Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
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RAMON GERARDO B. SAN
LUIS, |
G.R. No. 159127 |
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Petitioner, |
Present: |
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|
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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HON. PABLITO M. ROJAS in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC. |
Promulgated: |
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Respondents.* |
March 3, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
filed by Ramon Gerardo B. San Luis (petitioner) seeking to set aside the
Resolutions dated September 11, 2002[1] and May 20, 2003[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA
-G.R. SP No. 72596.
The factual background of herein petition is as follows:
On July 12, 2001, Berdex International, Inc. (private
respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City (RTC) a complaint[3]
for a sum of money against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 68530
alleging that: it is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the United States
of America with principal office in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.; it is maintaining the present action only to
enforce its rights by virtue of an isolated transaction with petitioner; in
June 1997, petitioner received from it
certain amounts of money which were meant partly as advances or loan and partly for the purchase of 40% shares in both Seanet
and Seabest Corporations, however, not a single share
in those corporations was transferred to private respondent by petitioner and
the shares were retained by the latter;
the parties then agreed to treat all the payments/advances made by
private respondent to petitioner as the latter's loan; petitioner proposed the
payment of the loan within a period of three years, which proposal was accepted
by private respondent with the agreement that in case of non-payment of any
installment on their due dates, the entire amount shall become due and
demandable; petitioner later refused to sign a formal contract of loan;
petitioner confirmed such loan to private respondent's auditors on August 8,
2000; and he had only paid US$20,000.00 and no further payment was made despite
repeated demands. Private respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay
the amount of US$150,335.75 plus interest
until fully paid and attorney's fees.
Petitioner filed his Answer[4] contending that: he is a businessman engaged in the trading of
seafoods; he received from private respondent the
total amount of US$141,944.71 with instructions that petitioner first deduct therefrom the amount of US$23,748.00 representing the
latter's commission from private respondent in their other transaction; the
money was intended to be used to buy 70% of the outstanding shares of Seanet Corporation on behalf of private respondent and the
balance as private respondent's advances
as Seanet's stockholder, which he complied with; in
view, however, of subsequent substantial losses incurred by Seanet
and petitioner's desire to maintain good business with private respondent,
petitioner offered that the amounts he received from private respondent be paid
by Fuegomar Traders, Inc. (Fuegomar),
a company which he subsequently put up and which he substantially owned and
engaged in the same line of business as Seanet; Fuegomar will purchase at cost the stock investment of
private respondent in Seanet; while the documentation
of such agreement was being finalized, petitioner then gave US$20,000.00 to
private respondent on behalf of Fuegomar; however,
private respondent then claimed that its investment in Seanet was petitioner's personal loan and the amount of US$20,000.00 paid on behalf
of Fuegomar was maliciously interpreted as
petitioner' admission of personal liability.
The pre-trial conference was
terminated on
On April 4, 2002, private respondent
filed a MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories)[5]
alleging that initial presentation of
its evidence is set on May 3, 2002; that however, all of its witnesses
are Americans who reside or hold office in the USA; that one of the witnesses
is already of advanced age and travel to the Philippines may be extremely
difficult if not dangerous; and there is
a perceived danger to them in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2002;[6] that written interrogatories are
ideal in this case since the factual issues are already very few; that such
mode of deposition-taking will save precious judicial and government time and
will prevent needless delays in the case.
In his Opposition and Comment,[7] petitioner contends: If indeed there was an oral contract and
petitioner was liable to private respondent for the amount he received from the
latter, the documents attached to private respondent's complaint did not
support its claim, but rather supported
his position. There is a very strict standard in proving an oral contract.
Taking the deposition through written interrogatories would deprive the court
of the opportunity to observe the general bearing and demeanor of
witnesses. Petitioner's right to
cross-examine the witnesses will be prejudiced, since he will be limited to
cross-interrogatories which will severely limit not only the scope but the
spontaneity of his cross-examination. It
is doubtful whether the witnesses will give their deposition under sanction of
the penalties prescribed by Philippine law for perjury. It will not necessarily
save precious judicial and government time but may in fact lengthen the trial,
as both parties will have the right to review and to object to interrogatories
submitted by the other party. The claim that travel to the Philippines would be dangerous for the witnesses who are
all Americans is frivolous, since
respondent has not presented evidence that the US government has
prohibited its citizens from traveling to the Philippines; and if ever there
was such prohibition, it was not binding on our own legal system. Old age was
not a valid reason.
In an Order[8] dated
Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in an Order[9] dated
Petitioner filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
In a Resolution dated
A perusal of the petition and its annexes indicates that:
1.
no affidavit of service is attached;
2.
the following Annexes are blurred:
- Annex H
- Annex J
3.
the pleadings filed before the respondent court
are not attached.
