Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
OSCAR P. GARCIA and G.R.
NO. 160339
ALEX V. MORALES,
Petitioners,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and
REYES,
JJ.
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC. Promulgated:
and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION,* March
14, 2008
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of Oscar P.
Garcia and
Alex V. Morales (petitioners), assailing the March 13, 2003 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), which
upheld the validity of the termination of their employment; and the
The facts are of record.
Petitioners were
employed as risk inspectors by Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (private respondent).
They were also officers of the Malayan Employees Association-FFW (MEA-FFW).
On
In their separate
written explanations, petitioners denied their involvement in the theft and
countered that the filing of the charges against them was a form of harassment
against their union MEA-FFW, which was in a deadlock with respondent in the
ongoing negotiations over the terms of their collective bargaining agreement.[5]
After the conduct of an informal
administrative hearing,[6] private respondent notified petitioner
Garcia, through a letter dated
After a painstaking evaluation of the pieces of
documentary and testimonial evidence presented, the Investigating Committee
concluded that there is reason to believe that you participated in the theft of
the subject Company properties when you:
1)
Took possession of
the subject diskettes and logbooks without any permission from the company;
2)
Instigated the
commission of the said unlawful act; and
3)
Refused to deliver
said Company properties upon demand by Management.
The above acts
constitute serious misconduct and a violation of the Company’s Code of Ethics
which, under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, justify your dismissal
from the Company. In view thereof, we regret to inform you that you are
considered dismissed from your employment effective immediately.[7]
Petitioner
Morales was also served a similar notice of termination but on the following
grounds:
After a painstaking evaluation of the pieces of documentary and
testimonial evidence presented, the Investigating Committee concluded that
there is reason to believe that you participated in the theft of the subject
Company properties when you:
1)
Conspired with Mr.
Garcia in attempting to cover-up the loss of the subject diskettes and logbook;
and
2)
Deliberately
withheld information from the Company regarding the whereabouts of said Company
properties .
A
review of your 201 File likewise revealed that you have been previously
suspended for tampering receipts which you presented for reimbursement by the
Company. You will therefore realize that when it comes to dishonesty, you are
not a first offender.
The
above recent acts constitute serious misconduct and violation of the Company’s
Code of Ethics which, under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, justify
your dismissal from the Company. In view thereof, we regret to inform you that
you are considered dismissed from your employment effective immediately.[8]
Petitioners
filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, unfair labor practice,
damages and attorney’s fees.[9] The LA dismissed their Complaint
in
a
Decision[10]
dated
Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
which issued a Resolution[11] dated November 29, 2001,
affirming the November 20, 2000 LA Decision. The NLRC also denied petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution[12] dated
Petitioners filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA, which dismissed it in the
Hence, the present petition, which
raises the following issues:
I
The Honorable public respondent court seriously
erred and committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack and/or excess
of jurisdiction, in denying the petition
for certiorari a quo and, in effect, affirming the assailed resolutions
of public respondent NLRC, dismissing the complaint for unfair labor practice,
illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, damages and attorney's fees x x x.
II
While the public respondent court is totally
correct in declaring that “factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when it
coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, are accorded respect, even finality,”
it erred, however in applying said doctrinal ruling in the instant case, x x x.
III
The public respondent court seriously erred in
not finding that the public respondent NLRC and the Labor Arbiter a quo
seriously erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
assailed resolution, as clearly private respondent company acted with bad faith
in terminating the services of herein petitioners.
IV
The
public respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration without resolving the legal issues raised.[14]
Resolution
of the foregoing issues entails an
inquiry into the facts, a
re-evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and a recalibration of the evidence presented.
Ordinarily, the Court does not undertake these functions, for it defers to the
expertise of the CA, NLRC and LA, and accords
great weight to their factual findings, especially when these are
unanimous. Thus, only their errors of law are reviewable by the Court in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
However, under extraordinary
circumstances, the Court delves into the
factual assessment of the forums below when it is shown that (1) the findings are not supported by evidence; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.[15]
To determine whether any of these
extraordinary circumstances obtains in the present case, a preliminary
assessment of the evidence upon which the CA, NLRC and LA based their factual
findings cannot be avoided.
