EN BANC
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PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC
FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, represented by PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT through ATTY. Petitioner, - versus - HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO,
in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN; DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES’ MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND OFFICERS AT THE TIME –
Rafael Sison, Joseph Tengco, Alice Reyes, Vicente Paterno, Joseph Edralin,
Roberto Ongpin, Verden Dangilan, Rodolfo Manalo; BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
INTEGRATED CIRCUITS PHILIPPINES, INC. Querube Makalintal,*
Ambrosio Makalintal, Vicente Jayme, Antonio Santiago, Edgar Quinto, Horacio
Makalintal, Alfredo de los Angeles, Jose Rey D. Rueda, Ramoncito Modesto,
Gerardo Limjuco, Respondents. |
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G.R.
No. 145184 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated: March
14, 2008 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
NACHURA, J.:
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee),
representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through
Atty. Orlando L.
On
WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest”;
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The right of the state to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel”;
WHEREAS, there have been allegations of loans, guarantees, or other forms of financial accommodation granted, directly or indirectly, by government owned and controlled bank or financial institutions, at the behest, command or urging by previous government officials to the disadvantage and detriment of the Philippine government and the Filipino people;
ACCORDINGLY, an “Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS” is hereby created to be composed of the following:
Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government - Chairman
The Solicitor General - Vice-Chairman
Representative from the
Office
of the Executive Secretary -
Member
Representative from the
Department
of Finance -
Member
Representative from the
Department of Justice - Member
Representative from the
Development
Bank of the
Representative from the
Philippine
National Bank -
Member
Representative from the
Asset
Privatization Trust -
Member
Government
Corporate Counsel -
Member
Representative from the
Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation - Member
The
Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:
1.
Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and
borrowers, including the principal officers and stockholders of the borrowing
firms, as well as the persons responsible for granting the loans or who
influenced the grant thereof;
2. Identify the borrowers who were granted “friendly waivers”, as well as the government officials who granted these waivers; determine the validity of these waivers;
3.
Determine the courses of action that the government
should take to recover those loans, and to recommend appropriate actions to the
Office of the President within sixty (60) days from the date hereof.
The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any department, bureau, office, agency, instrumentality or corporation of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for such assistance as it may need in the discharge of its function.
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November
9, 1992, the functions of the Committee were subsequently expanded by including
in its investigation, inventory and study all non-performing loans, whether
behest or non-behest. It likewise
provided for the following criteria which might be utilized as frame of
reference in determining a behest loan, to wit:
1.
It is under-collateralized;
2.
The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
3.
Direct or indirect endorsement by high government
officials like presence of marginal notes;
4.
Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower
corporation are identified as cronies;
5.
Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose
intended;
6.
Use of corporate layering;
7.
Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is
being sought; and
8. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that while both may involve civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal liability.
Several loan accounts were referred
to the Committee for its investigation, including the loan transactions between
Comptronics
After examining and studying the loan
transactions, the Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of a
behest loan as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61. Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador,
Consultant of the Committee, and representing the PCGG, filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint[3]
for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
against the Concerned Members of the DBP Board of Governors, and Concerned
Directors and Officers of ICPI, namely, Querube Makalintal, Ambrosio C.
Makalintal, Vicente R. Jayme, Antonio A. Santiago, Edgar L. Quinto, Horacio G.
Makalintal, Alfredo F. delos Angeles, Josery D. Ruede, Manuel Tupaz, Alberto T.
Perez and Gerardo A. Limjuco (private respondents).
Atty. Salvador alleged that ICPI
applied for an industrial loan (foreign currency loan) of US$1,352,400.00, or P10,143,000.00,
from DBP. The loan application was
approved on P1,786,000.00 to cover the
project’s initial financing requirement. He added that the ICPI’s industrial
loan was under-collateralized and ICPI was undercapitalized at the time the
loan was granted. ICPI’s paid up capital by then was only P3,000,000.00,
while the appraised value of the machinery and equipment offered as collaterals
was only P5,943,610.00. Atty.
Salvador concluded that ICPI was undeserving of the concession given to it, and
the approval of the loan constitutes a violation of Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No.
3019.
