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DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA
TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ
MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS,
Petitioners, - versus - HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON
DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented
by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO
SANSON & MA. Respondents. |
G.R. No. 182484
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, * CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, * velasco, JR., * NACHURA,
REYES,
leonardo-de castro, and
brion, JJ. Promulgated: June 17, 2008 |
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RESOLUTION
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BRION, J.:
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Before us for the determination of
sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant
to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;[1] and
Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data[2])
is the petition for certiorari and
for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas
data filed by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as
presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson
de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National
Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by
the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th
Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma.
Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose
the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses
Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the “private respondents”), filed with the
Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay,
Aklan (the “MCTC”) a complaint[3]
dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners
Daniel Masangkay Tapuz,
Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga,
Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the “petitioners”)
and other John Does numbering about 120.
The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are
the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land
located at Sitio Pinaungon,
Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the “disputed
land”); (2) they were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the
petitioners – armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together
with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force
and intimidation, without the private respondents’ permission and against the
objections of the private respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer[4]
dated
The MCTC, after due proceedings,
rendered on
“The key that could unravel the answer to
this question lies in the Amended Commissioner’s Report and Sketch found on
pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have
submitted. It is shown in the Amended
Commissioner’s Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a
concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown
in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter
fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in
his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they
acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex
‘A’, Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.),
they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit
of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it
could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession
of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the
defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio
Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with
view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff
Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police
Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay
Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of their confrontation, the
parties signed an Agreement (Annex ‘D’, Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to
vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any
structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of
the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted
security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the
defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain
firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation
forcibly entered the premises along the road and built a nipa
and bamboo structure (Annex ‘E’, Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question
which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by
plaintiffs’ Certification (Annex ‘F’, Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the
police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a
complaint with the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their
Certificate to File Action (Annex ‘G’, Complaint, p. 13); hence the present
action.
Defendants’ (sic) contend in their answer
that ‘prior to January 4, 2005, they were already occupants of the property,
being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open
continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)’. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is
enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as
noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it
is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical
possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they
were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of
force. Applying by analogy the ruling of
the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of
plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants’ claims to an older
possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the
plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on
The contention is untenable for being
inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner who constituted
(sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land in question
only on
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by
the categorical statements of defendants’ witnesses, Rowena Onag,
Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- ‘144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated ‘that on or about
From the foregoing, it could be safely
inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and
other structures depicted in their pictures attached as annexes to their
position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch
submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures
are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question,
accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered
as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question prior to April
19, 2006[6].”
The petitioners appealed the MCTC
decision to the Regional Trial Court (“RTC,”
Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan)
then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin (“Judge
Marin”).
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the
private respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated
The respondent Judge subsequently
denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed
the motion for demolition.[9] The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order[10] a
writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff’s
written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to
allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the
land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2
August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review[11]
(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent
Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo,
Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson
R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition
on
It was against this factual backdrop
that the petitioners filed the present petition last
To support the petition and the
remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically
opposed to the MCTC’s findings and legal
reasons. Most importantly, the
petitioners maintain their claims of prior
possession of the disputed land and of intrusion
into this land by the private respondents.
The material factual allegations of the petition – bases as well of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo –
read:
“29. On
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed
the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect their property from
intruders. Two of the armed men trained
their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was
identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad,
31. The
armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]
32.
These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of
the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The
terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and
MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion.
Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence
against women and children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered
weapons.
[…]
34.
That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and
unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are
influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political
clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as
the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the
terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are
attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are
therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin
Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs
resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict the
defendants.[13]”
The
petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint
for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,[14]
they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to
or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value
of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00;
thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that
the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed – equally has no jurisdiction
to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed
orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and
issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in
form. The petition for the issuance of
the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally
defective with respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We
conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition,
that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners
have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the “CA petition”) for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in
the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the
exact status of their pending CA petition.
The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on
We
note in this regard that the petitioners’ counsel stated in his attached
“Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court”[16]
(“Certificate of Compliance”) that “in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff
issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the
petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April
18, 2008 by LBC.” To guard against
any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of
this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the
60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start
from the
Based on the same material
antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and
deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum
shopping.
By
the petitioners’ own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals (docketed as CA – G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now
also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us,
allegedly because “the CA did not act on
the petition up to this date and for
the petitioner (sic) to seek relief
in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic
since the CA refused to
resolve pending urgent motions and
the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of
LACK OF JURISDICTION.”[18]
Interestingly,
the petitioners’ counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition
- at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance[19]
that:
“x x x
(e) the petitioners went up
to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of
the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA
initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the
ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable
of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution
of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring
supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on
x x x”
The
difference between the above representations on what transpired at the
appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners’
intentions. We discern -- from the
petitioners’ act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that “the CA did not act on the petition up to
this date” while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the
Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the
remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the
RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals
had already undertaken.
