THIRD DIVISION
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gonzalo a. araneta, Petitioner, - versus - People of the
Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 174205 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2005, which affirmed the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City,
Branch 41, finding petitioner Gonzalo Araneta y Alabastro guilty of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the “Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,” as amended.
On
That on April 10, 1998, at about 11:00 o’clock in the
morning, at Barangay Poblacion,
District III, Dauin, Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said Gonzalo Araneta y Alabastro,
with intent to abuse, harass and degrade 17-year-old offended party AAA[3],
and gratify the sexual desire of said accused, the latter, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation, hold
and embrace said AAA, after trespassing with violence into the room of the
dwelling occupied by said offended party, all against the latter’s will and
consent.[4]
When arraigned on
At the trial, the prosecution presented
the following witnesses: (1) the victim herself, AAA, who testified on matters
that occurred prior, during and after her abuse; (2) BBB, AAA’s 12-year-old
sister, whose testimony corroborated that of the victim; (3) CCC, AAA’s mother
who testified on the fact that the victim was a minor during the alleged
commission of the crime.
As culled from the combined
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the prosecution was able to establish
that at the time of the commission of the crime, AAA was 17 years old, having
been born on 28 March 1981, in Batohon Daco, Dauin, Negros
Oriental.[5]
Because she was then studying at
At around
The petitioner, on the other hand, denied
the charge. He alone took the stand. Petitioner narrated that he met AAA and her
younger sisters at the waiting shed, but he denied having embraced or kissed
the victim.[13] He said he only spoke to her and told her that
he loved her. Although he admitted that
he followed AAA and her sisters when they went to the boarding house, it was
because AAA beckoned him to follow her.[14] When he was inside the room, he again told her
of his feelings but he was merely told by her to wait until she finished her
studies.[15] He further said that he had been courting and
visiting AAA since she was 12 or 13 years old.[16]
On
The decretal
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Gonzalo Araneta y Alabastro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period, to pay the offended party Php50,000.00 as moral
damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.[17]
Dissatisfied with the
ruling of the RTC, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner claimed that the RTC gravely erred
in convicting him of child abuse despite failure of the prosecution to
establish the elements necessary to constitute the crime charged. Section 10(a) provide: “Any
person who shall commit any other acts of abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development
including those covered by Article Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period”; and Section 3(b)(2) defines child abuse in
this manner: “Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.” From these provisions, petitioner concludes
that an act or word can only be punishable if such be prejudicial to the
child’s development so as to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being. In
other words, petitioner was of the opinion that an accused can only be successfully
convicted of child abuse under Section 10(a) if it is proved that the victim’s
development had been prejudiced. Thus, according
to petitioner, absent proof of such prejudice, which is an essential element in
the crime charged, petitioner cannot be found guilty of child abuse under the subject
provision.
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), on the other hand, believes that the questioned acts of petitioner fall
within the definition of child abuse. According
to the OSG, when paragraph (a) of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610 states: “Any
person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation
or be responsible for other condition prejudicial to the child’s development x x x,” it contemplates two
classes of “other acts” of child abuse, i.e.,
(1) other acts of child abuse, cruelty, and exploitation; and (2) other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. It argues that unlike the second kind of
child abuse, the first class does not require that the act be prejudicial to
the child’s development.
In a decision dated
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED and
accordingly, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.[18]
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration dated
Hence, the instant petition.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure
geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for the
survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino
children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section
3, paragraph 2, that “The State shall defend the right of the
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.”[19] This
piece of legislation supplies the inadequacies of existing laws treating crimes
committed against children, namely, the Revised Penal Code and Presidential
Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code.[20] As a statute that provides for a mechanism for
strong deterrence against the commission of child abuse and exploitation, the law
has stiffer penalties for their commission, and a means by which child
traffickers could easily be prosecuted and penalized.[21] Also, the definition of child abuse is
expanded to encompass not only those specific acts of child abuse under
existing laws but includes also “other acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development.”
Article VI of the statute enumerates
the “other acts of abuse.” Paragraph (a)
of Section 10 thereof states:
Article VI
OTHER ACTS OF ABUSE
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse,
Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s
Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development including those covered by Article Article
59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As gleaned from the foregoing, the
provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59[22] of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child
cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of the
questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and
exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and
from the act prejudicial to the child’s development. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts
of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the
prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the
child is different from the former acts.
Moreover, it is a rule in statutory
construction that the word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation
and independence of one thing from other things enumerated.[23]
It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies.
Hence, the use of “or” in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the
phrase “be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development” supposes that there are
four punishable acts therein. First, the
act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and
fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development. The fourth penalized act cannot
be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three
other acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned
provision does not warrant such construal.
The subject statute
defines children as persons below eighteen (18) years of age; or those over that
age but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or condition.[24] It is undisputed that the victim, under said
law, was still a child during the incident.