The LA declared the
dismissal of petitioners valid in view of substantial evidence that petitioner
Garcia was involved in the theft of private respondent's confidential records
and that petitioner Morales participated in the cover-up thereof:
In
the case at bar, this Office finds that there is substantial evidence to
justify the dismissal of [petitioners]. The testimonies of [Jovita] Umila,
[Philip] de Guzman and [Romeo] Corral are such “relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify (the) conclusion” that
[petitioners] are guilty of serious misconduct which is duly recognized under
the law as valid cause for the dismissal of an employee. Their statements
explain the questioned incident in its entirety from the inception of
wrongdoing (Umila), to the denial of knowledge of the whereabouts of the
subject lost records (Corral), to the subsequent admission of possession of the
missing diskettes and logbooks (Umila), up to the attempt to cover-up their
misconduct (De Guzman). [Petitioners] failed to adduce any evidence that would
taint the credibility of said witnesses. It goes against the usual grain of
logic and normal human conduct for a witness to testify against a co-Union
member or co-employee, absent any clear evil or ill-motive on his/her part,
thus demonstrating that said witness is moved only by the desire to tell the
truth and clear his conscience. There being nothing to indicate that the
witnesses were moved by dubious or improper motives to testify falsely, their
testimonies should be accorded full faith and credit.
Tellingly,
[petitioner] Garcia never denied, much less refuted, Umila's positive testimony
that he (Garcia) admitted that he has in his possession the missing diskettes
and logbooks. The same holds true as regards [petitioner] Morales who likewise
never denied, much less refuted, De Guzman's first person testimony of his
(Morales') complicity in the cover-up of the wrongdoing of [petitioner] Garcia.[16]
The NLRC sustained the
findings of the LA. It held that the LA correctly relied on the affidavits of
Umila and De Guzman whose detailed account of
how petitioners committed serious misconduct was never refuted
by the latter.[17] The NLRC found these
witnesses credible because they were not shown to hold any “grudge against
[petitioners], much more because said witnesses are ordinary members of the
union while those being charged are union officers, hence, with moral
ascendancy over them.”[18]
While the CA did not
elaborate on its view, it bound itself by the concurrent factual findings of
the LA and NLRC for it found them to be supported by evidence.[19]
Impugning the stand of
the CA, petitioners argue that the affidavits of Umila and De Guzman have no
probative value for neither had direct knowledge of the taking of private respondent's
properties: first, Umila merely stated
that on December 24, 1998, petitioner
Garcia and another employee, Jun Bato, asked about these properties and that
she told them that said properties were
on top of her office table; and second, De Guzman merely described how these
properties were recovered.[20]
Perusal of the affidavits in question does not bear out
petitioners' claim. Umila also stated that when she confronted petitioner
Garcia about the lost properties, the latter admitted having them in his
possession.[21] De Guzman's statement detailed the
effort to bring said properties back into the premises of private respondent
and to make it appear that these were merely misplaced.[22] Thus, without going into the veracity of the
statements in said affidavits, the Court cannot agree that no direct evidence
was presented on the theft of the properties or the cover-up thereof.
However, it is noted that while the
participation of petitioner Garcia in said theft and
cover-up is detailed in said affidavit, the same cannot
be said of the connection of Morales to said incidents. To recall, petitioner Morales was dismissed
for conspiring in the cover-up of the theft. However, it appears that the only
evidence of petitioner Morales's
involvement in the cover-up is the statement of De Guzman that it was
said petitioner who instructed him to get a parcel from a third person. The statement of De Guzman on this particular
matter is reproduced below:
3. Noon Disyembre 29,
1999 bandang alas-kuwatro kuwarenta y singko ng hapon (4:45 p.m.), ako ay
kasalukuyang naghuhugas ng mga plato sa Comfort Room ng 5th floor ng
ETY Building nang ako ay lapitan ni Alex Morales ng Risk Analysis Department at
inutusang pumunta sa Farmacia Rubi, dito rin sa Quintin Paredes, Binondo para
kunin ang isang bagay sa lalaking may bigote.[23]
By no means can it be extrapolated from the
foregoing statement that petitioner Morales knew the contents of the parcel -
whether or not these were the stolen company properties - or the purpose for
getting the parcel from a third party.
In fact, the succeeding paragraphs in the statement disclose that it was
that third party who instructed De Guzman to call petitioner Garcia, who, in
turn, disclosed the nature of the contents of the parcel and gave out
instruction on what steps to take to bring said parcel back into the office
building and to make it appear that it was just misplaced. Nowhere does it
appear that petitioner Morales had knowledge of what was to happen or had participation
in it. It is difficult then to connect
petitioner Morales to the theft or the attempt to cover it up merely on the
basis of his having instructed De Guzman to get a parcel from another
person.
Therefore, on the
specific culpability of petitioner Morales,
the Court finds the affidavit of De Guzman so lacking in crucial detail
that the same cannot serve as basis for the finding that said petitioner
conspired in the theft
of private respondent's properties or the cover up thereof.[24] The Court reverses the factual findings of
the CA, NLRC and LA, for the evidence
on which their findings were based was too tenuous to justify the termination
of petitioner Morales's
employment.
