THIRD DIVISION
|
OLIGARIO SALAS, Petitioner, - versus - ABOITIZ ONE, INC., and
SABIN ABOITIZ, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 178236
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: June 27,
2008 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner
Oligario Salas (Salas) appeals by certiorari
the January 31, 2007 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93947 and CA-G.R. SP No. 94145, and
its June 13, 2007 Resolution[2]
denying his motion for reconsideration.
Salas
was hired as assistant utility man by respondent Aboitiz One, Inc. (Aboitiz) on
On
On
Dear Mr. Salas:
In connection with the
administrative investigation conducted on
1. Although you repeatedly made follow-up to the
[supplier], you failed to elevate the critical situation to the attention of
your leaders resulting to the stock out of a critical stock;
2. Your case was aggravated by your tampering of
the Bin Card by changing the date of stock from May 31 to
3. The stock out incident had a negative impact
to the company in terms of revenue and goodwill to clients.
Your position as
Warehouseman is vested with trust and confidence by the company for the reason
that you are in-charge of safekeeping and monitoring of the company’s operational
supplies and ensuring that these are available anytime.
In consideration of the
results of the investigation you are hereby terminated from the company for
loss of trust and confidence effective
Accordingly, you are
hereby directed to report to the Human Resource Office for your final clearance
of money and property accountabilities, and obligations.
For your information and
compliance.
Sincerely yours
(Signed)
PAUL HAMOY
Team Leader, Purchasing
Aboitiz One, Inc.
Salas thereafter
sent a letter to Mr. Hamoy requesting reconsideration of the management’s
decision stating:
Sir,
I would like to appeal
for humanitarian reason on the decision of the management terminating me from
service.
1. I would like to ask
if I could avail of the early retirement plan since I was able to work for the
company for 10 years, it is very hard for me that I be terminated after working
for that long years in A1, the money I will get from retirement plan will be
use[d] for my family expenses for at least a couple of months until I got a new
job, pls. spare my family.
2. If you can’t grant #1
appeal can you please allow me to tender my resignation instead of being
terminated by the company;
3. If I can stay up to
thanks, ohlee salas.[5]
Mr. Hamoy replied via electronic mail
(e-mail) denying Salas’ request to avail himself of the retirement plan or
tender his resignation. He reasoned that
the company’s table of discipline provides the penalty of dismissal for the
offenses he committed. Salas was, however, granted an extension of one (1)
month or until
Claiming termination without cause,
Salas filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against Aboitiz and its
president Sabin Aboitiz for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement,
and for payment of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees.
Aboitiz
responded that there was valid termination.
It asserted that Salas was dismissed for just cause and with due
process. It claimed Salas willfully breached
his duty when Aboitiz ran out of Large
Quickbox, justifying the termination
of his employment.[7]
On
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the
Labor Arbiter. But noting that Salas was
not entirely faultless, the NLRC denied his prayer for backwages, and ordered
the payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement. The NLRC ratiocinated, thus:
Under the Labor Code, gross negligence is a valid ground for an employer
to terminate an employee. Gross negligence characterized by want of even slight
care acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequence insofar as other persons may be affected (Tres Reyes vs. Maxim’s
Tea House, 398 SCRA 288). It is for
this reason that We disagree with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that [Salas]
is guilty of gross negligence because [Salas] did his duty to make proper
requisition in advance. If there is
anyone to blame for failure to deliver to the requisitioner [Salas], the
requisitioned items, it should be the purchasing officer who should have made
the corresponding explanation, and to bear the consequences if his explanation
is implausible. If ever [Salas] failed
to follow-up, it does not follow that he is remiss in his duty, as the duty to
deliver the requisitioned items is already on the purchasing officer. Moreover, [Salas] explained during the
hearing that he made follow-ups. What
puzzles Us is, why did not the management require the Circle Team and the
Purchasing Officer to explain. Such omission, to Our mind, indicates discrimination
against [Salas].
Past infractions of the same nature can be used to evaluate the
sufficiency of the last offense for termination of employment. Considering that We see no gross negligence
on [Salas] for which his employment was terminated, consideration of past
infractions become immaterial. Moreover,
with his ten years of service in the company, he was charged twice, about the
alleged sale of used eight units of air conditioner and refusal to assist in
the loading at the fuel depot of refueler truck, for which he was penalized by
suspension x x x. These past offenses
are not of the same nature as the alleged gross negligence that prompted
[Aboitiz] to dismiss [Salas] and, therefore, cannot be used as additional
justification with the last offense.