On P1,786,000.00, which he
claimed was granted with undue haste and without collateral, except a
promissory note and comfort letter signed by DBP Chairman Rafael Sison. He added that the stockholders, officers and
agents are identified cronies, since the Chairman of the Board – Querube
Makalintal – was, at the same time, the then Speaker of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa. He named Rafael A. Sison, Jose Tengco, Alice Ll. Reyes, and Casimiro
Tanedo as the ones responsible for the approval of the loan who should, thus, be
charged, along with the officers and directors of ICPI, for violation of R.A.
No. 3019.
After evaluating the evidence
submitted by the Committee, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Memorandum, finding
that:
After
going over the record, we find no probable cause to warrant the filing of the
instant case in court.
To
start with, the cause of action has prescribed.
The
loan in [question] was entered into between ICPI and DBP sometime in August
1980, while the complaint was filed on
The transaction was duly documented and the instruments drawn in support thereof were duly registered and open to public scrutiny, the prescriptive period of any legal action in connection with the said transaction commenced to run from the date the same was registered sometime in 1980.
x x x x
Complainant’s
allegation that the questioned loans were not covered by sufficient collaterals
is negated by the evidence on record. It
appears from the Executive Summary attached to the complaint that ICPI loans
were secured by the following, to wit: (a) Machinery and Equipment to be
acquired valued at P5,943,610.00; (b) The Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation guarantee up to 70% of the proposed DBP loan or P7,100,000.00;
(c) By the Joint and several signatures with ICPI, Philippine Underwriter
Finance Corporation; Atrium Capital Corporation, Mr. Ambrocio and Querube
Macalintal. The value of the machineries
and equipment and the amount guaranteed by Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation have a total amount P13,043,610.00. ICPI’s paid up capital in the amount of P3,000,000.00
was also considered as additional security.
The aggregate value of ICPI’s securities was therefore P16,043,610.00,
while the total amount of loans granted was only P10,143,000.00. Clearly, therefore, the loans granted to ICPI
were not undercollaterized (sic).
Moreover,
ICPI had an authorized capital stock of P10 Million of which P3
Million had been paid up or more than 25% of the authorized capital. It cannot be said that the corporation is
undercapitalized.
In
fine, the questioned loans were not considered behest loans within the purview
of Memorandum Order No. 61, dated
Finally, the aforesaid Administrative and Memorandum Orders both issued by the President in 1992, may not be retroactively applied to the questioned transactions which took place in 1980 because to do so would be tantamount to an ex post facto law which is proscribed by the Constitution.[5]
Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, let the instant complaint be, as the same is hereby,
DISMISSED.
SO RESOLVED.[6]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the Ombudsman denied the same
on
Hence,
this petition for certiorari.
Before tackling the issues raised by
the petitioner, this Court takes notice of a serious procedural flaw. Joseph Edralin, Roberto Ongpin, Verden
Dangilan and Rodolfo Manalo were impleaded as respondents in this
petition. However, they were not made
respondents in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. Neither was there any allegation in the
sworn-complaint and supplementary complaint executed by Atty. Salvador before
the Ombudsman that Edralin, Ongpin, Dangilan and Manalo had any participation
in, or were responsible for, the approval of the questioned loan. As such, they cannot be made respondents for
the first time in this petition.
Accordingly, we dismiss the petition as against them.
With
the procedural issue resolved, this Court now comes to the issues raised by the
petitioner.
Petitioner
alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that (i) the offenses subject of its
criminal complaint had prescribed; (ii) Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto
laws; and (iii) there is no probable cause to indict private respondents for
violation under Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The
computation of the prescriptive period for offenses involving the acquisition
of behest loans had already been laid to rest in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[8] thus:
[I]t was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the “beneficiaries of the loans.” Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.[9]
The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Desierto,[10]
wherein the Court explained:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.[11]
The
Sworn Statement filed by Atty. Salvador did not specify the exact dates when the
alleged offenses were discovered.
However, the records show that it was the Committee that discovered the
same. As such, the discovery could not
have been made earlier than
Likewise, we
do not agree with the Ombudsman’s declaration that Administrative Order No. 13
and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be applied retroactively to the questioned
transactions because to do so would violate the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an
action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done
criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the defendant;[12] or
(e) which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when exercised was lawful; or
(f) which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[13]
The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity
of penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.[14]
Administrative Order No. 13 does not
mete out a penalty for the act of granting behest loans. It merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest
Loans and provides for its composition and functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other hand,
simply provides the frame of reference in determining the existence of behest
loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order
No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex-post
facto laws.
