Republic of the
Supreme Court
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DEPARTMENT OF |
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G.R.
No. 178256 |
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TRANSPORTATION and |
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COMMUNICATIONS, |
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Present: |
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Petitioner, |
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PUNO,
C.J., |
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QUISUMBING, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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CARPIO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CARPIO
MORALES, |
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- versus - |
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AZCUNA,
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TINGA, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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VELASCO, Jr., |
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NACHURA, |
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REYES, |
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DE CASTRO, and |
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BRION, JJ. |
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ROLANDO S. CRUZ, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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July
23, 2008 |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before the Court
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]
dated
The material
antecedents that spawned the present controversy are the same with Mamaril v. Civil Service Commission.[3] Thus, the Court adopts and quotes the facts
therein stated:
On
December 19, 2000, then [Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC)] Secretary Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. requested the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) to attest that at least two of the four [Department Legislative Liaison
Specialist (DLLS)] positions in the DOTC be made permanent. The request was
granted by the CSC by Resolution No. 01-0233 dated
Upon
verbal query by DOTC Director Carina S. Valera (Director
Valera), then CSC Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon
advised the DOTC that the incumbents of the formerly coterminous DLLS positions
had no vested right to occupy the already permanent DLLS positions, and that
they were not automatically appointed thereto; and the positions which were
made permanent could only be filled up by following existing CSC rules and
regulations as well as DOTC policies and guidelines on the appointment of
personnel.
By
letter of
The change of the nature of the
DLLS position which you held, from coterminous to permanent pursuant to
CSC Resolution No. 010233 dated
As your appointment was of cotermin[o]us nature, your services automatically
terminated with the non-existence of the cotermin[o]us
position and the advent of the new appointing authority.
When the new DLLS permanent
positions are authorized to be filled up, you can apply therefor.
In the meantime, you may seek appointment to any other vacant position that
suits your qualifications. Needless to say, selection in any case will follow
the usual process in accordance with the DOTC guidelines and the CSC rules and
regulations.
Acting
on the above-said query of Trinidad, the CSC, by Resolution No. 01-0502 dated
February 22, 2001 which was received at his office on March 9, 2001 and by the
DOTC Personnel Division on March 12, 2001, ruled that “the two occupants of the
two DLLS positions are ipso facto appointed
to such positions under permanent status if they meet the minimum
requirements of the said positions.
In
light of the contrary advice previously given by the former CSC Chairman de
Leon, the DOTC, by letter of
By
Resolution No. 01-1409 issued on August 20, 2001, the CSC modified Resolution
No. 01-0502 by declaring that “the previous
incumbents of the two Department Legislative Liaison Specialist (DLLS)
positions were no longer existing
employees as of the date said positions were declared by the Commission as
career in CSC Resolution No. 01-0233 dated January 23, 2001,” and that
“DOTC Secretary Pantaleon D. Alvarez may now appoint
who will occupy these newly created DLLS positions x x
x.”
x
x x x
[Mamaril] and Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration of CSC
Resolution No. 01-1409. By Resolution of
The
DOTC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 02-1504 which was
denied, by Resolution No. 03-1019 dated
[Mamaril] thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
Resolution No. 03-1019 only insofar as the CSC held that she was not entitled
to backwages. By Resolution No. 04-0279 issued on
Cruz and Mamaril filed separate petitions for review with the CA
assailing Resolution No. 03-1019 only insofar as the CSC held that they were
not entitled to backwages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
80353 and CA-G.R. SP No. 83314, respectively.
In a Resolution[5]
dated
On
Meanwhile, on
The DOTC filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution[9]
dated
Hence, the
present petition on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S GOOD FAITH IN TERMINATING RESPONDENT
DID NOT PRECLUDE THE LATTER FROM RECEIVING BACK SALARIES IN HIS FAVOR.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE THE RULING IN OCTOT VS.
YBAÑEZ, 111 SCRA 79 (1982) THAT “IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT [A GOVERNMENT
AGENCY] ACTED IN BAD FAITH AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, [A DISMISSED
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE] IS NOT ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES AND CONSEQUENTLY CANNOT CLAIM
FOR DAMAGES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
APPLYING THE RULE THAT A PUBLIC OFFICIAL IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY COMPENSATION IF
HE HAS NOT RENDERED ANY SERVICES.[10]
The DOTC
contends that a government employee who was dismissed from service in good
faith is not entitled to back salaries upon his reinstatement, relying on the
Court's application of Octot in Mamaril; the assailed Decision should be set aside
under the doctrine of stare decisis, since the
facts in Mamaril and the present case are
exactly the same.
On the other
hand, Cruz contends that his dismissal was effected in bad faith since he was
terminated without awaiting the reply of the CSC to the query of DOTC regarding
his employment status; Octot is inapplicable
because prevailing jurisprudence supports the award of backwages
for a maximum period of five years to an illegally dismissed employee.
The Court finds
for the petitioner DOTC.
As stated at the
outset, the pivotal question of whether a government employee who was dismissed
from service in good faith is entitled to back salaries upon his reinstatement
has already been resolved in the negative in Mamaril,
thus:
The general proposition is that a public official
is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. As he
works, so shall he earn. Compensation is paid only for
service actually or constructively rendered.
