FIRST
DIVISION
|
CHARLES LIMBAUAN, Petitioner, - versus - FAUSTINO ACOSTA, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 148606
Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO, CORONA, AZCUNA, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
In this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner seeks
to set aside and annul the Decision[1]
dated
The
CA decision affirmed an earlier decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The
pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are quoted hereunder:
Sometime in 1938, the Government acquired the Tala Estate
consisting of
It was also decreed that, more precise identities of the parcels
of land allocated to the government will be made only after a final survey
shall have been completed. A joint PHHC-Bureau of Lands team was
tasked to undertake the necessary segregation survey and inquiries on private
rights within the Estate. In
the Interim, it was decreed that no transfer of title shall be made until the
enactment of a law allowing the use of the site for purposes other than that of
a leprosarium.
In the meantime, Faustino Acosta took possession of a vacant
portion of the Tala Estate and constructed his house thereon, bearing address
No. 786, Barrio San Roque, Barangay 187, Tala,
NORTH: WAITING
SHED……SOUTH: JUAN DAMIAN WEST: NITA CRUZ, RESTAURANT…..EAST: BRGY. HALL…187 (at page 7, Records)
Faustino Acosta then took possession of the property, constructed
a fence around the perimeter of the property and planted vegetables thereon. However, in 1984, Paulino Calanday took
possession of the said property without the consent of Faustino, constructed an
edifice thereon and used the same as a beerhouse. When Faustino remonstrated,
Paulino filed two (2) criminal complaints against Faustino with the
Metropolitan Trial Court, entitled and docketed “People versus Faustino Acosta,
Criminal Case Nos. 143550-
Paulino, in the meantime, conveyed the beerhouse to Juanita
Roces. The latter and Faustino entered
into an oral contract of lease over the parcel of land for a monthly rental of
P60.00. About a year thereafter, Juanita
suddenly stopped paying to Faustino her rentals for the property. It turned out that Juanita conveyed the
beerhouse to her nephew, Charles Limbauan, who forthwith assumed the lease from
his aunt and who, thenceforth, paid the monthly rentals for the property in the
amount of P60.00 to Faustino. However,
in November, 1987, Charles stopped paying rentals to Faustino claiming that,
since the property was government property, Faustino had no right to lease the
same and collect the rentals therefore.
However, Faustino did not file any complaint nor unlawful detainer
against Charles.
Sometime in February, 1995, Congress approved Republic Act 7999
under which the State converted a portion of the Estate, with a total area of
(a) Seventy (70)
hectares of the one hundred thirty (130) hectares reserved for the leprosarium
and settlement site of the hansenites and their families under Proclamation No.
843 are hereby declared alienable and disposable for use as a housing site for
the bona fide residents, hansenites and their immediate families and for
qualified employees of the Department of Health: Provided, That if the said beneficiary is an employee of the
Deparment of Health, the said employee must have been assigned in the Tala
Leprosarium and must have been a resident thereat for at least five (5) years: Provided, further, That the residential lot awarded to the beneficiaries
under this Act shall not be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other
person for a period of twenty-five (25) years, except to legal heirs by way of
succession; and
(b) The fifty (50)
hectares reserved for the plants, installations and pilot housing project of
the National Housing Corporation, as provided in the same proclamation, are
hereby declared as alienable and disposable: Provided, That twenty-nine (29) hectares of the said fifty (50)
hectares shall be converted into a housing site exclusively for the bona fide
and qualified residents of the area. (idem,
supra)
After the passage by Congress of Republic Act 7999, Faustino filed
a complaint against Charles with the Lupon for ejectment for failure of Charles
to pay his rentals from October, 1987.
On
On
Faustino, forthwith, filed, on
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant as
follows:
1. To order the
immediate restoration of the premises to plaintiff in accordance with Rule 70,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court;
2. Ordering the defendants
to pay to plaintiff the sum of P60.00 a month plus interest from November 1987
until they vacate the premises;
2.(sic) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of
P10,000.00 by way of moral damages;
3. Such other
remedies as may be just and equitable under the premises. (at
page 4, Records)
Upon suggestion of the Court, Faustino Acosta, through the Law
Interns, sent another letter of demand to Charles Limbauan, dated
In his Answer to the Complaint, Charles alleged, inter
alia that Faustino had no cause of action against him because the property
on which the beerhouse was constructed is owned by the government since the government
is the owner of the property, Faustino had no right of possession over the
property and collect rentals therefore.
