Republic of the
Supreme
Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
ROSE AOAS, Petitioner, -
versus – PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 155339
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ.
Promulgated: |
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari
of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals, dated
The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th
day of October, 1992 in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, with intent to gain and without
the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, eighteen (18) sacks of
red and white beans, all valued at P24,720.00 belonging to NATY
MADON-EP, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned
amount of TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS (P24,720.00),
Philippine Currency.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution presented two witnesses: private complainant and barangay tanod Gregorio Garcia. As summarized by the Court of Appeals, the evidence for the prosecution are as follows:
Private complainant Naty Madon-ep testified that she
is a businesswoman engaged in the buy and sell of assorted seeds such as white
beans, red beans, black beans, mongo beans, peas, peanuts and malagkit rice. She owns four (4) stalls in the city market
of P24,000.00, more or
less, were missing. Upon inquiry from
the persons in the city market she was informed by a certain Gregorio Garcia
that the accused-appellant was the culprit.
Gregorio Garcia testified that he is a barangay tanod assigned at the rice section of the city
market of P15.00
for his coffee. On
For the defense, petitioner and witness Imelda Bautista presented their evidence, as follows:
[Rose Aoas] testified that
she is a businesswoman engaged in the buy and sell of gold and broken
jewelry. She was occupying stall No. 9
at the muslim section of the city market of
Defense witness Imelda Bautista narrated that she was
engaged in the business of selling mongo beans and peanut butter. Every afternoon she kept her goods at the ground
floor of the stall of the accused-appellant located at the muslim section of
the city market of
On
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered convicting accused Aoas of theft and hereby sentences her,
after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 4
years, 9 months and 10 days of prision correctional medium, as minimum, to 8
years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor, medium, as maximum, and to return
to the complainant Madon-ep the 18 sacks of beans stolen, or to pay the value
of said sacks of beans in the amount of P24,720.00 if the same can no
longer be returned.
Costs against the accused.[5]
On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in
toto.
Hence, this petition for review raising the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF CONVICTION
BY THE TRIAL COURT;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION THAN THE TESTIMONY
OF THE ACCUSED AND HER WITNESS.[6]
Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.[7] Petitioner contends that these elements of the crime of theft were not proven and, therefore, she deserves to be acquitted.
We agree.
Considering that there is no direct evidence pointing to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, the trial court relied solely on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience, observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. In order that conviction be had, the following must concur:
1. There is more than one
circumstance;
2. The facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven;
3. The combination of the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with one other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.[8] The circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed.[9] The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed the offense.
To the appellate court, the following make up the web of circumstantial evidence against petitioner:
First, it was established that at
around
After a careful review, we
find that the aforesaid circumstantial evidence does not pass this test of
moral certainty as to warrant petitioner’s conviction. Complainant testified that 18 sacks of beans
which she stored in the mezzanine of her stall were missing. She discovered the loss in the morning of
It behooves the Court to see how petitioner’s guilt was logically inferred from Garcia’s testimony which was not corroborated. Whether the sacks loaded in the jeepney contained beans, and if so, whether these beans belonged to private complainant were not proven. Where the sacks of beans came from was not explained since Garcia admitted that he did not actually see petitioner load the sacks of beans into the jeepney.[14] He stated that he merely met petitioner in the evening of October 15 in front of the Dimalanta Grocery, when petitioner asked him for the whereabouts of the jeepney. Thereafter, he saw petitioner seated inside the jeepney as it was leaving the market vicinity. In pointing to petitioner, Garcia cited the two previous occasions, October 2 and 12, 1992, when he encountered petitioner loading sacks of beans in the jeepney. We do not agree with the appellate court that this circumstance should form part of the “unbroken chain” and incriminate petitioner of the crime. Complainant testified that she bought her 18 sacks of beans from a provincemate from Bontoc. The goods arrived on October 14 and were stored in the mezzanine, and complainant noticed the loss 2 days thereafter or on October 16.[15] Obviously, the sacks of beans brought out by petitioner on October 2 and 12 were not the objects of the alleged crime.
The defense proffered an explanation which, unfortunately, was not given credence. Defense witness Imelda Bautista testified that she was also engaged in the buying and selling of beans. Her goods were also kept at the second floor/mezzanine of petitioner’s stall. Petitioner testified that she brought out sacks of beans from her stall because one Ronda Sabado bought them from Imelda Bautista.[16] There being no direct evidence of petitioner’s culpability, this explanation could have sufficiently created reasonable doubt about petitioner’s guilt.
The fact that beans were scattered on the floor inside and in front of the stall of petitioner and in the parking lot does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that petitioner is the perpetrator of the crime. This cannot be equated with the principle of law that a person in possession or control of stolen goods is presumed to be the author of the larceny.[17] Absent proof of any stolen property in the possession of a person, as in the case at bar, no presumption of guilt can arise. Instead, the constitutional presumption of innocence should prevail in petitioner’s favor.[18] As to who caused those beans to be scattered inside and in front of the stall of petitioner was not proven. Furthermore, it is not farfetched that those scattered beans could have belonged to Imelda Bautista who also stored beans in the stall of petitioner. It must be noted that the place is a market, a public place where people come and go. Presumably, the complainant is not the only vendor in the market selling beans.
The removal of the partition wall in the mezzanine is also of no moment. Petitioner admitted that she removed the partition wall in September 1992 because she intended to use the space to sell coffee.[19] Notably, the partition was removed much earlier than the date of the alleged commission of the crime in October 1992, and it would simply be conjectural to suppose that this was part of petitioner’s alleged scheme to stash away the sacks of beans. There should be more proof presented to show petitioner’s alleged complicity in the crime. Conviction must rest on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[20]
The prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked completely discount the possibility that persons other than petitioner could have perpetrated the crime. Thus, where the proven facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to convict the accused.[21]
We find that the conviction of petitioner does not pass the test of moral certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the
No costs.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate Justices Candido V. Rivera and Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp.
39-46.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] People v. Avecilla, G.R. No. 46370,
[8] People v. Canlas, 423 Phil. 665, 678 (2001).
[9] Francisco, Evidence, p. 605
[10] Rollo, p. 44.
[11]
TSN,
[12]
[13]
TSN,
[14] Rollo, p. 32.
[15]
TSN,
[16]
TSN,
[17]
People v.
[18] Melayo v. People, 440 Phil. 806, 818 (2002).
[19]
TSN,
[20] People v. Muleta, 368 Phil. 451, 476 (1999).
[21] Gan
v. People, G.R. No. 165884,
22 People v. Ferras, 351 Phil. 1020, 1034
(1998); People v. Ilaoa, G.R. No.
94308,