Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
CHINESE
YOUNG MEN’S G.R. NO. 159422
CHRISTIAN
ASSOCIATION
OF
THE PHILIPPINE
doing
business under the name of
MANILA
DOWNTOWN
Petitioner, Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and
REYES,
JJ.
- versus -
REMINGTON
STEEL Promulgated:
CORPORATION,
Respondent. March 28, 2008
x-
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- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution[1] dated
January 16, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 which
dismissed outright petitioner's Petition for Review for failure to show proof
of authority of the signatory to the Verification and Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping, and
the CA Resolution[2] dated
The antecedent facts of
the petition are as follows:
Remington Steel
Corporation[3]
(Remington) leased ground floor units 964 and 966 and second floor unit 963 of
a building owned by the Manila Downtown YMCA (YMCA) in
On
During the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 154969-CV and 155083-CV,
Remington filed a Petition for Consignation of Rentals on the ground that YMCA
refused to receive rentals for ground floor units 964 and 966, docketed as
Civil Case No. 155897 and assigned to Branch 24 of MeTC-Manila
(MeTC-Branch 24). On
Remington, however,
continued to use ground floor units 964 and 966 as passageway to second floor
unit 963. It kept the premises padlocked and failed to give YMCA the keys to
the premises.
On
On
On March 15, 2000,
RTC-Branch 30, acting as an appellate court, rendered a Decision[7] in Civil
Case Nos. 99-93836 and 99-93837 granting Remington a longer extension period of
five years for second floor unit 963 and ordering YMCA to provide a two-meter
passageway between units 964 and 966.
Dissatisfied, YMCA filed
an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58957. On
In the meantime that
CA-G.R. SP No. 58957 was pending, YMCA filed in MeTC-Manila
two separate complaints for unlawful detainer to
evict Remington from ground floor units 964 and 966,[8] docketed
as Civil Case Nos. 168629-CV and 168628-CV, respectively. Civil Case No. 168629-CV was raffled to
Branch 20, while Civil Case No. 168628-CV was raffled to Branch 17. Upon
Remington's motion, the two cases were consolidated. However, when YMCA filed a motion for
reconsideration, the consolidation of cases was reversed and canceled. Thus, the cases were tried separately.
YMCA contended in both
cases that Remington did not surrender the ground floor units but padlocked the
doors, refused to surrender the keys, and failed to pay rent therefor demand.
Remington countered that
it vacated and surrendered ground floor units 964 and 966 on July 1, 1998; that
although it had the doors of the units locked, it did so only as an act of
self-preservation, since it had a valid lease on second floor unit 963, and
YMCA refused to heed the order of the court to provide a passageway to the
second floor; that, if it were true that no turnover of ground floor units 964
and 966 was made, YMCA had the remedy of filing the appropriate motion in the
consignation case, where the parties agreed on such turnover; and that the fact
that it did not complain shows completion of such turnover.[9]
Both branches of MeTC-Manila separately ordered Remington to vacate the
premises and to pay reasonable rent and attorney's fees to YMCA.[10]
Remington separately
appealed both decisions to the Regional Trial Court,
reconsideration[12] which were denied.[13]
YMCA then filed separate
petitions for review[14] in the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R SP Nos. 74292 and 88599.
On
On February 10, 2003,
YMCA filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] therein,
appending thereto a Secretary's Certificate[17] dated
December 26, 2002 executed by YMCA's Corporate Secretary attesting to a
December 13, 2002 Resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing William Golangco to prepare and file the petition for review.
On
Hence, the present
petition involving only unit 964 anchored on the following ground:
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION RAISED BEFORE IT
WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBMIT THE AUTHORITY OF THE AFFIANT
WHO SIGNED FOR THE PETITIONER CORPORATION AND THE SUBSEQUENT SUBMISSION OF THE
SECRETARY'S CERTIFICATE DID NOT CURE SAID DEFECT IN THE CERTIFICATION AGAINST
FORUM SHOPPING.[20]
YMCA argues that the
rules do not require that the filing of the Verification and Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping should include therewith the authorization of the person
signing the same; that Melo does not apply,
since it involves the total failure to append to the petition a Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; that recent cases of this Court, while
upholding the need to present the authority of the person signing the Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in case the party litigant is not a
natural person, emphasize that its late submission is not fatal.
