THIRD DIVISION
|
JUANITO CHAN y LIM, a.k.a.
ZHANG ZHENTING, Petitioner, - versus - SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
PABLO C. FORMARAN III and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-ORGANIZED CRIME TASK FORCE,
represented by PO3 DANILO L. SUMPAY, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 147065
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 seeks to set aside the Resolution[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 21, 2000, which dismissed the
petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) finding probable
cause against the herein petitioner for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The petitioner likewise assails the CA Resolution dated
The case flows
from the following antecedents:
On April 23, 1999, the Chief of the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF), then Police Director
Panfilo M. Lacson, referred to the State Prosecutor for appropriate action the
evidence collected by the task force during a buy-bust operation against
petitioner Juanito Chan, a Chinese citizen who was a resident of Binondo,
Manila. The evidence consisted of —
EXH “A” – One (1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance/granules suspected to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride “SHABU,” weighing approximately one (1) kilogram with markings “DLS 04/23/99” placed inside a box of HENNESSY V.S.O.P. COGNAC.
EXH “B” – Buy-bust
money amounting to six thousand pesos (P6,000.00)
in twelve (12) pieces of five hundred peso bill denomination placed at the top
of each of the twelve (12) bundles of boodle money (pieces of paper cut in the
same size and shape of a genuine money) placed inside a yellow paper bag with
markings “HAPPY BIRTHDAY.”
EXH “C” – one (1) green Hyundai van with plate number ULK 815 used in transporting the confiscated SHABU.[2]
The PAOCTF also submitted the
following documents to the State Prosecutor: (1) the Joint Affidavit of Arrest
executed by PO3 Danilo L. Sumpay, PO3 Rolly S. Ibañez and SPO1 Ronald C.
Parreño, the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation; (2) booking
sheet and arrest report; (3) receipt for property seized; (4) request for
laboratory examination; (5) result of laboratory examination; (6) request for
medical/physical examination; (7) result of medical/physical examination; (8) request
for drug dependency test; (9) receipt for buy-bust money; and (10) photocopy of
buy-bust money.
In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest,[3] PO3
Danilo L. Sumpay, PO3 Rolly S. Ibañez and SPO1 Ronald C. Parreño narrated that,
on April 22, 1999, at about 10:30 p.m., their Confidential Informant (CI)
reported to them that a certain Juanito Chan was engaged in the sale of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu in different parts of Metro Manila, and that Chan
offered him a handsome commission if he would find a buyer of shabu. According
to them, the CI received a phone call from Chan later that evening, and the two
made a deal for the sale of one kilogram of shabu worth P600,000.00 at
the parking space in front of Fuji Mart Inc., along P500.00 peso bill on top) which he received
from the poseur-buyer.
Petitioner requested a preliminary
investigation and waived his rights under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.[4]
Thereafter, Chan submitted his
Counter-Affidavit[5] denying
the charges against him. He claimed that he was the victim of a frame-up and
extortion by the police officers who allegedly demanded P2 million in
exchange for his release. He contended that his warrantless arrest was illegal
because he was not committing a crime at that time. He insisted that the
supposed sale of drugs never took place and that the alleged 1 kilo of shabu
was just planted by the arresting officers.
After preliminary investigation,
State Prosecutor Pablo C. Formaran III issued a Resolution[6]
dated
In the face of the laboratory findings that the white crystalline substance weighing 935.80 grams, which appears to have been taken from the possession of the respondent is positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, and considering the existence of the buy-bust money, the undersigned investigating prosecutor finds sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that [the] crime charged has been committed and that the herein respondent is probably guilty thereof and should, therefore, be held for trial.
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that an Information for violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, be filed in court against respondent Juanito Chan y Lim alias Zhang Zhenting.[7]
Senior State Prosecutor Archimedes V.
Manabat recommended the approval of this Resolution. It was then approved by
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., in behalf of the Chief
State Prosecutor.
On
That on or about April 23, 1999, in Timog Avenue, Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent and without authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer nine hundred thirty-five point eight (935.80) grams, more or less, of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-99-84778, which was raffled to RTC Quezon City, Branch 224.
On
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Very Urgent Prayer for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the CA,
assailing the Resolutions of the Justice Secretary. The petition prayed, among
others, that the appellate court nullify said Resolutions and direct the
withdrawal of the Information.
