Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, G.R. No. 173002
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus
- Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
SHIRLEY
G. UNANGST and
OTHER
UNKNOWN
PERSONS,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
July 4, 2008
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D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE presumption of equitable mortgage imposes a
burden on the buyer to present clear evidence to rebut it. He must
overthrow it, lest it persist.[1]
To overturn that prima facie presumption,
the buyer needs to adduce substantial and credible evidence to prove that the
contract was a bona fide deed of sale
with right to repurchase.
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85942[3]
which reversed and set aside that[4] of
the Regional Trial Court (
The Facts
On P1,000.00 per day.[5] However, Salak failed to return the car after
three (3) days prompting petitioner to file a complaint against him for estafa, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and carnapping.[6]
On
P232,372.00 as payment for car rental fees, fees incurred in locating
the car, attorney’s fees, capital gains tax, transfer tax, and other incidental
expenses.[7]
Salak and respondent expressed
willingness to pay but since they were then short on cash, Salak proposed to
sell to petitioner a house and lot titled in the name of respondent. Petitioner welcomed the proposal after
consulting his wife, Cynthia. Cynthia,
on the other hand, further agreed to pay the mortgage loan of respondent over
the subject property to a certain Jojo Lee in the amount of P295,000.00
as the property was then set to be publicly auctioned on
To
formalize their amicable settlement, Cynthia, Salak and respondent executed a
written agreement.[9] They stipulated that respondent would sell,
subject to repurchase, her residential property in favor of Cynthia for the
total amount of P527,372.00 broken down, as follows: (1) P295,000.00
for the amount paid by Cynthia to Lee to release the mortgage on the property;
and (2) P232,372.00, which is the amount due to GAB Rent-A-Car. Cynthia also agreed to desist from pursuing
the complaint against Salak and respondent.[10]
Respondent
and petitioner also executed a separate deed of sale with right to repurchase,[11]
specifying, among others, that: (1) respondent, as vendor, shall pay capital
gains tax, current real estate taxes and utility bills pertaining to the
property; (2) if respondent fails to repurchase the property within 30 days
from the date of the deed, she and her assigns shall immediately vacate the
premises and deliver its possession to petitioner without need of a judicial
order; and (3) respondent’s refusal to do so will entitle petitioner to take
immediate possession of the property.[12]
Respondent
failed to repurchase the property within the stipulated period. As a result, petitioner filed, on
In
his complaint,[13]
petitioner alleged, among others, that after respondent failed to repurchase
the subject realty, he caused the registration of the deed of sale with the
Register of Deeds and the transfer of the tax declarations in his name; that
respondent failed to pay the capital gains taxes and update the real estate
taxes forcing him to pay said amounts in the sum of P71,129.05 and P11,993.72,
respectively; and that respondent violated the terms of the deed when she, as
well as the other unnamed persons, refused to vacate the subject property despite
repeated demands.[14]
Petitioner prayed before the P150,000.00 for the
reasonable compensation for its use from P10,000.00 per month afterward; (3) pay the amount advanced by
petitioner, to wit: P71,129.05 and P11,993.72 for the payment of capital
gains tax and real estate taxes, respectively; and P70,000.00 for
attorney’s fees.[15]
On
On
the other hand, respondents controverted the allegations in the complaint and
averred in their Answer,[18]
among others, that plaintiff had no cause of action inasmuch as respondent
Unangst signed the subject deed of sale under duress and intimidation employed
by petitioner and his cohorts; that, assuming that her consent was freely
given, the contract of sale was simulated and fictitious since the vendor never
received the stipulated consideration; that the sale should be construed as an
equitable mortgage pursuant to Articles 1602 and 1604 of the Civil Code because
of its onerous conditions and shockingly low consideration; that their
indebtedness in the form of arrears in car rentals merely amounts to P90,000.00;
and that the instant action was premature as plaintiff had not yet consolidated
ownership over the property. Defendants
counterclaimed for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P500.00 per
appearance.[19]
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered
finding the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase (Exh. “C”) as, indeed, a
document of sale executed by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff covering
the parcel of land house (sic)
situated at Lot 3-B, Blk. 10, Waterdam Road, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City,
declared under Tax Declaration Nos.