Remington, on the other
hand, contends that YMCA is required at the time of the filing of its petition
to show that the person signing the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping on its behalf had proper authority to do so; that subsequent
compliance would encourage parties to make light of the requirements of
petitions for review.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42
of the Rules of Court require that a petition for review filed with the CA
should be verified and should contain a certificate of non-forum shopping, to
wit:
SEC. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals x x x.
SEC. 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, x x x.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphasis supplied)
These
requirements are mandatory, and failure to comply therewith is sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition.[21] The requirement that the petitioner should sign the Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping applies even to corporations,
considering that the mandatory directives of the Rules of Court make no
distinction between natural and juridical persons.[22]
Except
for the powers which are expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and
those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence, a corporation has
no powers. It exercises its powers through its board of directors and/or its
duly authorized officers and agents.[23] Thus,
its power to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors
that exercises its corporate powers.[24]
Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural
persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific
act of the board of directors.[25]
The purpose
of requiring a verification is to secure an
assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or
are true and correct, not merely speculative.[26] On the other hand, the rule against
forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora,
as this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial procedure.[27]
A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirements for Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. As to Verification, non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective; hence, the court may order its correction if verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.[28] On the other hand, the lack of certification of non-forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition.[29] The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is thus deemed obligatory, albeit not jurisdictional.[30] However, jurisprudence instructs that the rule on certification against forum shopping may be relaxed on grounds of “substantial compliance” or “special circumstance or compelling reasons.”[31]
In Shipside
Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,[32] the petitioner had not attached any
proof that its resident manager was authorized to sign the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, as a consequence of which, the petition
was dismissed by the CA. Subsequent to
the dismissal, however, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, to
which was attached a Certificate issued by its board secretary who stated that,
prior to the filing of the petition, the resident
manager had been authorized by the board of directors to file the
petition. The Court recognized therein
the abundance of cases excusing non-compliance with the requirement of a certification
of non-forum shopping and held that with more reason should a petition be given
due course when it incorporates a certification of non-forum shopping without
evidence that the person signing the certification was an authorized signatory
and the petitioner subsequently submits a secretary’s certificate attesting to the signatory’s
authority in its motion for reconsideration.
Similarly, in Havtor Management
Philippines Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[33] the
Court acknowledged substantial compliance when the lacking secretary’s
certificate was submitted by the petitioners as an attachment to the motion for
reconsideration seeking reversal of the original decision dismissing the
petition for its earlier failure to submit such requirement.
Likewise, in General Milling Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission,[34] the CA
dismissed the petition, which was not accompanied by any board resolution or
certification by the corporate secretary that the person who signed the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was duly authorized to represent the
petitioner corporation. In the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the
petitioner attached a board resolution stating that the signatory of the
Certification had been duly authorized to do so. The Court deemed as
substantial compliance the belated attachment to the motion for reconsideration
the board resolution or the secretary’s certificate, stating that there was no
attempt on the part of the petitioner to ignore the prescribed procedural
requirements.
The ruling in these cases has been repeatedly reiterated in
subsequent cases: Pascual and Santos, Inc.
v. The Members of the Tramo Wakas
Neighborhood Association,[35] Wack Wack Golf and Country Club v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[36] Vicar International Construction,
Inc. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation,[37]
Ateneo De
Naga University v. Manalo,[38] China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc.,[39]
LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter,[40] Varorient
Shipping Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[41] and most recently in Cana
v. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines,[42] and
continues to be the controlling doctrine.
As in the aforementioned cases, YMCA rectified
its failure to submit proof of Golangco's authority
to sign the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum Shopping on its behalf
when it attached in its
Motion for Reconsideration a Secretary's Certificate issued by its Corporate
Secretary stating that on December 13, 2002, or prior to the filing of the
petition on December 27, 2002, Golangco had been
authorized by YMCA's Board of Directors to file the petition before the CA.
Thus, the CA's reliance on Melo was misplaced. That case involved a total
failure to append to the petition a verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, unlike the present case in which YMCA
timely filed a Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, but merely
failed to submit proof of authority of the signatory to sign the same.
