SPECIAL
THIRD DIVISION
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Petitioner,
- versus - NESTLÉ Respondent. x------------------------------------------x NESTLÉ Petitioner, - versus - Respondent. |
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G.R. Nos.
158930-31 G.R. Nos. 158944-45 Present: YNARES
- Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
AZCUNA,* TINGA,* and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: March
3, 2008 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition in G.R.
No. 158930-31 seeking that Nestlé be declared to have committed unfair labor
practice in allegedly setting a precondition to bargaining is DENIED. The
Petition in G.R. No. 158944-45, however, is PARTLY GRANTED in that we REVERSE
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 69805 in so far as it
ruled that the Secretary of the DOLE gravely abused her discretion in failing
to confine her assumption of jurisdiction power over the ground rules of the
CBA negotiations; but the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the inclusion
of the Retirement Plan as a valid issue in the collective bargaining
negotiations between UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestlé is AFFIRMED. The parties are
directed to resume negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan and to take
action consistent with
the discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.
Subsequent thereto, Nestlé Philippines,
Incorporated (Nestlé) filed a Motion for
Clarification[2] on 20 September 2006;
while Union of Filipro Employees – Drug, Food and Allied Industries Union –
Kilusang Mayo Uno (UFE-DFA-KMU), on 21 September 2006, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[3] of
the foregoing Decision.
The material facts of the case, as
determined by this Court in its Decision, may be summarized as follows:
UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Nestlé belonging to the
latter’s Alabang and Cabuyao plants. On
On 29 May 2001, in another letter to the
UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division only)[7],
Nestlé reiterated its stance that “unilateral grants, one-time company
grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are not
limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium,
are by their very nature not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore
shall be excluded therefrom.”[8]
Dialogue between the company and the
union thereafter ensued.
On
Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective,
though, and the UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice
of Strike[10] on
On
On
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, this Office hereby assumes
jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the Nestlé Philippines, Inc. (Cabuyao
Plant) pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Accordingly, any strike or lockout is hereby enjoined. The
parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any act that might
lead to the further deterioration of the current labor relations situation.
The parties are further directed to meet and convene for
the discussion of the union proposals and company counter-proposals before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) who is hereby designated as
the delegate/facilitator of this Office for this purpose. The NCMB shall report
to this Office the results of this attempt at conciliation and delimitation of
the issues within thirty (30) days from the parties’ receipt of this Order, in
no case later than
UFE-DFA-KMU sought reconsideration[16]
of the above but nonetheless moved for additional time to file its position
paper as directed by the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order.
On
On
In view of the above, in an Order dated on
On
On
UFE-DFA-KMU,
instead of filing the above-mentioned supplement, filed several pleadings, one
of which was a Manifestation with Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order dated
On
Thereafter, UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Petition
for Certiorari[18] before the Court
of Appeals, alleging that Sec. Sto. Tomas committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she issued the Orders of
In the interim, in an attempt to finally
resolve the crippling labor dispute between the parties, then Acting Secretary
of the DOLE, Hon. Arturo D. Brion, came out with an Order[19] dated
a. we
hereby recognize that the present Retirement Plan at the Nestlé Cabuyao Plant
is a unilateral grant that the parties have expressly so recognized subsequent
to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nestlé, Phils. Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
90231, February 4, 1991, and is therefore not a mandatory subject for
bargaining;
b. the
c. the
parties are directed to secure the best applicable terms of the recently
concluded CBSs between Nestlé Phils. Inc. and it eight (8) other bargaining
units, and to adopt these as the terms and conditions of the Nestlé Cabuyao
Plant CBA;
d. all
union demands that are not covered by the provisions of the CBAs of the other
eight (8) bargaining units in the Company are hereby denied;
e. all
existing provisions of the expired Nestlé Cabuyao Plant CBA without any
counterpart in the CBAs of the other eight bargaining units in the Company are
hereby ordered maintained as part of the new Nestlé Cabuyao Plant CBA;
f. the
parties shall execute their CBA within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Order, furnishing this Office a copy of the signed Agreement;
g. this
CBA shall, in so far as representation
is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years; all other provisions shall be
renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its effective date which
shall be December 5, 2001 (or on the first day six months after the expiration
on June 4, 2001 of the superceded CBA).
