Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
DIESEL CONSTRUCTION CO., G.R. No. 154885
INC.,
Petitioner,
-
versus -
UPSI PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC.,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------x
UPSI PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC., G.R. No. 154937
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO,
JR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
DIESEL CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. Promulgated:
and FGU INSURANCE CORP.,
Respondents. March 24, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I
S I O N
VELASCO,
JR., J.:
The
Case
Before the Court are these petitions
for review under Rule 45 separately interposed by Diesel Construction Co., Inc.
(Diesel) and UPSI Property Holdings, Inc. (UPSI) to set aside the Decision[1] dated
April 16, 2002 as partly modified in a Resolution[2] of August 21, 2002, both rendered by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68340, entitled UPSI Property Holdings, Inc. v. Diesel Construction Co., Inc., and FGU
Insurance Corporation. The
CA Decision modified the Decision dated
The Facts
The facts, as found in the CA Decision under review, are as follows:
On
Inter
alia, the Agreement contained provisions on contract works and Project completion,
extensions of contract period, change/extra works orders, delays, and damages
for negative slippage.
Tasked
to oversee Diesel’s work progress were: Grace S. Reyes Designs, Inc. for
interior design and architecture, D.L. Varias and Associates as Construction
Manager, and Ryder Hunt Loacor, Inc. as Quantity Surveyor.[6]
Under
the Agreement, the Project prosecution proper was to start on
Of
particular relevance to this case is the section obliging the contractor, in
case of unjustifiable delay, to pay the owner liquidated damages in the amount
equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of one (1) percent of the total Project cost for
each calendar day of delay.[7]
In
the course of the Project implementation, change orders were effected and
extensions sought. At one time or
another, Diesel requested for extension owing to the following causes or
delaying factors: (1) manual hauling of materials from the 14th to 16th floors;
(2) delayed supply of marble; (3) various change orders; and (4) delay in the
installation of shower assembly.[8]
UPSI, it
would appear, disapproved the desired extensions on the basis of the foregoing
causes, thus putting Diesel in a state of default for a given contract
work. And for every default situation,
UPSI assessed Diesel for liquidated damages in the form of deductions from
Diesel’s progress payments, as stipulated in the Agreement.[9]
Apparently
irked by and excepting from the actions taken by UPSI, Diesel, thru its Project
manager, sent, on March 16, 2000, a letter notice to UPSI stating that the
Project has been completed as of that date.
UPSI, however, disregarded the notice, and refused to accept delivery of
the contracted premises, claiming that Diesel had abandoned the Project unfinished. Apart therefrom, UPSI withheld Diesel’s 10%
“retention money” and refused to pay the unpaid balance of the contract price.[10]
It is upon
the foregoing factual backdrop that Diesel filed a complaint before the CIAC,
praying that UPSI be compelled to pay the unpaid balance of the contract price,
plus damages and attorney’s fees. In an answer
with counterclaim, UPSI denied liability, accused Diesel of abandoning a
project yet to be finished, and prayed for repayment of expenses it allegedly
incurred for completing the Project and for a declaration that the deductions
it made for liquidated damages were proper.
UPSI also sought payment of attorney’s fees.[11]
After due
hearing following a protracted legal sparring, the Arbitral Tribunal of the CIAC,
on December 14, 2001, in CIAC Case No. 18-2001, rendered judgment for Diesel,
albeit for an amount lesser than its original demand. To be precise, the CIAC
ordered UPSI to pay Diesel the total amount of PhP 4,027,861.60, broken down as
follows: PhP 3,661,692.60, representing the unpaid balance of the contract
price; and PhP 366,169 as attorney’s fees.
In the same decision, the CIAC dismissed UPSI’s counterclaim[12]
and assessed it for arbitration costs in the amount of PhP 298,406.03.[13]
In time,
UPSI went to the CA on a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
68340. Eventually, the appellate court
rendered its assailed Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned Decision is
MODIFIED in this wise:
a. The claim of [UPSI] for liquidated damages is
GRANTED to the extent of PESOS: ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED NINE THOUSAND AND
FIVE HUNDRED (P1,309,500.00) representing forty-five (45) days of delay at
P29,100 per diem;
b. We
hold that [Diesel] substantially complied with the Construction Contract and is
therefore entitled to one hundred percent (100%) payment of the contract price.