However, We find [Salas] guilty of negligence, not because the quick box
ran out of stock as of
Dismissal is too harsh a penalty for his negligence and act of
tampering. This is especially true
because he readily admitted the same during the administrative hearing. Considering his length of service, and
adhering to the compassionate justice observed in labor cases, deletion of
backwages, but with reinstatement, is sufficient penalty. Nonetheless, it appears that strained
relations has (sic) already set between the parties that precludes harmonious
working relationship. In such case,
jurisprudence has laid out the solution by ordering payment of separation pay
at one (1) month for every year of service in lieu of reinstatement.
The alleged failure of [Salas] to account for alleged unused accountable
forms in the amount of P57,850.00 cannot be used as justification for
[Salas’] dismissal. This charge came out
after Salas’ dismissal for which [Salas] was not surely given an opportunity to
be heard. Additionally, [no] substantial
evidence was presented to establish such charge. by mere certification of Pablo
Osit (sic). How Mr. Osit arrived at such
figure is not even explained.[9]
Aboitiz filed a motion for reconsideration, while Salas sought partial
reconsideration of the decision, both of which were denied by the NLRC on
Salas and Aboitiz thereupon filed
their respective petitions for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93947 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 94145, respectively. Salas
questioned the denial of his prayer for backwages and other monetary benefits,
and the order directing payment of separation pay instead of
reinstatement. Upon the other hand,
Aboitiz faulted the NLRC for not sustaining the validity of Salas’ dismissal.
By decision of
[t]hree
valid grounds attended the dismissal of Salas: (1) Serious misconduct under Art. 282 (a), Labor Code, for his
tamper(ing) the records to show that the stock on
The CA disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition of
Aboitiz One, Inc. is GRANTED. The NLRC’s decision dated
SO ORDERED.[11]
Salas
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on
Aggrieved by the resolutions of the CA, Salas comes to this
Court positing that:
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN LAW AND COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN REVERSING THE NLRC DECISION INSTEAD OF MODIFYING IT
TO INCLUDE BACKWAGES ON MERE GROUND OF A SINGLE AND SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE WHICH IS
NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL. SIMILARLY,
THIS CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF DISMISSAL ON GROUND OF LOSS OF TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE.[12]
The
Court shall deal first with the procedural issue.
Commenting
on the petition, Aboitiz argues that
the petition suffers from procedural infirmities which warrant its dismissal.
It asserts that no duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed
decision and resolution, and material portions of the record were appended to
the petition. It also alleged that the
petition did not indicate the material dates to show that it was filed on
time. Finally, it argues that the
certification of non-forum shopping is defective.
Contrary to Aboitiz’s assertion, the petition substantially
complies with the requirements set forth by the Rules of Court. Salas submitted a duplicate original of the
assailed Decision[13] and Resolution[14]
of the CA, as well as copies of the material portions of the record referred to
in the petition.[15]
Likewise, he indicated in his petition the material dates
showing that the petition was filed on time.
He alleged that he received the assailed CA Decision on February 9, 2007
and filed a motion for reconsideration on February 19, 2007, which was denied
by the CA in its June 13, 2007 Resolution.
The Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration was received on
There is also no dispute that
Salas had complied with the requirement of the rules on the certification of
non-forum shopping. Salas certifies that
he did not commence any case based on similar cause of action before any Court,
quasi-judicial body or tribunal. He also
averred that:
[t]here is no pending case similar to this
case before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals (or any of its Division)
quasi-judicial bodies or any tribunal, and should I thereafter learn, that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, I shall report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Hon. Court of Appeals wherein
this initiatory pleading has been filed pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 paragraph
(c) of the Revised Rules of Court.[17]
Obviously, Salas
committed a typographical error in stating “this
Hon. Court of Appeals” instead of “this Honorable Court where this initiatory pleading (petition) has been filed.” This innocuous oversight did not render the
certification defective, and thus, would not warrant the outright dismissal of
the petition.