While the requirement of the
certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirement
must not be interpreted too literally as to defeat the objective of preventing
the undesirable practice of forum shopping.[43]
Accordingly, the CA committed an error in dismissing outright
YMCA's petition for review for failure to attach a proof of authority of the
signatory to the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
Ordinarily, the Court would remand the case to the CA for
proper disposition of the petition on the merits.[44] The
particular surrounding facts and circumstances in the present case, however,
prevent the Court from doing so. In the meantime that the present petition was
pending, the CA rendered a Decision dated October 17, 2005 in CA-G.R SP No.
88599, involving ground floor unit 966 reversing the Decision of
RTC-Branch 25 and reinstating the Decision of MeTC-Branch
17 on YMCA's complaint for unlawful detainer. When Remington's motion for reconsideration
was denied, it filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court, entitiled “Remington Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the Philippine
Islands, doing business under the name Manila Downtown YMCA,” docketed
as G.R. No. 171858.[45] On P11,000.00 a month from July 1, 1998 until March 12,
2004 as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises.[47] The Court held therein:
The filing of the Formal
Surrender of Leased Premises and the actual emptying of the premises constitute
constructive delivery of possession. Hence, the contract of lease was
terminated on
However, [Remington] failed to comply with its obligation to return the premises to [YMCA]. In order to return the thing leased to the lessor, it is not enough that the lessee vacates it. It is necessary that he places the thing at the disposal of the lessor, so that the latter can receive it without any obstacle. He must return the keys and leave no sub-lessees or other persons in the property; otherwise he shall continue to be liable for rents.
[Remington’s] constructive delivery of the premises did not produce the effect of actual delivery to the [YMCA]. To be effective, it is necessary that the person to whom the delivery is made must be able to take control of it without impediment especially from the person who supposedly made such delivery. In the case at bar, records show that despite the termination of the lease, [YMCA] was never in possession of the premises because it was padlocked. [YMCA] was not given the key to the premises hence it was deprived to use the same as it pleases.
Although the use of the premises as passageway was justified, [Remington] cannot deprive [YMCA] the use of the said premises by having it padlocked. Other than simply repudiating the demand for back rentals, [Remington] should have given [YMCA] a set of keys so it can enter the premises without exposing the property to security risks. Prudence dictates the delivery of the keys to [YMCA] to dispel any doubt that [Remington] is using the premises other than as a mere passageway and that it has never withheld possession of the same to the [YMCA]. [Remington] had several opportunities to give [YMCA] access to the premises starting from the time it sent its first demand to pay back rentals until the complaint for ejectment was filed but it never availed of these opportunities.
From the
foregoing, it is apparent that [Remington’s] constructive delivery did not
effectively transfer possession of the leased premises to [YMCA]. From the time
the lease was terminated, [Remington] unlawfully withheld possession of the
leased premises from [YMCA]. However, it appears that [Remington] had moved
out from [YMCA’s] building on
Under Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the trial court may award reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased premises after the same is duly proved. In Asian Transmission Corporation v. Canlubang Sugar Estates, the Court ruled that the reasonable compensation contemplated under said Rule partakes of the nature of actual damages based on the evidence adduced by the parties. The Court also ruled that “fair rental value is defined as the amount at which a willing lessee would pay and a willing lessor would receive for the use of a certain property, neither being under compulsion and both parties having a reasonable knowledge of all facts, such as the extent, character and utility of the property, sales and holding prices of similar land and the highest and best use of the property.”
The reasonable
compensation for the leased premises fixed by the trial court based on the
stipulated rent under the lease contract which is P22,531.00, must be
equitably reduced in view of the circumstances attendant in the case at bar.