According to the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 in relation to Section 1,
Rule 65 of the 1994 Rules of Civil Procedure, non-compliance with the
requirements is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED.[10]
In a Resolution dated
Petitioner
filed the instant petition for certiorari.
Petitioner
raises the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED ON MERE TECHNICALITY THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI OF THE PETITIONER EVEN IF THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE THE UNIQUENESS OF THE LEGAL ISSUE RAISED BY THE PETITIONER
AND THE GRAVE INJUSTICE THAT WILL BE VISITED UPON THE PETITIONER IF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, A NON-RESIDENT FOREIGN CORPORATION, WILL BE ALLOWED TO PROVE THE
EXISTENCE OF AN ORAL CONTRACT THROUGH DEPOSITION BY WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES OF
ALL ITS WITNESSES TAKEN OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES.[11]
Petitioner argues that the CA focused
on technicality rather than substantial justice, notwithstanding that he subsequently
complied with all the requirements and attached them to his Motion for
Reconsideration; that his failure to attach an affidavit of service was due to
his belief that the affidavit can be dispensed with in case of personal service
of the petition to the parties who received the same; that Annex “H,” a letter dated July 12, 2000 sent by
private respondent to Fuegomar and R.G. San Luis
(herein petitioner) asking for confirmation of
the note held by the former regarding the latter's outstanding obligation to it,[12] which was attached to the complaint
filed with the RTC, was also blurred; that the blurred copy of Annex “J,” the Seanet
Corporation Loan Amortization Schedule,[13] was due to inadvertence during the
reproduction of the numerous annexes; and
that he only attached pleadings to the petition filed in the CA which he
believed to be important and relevant to the issue submitted in his petition.
Petitioner further alleges that the CA
failed to appreciate that grave
injustice would be done to him if private respondent, a non-resident foreign
corporation, would have all its
witnesses who are foreigners give their testimonies through deposition upon
written interrogatories which would be taken outside of the Philippines and
would seek to establish an oral contract not supported by any documentary
evidence; that to allow such deposition will prevent the RTC from testing the
credibility of the witnesses, and petitioner's right to cross-examine the
witnesses would be curtailed if not denied, as he would be limited to
cross-interrogatories and re-cross interrogatories based on written
interrogatories.
Private respondent counters that
petitioner resorted to a wrong remedy by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition
for review under Rule 45; that petitioner can no longer question the CA
Resolutions, as certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute
for an appeal where the latter remedy is available; that the CA's dismissal of
the petition was proper; that Circular 19-91 is quite clear that any petition
under Rule 65 may be denied outright if there is no proof of service on the
lower court; that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC in
allowing deposition-taking as the same was consistent with the rules.
The Court’s Ruling
Preliminarily, we find petitioner's
resort to a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 proper considering that petitioner is assailing the Resolutions
of the CA dismissing their petition outright.[14]
In Donato v. Court of Appeals[15], we held:
The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a
decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one
of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper
remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona:
Anent the first issue,
in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it
is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable
only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the
act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which
is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Inasmuch as the present
petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of
procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the
petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[16]
Anent petitioner's failure to attach
the affidavit of service, we find the same not fatal to the petition since it
showed that copies of the petition were personally served on the RTC and
private respondent's counsel on September 3, 2002 as evidenced by the parties'
official receiving stamps appearing opposite their names. By analogy, we have
held[17]
that the non-attachment of the affidavit of service is not fatal to the
petition when the registry receipts
attached to the petition clearly show that respondents were served copies of
the petition; that the demands of substantial justice were satisfied by the
actual receipt of the petition.[18]
We likewise find satisfactory the
explanation advanced by petitioner with
respect to the blurred copies of the annexes attached to the petition.
Moreover, we find that Annexes “H” and “J” are not necessary for the resolution
of the issue brought before the CA, i.e., whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting private
respondent's MOTION (To Authorize
Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories).
As
to the non-attachment to the petition of the pleadings filed in the RTC, we
find that the documents attached to the petition -- to wit: private
respondent's MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written
Interrogatories), petitioner's opposition,
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and private respondent's
opposition -- show that they contained the relevant facts of the case and the
respective arguments of the parties on which the CA could have based its
resolution on the merits of the issue
brought before it. Thus, there was no
need to attach all other pleadings filed in the RTC. Nonetheless, petitioner had submitted all the
pleadings when he filed his motion for reconsideration.