On
On
I
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE CONSTITUTION, LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN NOT NULLIFYING THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NOT NULLIFYING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.[12]
Petitioner argues that the CA erred
in dismissing the petition for certiorari
based on the Court’s ruling in Crespo v. Mogul.[13] He argues that Crespo is not applicable to the present case because it involves a
different factual setting. He points out
that in said case, it was the provincial fiscal who filed a motion to dismiss
the criminal case pending before the trial court on the basis of the resolution
of the Undersecretary of Justice, whereas here, the issue involves the validity
of the preliminary investigation. He avers that Crespo was superseded by Allado
v. Diokno,[14] which
recognized the courts’ authority to nullify findings of probable cause by the
prosecutor or investigating judge when due process is violated.[15]
Petitioner contends that the
preliminary investigation was void for being violative of his right to due
process, which includes the right to be heard by an impartial authority. He
contends that State Prosecutor Formaran could not have been objective and
impartial in conducting the preliminary investigation because the latter was a
member of the PAOCTF, the agency that initiated the case against him.[16]
Petitioner
asserts that the petition for certiorari
was his speedy and adequate remedy from the ruling of the Justice Secretary,
and not a motion to quash or dismiss the Information, as suggested by the CA.
He insists that the Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion when
he affirmed the State Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, which was based
solely on the Joint Affidavit of Arrest. He claims that the State Prosecutor
ignored certain facts and circumstances which indicate that there was actually
no buy-bust operation but an extortion attempt instead, and capriciously relied
on the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’
duty.[17]
He posits that such presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence of an accused. Citing People v. Sapal,[18]
petitioner also submits that the police authorities’ undue delay in delivering
him to the proper authorities effectively destroys the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties. Petitioner is referring to the
10-hour delay in turning him over to the PNP Crime Laboratory from the time of
his arrest. He alleges that this undue delay confirms the attempted extortion
against him.
Respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintain that Allado is an exception to the general rule which may be invoked
only if similar circumstances are shown to exist, and such circumstances do not
exist in this case. They aver that petitioner cannot feign denial of due
process considering that he actively participated in the preliminary
investigation and was given the opportunity to present his side. Respondents
dispel petitioner’s doubt as to the partiality of State Prosecutor Formaran by
pointing out that his findings were reviewed by his superiors, even by the
respondent Secretary of Justice.
Respondents contend that petitioner’s
claim that he is the victim of frame-up in not worthy of credence for being
unsubstantiated. Likewise, petitioner cannot rely on the failure to deliver him
on time to the proper authorities because there was actually no need to do so
since the PAOCTF was already a convergence of various law enforcement units,
namely, the police, the military and the National Bureau of Investigation.
We deny the petition.
Contrary to petitioner’s view, Crespo subsists and was not superseded
by Allado.
Allado, which
was punctuated by inordinate eagerness in the gathering of evidence and in the
preliminary investigation, serves as an exception and may not be invoked unless
similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist.[19]
No such circumstances were established in the present case.
In Crespo, the Court laid down
the rule that once an Information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of
the court. In subsequent cases,[20]
the Court clarified that Crespo does
not bar the Justice Secretary from reviewing the findings of the investigating
prosecutor in the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates. The
Justice Secretary is merely advised, as far as practicable, to refrain from
entertaining a petition for review of the prosecutor’s finding when the
Information is already filed in court. In other words, the power or authority
of the Justice Secretary to review the prosecutor’s findings subsists even
after the Information is filed in court. The court, however, is not bound by
the Resolution of the Justice Secretary, but must evaluate it before proceeding
with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it is
not binding on courts.[21]
Albeit the findings of the Justice
Secretary are not absolute and are subject to judicial review, this Court
generally adheres to the policy of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, particularly when the said findings are
well-supported by the facts as established by the evidence on record.[22] Absent
any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to
said officer’s finding and determination of probable cause, since the
determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the
prosecutor.[23] Simply stated, findings of the
Secretary of Justice are not subject to review, unless made with grave abuse of
discretion.[24] As held
in one case:
The general rule is that the courts do not
interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in determining the
specificity and adequacy of the averments in a criminal complaint. The
determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information in court is an executive function which
pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. The
duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the
executive determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice are not subject to review unless
made with grave abuse.[25]
Thus, the findings of the Justice
Secretary may be reviewed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on the allegation that he acted with
grave abuse of discretion.[26]
This remedy is available to the aggrieved party.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the CA primarily anchored
its decision on Crespo, ratiocinating
that it is without authority to restrain the lower court from proceeding with
the case since the latter had already assumed jurisdiction. Such concern is
clearly of no moment.
In the petition for certiorari, the CA is not being asked to
cause the dismissal of the case in the trial court, but only to resolve the
issue of whether the Justice Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. Should
it determine that the Justice Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion,
it could nullify his resolution and direct the State Prosecutor to withdraw the
Information by filing the appropriate motion with the trial court. But the rule
stands — the decision whether to dismiss the case or not rests on the sound
discretion of the trial court where the Information was filed.
The CA, likewise, opined that the filing of the petition for certiorari was improper since petitioner
still had an available remedy, that is, to file a motion to dismiss or to quash
the Information with the trial court. We do not agree. A petition for certiorari may still be availed of even
if there is an available remedy, when such remedy does not appear to be plain,
speedy, and adequate in the ordinary
course of law. The following excerpt from Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals[27] is instructive —
The determination as to what exactly constitutes
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy rests on judicial discretion and depends on
the particular circumstances of each case.
