SECOND DIVISION
|
SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ,
represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, VIRGILIO VALDEZ, Petitioners, - versus - SPOUSES
FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD TABISULA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 175510
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: July 28, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn
Valdez purchased via a January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale[1]
(the deed) from respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula
and Caridad Tabisula a 200 square
meter (sq.m.) portion (the subject property) of a 380
sq. m. parcel of land located in
A
parcel of land classified as residential lot, bounded on the North by Lot No.
25569, on the East, by Lot No. 247, 251, on
the South, by a Creek and on the West, by Lot No. 223-A, declared under
Tax Decl. No. 52820, with an area of 380
square meters, more or less, and assessed at P 17100.00 for the current
year. It is not registered under Act 496 nor under the
Spanish Mortgage Law. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The pertinent portions of the deed read:
x x x x
That for and in consideration of the sum of SEVENTY THOUSAND (P70,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currencyp [sic] paid to us at our entire satisfaction by spouses VICTOR and JOECELYN [sic] VALDEZ, both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of 148 P. Burgos St., San Fernando, La Union, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby SELL, CONVEY and TRANSFER by way of absolute sale unto the said spouses Victor and Joecelyn Valdez, their heirs and assigns, the TWO HUNDRED (200) SQUARE METERS, EASTERN PORTION of the parcel of land above-described, free from all liens and encumbrances.
x x x x
That now and hereinafter, said VENDEE-SPOUSES VICTOR and JOECELYN [sic] VALDEZ shall be the absolute owners of the said 200 sq. meters, eastern portion and that we shall warrant and forever defend their ownership of the same against the claims of all persons whomsoever; they shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters [sic] wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale.
x x x.x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondents subsequently built a
concrete wall on the western side of the subject property.[2] Believing that that side is the intended road
right of way mentioned in the deed, petitioners, through their representative,
reported the matter to the barangay for mediation and
conciliation. Respondents failed to
attend the conferences scheduled by the barangay, however,
drawing petitioners to file in April 1999 or more than six years after the
execution of the deed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages[3]
against respondents before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of
In their complaint, petitioners alleged
that they purchased the subject property on the strength of respondents’
assurance of providing them a road right of way. They thus prayed that respondents be ordered
to provide the subject property with a 2˝-meter wide easement and to remove the
concrete wall blocking the same.[4]
Respondents,
in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (for damages and attorney’s fees),[5]
averred that the 2 ˝-meter easement should be taken from the western portion of
the subject property and not from theirs;[6] and petitioners and their family are also the
owners of two properties adjoining the subject property, which adjoining
properties have access to two public roads or highways – the bigger one which adjoins
P. Burgos St. on the north, and the smaller one which abuts an existing barangay road on the north.[7]
Respondents
further averred that they could not have agreed to providing petitioners an easement
“on the western side of their lot” as there exists a two-storey concrete house
on their lot where the supposed easement is to be located, which was erected long
before the subject property was sold to petitioners.[8] In support of this claim, respondents submitted
a
Branch
26 of the RTC of San Fernando dismissed petitioners’ complaint and granted
respondents’ Counterclaim by Decision[10] of
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants as against the plaintiffs and hereby orders the Complaint dismissed for being unmeritorious and plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay the defendants, the following:
1) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
4) P30,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
5) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[11] (Underscoring supplied)
On
appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of
The appellate court went on to hold
that petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right
of way as they failed to present circumstances justifying their entitlement to it
under Article 649 of the Civil Code.[14]
Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration[15] having
been denied by the Court of Appeals by Resolution of
I. . . . IN RULING THAT THE RIGHT OF WAY IS
NOT PART OF THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF
II. . . . IN RULING
THAT THE PROVISION OF THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF
III. . . . IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
An easement or servitude is “a real right
constituted on another’s property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which
the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do
something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person.”[17] The statutory basis of this right is Article
613 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
There are two kinds of easements
according to source – by law or by the will of the owners. So Article 619 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
From
the allegations in petitioners’ complaint, it is clear that what they seek to
enforce is an alleged grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading: “they
shall be provided a 2 ˝ meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of
their lot but which is not included in this sale.”
Article
1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale or
disposition of real property must be in writing.[18] The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that
they “shall be provided a 2 ˝ meters wide road right-of-way on the
western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale” is not
a disposition of real property. The
proviso that the intended grant of right of way is “not included in this
sale” could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a separate and
distinct agreement for the purpose.[19] The use of the word “shall,” which is
imperative or mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be construed as
merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private
right requires it to be given an imperative meaning.[20]
Besides,
a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in the Registry of
Property in order not to prejudice third parties. So Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil Code call
for, viz:
Art.
