SPECIAL
SECOND DIVISION
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CELSO VERDE,
Petitioner, - versus
- VICTOR E. MACAPAGAL, AIDA MACAPAGAL,
RECTOR E. MACAPAGAL, HECTOR MACAPAGAL, FLORIDA M. GUIRIBA, REDENTOR E.
MACAPAGAL, NESTOR E. MACAPAGAL and ZENAIDA E. MACAPAGAL, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 151342 Present: PUNO, CJ., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA,*
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
the Court is respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated
We
briefly revisit the facts:
Respondents
are the pro-indiviso owners of 2.5 hectares of land located in Palapala, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, which they inherited from their parents Vicente F.
Macapagal and Irenea R. Estrella.
Petitioner is the leasehold tenant of the disputed land having succeeded
his father, Francisco Verde, in the tenancy thereof.
On
Attached
to the Complaint was the joint sworn statement of Albino Sanciangco and Monico
Cruz who declared that in 1993, dela Cruz was the one who farmed one-half of
the subject land by virtue of a contract of mortgage between him and
petitioner. Sanciangco even went on to
state that he witnessed respondents Victor and Rector confront petitioner about
the mortgage but dela Cruz continued cultivating the subject land in 1994.
Petitioner
filed his Answer denying the material allegations of the Complaint and claimed
that he only hired the services of dela Cruz for the latter owned a carabao
which he did not have in 1993 and 1994.
In
support of his defense, petitioner presented the sworn statement of dela Cruz
and the joint sworn statement of Petronilo Sayco and Oscar Cruz. Dela Cruz claimed that in 1993 and 1994,
petitioner merely hired his services for he had a carabao which petitioner did
not have during those years. Sayco and
Cruz maintained that from the time petitioner took over the tenancy of the
subject land, he had continuously farmed and possessed said property.
In
our Decision now sought to be reconsidered, we reversed and set aside the Court
of Appeals’ Decision and reinstated the earlier ruling of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. In
essence, we ruled that petitioner’s act of hiring the services of dela Cruz and
that of the latter’s carabao did not amount to abandonment for under Section 38
of Republic Act No. 1199,[1] a
tenant is required to perform various acts which are not limited only to the
plowing and harrowing of the land, to wit:
1.
The preparation
of the seedbed which shall include plowing, harrowing, and watering of the
seedbed, the scattering of the seeds, and the care of the seedlings.
2. The
plowing, harrowing, and watering of the area he is cultivating, except final
harrowing of the field as an item of contribution specified in Section
thirty-two of this Act.
3. The
maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies, and irrigation canals in his
holdings.
4. The
pulling and bundling of the seedlings preparatory to their transplanting.
5. Care
of the growing plants.
6. Gathering
and bundling of the reaped harvest.
7. The
piling of the bundles into small stacks.
8. The
preparation of the place where the harvest is to be stacked.
9.
Gathering of the
small stacks and their transportation to the place where they are to be
stacked.
10. Piling into a big stack preparatory to
threshing.
Thus, we ruled that a tenant or an agricultural lessee may
employ farm laborers to perform some phases of farm work provided that he does
not leave the entire process of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers.
In addition, we noted that even Section 27(2) of Republic Act
No. 3844 allows an agricultural lessee, in case of illness or temporary
incapacity, to avail himself of the services of laborers and we ruled that
petitioner’s lack of means to own a carabao during the agricultural years in
question constitutes incapacity justifying the employment of dela Cruz.
The respondents’ present Motion for
Reconsideration is anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
AFFIDAVIT OF AURELIO DELA CRUZ WHO DID NOT EVEN APPEAR DURING THE ENTIRE
PROCEEDING BELOW AND WHO, DESPITE SUFFICIENT NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE PART
OF PETITIONER, WAS THUS NOT PRESENTED THEREIN TO AUTHENTICATE SAID AFFIDAVIT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING PROBATIVE
VALUE TO THE AFFIDAVITS OF RESPONDENTS’ WITNESSES ALBINO SANCIANGCO, MONICO
CRUZ, CONRADO VIOLAGO AND OLEGARIO FLORES.