Therefore, the claim of [Diesel] for an unpaid balance of PESOS: TWO MILLION
FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY TWO and SIXTY FOUR centavos
(P2,441,482.64), which amount already includes the retention on the additional
works or Change Orders, is GRANTED, minus liquidated damages. In sum, [UPSI] is
held liable to [Diesel] in the amount of PESOS: ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY TWO and sixty four centavos (P1,131,982.64),
with legal interest until the same is fully paid;
c. The
parties are liable equally for the payment of arbitration costs;
d. All
claims for attorney’s fees are DISMISSED; and
e. Since
there is still due and owing from UPSI an amount of money in favor of Diesel,
respondent FGU is DISCHARGED as surety for Diesel.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Therefrom, Diesel and UPSI each sought reconsideration. On
WHEREFORE, the Motion
for Reconsideration of [Diesel] is partially GRANTED. The liquidated damages
are hereby reduced to P1,146,519.00 (45 days multiplied by P25,478.20 per diem). However, in accordance with
the main opinion, We hold that [UPSI] is liable to [Diesel] for the total
amount of P3,661,692.64, representing the unpaid balance of the contract price
plus the ten-percent retention, from which the liquidated damages, must, of
course, be deducted. Thus, in sum, as amended, We hold that petitioner is still
liable to respondent Diesel in the amount of P2,515,173.64, with legal interest
until the same is fully paid.
The
main opinion, in all other respects, STANDS.
SO
ORDERED.[15]
Hence,
these separate petitions are before us.
Per its
Resolution of
The Issues
In its
petition in G.R. No. 154885, Diesel raises the following issues:
1.
Whether or not
the [CA] has the discretion, indeed the jurisdiction, to pass upon the
qualifications of the individual members of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal and
declare them to be non-technocrats and not exceptionally well-versed in the
construction industry warranting reversal and nullification of the tribunal’s
findings.
2.
Whether or not
the [CA] may intervene to annul the findings of a highly specialized agency,
like the CIAC, on the ground that essentially the question to be resolved goes
to the very heart of the substantiality of evidence, when in so doing, [CA] merely
substituted its own conjectural opinion to that of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s
well-supported findings and award.
3.
Whether or not
the [CA] erred in its findings, which are contrary to the findings of the CIAC
Arbitral Tribunal.[16]
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 154937,
UPSI presents the following issues:
I
Whether or not portion of the Decision dated
April 16, 2002 of the Honorable [CA] denying additional expenses to complete
the unfinished and abandoned work of [Diesel], is null and void for being
contrary to clean and convincing evidence on record.
II
Whether or not portion of the Decision x x x
of the [CA] finding delay of only forty
five (45) days is null and void for being not in accord with contractual
stipulations upon which the controversy arise.
III
Whether or not the resolution of the Honorable
Court of Appeals denying the herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and
partially granting the respondent’s motion for reconsideration is likewise null
and void as it does not serve its purpose for being more on expounding than
rectifying errors.[17]
The issues shall be discussed in seriatim.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to modify the assailed CA Decision.
First
Issue
Diesel
maintains that the CA erred in its declaration that it may review the CIAC’s decision
considering the doctrine on the binding effect of conclusions of fact of highly
specialized agencies, such as the CIAC, when supported by substantial evidence.
The
above contention is erroneous and, as couched, misleading.
As
is noted, the CA, in its assailed resolution, dismissed as untenable Diesel’s
position that the factual findings of the CIAC are binding on and concludes the appellate court. The CA went to
clarify, however, that the general rule is that factual conclusions of highly
specialized bodies are given great weight and even finality when supported by
substantial evidence. Given this perspective, the CA was correct in holding
that it may validly review and even overturn such conclusion of facts when the
matter of its being adequately supported by substantial evidence duly adduced
on record comes to the fore and is raised as an issue.
Well-established
jurisprudence has it that “[t]he consequent policy and practice underlying our
Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the findings of
fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in
support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial.”[18]
There can be no serious dispute about
the correctness of the CA’s above posture. However, what the appellate court stated
later to belabor its point strikes the Court as specious and uncalled for.