Besides,
it has been our consistent holding that the ends of justice are better served
when cases are determined on the merits - after all, parties are given full
opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses - rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections.[18]
Aboitiz’s plea for the outright dismissal of the petition cannot, therefore, be
sustained.
Having
resolved the procedural issue, we proceed to the merits of the case.
As stated in the decision notice,[19]
Salas was terminated for neglect of duty and willful breach of trust. Gross
negligence connotes want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or
diligence, or the entire absence of care.
It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any
effort to avoid them. To warrant removal
from service, the negligence should not merely be gross, but also habitual.[20]
Undoubtedly, it was Salas’ duty, as
material controller, to monitor and maintain the availability and supply of Quickbox needed by Aboitiz in its
day-to-day operations, and on
If there is anything that Salas can
be faulted for, it is his failure to promptly inform his immediate supervisor,
Mr. Ed Dumago, of the non-delivery of the requisitioned items. Nevertheless, such failure did not amount to
gross neglect of duty or to willful breach of trust, which would justify his
dismissal from service.
The CA also justified Salas’
dismissal on ground of willful breach of trust. It lent credence to Aboitiz’s
posture that Salas was a warehouseman holding a position of trust and
confidence, and that he tampered with the bin
card to cover up [his] negligence and [to] mislead
the investigating team.
We disagree.
A position of trust and confidence
was explained in Panday v. NLRC,[22] viz.:
The case of Lepanto Consolidated Mining
A few examples were given by the Court in the
case of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission and Imelda Salazar, G.R.
No. 82511,
x x x where the employee is a Vice-President
for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top
management (Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]); or
is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works
(Citytrust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, 157 SCRA 87 [1988]); or is an organizer of a
union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the
workers in commercial and industrial establishments (Bautista v. Inciong, 158
SCRA 665 [1988]); or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose
primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts by foreign
individuals and organizations to the Philippines (Esmalin v. NLRC, 177 SCRA 537
[1989]); or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales (Maglutac v. NLRC, 189 SCRA
767 [1990])."
In fact, the classification of a Credit and
Collection Supervisor by management as managerial/supervisory was sustained by
this Court in the case of Tabacalera
Insurance Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 152 SCRA 667 [1987].
The reasons for a similar ruling apply to the position of branch accountant
which the petitioner was then holding.
Evidently, Salas as material
controller was tasked with monitoring and maintaining the availability and
supply of Quickbox. There appears nothing to suggest that Salas’
position was a highly or even primarily confidential position, so that he can be
removed for loss of trust and confidence by the employer.
Notably, in
[T]he term “trust and confidence” is
restricted to managerial employees or those who are vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire
transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees
or to effectively recommend such managerial actions.
Besides, as we review the records
before us, we do not see any semblance of willful breach of trust on the part
of Salas. It is true that there was
erasure or alteration on the bin card.
Aboitiz, however, failed to demonstrate that it was done to cover up
Salas’ alleged negligence. Other than the bin card and Aboitiz’s barefaced
assertion, no other evidence was offered to prove the alleged cover-up. Neither was there any showing that Salas
attempted to mislead the investigating team.
The CA, therefore, erred in adopting Aboitiz’s unsubstantiated assertion
to justify Salas’ dismissal.
Indeed, an employer has the right,
under the law, to dismiss an employee based on fraud or willful breach of the trust
bestowed upon him by his employer or the latter’s authorized
representative. However, the loss of
trust must be based not on ordinary breach but, in the language of Article
282(c) of the Labor Code, on willful breach.
A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on
substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or
suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the
employer. It should be genuine and not
simulated; nor should it appear as a mere afterthought to justify an earlier
action taken in bad faith or a subterfuge for causes which are improper,
illegal or unjustified. It has never
been intended to afford an occasion for abuse because of its subjective
nature. There must, therefore, be an
actual breach of duty committed by the employee which must be established by
substantial evidence.[24] In this case, Aboitiz utterly failed to
establish the requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence for a valid
dismissal on the ground of breach of trust and confidence.
Neither can Aboitiz validate Salas’
dismissal on the ground of serious misconduct for his alleged failure to
account for unused accountable forms amounting to P57,850.00.
As aptly found by the NLRC, the
charge came only after Salas’ dismissal.