Besides, it was unfair for Faustino, who was already in possession of
the lot at No. 786 B. San Roque, Barangay 187 to still claim possession over
the subject property. The Defendant
interposed the defense that the Court had no jurisdiction over the action of the
Plaintiff as it was one of accion publiciana and not one
for unlawful detainer.
On
DISPOSITION BY THE COURT:
Premises considered, decision is rendered for the plaintiff,
Faustino Acosta, and against the defendant, Charles Limbauan, directing the
latter and all those claiming under him to vacate the premises specifically
described as the parcel of commercial land located at the west portion of the
barangay hall, barangay 187, Zone 16, B. Sto. Nino, Tala,
a. P60.00 monthly from November, 1987, as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the parcel of land subject
matter of this case with legal interests from today up to the actual surrender
of the same.
b. P130.00 by way of reimbursement for
costs of suit as shown by the receipts on record.
Given in
Chambers. (at page 79, Records)
The Court found and declared that the Plaintiff adduced evidence
that the Defendant was the lessee of the Plaintiff over the property and,
hence, the latter was estopped from assailing Plaintiff’s title over the
property.
The Defendant interposed an appeal from said Decision to the Regional
Trial Court which, on
The Petitioner forthwith filed a “Petition for Review” with this Court (Court of Appeals),
under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and posed, for our
resolution, the following issues: (a) whether or not the remedy of the
Respondent in the Metropolitan Trial Court for unlawful detainer was proper;
(b) the subject property was government property and, hence, cannot be the
lawful subject of a lease contract between the Petitioner and Respondent and,
hence, the latter had no right to have the Petitioner evicted from the property
and to collect rentals from him. It was
inappropriate for the trial court, and the Regional Trial Court, to apply and
rely on Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Evidence.
On
Hence, this
petition for review which seeks the reversal of the said CA decision on the
basis of the issues quoted hereunder:
a) DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION?
b) WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE IS
RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC ON ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH OF THE RESPONDENT.[4]
In
relation to the aforequoted issues, the petitioner adduces the following
arguments:
(1)
The
right application of laws under Rule 70 and Rule
(2)
The
amendment under Section 2, Rule 10, Rules of Court is a futile remedy when the
Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
(3)
The
alleged existence of lessor-lessee relationship between the parties had not
been sufficiently established.
(4)
The
fact of death of respondent rendered the case moot and academic.[5]
The
first and second arguments advanced by petitioner are interrelated. Thus, they
shall be discussed jointly. Petitioner argues that there must be a prior demand
to vacate the leased premises and pay the rent and a 15-day period from the
time of demand must have lapsed before a complaint for unlawful detainer may be
commenced pursuant to Section 2, Rule 70. According to petitioner, respondent’s
demand letter gave the petitioner a five-day period only instead of fifteen (15)
days within which to comply with the demand to vacate. A jurisdictional
requisite, not having been complied with, the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case.
Section
2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Lessor
to proceed against lessee only after demand. –Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the
lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions
of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written
notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such
notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to
comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days
in the case of buildings.
As contemplated in the aforecited
rule, the demand to pay rent and vacate is necessary if the action for unlawful
detainer is anchored on the non-payment of rentals, as in the instant case. The
same rule explicitly provides that the unlawful detainer suit must be commenced
only if the lessee fails to comply after the lapse or expiration of fifteen (15)
days in case of lands and five (5) days in case of buildings, from the time the
demand is made upon the lessee. The demand required and contemplated in Section
2 of Rule 70 is a jurisdictional requirement for the purpose of bringing an
unlawful detainer suit for failure to pay rent. It partakes of an extrajudicial
remedy that must be pursued before resorting to judicial action such that full
compliance with the demand would render unnecessary a court action.[6]
Hence,
it is settled that for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two
requisites must concur, namely: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or to comply
with the conditions of the lease and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to
comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2, particularly, 15
days in the case of land and 5 days in the case of buildings. The first
requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer
while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of demand in order
that said cause of action may be pursued.[7]
As the subject matter of the
instant case is a parcel of land, the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen-day
period is a prerequisite to the filing of an action for unlawful detainer. As
to whether respondent observed this fifteen-day period, an affirmative answer
can be gleaned from the evidence on record. Respondent’s first demand letter
dated
Moreover, upon the advice of the
MTC, respondent sent another demand letter dated
Sec.