Wrote the CA:
This
dictum finds greater application in the case of the CIAC because x x x as
pointed out by petitioner in its Comment, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
relied upon by [Diesel] is diluted by the indubitable fact that the CIAC panel
x x x is not at all composed of technocrats, or persons exceptionally
well-versed in the construction industry. For instance, its chair x x x is a
statistician; another member, x x x a former magistrate, is a member of the
Bar. Doubtless, these two are preeminent in their fields, and their competence
and proficiency in their chosen professions are unimpeachable. However, when it
comes to determining findings of fact with respect to the matter before Us, the
said panel which they partly comprise cannot claim to have any special
advantage over the members of this Court.[19]
The question of whether or not the
findings of fact of the CIAC are supported by substantial evidence has no
causal connection to the personal qualifications of the members of the arbitration
panel. Surely, a person’s undergraduate
or postgraduate degrees, as the case may be, can hardly be invoked as the sole,
fool proof basis to determine that person’s qualification to hold a certain
position. One’s work experiences and
attendance in relevant seminars and trainings would perhaps be the more
important factors in gauging a person’s fitness to a certain undertaking.
Correlatively, Diesel, obviously
having in mind the disputable presumption of regularity, correctly argues that highly
specialized agencies are presumed to have the necessary technical expertise in
their line of authority. In other words,
the members of the Arbitral Tribunal of the CIAC have in their favor the
presumption of possessing the necessary qualifications and competence exacted
by law. A party in whose favor the legal
presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a
fact in issue. One need not introduce
evidence to prove that the fact for a presumption is prima facie proof
of the fact presumed.[20]
To set the records straight, however,
the CA did not cast aspersion on the competence let alone the bona fides
of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal to arbitrate. In context, what the appellate court said––in
reaction to Diesel’s negative commentary about the CA’s expertise on
construction matters––is that the said members do not really enjoy a special
advantage over the members of the CA in terms of fleshing out the facts from
the evidence on record.
In any event, the fact remains that
the CA stands justified in reviewing the CIAC decision.
Second and Third Issues
The
next two issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
Diesel
submits that the CA, in reaching its decision, substituted its own conjectural
opinion to that of the CIAC’s well-grounded findings and award.
Even
as Diesel’s submission has little to commend itself, we deem it prudent to
address its concern by reviewing the incongruent determinations of the CIAC and
CA and the factual premises holding such determinations together.
As
it were, the CA reduced the award for unpaid balance of the contract cost from
PhP 3,661,692.60, as earlier fixed by the CIAC, to PhP 2,441,482.64, although
it would consider the reduction and revert to the original CIAC figure. Unlike the CIAC which found the award of
liquidated damages to be without basis, the CA was of a different disposition
and awarded UPSI PhP 1,309,500, only to reduce the same to PhP 1,146,519 in its
assailed resolution. Also, the CA struck
out the CIAC award of PhP 366,169 to Diesel for attorney’s fees. Additionally,
the CIAC’s ruling making UPSI alone liable for the costs of arbitration was
modified by the CA, which directed UPSI and Diesel to equally share the burden.
The CIAC found Diesel not to have
incurred delay, thus negating UPSI’s entitlement to liquidated damages. The CA,
on the other hand, found Diesel to have been in delay for 45 days.
In
determining whether or not Diesel was in delay, the CIAC and CA first turned on
the question of Diesel’s claimed entitlement to have the Project period
extended, an excusable delay being chargeable against the threshold 90-day
completion period. Both were one in saying
that occurrence of certain events gave Diesel the right to an extension, but
differed on the matter of length of the extension, and on the nature of the
delay, that is, whether the delay is excusable or not. The CA deemed the delay, and the resulting extension
of 14 days, arising from the manual hauling of materials, as undeserved. But the CIAC saw it otherwise for the reason
that Frederick W. Crespillo, the witness UPSI presented to refute the
allegation of Diesel’s entitlement to time extension for the manual hauling of
materials, was incompetent to testify on the issue. As CIAC observed, Crespillo lacked personal
knowledge of the real situation at the worksite.