First, it should be noted that the premises was used only as a means of
passageway caused by [YMCA’s] failure to provide sufficient passageway towards
the second floor unit it also occupies. Second, [YMCA] was negligent because it
waited for more than a year before it actually demanded payment for back
rentals as reflected in its Statement of Accounts dated September 7, 1999. When
both parties to a transaction are mutually negligent in the performance of
their obligations, the fault of one cancels the negligence of the other and, as
in this case, their rights and obligations may be determined equitably under
the law proscribing unjust enrichment. From the foregoing, we find the amount
of P11,000.00 a month equitable and reasonable
compensation for petitioner’s continued use of the premises.[48]
(Emphasis supplied)
Remington filed a Motion for
Reconsideration therein but it was denied with finality in a Resolution dated
The
final Resolution dated
The
doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy
grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial
decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has
held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a
court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in
which the facts are substantially the same.
Stare decisis et
non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not
what is settled. Stare decisis
simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different.
It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Thus, where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is
a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[52]
It
bears stressing that the facts of the present case and those of G.R. No. 171858
are substantially the same. The only
difference is the unit involved; G.R. No. 171858 involves unit 966 while the
present case involves unit 964. The
opposing parties are likewise the same.
Clearly, in the light of the final Resolution dated
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS herein
petition insofar as the outright dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 74292 is
concerned. The Resolutions dated
SO
ORDERED.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
Acting
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* In lieu of
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, per Special Order No.
497 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Regalado E. Maambong, CA rollo, p. 260.
[2] CA rollo, p. 296.
[3] Also known as “Remington Industrial Sales Corporation” in other parts of the record.
[4] CA rollo, p. 88.
[5]
[6]
[7] CA rollo, p. 150.
[8]
[9] CA rollo, p. 119.
[10] Rollo, p. 145; Remington Industrial Sales Corporation v. Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 171858, January 22, 2007, 512 SCRA 183, 188.
[11] CA rollo, p. 36; Remington Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Chinese Young Men's
Christian Association of the Philippine Islands, supra.
[12] CA rollo, p. 50; Remington Industrial
Sales Corporation v. Chinese Young
Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands, supra at 189.
[13] CA rollo, p. 75; Remington Industrial
Sales Corporation v. Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the
Philippine
[14] CA rollo, p. 2.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] 376 Phil. 204 (1999).
[20] Rollo, p. 13.
[21] Rules of Court, Rule 42, Sec. 3, provides:
SEC. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
[22] Pascual and Santos, Inc. v. The Members of the Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association, Inc., G.R. No. 144880, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 438, 446; Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, 406 Phil. 543, 553 (2001)
[23] Pascual and Santos, Inc. v. The Members of the Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association, Inc., supra note 22; National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 656, 665-666 (2002).
[24] Pascual and Santos, Inc. v. The Members of the Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association, Inc., supra note 22; Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 981, 994 (2001).
[25] Pascual and Santos, Inc. v. The Members of the Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association, supra note 22, at 446-447; Firme v. Bukal Enterprises and Development Corporation, 460 Phil. 321, 346 (2003).
[26] Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 463; Robern Development Corp. v. Judge Quitain, 373 Phil. 773, 786; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 450 Phil. 532, 540 (2003).
[27] Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 391 Phil. 303, 312 (2000); Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24.
[28] Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, supra note 27; Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24, at 995.
[29] Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, supra note 27; Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24, at 995.
[30] Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, supra note 26, at 465.
[31] Mamaril v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 164929,
[32] Supra note 24.
[33] 423 Phil. 509, 513 (2001).
[34] 442 Phil. 425, 427 (2002).
[35] Supra note 22.
[36] G.R. No. 149793,
[37] G.R. No. 157195,
[38] G.R. No. 160455,
[39] G.R. No. 164798,
[40] G.R. No. 159653,
[41] G.R. No. 164940,
[42] G.R. No. 157573,
[43] Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 41, p.8; Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals supra note 24, at 996; Bernardo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 325 Phil. 371, 384 (1996).
[44] Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160798, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 768, 778; Vicar International Construction, Inc. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation, supra note 40 at 599; Donato v. Court of Appeals, 462 Phil. 676, 692 (2003); BA Savings Bank v. Sia, 391 Phil. 370, 378 (2000).
[45] Supra note 10.
[46] Penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
[47] G.R. No. 171858,
[48] Supra note 47, at 758-760.
[49] Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition.
[50] Horne v. Moody,
146 S.W.2d 505 (1940).
[51]
[52] Ty
v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank,
G.R. No. 144705, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 65, 76.
[53]