Nonetheless, no bad faith can be attributed to private
respondent in dismissing petitioner Morales despite such scant evidence. Its
error in the assessment of the available evidence cannot be equated with bad
faith as there is no evidence that it was animated by malice or ill motive. Hence, its action in dismissing petitioner
Morales may have been illegal, but did not amount to unfair labor practice.
Moving on to the other
issues pertaining to petitioner Garcia, he insists that, contrary to the
observation of the CA, he controverted
the affidavits presented by private respondent, not only by denying the
averments therein, but also by presenting counter evidence consisting of an
entry in the guard's logbook and the affidavit of the guard-on-duty, Joey
Limbo.[25] Petitioner explains that it took time
for him to present these documents, because private respondent had tried to
conceal them and was compelled to present the same before the LA[26]
only when he (petitioner Garcia) demanded to see them.[27]
The Court is not convinced that by said logbook entry and
affidavit of Joey Limbo, petitioner Garcia effectively controverted the
existing evidence against him. The
logbook entry merely reports that De Guzman recovered the stolen
properties from the
fifth floor of the office building.[28]
The
affidavit of Joey Limbo merely repeated the logbook entry.[29] That these documents do not disclose
any further detail is understandable, for as explained by De Guzman himself
in his affidavit,
he merely reported the recovery of the
stolen properties to Joey Limbo and did not elaborate on the circumstances
thereof, but when he was confronted by private respondent the following day, it
was then that he divulged the details leading to the recovery of said
properties.[30]
Verily, the Court finds no indication that the CA
misappreciated the evidence when it affirmed the findings of the NLRC and LA
against petitioner Garcia.
Finally, petitioners complain that they were denied due
process when they were not furnished a copy of the evidence against them or the
minutes of the investigation.[31]
It is oft repeated that in
administrative proceedings, due process is served by the mere fact that each
party is afforded an opportunity to air its side,[32]
not necessarily through verbal argumentation, but also through pleadings in
which the parties may explain their side of the controversy. [33] It is of record that petitioners were
informed of the charges against them and were given the opportunity to present
their defense, not just in the administrative investigation, but also in the
proceedings before the LA and NLRC. The requirements of due process were more
than adequately satisfied.
In fine, the Court sees no compelling
reason to disturb the concurrent factual findings of the CA, NLRC and LA that
petitioner Garcia was involved in the theft of respondent's properties and in
the attempt to cover up said act for the same are supported by substantial
evidence.
However, the Court finds scant evidence to
connect petitioner Morales to the theft or its cover-up and therefore declares
that the CA committed a grievous error in upholding his dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
The present petition impleaded the
Court of Appeals as respondent. Pursuant
to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the name of the Court of Appeals
is deleted from the title.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices Renato
C.
Dacudao and Danilo B. Pine; rollo, p. 41.
[2] Rollo, p. 69.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
Rollo, pp. 266-267.
[8]
[9]
CA rollo, p. 117.
[10] Rollo,
p. 108.
[11]
[12] CA rollo, p. 114.
[13]
[14] Petition, rollo, pp. 20,
28, 31 and 34.
[15] BMG Records (Phils.), Inc. v.
Aparecio, G.R. No. 153290, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 300, 309; Asiatic
Development Corporation v. Brogada, G.R. No. 169136, July 14, 2006, 495
SCRA 166, 168; Binay v. Odeña, G.R. No.
163683, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 248, 257; Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No.
154521, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605-606; Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Barrientos, G.R. No. 157028, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 311,
321; Marival Trading, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 169600, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA
708, 721; Metro Transit Organization v. Court of Appeals, 440
Phil. 743, 754 (2002).
[16] LA Decision, rollo, pp.
117-118.
[17] NLRC Decision, rollo, p.
158.
[18]
[19] CA Decision, id. at 46-47.
[20] Petition, id. at 26-28.
[21] Sinumpaang Salaysay, id.
at 246.
[22]
[23]
[24] C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. v. Zialcita, G.R. No. 157619, July
17, 2006, 495 SCRA 387, 393.
[25] Petition, rollo, p. 23.
[26] Manifestation and Motion, CA rollo,
p. 253.
[27] Rejoinder, id. at
232.
[28]
[29]
[30] Sinumpaang Salaysay,
paragraphs 15 and 16, rollo, pp. 259-260.
[31] Petition, id. at 24.
[32] Nueva Ecija Electric Cooperative II v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
157603, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 169, 178; Mayon Hotel & Restaurant v. Adana, G.R. No. 157634, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA
609, 629.
[33] Sunrise Manning Agency, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 146703, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 35, 42.