UFE-DFA-KMU moved to reconsider the
aforequoted ruling, but such was subsequently denied on
For
the second time, UFE-DFA-KMU went to the Court of Appeals via another Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the Orders
of
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
there being grave abuse on the part of the public respondent in issuing all the
assailed Orders, both petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated
February 11, 2001, and March 8, 2001 (CA-G.R. SP No. 69805), as well as the
Orders dated April 2, 2002 and May 6, 2002 (CA-G.R. SP No. 71540) of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment in the case entitled: “IN RE: LABOR DISPUTE
AT NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC. (CABUYAO FACTORY)” under OS-AJ-0023-01
(NCMB-RBIV-CAV-PM-08-035-01, NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-10-037-01,
NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-11-10-039—01) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondent is hereby directed to resume the CBA negotiations with the
petitioner.[20]
Both parties appealed the aforequoted ruling. Nestlé
essentially assailed that part of the decision finding the DOLE Secretary to
have gravely abused her discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when she ruled that the Retirement Plan was not a valid issue to be tackled
during the CBA negotiations; UFE-DFA-KMU, in contrast, questioned the appellate
court’s decision finding Nestlé free and clear of any unfair labor practice.
Since
the motions for reconsideration of both parties were denied by the Court of
Appeals in a joint Resolution dated
G.R. No. 158930-31 was filed by UFE-DFA-KMU
against Nestlé seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals Decision insofar as the
appellate court’s failure to find Nestlé guilty of unfair labor practice was
concerned; while G.R. No. 158944-45 was instituted by Nestlé against
UFE-DFA-KMU likewise looking to annul and set aside the part of the Court of
Appeals Decision declaring that: 1) the Retirement Plan was a valid collective
bargaining issue; and 2) the scope of the power of the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the labor
dispute between UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestlé was limited to the resolution of
questions and matters pertaining merely to the ground rules of the collective
bargaining negotiations to be conducted between the parties.
On 29 March 2004, this Court resolved[21]
to consolidate the two petitions inasmuch as they (1) involved the same set of
parties; (2) arose from the same set of circumstances, i.e., from several Orders issued by then DOLE Secretary, Hon.
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, respecting her assumption of jurisdiction over the
labor dispute between Nestlé and UFE-DFA-KMU, Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions;[22]
and (3) similarly assailed the same Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
After giving due course to the instant
consolidated petitions, this Court promulgated on 22 August 2006 its Decision,
now subject of UFE-DFA-KMU’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Nestlé’s
Motion for Clarification.
In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, UFE-DFA-KMU
would have this Court address and discuss anew points or arguments that have
basically been passed upon in this Court’s
As to Nestlé’s prayer for clarification, the
corporation seeks elucidation respecting the dispositive part of this Court’s
Decision directing herein parties to resume negotiations on the retirement
compensation package of the concerned employees. It posits that “[i]n directing the parties to
negotiate the Retirement Plan, the Honorable Court x x x might have overlooked
the fact that here, the Secretary of Labor had already assumed jurisdiction
over the entire 2001-2004 CBA controversy x x x.”
As to
the charge of unfair labor practice:
The motion does not put forward new arguments to
substantiate the prayer for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision except for
the sole contention that the transaction speaks for itself, i.e., res ipsa loquitor. Nonetheless, even a perusal of the arguments of
UFE-DFA-KMU in its petition and memorandum in consideration of the point
heretofore raised will not convince us to change our disposition of the
question of unfair labor practice. UFE-DFA-KMU argues therein that
Nestlé’s “refusal to bargain on a very important CBA economic provision
constitutes unfair labor practice.”[23] It explains that Nestlé set as a precondition
for the holding of collective bargaining negotiations the non-inclusion of the
issue of Retirement Plan. In its words, “respondent Nestlé Phils., Inc.
insisted that the Union should first agree that the retirement plan is not a
bargaining issue before respondent Nestlé would agree to discuss other issues
in the CBA.”[24] It
then concluded that “the Court of Appeals committed a legal error in not ruling
that respondent company is guilty of unfair labor practice. It also committed a legal error in failing to
award damages to the petitioner for the ULP committed by the respondent.”[25]
We are unconvinced still.