III
THUS, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING ON THE
BASIS OF AURELIO DELA CRUZ’S AFFIDAVIT, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT RELINQUISH THE
CULTIVATION OF THE SUBJECT FARMHOLDING TO AURELIO DELA CRUZ AS THE LATTER WAS
MERELY HIRED TO DO ONE PHASE OF THE FARM LABOR, THAT IS, THE USE OF DELA CRUZ’S
CARABAO.
IV
HENCE, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PETITIONER DID NOT RELINQUISH PERSONAL CULTIVATION AND DID NOT ABANDON HIS
TENANCY OF THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING.[2]
On
Respondents’ postulations may be
summarized into two main points: 1) whether the affidavits of petitioners’
witnesses may be relied upon considering that no clarificatory questions were
posed on them during the hearings of this case at the provincial adjudicator
level; and 2) whether petitioner’s act of mortgaging the subject land to dela
Cruz amounted to abandonment of the same thereby extinguishing the tenancy
relationship between him and respondents.
Anent the first ground, respondents
insist that the affidavits of petitioner’s witnesses should not have been relied
upon because of the failure of said witnesses to appear before the provincial
adjudicator (PARAD), thus, the latter as well as respondents were deprived of
the opportunity to ascertain the truthfulness of their allegations. They also claim that the positive assertions
of their own witnesses should prevail over the bare denial by dela Cruz of the
fact that petitioner had mortgaged the subject land to him.
We find this contention to be bereft
of merit.
It is already settled that proceedings
before the Department of Agrarian Reform are summary in nature and the
department is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the
end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a
just, expeditious and inexpensive action or proceeding.[3] Although bound by law and practice to observe
due process, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are,
nonetheless, free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements. As applied to these proceedings, due process
requires only an opportunity to explain one’s side.[4]
In this case, there is no question
that the parties were able to submit the pleadings, together with supporting
affidavits, required of them by the PARAD.
This way, they were able to propound their arguments and ventilate their
respective positions on the issues affecting this case. That the PARAD ultimately decided in favor of
petitioner based on the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties does not
mean that the PARAD failed to observe respondents’ right to due process for the
latter were given the opportunity to voice their concerns over the tenancy
relationship they had with petitioner. The fact that the PARAD failed to ask
clarificatory questions to the parties and their witnesses was a mere
procedural lapse that did not deprive it of jurisdiction to resolve the
complaint filed by respondents. The
PARAD was not required to posit clarificatory questions if it finds the
pleadings and the evidence adduced before it to be sufficient and satisfactory
as to enable it to render judgment.
Moreover, the records reveal that
after the PARAD rendered its decision on
During the scheduled hearing on
(p)laintiff/counsel
did not further manifest except to submit for resolution the pending Motion for
Reconsideration. This Body will act
accordingly.[8]
It is then quite obvious that
respondents had given up on their insistence that the witnesses be questioned
before the PARAD as they themselves manifested their consent to the resolution
of their Motion for Reconsideration instead of moving for the resetting of the
hearing. If for this ground alone, their
argument with respect to the failure of PARAD to ask clarificatory questions
should be dismissed.
Turning now to the substantive issue
raised in this motion for reconsideration, respondents insist that petitioner
mortgaged the subject landholding to dela Cruz from 1993 to 1994 and that as
consideration for said mortgage, the latter tilled the land during those
years. By this, respondents claim,
petitioner had relinquished and abandoned the landholding.
We rule in favor of respondents on
this point.
The grounds for the termination of
leasehold relationship are specified in Sections 8, 28, and 36 of Republic Act
No. 3844.[9] These are:
SEC.
8. Extinguishment
of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. - The agricultural leasehold relation
established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1)
Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural
lessor;
(2)
Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written
notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3)
Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the
event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.
x x x x
SEC.