2. Amendments as a matter of right. — A party may amend his pleading once
as a matter of course at any time before
a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time
within ten (10) days after it is served.
Under this provision, a
party has the absolute right to amend his pleading whether a new cause of
action or change in theory is introduced, at any time before the filing of any
responsive pleading.[9] Undoubtedly, when respondent filed his Amended
Complaint on
It is well-settled that
amendment of pleadings
is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in
order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard
to technicalities. This principle is generally recognized in order that
the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay to
prevent circuity of action and needless expense.[11]
Petitioner also contends that
the MTC’s purpose for admitting the amended complaint was to eliminate the
jurisdictional defect of the original complaint. Petitioner cites the cases of Rosario v. Carandang[12]
and Gaspar v. Dorado[13]
which declared that the amendment of the complaint could not be allowed when
its purpose is to confer jurisdiction upon the court, since the court must
first acquire jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly therein.
Petitioner’s contention is devoid of merit. As earlier discussed, respondent’s
original complaint was free from any jurisdictional flaw and the MTC had
jurisdiction over the case to begin with. Thus, the cited cases are not
applicable in the instant case. Hence, the MTC was correct in allowing the
amendment.
Furthermore, it is a well-settled
rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought.[14] A
complaint for unlawful detainer is deemed sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[15] Here,
respondent alleged that he acquired possessory rights over the subject property
by virtue of a government grant. He leased the property to petitioner for a
monthly rental of P60.00. When petitioner failed to pay the rentals,
respondent eventually sent two demand letters asking petitioner to pay and
vacate the premises. Petitioner refused, thereby depriving respondent of
possession of the subject property. Clearly, the complaint alleges the basic
elements of an unlawful detainer case, which
are sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Likewise, petitioner’s
allegation in his petition that he received respondent’s second demand letter on
In sum, respondent clearly
satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of prior demand to vacate within the
period set by the rules. The MTC validly acquired jurisdiction over both the
original complaint and the amended complaint.
Petitioner next argues that no
lessor-lessee relationship existed between him and respondent. This argument
clearly deals with a question of fact. In petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be put in
issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained.[17]
The issue of whether or not a lessor-lessee relationship existed between the
herein parties is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon as it would
entail a re-evaluation of the evidence and a review of the factual findings thereon
of the courts a quo. As a rule, factual
findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the CA, are
conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[18] We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the MTC and the RTC, which the Court of Appeals had affirmed.
Lastly, petitioner
capitalizes on the failure of respondent’s counsel to inform the court of the
death of his client, Faustino Acosta, who passed away on
Section 16, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty
of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof,
and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground
for disciplinary action.
The
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without first requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The
court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. xxx.
It is well settled
that the failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform
the court of the death of his client and no substitution of such party is
effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the
action survives the death of such party. Moreover, the
decision rendered shall bind his successor-in-interest.[20]
The instant action for unlawful detainer, like any action for recovery of real property, is a real action
and as such survives the death of Faustino Acosta. His heirs have taken his
place and now represent his interests in the instant petition.[21]
Hence, the present case cannot be rendered moot despite the death of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition
for review is hereby DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49144 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by then Associate Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr. (now retired Associate Justice of this Court), with Associate
Justices Renato C. Dacudao (ret.) and Perlita J. Tria Tirona (ret.), concurring;
rollo, pp. 32-43.
[2] Decided by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles; id., at 55-60.
[3] Decided by Judge Delfina Hernandez
[4]
[5]
[6] Cetus Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 77647-77652, August 7, 1989, 176 SCRA 72, 80-81.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
[9] Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
121397,
[10] Rollo,
pp. 82-86.
[11] Andres v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 150869, June
9, 2005, 460 SCRA 38, 49.
[12] 96 Phil. 845 (1955).
[13] No. L-17884,
[14] Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. v. Ong, G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 35, 45.
[15] Ibid.
[16] CA Decision; rollo, p. 10.
[17] Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 290.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Rollo, p. 44.
[20] Benavidez
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125848,
[21] Rollo, pp. 169-170.