708. The Registry of Property has for
its object the inscription or annotation of acts and contracts relating to the
ownership and other rights over immovable property.
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a
legal or compulsory easement of right of way.
For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the preconditions under Articles
649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons, and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
x x x x
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts. (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus,
to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the
following requisites must be complied with:
(1) the property is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the
isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estate’s own acts; (4) the
right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the
foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest.[21] The onus of proving the existence of these
prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate,[22]
herein petitioners.
As
found, however, by the trial court, which is supported by the Sketch[23]
(Exhibit “B”; Exhibit “1”) of the location of the lots of the parties and those
adjoining them, a common evidence of the parties, petitioners and their
family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property
which have access to two public roads or highways.[24]
Since
petitioners then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they have
no right to demand the grant by respondents of an easement on the “western side
of [respondents’] lot.”
It
may not be amiss to note at this juncture that at the time the deed was
executed in 1993, the barangay road-Exhibit “1-G,” by
which petitioners could access Burgos Street-Exhibit “1-F,” was not yet in
existence; and that the Interior Street-Exhibit “1-H,” which petitioners via
this case seek access to with a right of way, was still a creek,[25] as
reflected in the earlier-quoted particular description of respondents’ parcel
of land from which the subject property originally formed part.
Respecting
the grant of damages in favor of respondents by the trial court which was affirmed
by the appellate court, the Court finds the same baseless.
To merit an award of moral damages, there
must be proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. It is not enough that one suffers sleepless
nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as a result of
the actuation of the other party.[26] Invariably, such actuation must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence[27] to
have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill-motive.
In
respondents’ case, they predicated their Counterclaim for damages on general
allegations of sickness, humiliation and embarrassment, without establishing
bad faith, fraud or ill-motive on petitioners’ part.[28]
More
importantly, respondents are precluded from filing any counterclaim in light of
Article 199 of Rule XXVI of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 reading:
x x x x
ARTICLE 199. Penalty for Refusal or Failure of Any Party or Witness to Appear
before the Lupon or Pangkat.
— Refusal or willful failure of any party or witness to appear before the lupon or pangkat in compliance with
summons issued pursuant to this Rule may be punished by the city or municipal
court as for indirect contempt of court upon application filed therewith by the
lupon chairman, the pangkat
chairman, or by any of the contending parties. Such refusal or willful failure
to appear shall be reflected in the records of the lupon
secretary or in the minutes of the pangkat secretary
and shall bar the
complainant who fails to appear, from seeking judicial recourse for the same
course of action, and the
respondent who refuses to appear, from filing any counterclaim arising out
of, or necessarily connected with the complaint.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While
respondent Caridad Tabisula
claimed that she always appeared, when summoned, before the barangay
lupon,[29] the
following Certificate to File Action[30] belies
the claim.
x
x x x
This is to certify that respondents failed
to appear for (2) Mediation Proceeding before our Punong Barangay thus the
corresponding complaint may now be filed in court.
Issued this 24th
day of November 1998 at the Multi Purpose Hall, Barangay
1 City of San Fernando (LU).
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
The
award for moral damages being thus baseless, that for exemplary damages must too
be baseless.
As for the award of attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, respondents have not shown their entitlement thereto in
accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the May 29, 2006 Decision
and
Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Exhibit “C,” Folder of Exhibits.
[2] Records, p. 2.
[3] Filed on
[4] Records, p. 3.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Ibid.
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 23-31.
[11] Page 9 of RTC decision; rollo, p. 31.
[12] Penned by Justice Magdangal M. de Leon with the concurrence of Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mariano C. del Castillo.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] 3 Sanchez Roman 572.
[18] Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document:
(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or an interest therein are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 and 1405;
(2) x x x
(3) x x x
(4) x x x
x x x x
[19] Dionisio, et al., v. Ortiz, et al., G.R.
No. 95738, December 10, 1991, 204 SCRA 745, 749.
[20] Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 91 Phil. 608 citing Sheldon v. Sheldon, 134 A. 904, 905, 100 N.J. Ex. 24.
[21] Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 63996, September 15, 1989; De la Cruz v. Ramiscal,
G.R. No. 137882, February 4, 2005, 450 SCRA 449, 450 citing Villanueva v. Velasco, G.R. No. 130845,
November 27, 2000.
[22] Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 333, 334.
[23] Records, p. 80.
[24] Exhibit “1” for respondents, Exhibit “F” for petitioners; records, p. 80.
[25] Vide
TSN,
[26] Francisco v. GSIS, G.R. No. L-18155,
[27] Audion Electric Co. v. NLRC, 367
Phil. 620, 635 (1999).
[28] TSN,
[29] TSN,
[30] Exhibit “E.”