The ownership of the said property
is properly consolidated in the name of the plaintiff.
The defendant is further ordered to
pay to the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 a month from P71,129.05
representing the payment made by the plaintiff on the capital gain taxes and
the further amount of P70,000.00 for attorney’s fees and the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Respondents
failed to interpose a timely appeal. However, on
Petitioner,
on the other hand, moved for the dismissal of respondent’s petition on the
ground that the latter paid an insufficient sum of P200.00 as docket
fees.[22]
It appears that respondent Unangst initially paid P200.00 as docket fees as
this was the amount assessed by the Clerk of Court of the P1,715.00.
Nevertheless, the correct amount was subsequently paid by said
respondent on
In
their comment,[25] respondents
countered that they should not be faulted for paying deficient docket fees as
it was due to an erroneous assessment of the Clerk of Court.[26]
The
Respondents contended before the CA
that the
On the other hand, petitioner insisted,
among others, that although the petition for relief of respondents was filed on
time, the proper filing fees for said petition were paid beyond the 60-day
reglementary period. He posited that
jurisdiction is acquired by the court over the action only upon full payment of
prescribed docket fees.[31]
CA Disposition
In a Decision[32]
dated
IN VIEW OF
SO ORDERED.[34]
The CA declared that the Deed of Sale
with Right of Repurchase executed by the parties was an equitable mortgage. On the procedural aspect pertaining to the
petition for relief filed by respondent Unangst, the CA ruled that “the trial
court, in opting to apply the rules liberally, cannot be faulted for giving due
course to the questioned petition for relief which enabled appellants to
interpose the instant appeal.”[35] It ratiocinated:
Appellee
recognizes the timely filing of appellants’ petition for relief to be able to
appeal judgment but nonetheless points out that the proper filing fees were
paid beyond the 60-day reglementary period.
Arguing that the court acquires jurisdiction over the action only upon
full payment of the prescribed docket fees, he submits that the trial court
erred in granting appellants’ petition for relief despite the late payment of
the filing fees.
While
this Court is fully aware of the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment
of appellate docket fee, the High Court has recognized that its strict
application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees
within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic,
dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its
exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all
attendant circumstances (Meatmasters
International Corporation v. Lelis Integrated Development Corporation, 452
SCRA 626 [2005], citing La Salette
College v. Pilotin, 418 SCRA 380 [2003]).
Applied
in the instant case, the docket fees were admittedly paid only on P200.00 as
docket fees because this was the amount assessed by the Clerk of Court of the P1,715.00,
which was eventually paid by appellants on
On the substantial issues, the CA
concluded that “While the records is bereft of any proof or evidence that
appellee employed unlawful or improper pressure against appellant Unangst to
give her consent to the contract of sale, there is, nevertheless, sufficient
basis to hold the subject contract as one of equitable mortgage.”[37] It explained:
Jurisprudence
has consistently held that the nomenclature used by the contracting parties to
describe a contract does not determine its nature. The decisive factor in determining the true
nature of the transaction between the parties is the intent of the parties, as
shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the
surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situations of the parties at
that time; the attitudes, acts, conduct, and declarations of the parties; the
negotiations between them leading to the deed; and generally, all pertinent
facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design
and understanding (Legaspi v. Ong, 459 SCRA 122 [2005]).
It must be stressed, however, that
there is no conclusive test to determine whether a deed absolute on its face is
really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage. In fact, it is often a question difficult to
resolve and is frequently made to depend on the surrounding circumstances of
each case. When in doubt, courts are
generally inclined to construe a transaction purporting to be a sale as an
equitable mortgage, which involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests
over the property in controversy (Legaspi,
ibid.).
Article 1602 of the Civil Code
enumerates the instances where a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage when – (a) the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually
inadequate; (b) the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (c)
upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (d)
the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (e) the vendor
binds himself to pay taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in any other case where
it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the
transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other
obligation (Legaspi, supra; Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA
38 [2001]).