We also note that the subject accountable forms were issued to Salas in
2001. Inexplicably, this alleged infraction was never included as ground in the
notice of termination. It was only on P57,850.00. It
is clear that such assertion of serious misconduct was a mere afterthought to
justify the illegal dismissal.
Similarly, before the Labor Arbiter,
NLRC, and CA, Aboitiz’s arguments zeroed in on Salas’ alleged neglect of duty
and breach of trust. It was, therefore, error for the CA to include serious
misconduct, which had never been raised in the proceedings below, as ground to
sustain the legality of Salas’ dismissal.
The CA also cited another infraction
allegedly committed by Salas as additional ground for his dismissal. It declared that Salas unauthorizedly sold the company’s eight units of used air-conditioners.
Yet, we note that Salas had never been charged or suspended for this alleged unauthorized
sale of used air-conditioners during his employment with Aboitiz. The infraction for which Salas had been
penalized by suspension of five (5) days was his failure to meet the security requirements of the company.[25] Accordingly, there is no basis for the CA to
include unauthorized sale of used air-conditioners as ground to sustain Salas’
dismissal.
Aboitiz’s reliance on the past
offenses of Salas for his eventual dismissal is likewise unavailing. The
correct rule has always been that such previous offenses may be used as valid
justification for dismissal from work only if the infractions are related to
the subsequent offense upon which the basis of termination is decreed.[26] While it is true that Salas had been
suspended on June 1, 2000 for failure to
meet the security requirements of the company,[27] and
then on July 20, 2001 for his failure to assist in the loading at the
fuel depot,[28] these
offenses are not related to Salas’ latest infraction, hence, cannot be used as added
justification for the dismissal.
Furthermore, Salas had already
suffered the corresponding penalties for these prior infractions. Thus, to consider these offenses as
justification for his dismissal would be penalizing Salas twice for the same
offense. As the Court ruled in Pepsi-Cola
Distributors of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[29]
and recently in Coca-Cola Bottlers,
Philippines, Inc. v. Kapisanan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Coca Cola-FFW:[30]
Moreover, private respondent was already
penalized with suspensions in some of the infractions imputed to him in this
case, like sleeping while on route rides, incomplete accomplishment of sales
report and his failure to achieve sales commitments. He cannot again be penalized for those
misconduct. The foregoing acts cannot be
added to support the imposition of the ultimate penalty of dismissal which must
be based on clear and not on ambiguous and ambivalent ground.
Undoubtedly, no just cause exists to
warrant Salas’ dismissal. Consequently, he is entitled to reinstatement to his
former position without loss of seniority rights, and to payment of backwages.[31]
However, we limit the award of
backwages because we find that Salas was not entirely faultless. As earlier adverted to, Salas failed to
promptly inform his immediate superior of the non-delivery of the requisitioned
items. Had Salas promptly informed Ed Dumago of the non-delivery, the incident
complained of would have been avoided.
Although such negligence would not justify Salas’ termination from employment
in view of the stringent condition imposed by the Labor Code on termination of employment
due to gross and habitual neglect, the same cannot be condoned, much less
tolerated.
In PLDT v. National Labor Relations Commission,[32]
this Court sustained the award of backwages in favor of an employee who was
found not to be entirely faultless, but only from the date of the NLRC’s promulgation
of the decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93947 and CA-G.R. SP No. 94145, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Aboitiz One, Inc. is ordered to REINSTATE
Oligario Salas to his former position without loss of seniority rights, with
payment of backwages computed from
No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring; rollo, pp. 37-49.
[2]
[3] Rollo, p. 80.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Torres
v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634,
[19] Rollo,
p. 81.
[20] Phil. Aeolus Automotive United Corp. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 250, 263 (2000).
[21] Rollo, pp. 114-121.
[22] G.R. No. 67664,
[23] G.R. No. 167118,
[24] Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Panado, id. at 767-768.
[25] Rollo, p. 109.
[26] La Carlota Planters Association, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 358 Phil. 732, 739 (1998).
[27] Rollo,
p. 109.
[28]
[29] 338 Phil. 773, 782 (1997).
[30] G.R. No. 148205,
[31] Labor Code, Art. 279.
[32] 362 Phil. 352 (1999).