The duty to bargain collectively is
mandated by Articles 252 and 253 of the Labor Code, as amended, which state –
ART.
252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. – The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours, of
work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for
adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and
executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party
but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any
concession.
ART.
253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining
agreement. – When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to
bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor
modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a
written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days
prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the
status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms of conditions of
the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is
reached by the parties.
Obviously, the purpose of collective
bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a contract binding on
the parties; but the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have continued
for a reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a
collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to bargain does not include the
obligation to reach an agreement.
The crucial question, therefore, of
whether or not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith
typically turns on the facts of the individual case. As we have said, there is no per se test of good faith in bargaining.
Good faith or bad faith is an inference
to be drawn from the facts. To some
degree, the question of good faith may be a question of credibility. The effect
of an employer’s or a union’s individual actions is not the test of good-faith bargaining,
but the impact of all such occasions or actions, considered as a whole, and the
inferences fairly drawn therefrom collectively may offer a basis for the
finding of the NLRC.[26]
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that Nestlé was
motivated by ill will, “bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of
course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted x
x x”[27]
in disclaiming unilateral grants as proper subjects in their collective
bargaining negotiations. While the law
makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain
collectively with each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment
to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties
should approach the negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to
reach a common ground of agreement.
Herein, the union merely bases its
claim of refusal to bargain on a letter[28]
dated 29 May 2001 written by Nestlé where the latter laid down its position
that “unilateral
grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which
include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty
Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of
CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom.” But as we
have stated in this Court’s Decision, said letter is not tantamount to refusal
to bargain. In thinking to exclude the
issue of Retirement Plan from the CBA negotiations, Nestlé, cannot be faulted
for considering the same benefit as unilaterally granted, considering that
eight out of nine bargaining units have allegedly agreed to treat the
Retirement Plan as a unilaterally granted benefit. This is not a case where the employer exhibited
an indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining, because the negotiations
were not the unilateral activity of the bargaining representative. Nestlé’s
desire to settle the dispute and proceed with the negotiation being evident in
its cry for compulsory arbitration is proof enough of its exertion of
reasonable effort at good-faith bargaining.
In the case at bar, Nestle never refused to bargain
collectively with UFE-DFA-KMU. The
corporation simply wanted to exclude the Retirement Plan from the issues to be
taken up during CBA negotiations, on the postulation that such was in the
nature of a unilaterally granted benefit. An employer’s steadfast insistence to exclude
a particular substantive provision is no different from a bargaining
representative’s perseverance to include one that they deem of absolute
necessity. Indeed, an adamant insistence
on a bargaining position to the point where the negotiations reach an impasse
does not establish bad faith.[fn24 p.10] It is but natural that at negotiations,
management and labor adopt positions or make demands and offer proposals and
counter-proposals. On account of the importance of the economic issue proposed
by UFE-DFA-KMU, Nestle could have refused to bargain with the former – but it
did not. And the management’s firm stand against the issue of the Retirement
Plan did not mean that it was bargaining in bad faith. It had a right to insist on its position to
the point of stalemate.
The foregoing things considered, this
Court replicates below its clear disposition of the issue:
The concept of “unfair labor practice” is
defined by the Labor Code as:
ART. 247. CONCEPT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR PROSECUTION THEREOF.
– Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees
to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor
and management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise
deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt
industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable
labor-management relations.
x
x x x.
The
same code likewise provides the acts constituting unfair labor practices
committed by employers, to wit:
ART. 248.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF
EMPLOYERS. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following unfair labor practices:
(a)
To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization;
(b)
To require as a condition of employment that a person
or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one
to which he belongs;
(c)
To contract out services or functions being performed
by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of their right to self-organization;
(d)
To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the
giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;
(e)
To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and
other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from
requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition
for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union
at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement.
Employees
of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits
under the collective agreement. Provided,
That the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of
this Code shall not apply to the nonmembers of the recognized collective
bargaining agent; [The article referred to is 241, not 242. – CAA]
(f)
To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or
discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give
testimony under this Code;
(g)
To violate the duty to bargain collectively
as prescribed by this Code;
(h)
To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or
its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective
bargaining or any other dispute; or
(i)
To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The
provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and
agents of corporations associations or partnerships who have actually
participated, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held
criminally liable. (Emphasis supplied.)