The CA's reliance on Administrative
Circular No. 3-96 dated
As to the non-submission of the
affidavit of service and other pleadings jurisprudence dictates that the
subsequent and substantial compliance of a petitioner may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure.[19]
While it is true that rules of
procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice,
and the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, they
nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice.[20]
Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of
procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice,
rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid application of the rules must
always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules,
that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should
never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant
must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination
of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[21]
Thus, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in hastily dismissing
the petition on procedural flaws.
While herein petitioner prays that the
CA be ordered to give due course to the petition for certiorari filed before it and to remand the
case to the CA for proper disposition, the Court opts to resolve the sole issue
raised in the present petition which is a pure question of law, i.e., whether Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court allows a non-resident foreign corporation the
privilege of having all its witnesses, all of whom are foreigners, to testify
through deposition upon written interrogatories taken outside the Philippines
to prove an oral contract, in order to avoid further delay.
Section
1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, which substantially reproduced Section 1,
Rule 24 of the old Rules, provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action,
when may be taken. - By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained
over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or
without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
depositions upon oral examination or written interrogatories.
Unequivocally, the rule does not make
any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The fact that
private respondent is a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial. The rule clearly provides that the testimony
of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, at the instance of any party. Depositions serve as a device
for ascertaining the facts relative to the issues of the case. The evident
purpose is to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil
trials and thus prevent the said trials from being carried out in the dark.[22]
In Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes[23], where we upheld the right of
plaintiff during the trial stage of the case to present its evidence by
deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction in lieu of their oral
examination in court, we said:
Depositions
are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which
are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other
modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by
adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and
mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material
and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those
known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object
of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all
the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to
the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of
factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely
laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.
Depositions
are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing
themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to
be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.
The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at
the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section
1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall
be given orally."
Indeed, any
deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or
hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court,
may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay: the party against
whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time
that his testimony is offered. It matters not that opportunity for cross-examination was
afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for
cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial
evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.
However,
depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain
limited purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule
24[24]
of the Rules of Court.
SEC 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the
hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used
against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the
deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the
following provisions:
(a) Any
deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness;
(b) The
deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition
was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation,
partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party
for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party,
may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness if out of the province and at a
greater distance than fifty[25] (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing,
or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by
the party offering the deposition; or
(3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has
been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon
application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it
desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition
to be used;
(d) If only
part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may
require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the party introduced,
and any party may introduce any other parts.
The principle
conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent
with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to
testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him."
It is
apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may
be, in the
Leave of court
is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary
or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent
of the Republic of the
Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting private respondent's MOTION (To Allow
Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories) considering private
respondent's allegation in its MOTION that its witnesses are all Americans
residing in the
Petitioner insists that Dasmariñas
does not constitute a precedent in the instant case as the facts are
substantially different; to wit: (1) in Dasmariñas, plaintiff filed a motion to take
deposition through written
interrogatories of two witnesses abroad after it had already presented its
first witness, while in the present case, private respondent will not present a
single witness to testify in court but only the witnesses’ depositions; (2) in Dasmariñas, the existence of the contract
involved was not in issue at all, while in the present case,
petitioner denied the existence of the alleged contract of loan and private respondent has not presented any
documentary evidence to support its claim.
We do not
agree.
The situation in Dasmariñas is the same as in the instant case since in both
cases, it was already during the trial stage that the deposition through
written interrogatories was sought to be taken.
It does not matter whether one witness for the plaintiff had already testified
since the Dasmariñas ruling did not
make such testimony in court a condition to grant the deposition of the two
other witnesses. Also, in Dasmariñas, the plaintiff
sued defendant to recover a certain sum of money which was the same as in the
instant case as private respondent was suing petitioner for collection of sum
of money.
Petitioner claims that the right to
take depositions upon written interrogatories in lieu of oral testimony in open
court would result in grave injustice to him, as private respondent is seeking
to establish the existence of an oral contract which requires stricter standard
in proving the same.
We find such
argument untenable.
While there are limitations to the
rules of discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and
without judicial intervention,[27] such limitations inevitably arise
when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith;[28] or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry;[29] or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches
upon the recognized domains of privilege.[30]
It has been repeatedly held that
deposition discovery rules are to be accorded
a broad and liberal treatment[31] and should not be unduly restricted
if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the
inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. Otherwise, the
advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and
expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.[32] In fact, we find nothing
in the rules on deposition that limits their use in case of oral
contract as alleged by petitioner.