For
the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Article 1602, two (2)
requisites must concur: (a) that the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a contract of sale; and, (b) that their intention was to secure
an existing debt by way of a mortgage.
Any of the circumstance laid out in Article 1602, not the concurrence
nor an overwhelming number of the circumstances therein enumerated, suffices to
construe a contract of sale to be one of equitable mortgage (Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 716
[2001]).
Applying the foregoing
considerations in the instant case, there is hardly any doubt that the true
intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a
debt. It is not contested that before
executing the subject deed, Unangst and Salak were under police custody and
were sorely pressed for money. Such
urgent prospect of prolonged detention helps explain why appellants would
subscribe to an agreement like the deed in the instant case. This might very well explain appellants’
insistence that Unangst was not truly free when she signed the questioned deed.
Besides, there is no gainsaying that when appellee allowed appellants to retain
possession of the realty sold for 30 days, as part of the agreement, that
period of time surely signaled a time allotted to Salak and Unangst, as
debtors, within which to pay their mortgage indebtedness.
The
High Court, in several cases involving similar situations, has declared that
“while it was true that plaintiffs were aware of the contents of the contracts,
the preponderance of the evidence showed, however, that they signed knowing
that said contracts did not express their real intention, and if they did so
notwithstanding this, it was due to the urgent necessity of obtaining
funds. Necessitous men are not, truly
speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency, will submit to any terms
that the crafty may impose upon them” (Lorbes,
ibid.; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 339
SCRA 97 [2000]; Lao v. Court of Appeals,
275 SCRA 237 [1997]; Zamora v. Court of
Appeals, 260 SCRA 10 [1996]; Labasan
v. Lacuesta, 86 SCRA 16 [1978]).
After
all, Article 1602(6) provides that a contract of sale with right to repurchase
is presumed to be an equitable mortgage in any other case where it may be
fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction
shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any obligation. In fine, a careful review of the records
convincingly shows that the obtaining facts in this case qualify the
controversial agreement between the parties as an equitable mortgage under
Article 1602 of the New Civil Code.[38]
Issues
Petitioner has resorted to the
present recourse under Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
(a) The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave error in finding that the respondent perfected an appeal via Petition for Relief To Be Able To Appeal Judgment even when the proper docket fees were paid beyond the period prescribed to bring such action under Section 3 of Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to the pronouncements by the Honorable Court in the cases of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Arciaga [148 SCRA 433], Philippine Pryce Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals [148 SCRA 433] and Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion [170 SCRA 274].
(b) The Honorable Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in reversing the Decision of the Court a quo finding the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase a document of sale executed by the respondent in favor of the petitioner and in further holding such contract as one of equitable mortgage.[39]
Our Ruling
On the first issue, petitioner
contends that respondents’ “Petition for Relief to Be Able to Appeal Judgment,”
which paved the way for the allowance of respondents’ appeal of the
On this issue, respondent counters
that the belated payment of proper docket fees was not due to their fault but
to the improper assessment by the Clerk of Court. Respondent asserts the ruling of the CA that
the court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if there is a
justifiable reason for the failure to pay the correct amount. Moreover, respondent argues that petitioner
failed to contest the
We agree with respondents. Their failure to pay the correct amount of
docket fees was due to a justifiable reason.