28. Termination
of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During Agricultural Year.- The
agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold during the agricultural year
for any of the following causes:
(1)
Cruel, inhuman or offensive treatment of the agricultural lessee or any member
of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor or his
representative with the knowledge and consent of the lessor;
(2)
Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the
obligations imposed upon him by the provisions of this Code or by his contract
with the agricultural lessee;
(3)
Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm
household by the agricultural lessor to do any work or render any service not
in any way connected with farm work or even without compulsion if no
compensation is paid;
(4)
Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his representative against
the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm household; or
(5)
Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his
family.
x x x x
SEC.
36. Possession
of Landholding; Exceptions.- Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period
or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:
(1)
The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will
personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other
useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided,
That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights
under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and
leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which
case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an
advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings
are filed against him: Provided, further,
That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or
fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith
and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and
recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions;
(2)
The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms
and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his
failure is caused by fortuitous event or force
majeure;
(3)
The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose
other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4)
The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined
under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5)
The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially
damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or
negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6)
The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due; Provided, That if the non-payment of the
rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished; or
(7)
The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms
of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
In order to sustain a claim of
abandonment as alleged by respondents, it is incumbent that they prove the
following: (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or
to desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by which that intention
is expressed or carried into effect. The
intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never
returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been
abandoned.[10] What is critical in abandonment is intent
which must be shown to be deliberate and clear.
Moreover, the intention must be exhibited by a factual failure or
refusal to work on the landholding without a valid reason. Essentially, therefore, the act of ceasing
from performing labor in the landholding is a manifestation of the intent to
abandon, but the intent must also be shown as a separate element as clearly as
the failure to work. After taking a
second hard look at the records of this case, we find that both requisites
exist in the case at bar and that petitioner had indeed abandoned the
landholding in question.
We observe that in contrast to the
respondents’ unwavering stance that petitioner had mortgaged without
respondents’ knowledge, half of the subject landholding to dela Cruz who worked
on the same for the years 1993 and 1994, petitioner’s assertion of continuous
possession and cultivation of the subject landholding was significantly
weakened by the inconsistencies and discrepancies in the pleadings and evidence
submitted by petitioner himself.
In his Answer filed before the PARAD,
petitioner claimed that dela Cruz was his hired helper for agricultural years
1993 to 1994 particularly since he did not own a carabao during that time. To
support his claim of lack of intention to abandon the landholding, petitioner
presented the joint affidavit of Sayco and Cruz and the “Pagpapatunay” dated 4 August 1995, issued by Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman
Francisco Cruz, which both stated that until the execution of said documents,
petitioner was the one farming respondents’ property.
Subsequently, in his Position Paper
submitted before the same body, petitioner again depended on said BARC
certification.
When the case was brought before the
Court of Appeals, petitioner actually admitted that he allowed dela Cruz to
possess and cultivate the subject landholding, but argued that his act did not
constitute abandonment, to wit –
The act of the [herein
petitioner] by allowing Aurelio dela Cruz to possess and cultivate the same does
not constitute abandonment by way of mortgage but an act of recognition of his
personal loan and as an attribute of a scheme to repay the loan by allowing him
to do the farm work for the moment and thereafter the [petitioner] continues to
possess and cultivate the same up to now.[11]
The
afore-quoted statement constitutes a significant deviation by the petitioner
from his previous claim before the PARAD that he only hired the services of
dela Cruz to till the subject landholding using the latter’s carabao. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner
acknowledged obtaining a personal loan from dela Cruz and to pay for the
borrowed amount, he allowed dela Cruz to possess and cultivate the subject
landholding, an arrangement which, it bears to emphasize, considerably
corroborates respondents’ allegations, except for the use of the word
“mortgage” to describe the same.
The stark inconsistency in the reasons asserted by
petitioner for dela Cruz’s possession and cultivation of the landholding is but
an apparent and desperate attempt to justify the same. Even without a definite reason for
his doing so, petitioner already admitted, and it is thus established, that he
surrendered possession and cultivation to dela Cruz of the subject landholding
for at least two years, significantly affecting his tenancy relationship with
respondents.
For a tenancy relationship to exist,
the following requisites must be established: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4)
the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests. All these factors must concur to establish
the juridical relationship of tenancy.[12] Conversely, the absence of any of the
requisites negates the existence of a tenancy relationship.