Subsection (b), Section 3, Article I
of Republic Act No. 7610, states:
(b) “Child abuse” refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1)
Psychological
and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2)
Any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being;
(3)
Unreasonable
deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4)
Failure
to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or
death.
The evidence of the prosecution
proved that petitioner, despite the victim’s protestation, relentlessly
followed the latter from the waiting shed to her boarding house and even to the
room where she stayed. He forcibly
embraced her and threatened to kill her if she would not accept his love for
her. Indeed, such devious act must have shattered
her self-esteem and womanhood and virtually debased, degraded or demeaned her
intrinsic worth and dignity. As a young and helpless lass
at that time, being away from her parents, the victim must have felt desecrated
and sexually transgressed, especially considering the fact that the incident
took place before the very eyes of her two younger, innocent sisters. Petitioner who was old enough to be the
victim’s grandfather, did not only traumatize and gravely threaten the normal
development of such innocent girl; he was also betraying the trust that young
girls place in the adult members of the community who are expected to guide and
nurture the well-being of these fragile members of the society. Undoubtedly, such insensible act of
petitioner constitutes child abuse. As
the RTC aptly observed:
It bears stressing that the mere keeping or having in
a man’s companion a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who is ten (10) years
or more his junior in any public or private place already constitutes child
abuse under Section 10(b) of the same Act. Under such rationale, an unwanted
embrace on a minor would all the more constitute child abuse.[25]
This factual findings of the RTC,
which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals are entitled to respect and are not
to be disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance, having been overlooked or misinterpreted, might materially affect
the disposition of the case.[26] The assessment by the trial court of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence. In the case under
consideration, we find that the trial court did not overlook, misapprehend, or
misapply any fact of value for us to overturn the said findings.
The RTC imposed upon petitioner the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. The penalty is in order, pursuant to Section
10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610.
As to the award of damages, the
victim is entitled to moral damages, having suffered undue embarrassment when petitioner
forcibly hugged her and threatened to kill her if she would not accept
petitioner’s love. There is no
hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral
damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.[27] The
yardstick should be that it is not palpably and scandalously excessive.[28]
The Court finds that the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
is reasonable under the facts obtaining in this case.
WHEREFORE, the
15 February 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25168,
which affirmed in toto
the Decision of the Dumaguete City Regional Trial
Court, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 14246 finding Gonzalo A. Araneta guilty of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and awarding
to the victim moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Justice
Antonio T. Carpio was designated to sit as additional
member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
per Raffle dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Vicente L. Yap, concurring; rollo, pp. 73-79.
[2] Penned by Judge Araceli S. Alafriz.
[3] Under Republic Act No. 9262 also known as “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004” and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim and those of her immediate family members are withheld and fictitious initials are instead used to protect the victim’s privacy.
People v. Cabalquinto,
G.R. No. 167693,
[4] Records, p. 1.
[5] Exhibit “A.”
[6] TSN,
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13] TSN,
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Records, p. 257.
[18] Rollo, p. 79.
[19] Record of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 58, p. 793.
[20]
[21]
[22] Article 59. Crimes. – Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who:
(1) Conceals or abandons the child with intent to make such child lose his civil status.
(2) Abandons the child under such circumstances as to deprive him of the love, care and protection he needs.
(3) Sells or abandons the child to another person for valuable consideration.
(4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family’s station in life and financial conditions permit.
(5) Fails or refuses, without justifiable grounds, to enroll the child as required by Article 72.
(6) Causes, abates, or permits the truancy of the child from the school where he is enrolled. “Truancy” as here used means absence without cause for more than twenty schooldays, not necessarily consecutive.
It shall be the duty of the teacher in charge to report to the parents the absences of the child the moment these exceed five schooldays.
(7) Improperly exploits the child by using him, directly or indirectly, such as for purposes of begging and other acts which are inimical to his interest and welfare.
(8) Inflicts cruel and unusual punishment upon the child or deliberately subjects him to indignitions and other excessive chastisement that embarrass or humiliate him.
(9) Causes or encourages the child to lead an immoral or dissolute life.
(10) Permits the child to possess, handle or carry a deadly weapon, regardless of its ownership.
(11) Allows or requires the child to drive without a license or with a license which the parent knows to have been illegally procured. If the motor vehicle driven by the child belongs to the parent, it shall be presumed that he permitted or ordered the child to drive.
“Parents” as here used shall include the guardian and the head of the institution or foster home which has custody of the child.
[23] Pimentel v. Commission on Elections, 352
Phil. 424, 434 (1998).
[24] Article I, Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
[25] Records, p. 257.
[26] People v. Piedad, 441 Phil. 818, 838-839 (2002).
[27] Cagungun v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 158674,
[28] Spouses Saguid v. Security
Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 159467,