There are many authorities that subscribe to the view that it is the
inadequacy, and not the mere absence,
of all other legal remedies, and the danger of a failure of justice without it,
that must usually determine the propriety of the writ. An adequate remedy is a
remedy which is equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy
which at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment of
the lower court complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which would promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the
inferior court, tribunal, board or officer.[28]
However, instead of remanding the case to the CA, we deem it more
practical to decide the substantive issue raised in this petition so as not to
further delay the disposition of this case. On this issue, we hold that the
Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
finding of probable cause by the State Prosecutor.
Probable cause has been defined as
the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that
the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and reasonable
belief, it does not import absolute certainty.[29]
Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires
more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a
conviction.[30]
In the
case at bench, petitioner is charged with illegal sale of a prohibited drug. A
successful prosecution of this offense requires the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor.[31]
To our mind, the documentary and object evidence submitted to the State
Prosecutor, particularly the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the 935.80 grams of shabu,
and the buy-bust money sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause
against petitioner for the crime charged. After all, a finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect.[32] Unless there is a clear and
convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were impelled by any
improper motive, or were not properly performing their duties, their
testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.[33]
The
allegation that the State Prosecutor was not impartial in conducting the
preliminary investigation is merely speculative — a bare allegation unworthy of
credence. Such accusation is worthless in light of our finding that there is,
indeed, probable cause against petitioner.
Moreover, bias and partiality can never be presumed.[34]
The mere fact that State Prosecutor Formaran was also a member of the PAOCTF is
insignificant. The now defunct PAOCTF was created to investigate and prosecute
all crime syndicates. It was a convergence and collaboration of the different
agencies of the government, including the Philippine National Police and the DOJ.[35] Unsupported
statements of partiality will not suffice in the absence of contrary evidence
that will overcome the presumption that the State Prosecutor regularly
performed his duty.
Petitioner’s allegation of frame-up
and extortion is evidentiary in nature, and are matters for his defense.
Evidentiary matters must be presented and heard during the trial.[36]
They are best left for the trial court to evaluate and resolve after a
full-blown trial on the merits.[37]
In any case, it is well to note the Court’s stance on such defense: “This Court is, of course, aware that in some
cases, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence in order to, inter alia, harass. But the defense of
frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the
presumption that the police officers performed their duties regularly and that
they acted within the bounds of their authority. Besides, the defense of denial
or frame-up, like alibi, is viewed with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.”[38]
As a final note, on P100,000.00. On
We recognize the courts’ authority to
grant bail in cases involving capital offenses after a determination that
evidence of guilt is not strong. But we
urge them to be circumspect in exercising such discretion. In this case, it is
glaring that the bail bond fixed by the RTC was exceedingly low considering
that the crime charged is illegal sale of prohibited drug punishable by reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 milllion, with the risk of flight
extremely high, the petitioner being a Chinese citizen. However, upon
verification from the Office of the Court Administrator, we found out that
Judge Leachon, Jr. had already retired on
We are, thus, compelled to re-issue a
reminder to judges to comply strictly with our guidelines on the grant of bail
in capital offenses, to be conscientious in performing their judicial functions
and, at all times, to be faithful to the law and the rules. They should maintain
professional competence, and abide by the highest standard of integrity and
moral uprightness, to ensure the people’s confidence in the judicial system. In
the exercise of its authority to supervise judges and court personnel, this
Court will not hesitate to impose disciplinary sanctions on judges who fail to
measure up to these exacting standards of work ethics and morality.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. Subject to our
disquisition on the propriety of certiorari
under Rule 65 as an appropriate remedy, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona, with Associate Justices Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. and Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring; rollo, pp. 55-58.
[2] Rollo, pp. 61-62.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] No. L-53373,
[10] Rollo, pp. 55-58.
[11]
[12]
[13] Supra note 9.
[14] G.R. No. 113630,
[15] Rollo, pp. 28-30.
[16]
[17]
[18] 385 Phil. 109 (2000).
[19] People v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 401, 419 (1999).
[20] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, 235 (1997); Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 594 (1996).
[21] Torres, Jr. v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No.
164268, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 599, 611.
[22] Marietta K. Ilusorio v. Sylvia K. Ilusorio,
et al., G.R. No. 171659, December 13, 2007.
[23] Atty. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 444 Phil. 499, 531 (2003).
[24]
[25] Insular
Life Assurance Company Limited v. Serrano, G.R. No. 163255,
[26] Alcaraz
v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 164715,
[27] 456 Phil. 755 (2003).
[28] Landbank
of the
[29] Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, supra note 22.
[30] Ching
v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 164317,
[31] People
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 172975,
[32] Ching
v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 30.
[33] People
v. Sy, G.R. No. 171397,
[34] Republic
v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 156015,
[35] Executive Order No. 8,
[36] People v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19, at 415.
[37] Marilyn
H. Co, et al. v. Republic of the
[38]
[39] Rollo, p. 314.