In any event, the admissibility of the
deposition does not preclude the determination of its probative value at the
appropriate time. The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.[33]
Petitioner argues that to allow such
deposition-taking will prevent the RTC from observing the witnesses' demeanor and credibility; and that petitioner's right to cross-examine
the witnesses would be curtailed if not denied as he is limited to
cross-interrogatories and re-cross interrogatories based on written
interrogatories.
We are not persuaded.
Depositions are allowed as a departure
from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open
court, where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge; and the
procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition,
thereby taken, inadmissible.[34] It precisely falls within one of the
exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a
deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in
open court and without being subject to the prying eyes and probing questions
of the Judge.[35] Depositions are consistent with the principle
of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or
proceeding.[36]
Depositions are allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance
with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court; that is, with leave of court if the summons
have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted; and
provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists.[37]
We also find no merit in petitioner's
claim that his right to cross-examine private respondent's witnesses will be
curtailed since petitioner is fully accorded the opportunity for
cross-examination under Section 25, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 25. Depositions upon written
interrogatories; service of notice and of interrogatories. - A party desiring
to take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall serve
them upon every other party with a notice stating the name and address of the
person who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and address of the
officer before whom the deposition is to be taken. Within ten (10) days
thereafter, a party so served may serve
cross interrogatories upon the party proposing
to take the deposition. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may
serve re-direct interrogatories upon a party who has served cross
interrogatories. Within three (3) days after being served with re-direct
interrogatories, a party may serve
re-cross interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.
Thus, petitioner may submit
cross-interrogatories upon private respondent with sufficient fullness and
freedom.
Finally, petitioner contends that since private respondent will have the
testimonies of its witnesses in another jurisdiction, the sanction of penalty
for perjury under our laws would not apply to them; and petitioner may not be
able to enforce its own claim against private respondent, since it is domiciled
in a foreign country and does not appear to have any assets in the Philippines.
We will not venture to make any determination on this matter, as it would be
premature, conjectural or anticipatory. We must only deal with an existing case
or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one
that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. [38]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* The Court of Appeals is named as
respondent. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the name of the Court of Appeals is deleted from the
title.
[1] Penned
by Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, and concurred
in by Justices Renato
C. Dacudao and
Mario L. Guariña III; rollo,
p. 20.
[2]
[3] Rollo, pp. 23-26.
[4]
[5] Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[6] Should
be 2001.
[7] Rollo, pp. 34-38.
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, p. 20.
[11] Rollo, p. 206.
[12]
[13]
[14] See Lim v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 149748,
[15] G.R. No.
129638,
[16] Donato v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 15, at 223.
[17] Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara, G.R.
No. 142937, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 41, 52 citing Gutierrez v. Secretary
of Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 142248, December 16, 2004,
447 SCRA 107; Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 152998, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 621.
[18] Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
[19] Valdecantos v. People, G.R. No. 148852,
[20] Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara, supra
note 17 citing Wack Wack
Golf and Country Club v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
149793, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 280; General Milling Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 442 Phil. 425 (2002).
[21] Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
[22] Republic
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478,
[23] G.R. No.
108229,
[24] Now Rule
23 under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.
[25] Now under Sec. 4 (c)(2), Rule 23, which reads:
(2)
that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers
from the place of trial or hearing or is out of the
[26] Dasmariñas
Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, supra note 23, at
629-632.
[27] Republic
v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 22, at 225.
[28] Section
18, Rule 23, Rules of Court.
SECTION 18.
Motion to terminate or limit examination. - At any time during the taking of the deposition, on
motion or petition of any party or of the deponent and upon a showing that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably
to annoy embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the court in which the
action is pending or the Regional Trial Court of the place where the deposition
is being taken may order the officer conducting the examination to cease
forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the
taking of the deposition, as provided in section 16 of this Rule.
[29]
[30] Sec. 2,
Rule 23, Rules of Court
SECTION
2. Scope of examination. - Unless otherwise ordered
by the court as provided by section 16 or 18 of this Rule, the deponent may be
examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.
[31] Ayala
Land Inc. v. Tagle, G.R. No. 153667,
[32] Hyatt
Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Ley
Construction and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 147143, March 10, 2006,
484 SCRA 286, 301.
[33] Ayala
Land, Inc. v. Tagle, supra note 31 citing Permanent
Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde, G.R. No.
140608, September 23, 2004, 439 SCRA 1; PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38 (1998); De la Torre v. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 628 (1998).
[34] Dasmariñas Garments Inc. v. Reyes, supra note
23, at 635.
[35]
[36] Hyatt
Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Ley
Construction and Development Corporation, supra note 32 at 301, citing Jonathan
Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 155010, August 16, 2004, 436 SCRA
559.
[37] Jonathan
Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Mangudadatu, id.
[38] See Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No.
159357,