The right to appeal is a purely
statutory right. Not being a natural
right or a part of due process, the right to appeal may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the rules provided therefor.[41] For this reason, payment of the full amount of
the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period
is mandatory and jurisdictional.[42] Nevertheless, as this Court ruled in Aranas v. Endona,[43]
the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule on
payment of appellate docket fees may be mitigated under exceptional
circumstances to better serve the interest of justice. It is always within the power of this Court to
suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from their operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it.[44]
In not a few instances, the Court relaxed
the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored
principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance
to argue their causes and defenses.[45] For, it is far better to dispose of a case on
the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality, if it be
the case, that may result in injustice.[46] The emerging trend in the rulings of this
Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.[47]
As early as 1946, in Segovia v. Barrios,[48]
the Court ruled that where an appellant in good faith paid less than the
correct amount for the docket fee because that was the amount he was required
to pay by the clerk of court, and he promptly paid the balance, it is error to
dismiss his appeal because “(e)very citizen has the
right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain
duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law. To penalize such citizen for relying upon said
officer in all good faith is repugnant to justice.”[49]
Technicality and procedural
imperfections should thus not serve as bases of decisions.[50] In that way, the ends of justice would be
better served. For, indeed, the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to
hinder but to promote the administration of justice.[51]
We go now to the crux of the
petition. Should the deed of sale with
right to repurchase executed by the parties be construed as an equitable
mortgage? This is the pivotal question here.
According to petitioner, the deed
should not be construed as an equitable mortgage as it does not fall under any
of the instances mentioned in Article 1602 of the Civil Code where the
agreement can be construed as an equitable mortgage. He added that the “language and terms of the
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by respondent in favor of the
petition are clear and unequivocal. Said
contract must be construed with its literal sense.”[52]
We cannot agree.
Respondent is correct in alleging
that the deed of sale with right to repurchase qualifies as an equitable
mortgage under Article 1602. She merely
secured the payment of the unpaid car rentals and the amount advanced by
petitioner to Jojo Lee.
The transaction between the parties
is one of equitable mortgage and not a sale with right to purchase as
maintained by petitioners. Article 1602
of the New Civil Code provides that the contract is presumed to be an equitable
mortgage in any of the following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2)
When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4)
When the purchaser retains for
himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6)
In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real
intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a
debt or the performance of any other obligation.
In
any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received
by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall
be subject to the usury laws.[53] (Emphasis ours)
The conclusion that the deed of sale
with right to repurchase is an equitable mortgage is buttressed by the
following:
First, before
executing the deed, respondent and Salak were under police custody due to the
complaint lodged against them by petitioner.
They were sorely pressed for money, as they would not be released from
custody unless they paid petitioner. It
was at this point that respondent was constrained to execute a deed of sale
with right to repurchase. Respondent was
in no position whatsoever to bargain with their creditor, petitioner. Nel consensui tam contrarium est quam vis
atqui metus. There can be no consent when under force or
duress. Bale wala
ang pagsang-ayon kung ito’y nakuha
sa pamimilit o paraang di malaya.
It is
established that respondent signed the deed only because of the urgent
necessity of obtaining funds. When the vendor is in urgent need of
money when he executes the sale, the alleged sale with pacto de retro will be construed as an equitable mortgage.[54] “Necessitous men are not,
truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency will submit to any
terms that the crafty may impose upon them.”[55]
Second, petitioner
allowed respondent and Salak to retain the possession of the property despite
the execution of the deed. In fact, respondent
and Salak were not bound to deliver the possession of the property to
petitioner if they would pay him the amount he demanded.[56]
Where in a contract of sale with pacto de retro, the vendor remains in
possession, as a lessee or otherwise, the contract shall be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage.[57] The reason for the presumption lies in the
fact that in a contract of sale with pacto
de retro, the legal title to the property is immediately transferred to the
vendee, subject to the vendor’s right to redeem. Retention, therefore, by the vendor of the
possession of the property is inconsistent with the vendee’s acquisition of the
right of ownership under a true sale.[58] It discloses, in the alleged vendee, a lack of
interest in the property that belies the truthfulness of the sale a retro.[59]
Third, it is
likewise undisputed that the deed was executed by reason of: (1) the alleged
indebtedness of Salak to petitioner, that is, car rental payments; and (2)
respondent’s own obligation to petitioner, that is, reimbursement of what
petitioner paid to the mortgagee, Jojo Lee. Fact is, the purchase price stated in the deed
was the amount of the indebtedness of both respondent and Salak to petitioner.[60]
Apparently, the deed purports to be a
sale with right to purchase. However,
since it was executed in consideration of the aforesaid loans and/or
indebtedness, said contract is indubitably an equitable mortgage. The rule is firmly settled that whenever it is
clearly shown that a deed of sale with pacto
de retro, regular on its face, is given as security for a loan, it must be
regarded as an equitable mortgage.[61]
The above-mentioned
circumstances preclude the Court from declaring that the parties intended the
transfer of the property from one to the other by way of sale. They are more than sufficient to show that the true intention of
the parties is to secure the payment of said debts. Verily, an equitable mortgage under paragraphs
2 and 6 of Article 1602 exists here. Settled
is the rule that to create the presumption enunciated by Article 1602, the
existence of one circumstance is enough.[62]
Moreover, under Article 1603 of the Civil
Code it is provided that: “(i)n case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a
sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable mortgage.” In this case, We have no doubt that the
transaction between the parties is that of a loan secured by said property by
way of mortgage.