Herein, Nestlé is accused of violating its
duty to bargain collectively when it purportedly imposed a pre-condition to its
agreement to discuss and engage in collective bargaining negotiations with
UFE-DFA-KMU.
A
meticulous review of the record and pleadings of the cases at bar shows that,
of the two notices of strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU before the NCMB, it was only
on the second that the ground of unfair labor practice was alleged. Worse, the
A perusal of the allegations and arguments
raised by UFE-DFA-KMU in the Memorandum (in G.R. Nos. 158930-31) will readily
disclose the need for the presentation of evidence other than its bare
contention of unfair labor practice in order to make certain the propriety or
impropriety of the ULP charge hurled against Nestlé. Under Rule XIII, Sec. 4,
Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code:
x
x x. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice of strike shall as far as practicable,
state the acts complained of and the efforts to resolve the dispute
amicably.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In
the case at bar, except for the assertion put forth by UFE-DFA-KMU, neither the
second Notice of Strike nor the records of these cases substantiate a finding
of unfair labor practice. It is not enough that the union believed that the
employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly
negate even a prima facie showing to
warrant such a belief. (Tiu v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123276, 18 August 1997, 277 SCRA 681,
688.)
Employers
are accorded rights and privileges to assure their self-determination and
independence and reasonable return of capital. (Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris, G.R. No. 155098,
There
is no per se test of good faith in
bargaining. (Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125038, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 509, 518.) Good
faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. (Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation
Employees Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 125038, 6
November 1997, 281 SCRA 509, 518.)
Herein, no proof was presented to exemplify bad faith on the part of
Nestlé apart from mere allegation. Construing arguendo that the content of the aforequoted letter of
As to the jurisdiction of the
DOLE Secretary under the amended Notice of Strike:
This Court is not convinced by the
argument raised by UFE-DFA-KMU that the DOLE Secretary should not have gone
beyond the disagreement on the ground rules of the CBA negotiations. The union doggedly
asserts that the entire labor dispute between herein parties concerns only the
ground rules.
Lest it be forgotten, it was UFE-DFA-KMU
which first alleged a bargaining deadlock as the basis for the filing of its
Notice of Strike; and at the time of the filing of the first Notice of Strike,
several conciliation conferences had already been undertaken where both parties
had already exchanged with each other their respective CBA proposals. In fact, during
the conciliation meetings before the NCMB, but prior to the filing of the
notices of strike, the parties had already delved into matters affecting the
meat of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Secretary of the DOLE simply
relied on the Notices of Strike that were filed by UFE-DFA-KMU as stated in her
Order of
x x x The records disclose that the
“A. Bargaining Deadlock
1. Economic issues (specify)
1. Retirement
2. Panel Composition
3. Costs and Attendance
4. CBA”
The
second Notice of Strike is dated
“B. Unfair Labor Practices (specify)
Bargaining in bad faith
–
Setting pre-condition in
the ground rules
(Retirement issue)”
Nowhere
in the second Notice of Strike is it indicated that this Notice is an amendment
to and took the place of the first Notice of Strike. In fact, our Assumption of Jurisdiction Order
dated November 29, 2001 specifically cited the two (2) Notices of Strike
without any objection on the part of the Union x x x.[29]
Had the parties not been at the stage where the substantive
provisions of the proposed CBA had been put in issue, the union would not have
based thereon its initial notice to strike. This Court maintains its original position in
the Decision that, based on the Notices of Strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU, the
Secretary of the DOLE rightly decided on matters of substance. That the union later on changed its mind is of
no moment because to give premium to such would make the legally mandated
discretionary power of the Dole Secretary subservient to the whims of the
parties.
As to the point of
clarification on the resumption of negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan:
As for the supposed confusion or
uncertainty of the dispositive part of this Court’s Decision, Nestle moves for
clarification of the statement – “The parties are directed to resume
negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan and to take action consistent with
the discussion hereinabove set forth. No
costs.” The entire fallo of this Court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition in G.R.
