FIRST DIVISION
ANNIE FERMIN,
a.k.a. G.R.
No. 147977
ANITA SAGACO, and
AURELIO “LEO”
KIGIS, Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus -
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
HON. ANTONIO M.
ESTEVES,
in his capacity as
Presiding Judge
of Branch 5,
Regional Trial Court,
MARIANO
TANENGLIAN,
Respondents. March 26, 2008
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for
review[1]
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, assailing the
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 October 1986, Mariano Tanenglian (respondent) filed an action for quieting of
title and damages against Anselmo Arizo,
Fred Balusdan, Gregorio Carreon,
Teodita Ceril, Corazon Dapnisan, Mario Dapnisan, Rogel Estrada, Aida Fermin, Marilou Fernandez, Michael Fernandez, Teofilo
Fulmana, Andrew Herrero,
Simeon Jastan, Rogelio (Rodolfo) Lachica,
Naty Lachica, Manuel Lagartera, Juliano Landisen, Maximino Lapid, Silvestre Lorenzo, Timoteo
Lubusan (Dapnisan), Helen Matale, Soledad Nabunat, Damian Peñera, Eliseo Pidazo, Pablito Sacpa, Ananao Santos, Esteban
Santos, Juanito Santos, and Samson Santos (Arizo, et al.). The
case was docketed as Civil Case No.
925-R.
In a Decision[4]
dated
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
(a) Ordering the defendants to respect and recognize plaintiff’s ownership of the two (2) parcels of land in question;
(b) Ordering the defendants to remove their houses/structures/constructions/improvements from the subject parcels of land and surrender the possession of the premises they are respectively occupying to the plaintiff; and
(c) Ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and
severally, the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 for and as attorney’s
fees plus the costs of the suit.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling in its Decision dated
On
WHEREFORE, Defendants, their agents, assigns, representatives and/or successors-in-interest are hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from notice within which to remove their improvements from the premises subject of this case.
The Deputy Sheriff assigned to this Court is likewise hereby ordered to cause the demolition of all improvements which he may find within the premises immediately after the expiration of the abovesaid period with the survey report of the committee to be made as a parameter in compliance with this Order; and to simultaneously place Plaintiff in possession thereof.
Expenses of the demolition shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
SO
ORDERED.[7]
The trial court issued an Alias Writ of
Execution[8]
on even date.
Annie Fermin,
a.k.a. Anita Sagaco, and Aurelio “Leo” Kigis (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. They alleged that the deputy sheriff was
poised to implement the Special Order of Demolition not only against Arizo, et al. but also against them. Petitioners alleged that they were deprived
of their right to due process because they were never made defendants in Civil
Case No. 925-R. Petitioners alleged that they entered into
the possession and occupancy of the lands as members of an indigenous cultural
community in the honest perception and belief that the lands formed part of
their ancestral lands. Petitioners
further alleged that their occupancy of the lands was not pursuant to any agreement entered into with
anyone of the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R or any of the defendants’
predecessors-in-interest. Further, they alleged that it was not even
established that their residential structures were within the area subject of
Civil Case No. 925-R.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its
The Court of Appeals ruled that
respondent’s right to the subject parcels of land had already been settled with
finality. The Court of Appeals ruled
that had petitioners been in good faith regarding their possession of the land,
they could have intervened in Civil Case
No. 925-R under Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals further ruled that had
petitioners been really unaware of the proceedings or aggrieved because of the
damage posed by the Special Order of Demolition, they could just have apprised
the trial court of their adverse claim and move for the issuance of the
necessary terceria under Section 43, Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals ruled that since petitioners failed to avail of
these remedies or any other possible remedies in law, they could no longer
prevent respondent’s exercise of his rights of ownership by belatedly
complaining about their supposed property rights.
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration.
In its
Hence, the petition before this
Court.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the
Special Order of Demolition may be enforced against petitioners who were not
party-defendants in Civil Case No.
925-R.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The generally accepted principle is
that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court.[9] Execution of a judgment can only be issued
against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a
party in the case, did not have his day in court.[10] Due process requires that a court decision
can only bind a party to the litigation and not against one who did not have
his day in court.[11]
In this case, petitioners were not
parties in Civil Case No. 925-R. Petitioners’ allegation that their possession
did not arise from an agreement with the
defendants or the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R remains unrebutted
by respondent. The Special Order of
Demolition only binds the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R as well as their agents, assigns, representatives, or
successors-in-interest. In the absence
of proof that petitioners are agents, assigns, representatives, or successors-in-interest of the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R,
the Special Order of Demolition may not be enforced against them.
The Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioners could have intervened in Civil Case No. 925-R. Yet, there was no evidence that petitioners
were aware of the pendency of Civil Case No.
925-R. We cannot accept respondent’s
assertion that the pendency of Civil Case No. 925-R
could not have escaped petitioners’ notice because it was frequently talked
about in the community.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that
petitioners could have availed themselves of the remedy under Section 43, Rule
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:
Sec. 43. Proceedings when indebtedness denied or
another person claims the property. - If it appears that a person or
corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment obligor or to be indebted
to him, claims an interest in the property adverse to him or denies the debt,
the court may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the judgment obligee to institute an action against such person or
corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a transfer or
other disposition of such interest or debt within one hundred twenty (120) days
from notice of the order, and may punish disobedience of such order as for
contempt. Such order may be modified or
vacated at any time by the court which issued it, or by the court in which the
action is brought, upon such terms as may be just.
In this case, Arizo, et al. are
not judgment obligors as contemplated in Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Neither are
petitioners indebted to Arizo, et al. It was not even established that petitioners
are in possession of the property of Arizo, et
al. In fact, petitioners alleged that it
was not established that their residential structures are within the area
subject of Civil Case No. 925-R. In
other words, Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
would allow the judgment obligee to recover
indebtedness due to the judgment obligor, does not apply in this case.
When the Court of Appeals referred to
the remedy of terceria, it must be referring
to Section 16, Rule 39, not Section 43, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,[12] which provides:
Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. - If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
x x x x
The remedy of terceria
is available to a third person other than the judgment obligor or his agent who
claims a property levied on. In this
case, the property was not levied on and put on auction. The implementation of the Special Order of
Demolition would result in the destruction of petitioners’ property. Further, terceria
is not a speedy and adequate remedy
insofar as petitioners are concerned considering that the Special Order
of Demolition ordered the Deputy Sheriff to cause the demolition of all the
improvements immediately after the expiration of the 15-day period granted upon
the defendants, their agents, assigns, representatives, or
successors-in-interest to remove their improvements on the premises.
The Court recognizes the finality of
the trial court’s Decision in Civil Case No. 925-R. However, petitioners are contesting whether
their residential structures are within the area subject of Civil Case No.
925-R. Since petitioners are not
parties to Civil Case No. 925-R,
respondent has to file the proper action against petitioners to enforce his
property rights within the bounds of the law and our rules.[13] Petitioners’ right to possession, if any,
should be threshed out in a proper court proceeding.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE
the
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Denominated as Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
[2] Rollo, pp. 23-31. Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr., with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Andres B. Reyes, Jr., concurring.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Matuguina
Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98310,
[10] Panotes
v. City Townhouse Development Corporation, G.R. No. 154739,
[11] Mariculum
Mining Corporation v. Brion, G.R. Nos. 157696-97,
[12] See Sy
v. Discaya, G.R. No. 86301,
[13] See Pineda v.