The
CIAC’s reasoning, however, is flawed, assuming that the onus rested on UPSI,
instead of on Diesel, to prove that the delay in the execution of the Project
was excusable. Diesel explained that there was no place for its own hoisting
machine at the Project site as the assigned location was being used by the
General Contractor, while the alternative location was not feasible due to
power constraint. Moreover, Diesel could not use the site elevator of the
General Contractor as its personnel were only permitted to use the same for one
hour every day at PhP 600 per hour.
The
provisions in the Agreement on excusable delays read:
2.3 Excusable
delays: The Contractor shall inform the owner in a timely manner, of any delay
caused by the following:
2.3.a Acts of God, such as storm, floods or
earthquakes.
2.3.b Civil disturbance, such as riots,
revolutions, insurrection.
2.3.c Any government acts, decrees, general orders
or regulations limiting the performance of the work.
2.3.d Wars (declared or not).
2.3.e Any delays initiated by the Owner or his
personnel which are clearly outside the control of the Contractor.
2.3.1 Delays caused by the foregoing shall be
excusable. A new schedule or adjustments in contract time shall be negotiated
with the Owner. As time is of the essence of this agreement, all other delays
shall not be excusable.[21]
As
may be noted, a common thread runs among the events listed above, that is, the
delaying event is unforeseeable and/or its occurrence is beyond the control of
Diesel as contractor. Here, the lack of a location to establish Diesel’s own
hoisting machine can hardly be tagged as a foreseeable event. As the CA aptly
observed:
[U]nder
the terms of the contract, it is Diesel that would formulate the schedule to be
followed in the completion of the works; therefore, it was encumbent upon
Diesel to take into account all factors that would come into play in the course
of the project. From the records it appears that the General Contractor x x x had
been in the premises ahead of Diesel; hence it would have been a simple matter
for Diesel to have conferred with the former’s officer if the use of its
equipment would be viable. Likewise, it would not have been too much trouble
for Diesel to have made a prior request from UPSI for the use of its freight
elevator – in the face of the denial thereof, it could have made the necessary
remedial measures x x x. In other words, those delays were foreseeable on the
part of Diesel, with the application of even ordinary diligence. But Diesel did
all of those when construction was about to commence. Therefore, We hold that
the delays occasioned by Diesel’s inability to install its hoisting machine x x
x [were] attributable solely to Diesel, and thus the resultant delay cannot be
charged against the ninety-day period for the termination of the construction.[22]
There can be no quibbling that the
delay caused by the manual hauling of materials is not excusable and, hence,
cannot validly be set up as ground for an extension. Thus, the CA excluded the
delay caused thereby and only allowed Diesel a total extension period of 85
days. Such extension, according to that court, effectively translated to a
delay of 45 days in the completion of the project. The CA, in its assailed
decision, explained why:
7. All
told, We find, and so hold, that [Diesel] has incurred in delay. x x x However, under the circumstances wherein
UPSI was responsible for some of the delay, it would be most unfair to charge
Diesel with two hundred and forty (240) days of delay, so much so that it would
still owe UPSI, even after liquidated damages have eaten up the retention and
unpaid balance, the amount of [P4,340,000.00]. Thus, based on Our own
calculations, We deem it more in accord with the spirit of the contract, as
amended, x x x to assess Diesel with an unjustifiable delay of forty-five (45)
days only; hence, at the rate of 1/5 of one percent as stated in the contract, [or
at P1,309,500.00], which should be deducted from the total unpaid balance of [P2,441,482.64],
which amount already includes the retention on the additional works or Change
Orders.[23]
The CA, in its questioned resolution,
expounded on how it arrived at the figure of 45-day delay in this wise:
7. x x x We likewise cannot give Our assent
to the asseveration of [Diesel] that Our calculations as to the number of days
of delay have no basis. For indeed, the same was arrived at after taking a
holistic view of the entire circumstances attendant to the instant case. x x x
But prescinding from the above, the basis for
Our ruling should not be hard to discern. To disabuse the mind of [Diesel] that
the forty-five day delay was plucked from out of the blue, allow Us to let the
records speak. The records will show that while the original target date for
the completion x x x was 19 November 1999 x x x, there is a total of
eighty-five (85) days of extension which are justifiable and sanctioned by [UPSI],
to wit: thirty (30) days as authorized on 27 January 2000 by UPSI’s
Construction Manager x x x; thirty (30) days as again consented to by the same
Construction Manager on 24 February 2000 x x x; and twenty-five (25) days on 16
March 2000 by Rider Hunt and Liacom x x x. The rest of the days claimed by
Diesel were, of course, found by Us to be unjustified in the main opinion.
