
jurisprudence. In Valencia v. Sandiganbayan,[28] the
administrative case against the accused was dismissed by the Ombudsman on a
finding that the contract of loan entered into was in pursuance of the police
power of the accused as local chief executive,[29]
and that the accused had been re-elected to office.[30]
The Ombudsman, however, still found probable cause to criminally charge the accused
in court.[31] When
the accused filed a petition with the Supreme Court
to dismiss the criminal
case before the Sandiganbayan, the Court
denied the petition, thus:
In
the final analysis, the conflicting findings of the Ombudsman boil down to
issues of fact which, however, are not within our province to resolve. As has been oft-repeated, this Court is not a
trier of facts. This is a matter best left to the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners
argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative case against
them based on the same subject matter should operate to dismiss the criminal
case because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable
doubt, while that
in administrative
cases is only substantial evidence. While
that may be true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative
liability differs from criminal liability.
The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the
public service, based on the time-honored principle
that a public office is a public trust.
On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the
punishment of crime.
Moreover,
one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against
petitioners is the fact that they were re-elected to office. Indeed, a re-elected local official may not
be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior
term of office. The rationale for this
holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed
that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past
misconduct. If, armed with such
knowledge, it still re-elects him, then such re-election is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
However,
the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but
not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of office
x x x.
x x x x
There
is, thus, no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash
the Information against petitioners on the basis solely of the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against them.[32]
To sustain
petitioner's arguments will be to require the Sandiganbayan
and the Ombudsman to merely adopt the results of administrative
investigations which would not only diminish the powers and duties of these
constitutional offices, but
also violate the independent nature of criminal and administrative cases
against public officials. This will also amount to untold delays in criminal
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and
Ombudsman, as every criminal trial and investigation before these bodies will
be made to await the results of pending administrative investigations. Such is
not the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the laws governing public
officers.
Petitioner cites Larin
v. Executive Secretary[33]
to support his arguments. That case, however, is not on all fours with the
present case.
In Larin, the accused was first convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of the National
Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On the basis
of this conviction, an administrative case was filed against him. On appeal of
the criminal conviction to the Supreme Court, however, he was acquitted upon a
finding that the acts he had committed were neither illegal nor irregular. When
the accused sought a similar dismissal of the administrative case, the Supreme
Court sustained him and ruled that since the same acts for which he was
administratively charged had been found neither illegal nor irregular, his
acquittal in the criminal case should entail the dismissal of the
administrative case.
The present case differs from Larin
because here, the administrative case was filed independently of the
criminal case. The administrative case was not filed on the basis of a criminal
conviction, as in fact, the administrative case was dismissed without regard for
the results of the criminal case. This is in contrast with Larin,
where the administrative case was dismissed only after its basis, the
criminal conviction, was overturned on appeal.
We cannot
reverse Larin by ruling that
petitioner's discharge from the administrative action should result in the
dismissal of the criminal case. The argument cannot be sustained without
violating settled principles. The rule is
that administrative
liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liabilities.[34] In Larin,
no less than the Supreme Court acquitted the accused of charges of
wrongdoing; in the case at bar, no court of justice has yet declared petitioner
not guilty of committing illegal or irregular acts.
The independent nature of a criminal prosecution dictates
that the Sandiganbayan
must determine petitioner's criminal liability without its hands being tied
by what transpired in the administrative case. The court is duty-bound to
exercise its independent judgment.[35]
It is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the ruling in the administrative
proceeding. It is axiomatic that when the court obtains jurisdiction over a
case, it continues to retain it until the case is terminated.[36]
Under the Rules of Court, petitioner's absolution from administrative
liability is not even one of the grounds for a Motion to Quash.[37]
Moreover, petitioner lacked the right to file the instant
petition. Petitioner already raised the issue
of his discharge from administrative
liability in his supplemental
motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's
Resolution dated
Thus, the question on the effect of the administrative case
on the criminal case before the Sandiganbayan
was settled as early as the Resolution dated
Such
finality was evident in the public respondent's Resolution dated
The Court resolves to
deny the motion for re-determination of probable cause, the argument
advanced therein having been passed upon and resolved by this Court in accused's motion to dismiss as well as motion for
reconsideration and where the resolution of this Court was sustained by the
Supreme Court.[44]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the petition now before the Court, which raises the same issues,
must necessarily fail.
Petitioner's tactics to delay his arraignment and trial
cannot be countenanced. In utter
contempt of the Court's efforts to expedite all judicial
proceedings, he has filed a
petition which merely raises issues that have long been resolved with finality.
By so doing, petitioner has gone beyond
merely
exhausting his available
remedies and trodden in the realm of abusing legal processes.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Sandiganbayan is ordered to proceed
with the arraignment and trial of Criminal Case No. 26546. Petitioner and his
counsel are ADMONISHED not to engage further in delaying tactics.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval, Francisco H. Villaruz and Diosdado M. Peralta; rollo,
pp. 18-20.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval and concurred in by Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. and Rodolfo G. Palattao, id. at 21.
[3] Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26546.
[4] Rollo, p. 22
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 132, 215.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Rollo, pp. 5, 24-41.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Rollo, p. 21.
[20] Rollo, p. 126.
[21]
[22]
[23] 322 Phil. 709 (1996).
[24]
[25] 237 Phil. 353 (1994).
[26]
[27] Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 23, at 731; Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, 376 Phil. 191, 199 (1999).
[28] G.R. No. 141336,
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] 345 Phil. 962 (1997).
[34] Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 27.
[35] Muñez v. Ariño, 311 Phil 537, 548 (1995).
[36] Denila v. Bellosillo,159-A Phil. 354, 358 (1975).
[37] Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec. 3.
[38] Rollo, pp. 127, 131.
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
anonymous complainant.
[43]
[44]