In
Lorbes v. Court of Appeals,[63]
the Court held that:
The decisive factor in
evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not
necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding
circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the
attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations between
them leading to the deed, and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency
to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding. As such, documentary and parol evidence may be
submitted and admitted to prove the intention of the parties.
Sales with rights to repurchase, as
defined by the Civil Code, are not favored. We will not construe instruments to be sales
with a right to repurchase, with the stringent and onerous effects which
follow, unless the terms of the document and the surrounding circumstances
require it. Whenever, under the terms of
the writing, any other construction can fairly and reasonably be made, such
construction will be adopted and the contract will be construed as a mere loan unless
the court can see that, if enforced according to its terms, it is not an
unconscionable one.[64]
Article 1602 of the Civil Code is
designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale with
right of repurchase, such as the circumvention of the laws against usury and pactum commissorium.[65]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Ramos v. Sarao,
G.R. No. 149756,
[2] Rollo,
pp. 35-47. Penned by Associate Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo
and Magdangal M. De
[3] Entitled “Benjamin
Bautista v. Shirley G. Unangst and Other Unknown Persons.”
[4] Rollo,
pp. 48-56. Penned by Judge Eliodoro G.
Ubadias.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Records, p. 1.
[14] Rollo, p. 37.
[15]
[16] Records, p. 28.
[17] Rollo, p. 38.
[18] Records, p. 41.
[19] Rollo, p. 38.
[20] Records, pp. 264-265.
[21] Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[22] Records, p. 284.
[23] Rollo, p. 42.
[24]
[25] Records, p. 290.
[26] Rollo, p. 40.
[27] Records, p. 308.
[28]
[29] Rollo, p. 41; CA rollo, p. 32.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
Republic
v. Luriz, G.R. No. 158992,
[42] Ayala Land,
Inc. v. Carpo, G.R. No. 140162,
[43]
G.R. No. L-32719,
[44]
Chronicle
Securities Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 157907,
[45] Eastland Construction & Development Corporation v.
Mortel, G.R. No. 165648,
[46] Gutierrez v. Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 142248,
[47]
Id.; Añonuevo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 152998,
[48] 75
Phil. 764, 767 (1946).
[49]
[50] Crystal
Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,
G.R. No. 154798,
[51] Asian Spirit Airlines v. Bautista, G.R.
No. 164668,
[52] Rollo, p. 30.
[53]
See Lopez v. Sarabia, G.R. No.
140357,
[54] Tolentino,
A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.
V, 1992 ed., p. 160, citing Labasan v.
Lacuesta, G.R. No. L-25931,
[55] Agas v. Sabico, G.R. No. 156447,
[56] Rollo, pp. 45, 57.
[57]
See note 54, at 158-159.
[58]
[59] Padilla,
A., Civil Law, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. V, 1987 ed., p. 454.
[60] Rollo, pp. 35-37.
[61] Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
42108,
[62]
[63]
G.R. No. 139884,
[64] Ramos v. Court of Appeals, supra note
61, at 646, citing Padilla v. Linsangan,
19 Phil. 65 (1911) and Aquino v. Deala,
63 Phil. 582 (1936).
[65]