In this case, markedly absent from the petitioner’s pleadings
filed before the PARAD was any indication that during the agricultural years
1993 and 1994, he or any member of his immediate household personally
cultivated the disputed piece of land, as required by the law. Even at that point, petitioner already failed
to refute respondents’ evidence that petitioner ceased from personally
cultivating the subject landholding since 1993.
Although petitioner counters with the allegation that dela Cruz was
merely his hired help, he failed to submit evidence that he himself took part in the cultivation of the property and that
dela Cruz’s task was confined to the phase or phases of farm work where the use
of the latter’s carabao was necessary.
True, we recognized in our Decision of 23 June 2005 that “a
tenant or an agricultural lessee’s hiring of farm laborers on a temporary or
occasional basis does not negate the existence of the element of personal
cultivation,”[13]
but such statement was not intended to repudiate the equally-settled principle
that “absent the requisite of personal cultivation, by the alleged tenant, no
tenancy relationship can be said to exist between him and the landowner.”[14] While a tenant or an agricultural lessee may
employ farm laborers to perform some phases of farm work, he may not leave
the entire process of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers, so as to
say that he is still personally cultivating the landholding. While cultivation is not limited to plowing
and harrowing of the tenant, he or she is still required to perform some
general industry in the caring of plants.[15]
Personal cultivation by the tenant himself or any member of
his immediate household thus remains a requisite in a tenancy
relationship. We cannot overemphasize
that this element was glaringly wanting in this case warranting the conclusion
that the tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents had been severed. And since a tenant maintains possession of
the land only through personal cultivation, petitioner’s leaving the disputed
landholding into the hands of a third party amounts to abandonment and the
eventual termination of the tenancy relationship between him and respondents.[16] Persons who do not actually work the land
cannot be considered tenants. He who
hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land ceases to hold,
and is considered as having abandoned the land within the meaning of Sections
4, 5 and 8 of Republic Act No. 1199.[17]
Abandonment of the landholding is a recognized mode of
extinguishing the agricultural tenancy relationship. Once
the agricultural tenant abandons the landholding, his tenancy relationship with
the landholder comes to an end. It
cannot be reinstated simply by the former tenant’s demand for or even actual
recovery of possession of the landholding, absent the landholder’s
consent. It should be remembered that
consent is an essential element of the tenancy relationship. Moreover, the tenant who willfully abandons
the landholding must face the consequences of his action – the termination of
the tenancy relationship and the loss of his rights to the landholding – and
the landholder’s rights must not be held hostage to the possibility of the
tenant’s change of heart later on. When
the tenancy relationship is extinguished by volition of the tenant, he may no
longer recover possession of the property in question for such would be
repulsive to justice, fairness and equity.[18]
Given that the tenancy relationship
between petitioner and respondents was already extinguished by petitioner’s
voluntary abandonment of the subject landholding, petitioner no longer has any
right to the possession and cultivation of the same.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered the present Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 62736 promulgated on
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
was designated to sit as additional member replacing retired Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr. per Raffle dated
[1] This act is known as the
“Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
[2] Rollo, pp. 205-206.
[3] Quismundo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95664,
[4] Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 113911, 23 January 1998, 284 SCRA 656, 664.
[5] Records, p. 123.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] This act is known as the “Agricultural Land Reform Code.”
[10] Corpuz v. Spouses Grospe, 388 Phil. 1100, 1111 (2000).
[11] CA rollo, p. 136.
[12] Oarde
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 104774-75,
[13] Rollo, pp. 198-199 citing Cuaño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107159, 26 September 1994, 237 SCRA 122, 135-136.
[14] Carag
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48140,
[15] Spouses Samatra v. Vda. de Pariñas, 431 Phil. 255, 264-265 (2002).
[16] Gagola v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 125 Phil. 177, 179 (1966).
[17] Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act limits the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household work the land. It provides that leasehold tenancy exists when a person, who either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to, or legally possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both. (Gabriel v. Pangilinan, 157 Phil. 578, 587-588 [1974].)
[18] Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 176 Phil. 580, 588-591 (1978).