No. 158930-31 seeking that Nestlé be declared to have committed unfair labor
practice in allegedly setting a precondition to bargaining is DENIED. The
Petition in G.R. No. 158944-45, however, is PARTLY GRANTED in that we REVERSE
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 69805 in so far as it
ruled that the Secretary of the DOLE gravely abused her discretion in failing
to confine her assumption of jurisdiction power over the ground rules of the
CBA negotiations; but the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the inclusion
of the Retirement Plan as a valid issue in the collective bargaining
negotiations between UFE-DFA-KMU and Nestlé is AFFIRMED. The parties are
directed to resume negotiations respecting the Retirement Plan and to take
action consistent with
the discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.
Nestle interprets the foregoing as an
order for the parties to resume negotiations by themselves respecting the issue of retirement benefits due
the employees of the Cabuyao Plant. Otherwise
stated, Nestle posits that the dispositive part of the Decision directs the
parties to submit to a voluntary mode of dispute settlement.
A read-through of this Court’s Decision
reveals that the ambiguity is more ostensible than real. This Court’s Decision of
All
told, in consideration of the points
afore-discussed and the fact that no substantial arguments have been raised by
either party, this Court remains unconvinced that it should modify or reverse in
any way its disposition of herein cases in its earlier Decision. The labor dispute between the
Nestle and UFE-DFA-KMU has dragged on long enough. As no other issues are availing, let this
Resolution write an ending to the protracted labor dispute between Nestlé and
UFE-DFA-KMU (Cabuyao Division).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the basic issues of the case having been passed
upon and there being no new arguments availing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
is hereby denied with finality
for lack of merit. Let these cases be
remanded to the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment for proper
disposition, consistent with the discussions in this Court’s Decision of
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice |
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I attest that the conclusions in the
above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
* Justices
Adolfo S. Azcuna and Dante O. Tinga were designated to sit as additional
members replacing retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban and Justice Romeo
J. Callejo, Sr. per Raffle dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Minita
V. Chico-Nazario with retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, Associate
Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Alicia Austria-Martinez and Romeo J.
Callejo, Jr. concurring. G.R. Nos.
158930-31,
[2] Rollo of G.R. Nos. 158944-45, pp. 1371-1391.
[3] Rollo of G.R. Nos. 158930-31, pp. 1944-1956.
[4] Alabang and Cabuyao Divisions.
[5] Annex “B” of the Petition; rollo of G.R. Nos. 158930-31, Vol. I, p.
281.
[6]
[7] The Cabuyao Division of UFE-DFA-KMU became the sole
bargaining unit involved in the subject CBA negotiations because of the closure of the Nestlé Alabang
Plant.
[8] Annex “F-1” of the Petition; rollo of G.R. Nos. 158930-31, p. 460.
[9] In a letter addressed to Atty.
Jose Velasco, Director, National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Regional
Office No. IV, Imus,
[10]
[11] Records, Vol. IV, p. 1.
[12] Records, Vol. II, p. 146.
[13] Of the 789 regular rank-and-file
employees of Nestlé (Cabuyao Factory, Laguna), only 724 employees voted; the YES
ballot garnered 708 votes, while only 13 employees decided against the plan to
stage a strike; Records, Vol. II, p.
150.
[14] Dated
[15]
[16] Dated
[17]
[18] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 69805).
[19] Annex “BB” of the Petition; rollo of G.R. Nos. 158944-45, pp.
508-520.
[20]
[21] SC Resolution dated
[22] Concerning employees at Nestlé’s
Alabang and Cabuyao factories.
[23] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp 10-11; rollo of G.R. Nos. 158930-31, pp.
1672-1673.
[24]
[25]
[26] 48 Am. Jur. 2d, Labor and Labor
Relations, Sec. 1028, 828.
[27] San
Miguel Corporation v. Del Rosario, G.R. Nos. 168194 & 168603, 13
December 2005, 477 SCRA 604, 619.
[28] “x x x [U]nilateral grants, one-time company grants, company-initiated policies
and programs, which include, but are not limited to the Retirement Plan,
Incidental Straight Duty Pay and Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature
not proper subjects of CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded
therefrom.”
[29] Rollo
of G.R. Nos. 158930-31, Vol. I, pp. 333-334.