[Mamaril's] services
were actually terminated on
Octot v. Ybañez instructs that the good faith or bad faith and
grave abuse of discretion in the dismissal or termination of the services of a
government employee come into play in the determination of the award of back
salaries upon his reinstatement. In said case, the therein petitioner, a
security guard in the Regional Health Office No. VII, Cebu
City who had been convicted of libel by a trial court, was summarily
dismissed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 6 and LOI Nos. 14 and 14-A issued
by then President Marcos directing heads of departments and agencies of the
government to weed out undesirable government officials and employees,
specifically those who were facing charges or were notoriously undesirable on
the ground of dishonesty, incompetence or other kinds of misconduct defined in
the Civil Service Law. The therein petitioner was eventually acquitted of the
criminal charge. Hence, his request for reinstatement was granted but not
his claim for back salaries from the date of his dismissal. This Court,
through then Chief Justice Teehankee, held:
In the absence of
proof that respondent Regional Director acted in bad faith and with grave
abuse of discretion, petitioner is not entitled to backwages
and consequently cannot claim for damages. In the case at bar, the record
manifests that respondents officials were not motivated by ill will or
personal malice in dismissing petitioner but only by their desire to comply with the mandates of
Presidential Decree No. 6. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The denial of the award of back salaries, absent a
showing of bad faith and/or grave abuse of discretion in the termination of the
services of a government employee who was reinstated, was reiterated in Clemente v. Commission on Audit, Acting Director of Prisons v. Villaluz, and Echeche v. Court of
Appeals.
[Mamaril], however,
invokes the rulings in Tañala v. Legaspi, De Guzman v. Civil Service Commission, Gabriel v. Domingo, Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission to the effect that when an
official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement is ordered,
for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office and,
therefore, is entitled to all rights and privileges that accrue to him by
virtue of the office.
To begin with, [Mamaril]
cannot be considered to have been illegally dismissed. Her services were
terminated effective
At any rate, no parity of circumstances in the above-cited
cases invoked by [Mamaril] obtains in the case at
bar.
In Tañala, payment of back salaries upon reinstatement was
ordered upon acquittal in a criminal case of the regular employee of the
government who had been suspended as a result of the filing of said case. De Guzman involved a proscribed abolition
of office, hence, payment of back salaries was ordered upon reinstatement
of the separated employee. In Del
Castillo, the therein petitioner was preventively suspended and later
dismissed for grave misconduct. He was eventually exonerated. He was thus
ordered reinstated. He thereafter filed a “Motion for Clarificatory
Relief” praying for an award of backwages. Noting
that the CSC did not object to the payment of backwages
and the Solicitor General in fact recommended the payment thereof, this Court
granted the motion.
In Gabriel, the
therein petitioner was holding a permanent position of Motor Vehicle Registrar
I at the Motor Vehicles Office, later renamed the Land Transportation
Commission. In 1979, the Land Transportation Commission was reorganized,
renaming plantilla positions. The therein petitioner’s
position was changed to Transportation District Supervisor, but since another
had been appointed thereto, he filed a protest. During the pendency of his protest, he was extended a casual
appointment but his services were “in effect terminated” three days later,
drawing him to file a complaint for illegal termination of services
which reached the CSC. The CSC eventually found that the issuance to the
therein petitioner of a casual appointment which resulted in the termination of
his services was illegal and that he was more qualified than the one appointed
to his renamed position of Transportation District Supervisor. The CSC
accordingly directed his appointment to his former position. He was appointed
alright but to a lower position. He later filed a claim for backwages which was denied by the Commission on Audit
but which this Court ordered granted.
In all these cases, the suspensions and/or dismissals
were held unjustified, the therein petitioners having been either exonerated
from the charges-bases of suspension or dismissal or were victims of proscribed
abolition of office or issuance of appointment to a different position which
soon after resulted in dismissal therefrom.
That the DOTC’s
termination of [Mamaril's] services in accordance
with the
Mamaril is binding and
applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere which means “to adhere to precedents, and
not to unsettle things which are established.”[12]
Under the doctrine, when the Supreme
Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases,
where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and
property are the same.[13]
The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule
involved and not upon the judgment which results therefrom.
In this particular sense stare decisis differs from res
judicata which is based upon the judgment.[14]
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the Court has held that it is a
very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down
a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to
that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the
decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare
decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds
from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent
court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate
the same issue.[15]
It bears stressing that the facts of the
present case and those of Mamaril are the
same. Clearly, in the light of Mamaril, which the Court follows as a precedent, the
DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages can be awarded in his favor. It is the Court's duty to apply the previous
ruling in Mamaril to the instant case. Once a
case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point
at issue, as in the present case, should be decided in the same manner.[16]
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80353 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Resolution No.
03-1019 dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate
Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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(No Part) RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now Associate Justice of this Court) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga
and Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, rollo, p. 47.
[2] Rollo, p. 57.
[3] G.R.
No. 164929,
[4] Supra
note 3, at 67-69.
[5] Rollo, p. 87.
[6] Supra
note 3.
[7] Supra
note 1.
[8] No.
L-48643,
[9] Supra
note 2.
[10] Rollo, p. 70.
[11] Supra,
note 3 at 73-76.
[12] Confederation
of Sugar Producers Association, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), G.R. No. 169514, March 30, 2007, 519 SCRA 582,
618, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition.
[13] Confederation
of Sugar Producers Association, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), supra note 12, citing Horne v. Moody, 146 S.W.2d 505 (1940).
[14]
[15] Id.
at 619, citing Ty v. Banco Filipino
Savings & Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 144705, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA
65, 75-76.
[16] Manila Electric Company,
Inc. v. Lualhati, G.R. No. 166769, and Energy Regulatory Commission v. Lualhati, G.R. No. 166818, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA
455, 471; Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Trustworthy Pawnshop, Inc., G.R. No. 149834, May 2, 2006, 488
SCRA 538, 545.