Furthermore,
in Estarija v. Ranada,[15]
in which petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 in
his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision, we had occasion to
state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the
constitutionality of a law. The
Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in delving into the
constitutionality of the subject administrative and memorandum orders.
Now, on the merits of the case.
Private respondents were charged with
violation of Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The pertinent provisions read:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
x x x x
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
Petitioner asserts that the loan
transaction between DBP and ICPI bore the characteristics of a behest
loan. It claims that the loan was under-collateralized
and ICPI was under-capitalized when the questioned loan was hastily
granted. Petitioner believes that there
exists probable cause to indict the private respondents for violation of
Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Case
law has it that the
determination of probable cause against those in public office during a
preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman.[16] The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in
the exercise of his discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge
the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. As a rule,
courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory power, exercised
through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence
or absence of probable cause, except when the finding is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[17]
For one to have violated Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, the following elements must be established: 1) the accused
must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions; 2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and 3) he must have caused undue injury to any party,
including the government, or given any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference, in the discharge of his functions.[18] Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and
negligence per se are not enough for
one to be held liable under the law. It
is required that the act constitutive of bad faith or partiality must, in the
first place, be evident or manifest, while the negligent deed should be both gross
and inexcusable. Further, it is necessary
to show that any or all of these modalities resulted in undue injury to a
specified party.[19]
On the other hand, to be liable under
Section 3(g), there must be a showing that private respondents entered into a
grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government.
Petitioner did not satisfy either
criterion.
It is clear from the records that the
DBP officers studied and evaluated ICPI’s request for an interim loan and an industrial
loan, and they were convinced that ICPI was deserving of the grant, considering
the viability and economic desirability of its project. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that DBP
did not exercise sound business judgment when it approved the loan. Neither was there any proof that the
conditions imposed for the loan were specially designed in order to favor
ICPI.
The Chapter on Human Relations of the
Civil Code directs every person, inter
alia, to observe good faith, which springs from the fountain of good
conscience.[20] Well-settled is the rule that good faith is
presumed. Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good
faith in the performance of his duties.
Mistakes committed by a public
officer are not actionable, absent a clear showing that he was motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.[21] “Bad faith” does not simply connote bad moral
judgment or negligence. There must be
some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong,
a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent, or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for
ulterior purposes.[22] Petitioners utterly failed to show that
private respondents’ actions fit such description.
Neither was there any convincing
proof offered to demonstrate that the contracts were grossly disadvantageous to
the Government, or that they were entered into to give ICPI unwarranted
benefits and advantages.
Petitioner asserts that ICPI was
undeserving of the accommodation given by DBP.
To support this allegation, petitioners quoted a portion of the credit
evaluation report, which reads:
Investigations conducted by DBP’s Credit Department revealed adverse findings on ICPI and Mr. Gene Vicente Tamesis, who until recently, has been the principal stockholder and executive officer of subject Corporation. x x x Mr. Tamesis, however, has since transferred all of his shareholdings to Mr. Ambrosio G. Makalintal. Aware of Mr. Tamesis’ unfavorable credit standing, ICPI’s management has, further, caused him to yield his position as Chairman of the Board in favor of Mr. Querube C. Makalintal, former Justice of the Supreme Court and presently Speaker of the Interim Batasang Pambansa.[23]
But we note that the said credit
investigation report goes further, and states:
With the responsible management of the Makalintals and the conversion of substantial liabilities of ICPI into equity (subject-firm’s major creditors, namely, Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation and Atrium Capital Corporation have both agreed, in principle, to convert their claims into equity), the corporation can now operate on a clean credit slate and stands a good chance of meeting its credit obligations.[24]
There is, thus, no solid basis for
petitioners to claim that ICPI did not deserve the concession given by DBP.
Contrary
to what petitioner wants to portray, the contracts between ICPI and DBP were
not behest loans. ICPI was not under-capitalized and the loan was not under-collateralized
at the time of its approval. Likewise,
the approval can hardly be depicted as one done with undue haste.