Hence, the project should have been finished by
This is why We find the [conclusion] made by
the CIAC, x x x that there was no delay whatsoever in the work done by [Diesel],
too patently absurd for Us to offer Our unconditional assent.[24]
Aside from the fact that the CA seemingly
assumed contradictory positions in the span of two paragraphs, its holding
immediately adverted to above is patently erroneous. The CA completely failed
to factor in the change orders of UPSI to Diesel––the directives effectively extending
the Project completion time at the behest of UPSI.
Section V of the Agreement on the
subject Change Orders reads:
V. CHANGES IN SCOPE OF WORK AND EXTRA WORK
Any changes or extra work in the SCOPE OF
WORK recommended by the INTERIOR DESIGNER/ARCHITECT or directed and approved by
the OWNER shall be presented to the CONTRACTOR. Within the shortest time
possible, the CONTRACTOR x x x shall also inform the OWNER if such changes
shall require a new schedule and/or revised completion date.
The Parties shall then negotiate mutually
agreeable terms x x x. The CONTRACTOR shall not perform any change order or
extra work until the covering terms are agreed upon [in writing and signed by
the parties].[25]
Pursuant thereto, UPSI issued Change
Order (CO) Nos. 1 to 4 on February 3, 2, 8, and 9, 2000 respectively.
Thereafter, Diesel submitted a Schedule of Completion of Additional Works[26] under
which Diesel committed to undertake CO No. 1 for 30 days from February 10, 2000;
CO No. 2 for 21 days from January 6, 2000; CO No. 3 for 15 days, subject to UPSI’s
acceptance of Diesel’s proposal; and CO No. 4 for 10 days after the receipt of
the items from UPSI.
The CIAC found that the
CO No. 1 – February 9 to
CO No. 3 – February 24 to
CO No. 4 – March 16 to
Hence, as correctly held by the CIAC,
UPSI, no less, effectively moved the completion date, through the various
Moreover, as evidenced by UPSI’s
Progress Report No. 19 for the period ending
The fact that the laborers of Diesel
were still at the work site as of
In all, Diesel cannot be considered
as in delay and, hence, is not amenable under the Agreement for liquidated damages.
As to the issue of attorney’s fees,
Diesel insists that bad faith tainted UPSI’s act of imposing liquidated damages
on account of its (Diesel’s) alleged delay. And, this prompted Diesel to file its
petition for arbitration. Thus, the CIAC
granted Diesel an award of PhP 366,169 as attorney’s fees. However, the CA reversed
the CIAC on the award, it being its finding that Diesel was in delay.
The Court resolves to reinstate the
CIAC’s award of attorney’s fees, there being sufficient justification for this
kind of disposition. As earlier
discussed, Diesel was not strictly in delay in the completion of the Project.
No valid reason, therefore, obtains for UPSI to withhold the retention money or
to refuse to pay the unpaid balance of the contract price. Indeed, the retention and nonpayment were, to
us, as was to the CIAC, resorted to by UPSI out of whim, thus forcing the hand
of Diesel to sue to recover what is rightfully due. Thus, the grant of attorney’s fees would be
justifiable under Art. 2208 of the Civil Code, thus:
Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation,
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation x x x cannot be recovered, except:
x x x x
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just
and demandable claim.
And for the same reason justifying
the award of attorney’s fees, arbitration costs ought to be charged against
UPSI, too.
Fourth Issue
UPSI urges a review of the factual
basis for the parallel denial by the CIAC and CA of its claim for additional
expenses to complete the Project. UPSI states that the reality of Diesel having
abandoned the Project before its agreed completion is supported by clear and
convincing evidence.
The Court cannot accord the desired
review. It is settled rule that the
Court, not being a trier of facts, is under no obligation to examine, winnow,
and weigh anew evidence adduced below.