At
the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same
relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
02859. The petitioners’ act of seeking against the same parties the
nullification of the same RTC orders
before the appellate court and before us at
the same time, although made through different mediums that are both
improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can
sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the
combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3,
Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised
Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may
have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the
petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties,
involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing
side by side at the same time.
To
restate the prevailing rules, “forum shopping is the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively,
on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. Forum shopping may be
resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another,
other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts,
abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest
court dockets. Willful and deliberate
violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case;
it may also constitute direct contempt.”[20]
Additionally,
the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective
as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz
- did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46;
Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Of those who signed, only five
(5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In
any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the
basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over
the private respondents’ complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for
forcible entry and not – as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated
– a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest
therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The
Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases – called
accion interdictal –
even before the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the
assessed value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions
based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained.
Separately from accion interdictal
are accion publiciana
for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for
the recovery of ownership.[21] Apparently, these latter actions are the ones
the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with
Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level
courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the
realty subject of the litigation. As the
complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no
jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari
should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the
non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive
deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the
writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response
to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies
to address these extraordinary concerns.
It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to
life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its
issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact,
to wit:
“(a)
The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b)
The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e)
The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible
for the threat, act or omission; and
(f)
The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other
just and equitable reliefs.”[22]
The writ shall issue if the Court is
preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to
or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
was or is being committed.
The
issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is
anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted,[23]
that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the
following documents:
“(a)
Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the
petitioners, id., petitioners’ prior
possession, private respondents’ intrusion and the illegal acts committed by
the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b)
Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.)
committed by a security guard against minors – descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c)
Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia’s
affidavit;
(d)
Certification dated
(e)
Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis,
narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family
and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking
and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
(f)
Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a
house owned by Josiel Tapuz,
Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire.”
On the whole, what is clear from
these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private
parties. If at all,
issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned
except to the extent that the occurrence of past
violence has been alleged. The
right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the
threats and harassments implied from the presence of “armed men bare to the
waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably,
none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the
rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is
continuing.
A
closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them – the statements
of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are
practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been
reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay,
and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was “accidental.”
As
against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision
in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners’ factual
claims. These findings are significantly
complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process,
i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties’ positions,
evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed
commissioner.
We
preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of
a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat
thereof) that was brought to and ruled
upon by the MCTC; subsequently
brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much
later brought to the appellate court without
conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the
writ of amparo that, if decided as the
petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under
these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a
continuing threat to the persons of
the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the
disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners
wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable,
the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather
than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor
do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our
action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling
independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of
nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously
wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to
weaken or negate.
Separately
from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at
this point the indicators, clear
and patent to us, that the petitioners’ present recourse via the remedy
of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate
the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before
the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners’
misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping;
and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of
certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far
from forthright and sufficiently compelling.
To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of
deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither
the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo -
extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative
substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as
a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately
interfere with these processes – the situation obtaining in the present case.
While
we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
provides for rules on the institution of separate actions,[24]
for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,[25]
and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.[26] These rules were adopted to promote an
orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel
recourses.
Where,
as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a
writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to
life, liberty or security – the personal
concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or
threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar,
however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on
certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ
with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
“(a) The personal
circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b)
The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the
relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.”
Support for the habeas data aspect of
the present petition only alleges that:
“1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the
homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the
private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the
same;
[ … ]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report
pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in
dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted
by the PNP.”
These allegations obviously lack what
the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the
petition fatally deficient.
Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any
need for information under the control of police authorities other than those
it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification
for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts
made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the “fishing expedition” that this Court - in the course of drafting
the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS
the present petition OUTRIGHT for
deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and attachments.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1] A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC.
[2] A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC.
[3] Rollo,
pp. 71-76.
[4]
[5] Penned by Judge Raul C. Barrios, id.,
pp. 108-115
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
[ … ]
(3) Exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value
of the disputed property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the
value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
[15] Under Section 4, Rules 65
of the Revised Rules of Court.
[16] Rollo, pp.
27-28; A separate substitute compliance for the required Statement of Material
Dates in petitions for certiorari under the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46, in relations with Rules 56 and 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[17] Id.., p. 24.
[18]
[19] Supra, at note 16.
[20] Spouses
Julita dela Cruz v. Pedro Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28,
2005, 464 SCRA 576.
[21] Reyes
v. Sta. Maria, No. L-33213,
[22] Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
[23] At pages 7-8 of this Resolution
[24] SEC. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. — This Rule
shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative
actions.
[25] SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. – When a
criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be
filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available
by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of
the reliefs available under the writ of amparo.
[26] SEC. 23. Consolidation. – When a criminal action is
filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be
consolidated with the criminal action.
When
a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a
petition for a writ of amparo, the latter
shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall
continue to apply to the disposition of the reliefs
in the petition.