The records show that in 1979, Atrium
Capital Corporation and Philippine Underwriter’s Corporation agreed on the
conversion of their P8,500,000.00 worth of creditor’s equity into
capital stocks.[25] Then, in 1980, the individual stockholders
paid their respective subscriptions amounting to P3,000,000.00, thereby
increasing ICPI’s paid up capital to P11,500,000.00 as of
Similarly, the industrial loan was sufficiently
collateralized at the time of its approval.
It was granted on the condition that the assets intended for acquisition
by ICPI would serve as collateral. The
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PEFLGC) also
guaranteed 70% of the loan extended.
ICPI was further required to assign to DBP not less than 67% of its
total subscribed and outstanding voting shares, which should be maintained at
all times and should subsist during the existence of the loan. As additional
security, ICPI’s majority stockholders, namely, Integrated Circuits Philippine,
Inc. (ICP) of Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation, Atrium Corporation
(AC), Ambrosio G. Makalintal and Querube Makalintal were also made jointly and
severally liable to DBP. DBP was also given the right to designate its
comptroller in ICP.[27]
Petitioner’s insistence that DBP
excluded the joint and several liabilities of the majority stockholders of ICP
and AC and of Querube Makalintal has to be rejected. It is true that DBP’s Industrial Project
Department recommended the amendment of this condition. However, no proof was offered to prove that the
DBP Board of Directors approved such recommendation.
Petitioner
also points to the alleged non-implementation of the guarantee by PEFLGC to
demonstrate that the loan was under-collateralized at the time of its
approval. But the evidence[28]
presented shows that the PEFLGC approved the guarantee, although the approval
lapsed in 1985. Thus, it cannot be
gainsaid that, at the time of the approval of the loan, there was a guarantee
by PEFLGC. Besides, even if we exclude
as security the guarantee of PEFLGC, the loan still had sufficient collaterals
at the time of its approval.
The contention that the loan was
hastily granted also fails to persuade.
The supplemental complaint alleged that the interim loan was granted on
Neither does the industrial loan
appear to have been hastily granted.
Admittedly, the interim loan granted on
In sum, petitioner does not persuade us
that the contract between ICPI and DBP was a behest loan.
Finally, we note that petitioner did
not specify the precise role played by, or the participation of, each of the
private respondents in the alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019. No concrete or overt acts of the ICP’s
directors and officers, particularly of Mr. Querube Makalintal, were
specifically alleged or mentioned in the complaint and its supplement, and no
proof was adduced to show that they unduly influenced the directors and
concerned officials of DBP. Neither were
circumstances shown to indicate a common criminal design of either the officers
of DPB or ICPI, nor that they colluded to cause undue injury to the government
by giving unwarranted benefits to ICPI.
The Ombudsman can hardly be faulted
for not wanting to proceed with the prosecution of the offense, convinced that
he does not possess the necessary evidence to secure a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Memorandum and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-95-0443, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
|
|
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
|
RUBEN T.
REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Died during the pendency of
the case. Hence, in its
[1] Annex “A,” rollo, pp. 26-30.
[2] Annex “B,” id. at 31-33.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] 375 Phil. 697 (1999).
[9]
[10] 415 Phil. 723 (2001).
[11]
[12] Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 534, 565.
[13] Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 361 Phil. 251, 275 (1999).
[14] Orlando L. Salvador v. Placido L. Mapa, et
al., G.R. No. 135080, November 28, 2007.
[15] G.R.
No. 159314, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 652, 665.
[16] Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
169727-28, August 18, 2006, 499 SCRA 375, 394.
[17] Collantes v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos.
167006-07, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 142, 150-151.
[18] Uriarte v. People, G.R. No. 169251, December
20, 2006, 511 SCRA 471, 486; Santos v.
People, G.R. No. 161877, March 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 185, 194; Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
162314-17, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 377, 386.
[19] Collantes v. Marcelo, supra note 17, at 153.
[20] Venus v. Desierto, 358 Phil. 675, 697 (1998).
[21] Saber
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132981,
[22] Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), 430 Phil 101, 115 (2002); Baylon v. Office of the Ombudsman, 423 Phil. 705, 724 (2001); Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 820, 843 (1998).
[23] Rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 98-99.
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Minutes No. 31,
[28] Annex “J,” id. at 206-208.
[29] See
Presidential Commission on Good Government
v. Hon. Aniano Desierto, et al., G.R. No. 139296,