This general rule is, of course, not absolute. In Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. Philippine National
Construction Company, the Court enumerated the recognized exceptions to be:
x x x (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the [CA] went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion.[30] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the instant case, the factual
findings of the CIAC and CA, with regard to the completion of the Project and
UPSI’s entitlement to recover expenses allegedly incurred to finish the
Project, do not fall under any one of these exceptions. As things stand, the
factual findings of the CIAC and CA are supported by evidence presented during
the hearing before the Arbitral Tribunal. Consider what the CIAC wrote:
This Tribunal finds overwhelming evidence to
prove that accomplishment as of the alleged “period of takeover” was 95.87% as
of
The CA seconded what the CIAC said,
thus:
6.
Neither
are We prepared to sustain UPSI’s argument that Diesel left the work unfinished
and pulled-out all of its workmen from the project. This claim is belied by the
assessment of its own Construction Manager in Progress Report No. 19 for the
period “ending 22 March 2000,” wherein it was plaintly stated that as of that
period, with respect to Diesel, there were still twenty-three laborers on site
with the project “97.56%” complete x x x. This indicates that the contracted
works of Diesel were substantially completed with only minor corrections x x x,
thus contradicting the avowal of UPSI
that the work was abandoned in such a state that necessitated the engagement of
another contractor for the project to be finished. It was therefore not right
for UPSI to have declined the turn-over and refused the full payment of the
contract price, x x x.[32]
Given the 97.56% work accomplishment
tendered by Diesel, UPSI’s theory of abandonment and of its having spent a sum
to complete the work must fall on its face. We can concede hypothetically that
UPSI undertook what it characterized as “additional or rectification” works on the
Project. But as both the CIAC and CA
held, UPSI failed to show that such “additional or rectification” works, if there
be any, were the necessary result of the faulty workmanship of Diesel.
The Court perceives of no reason to doubt,
much less disturb, the coinciding findings of the CIAC and CA on the matter.
The foregoing notwithstanding and
considering that Diesel may only be credited for 97.56% work accomplishment,
UPSI ought to be compensated, by way of damages, in the amount corresponding to
the value of the 2.44% unfinished portion (100% – 97.56% = 2.44%). In absolute terms, 2.44% of the total Project
cost translates to PhP 310,834.01. This disposition is no more than adhering to
the command of Art. 1234 of the Civil Code.
The fifth and sixth issues have
already been discussed earlier and need not detain us any longer.
WHEREFORE, Diesel’s
petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and
UPSI’s Petition is DENIED
with qualification. The assailed Decision dated
(1) The
award for liquidated damages is DELETED;
(2) The
award to Diesel for the unpaid balance of the contract price of PhP 3,661,692.64
is AFFIRMED;
(3) UPSI
shall pay the costs of arbitration before the CIAC in the amount of PhP 298,406.03;
(4) Diesel is awarded attorney’s fees
in the amount of PhP 366,169; and
(5) UPSI is awarded damages in the
amount of PhP 310,834.01, the same to be deducted from the retention money, if
there still be any, and, if necessary, from the amount referred to in item (2)
immediately above.
In summary, the aggregate award to
Diesel shall be PhP 3,717,027.64. From
this amount shall be deducted the award of actual damages of PhP 310,834.01 to UPSI
which shall pay the costs of arbitration in the amount of PhP 298,406.03.
FGU is released from liability for the performance
bond that it issued in favor of Diesel.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
A T T
E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R
T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member as per Special Order No.
494 dated
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 154885), pp. 62-75. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (Chairperson) and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Sergio L. Pestaño.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Supra note 1, at 73-74.
[15] Supra note 2, at 59.
[16] Rollo (G.R. No. 154885), p. 24.
[17] Rollo (G.R. No. 154937), pp. 63-64.
[18] Blue
Bar Coconut
[19] Supra note 2, at 56.
[20] Tison
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027,
[21] Supra note 3, at 99.
[22] Supra note 1, at 66.
[23] Supra note 1, at 71-72.
[24] Supra note 2, at 57-59.
[25] Supra note 3, at 104.
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 154885), p. 165.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
G.R. No. 169596,
[31] Rollo (G.R. No. 154885), p. 91.
[32] Supra note 1, at 71.