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PHILIMARE, INC./MARLOW NAVIGATION CO.,
LTD., BONIFACIO GOMEZ and ALBERTO GOMEZ, Petitioners, |
G.R.
No. 168753
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, |
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- versus - BENEDICTO F. SUGANOB, |
CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO,
JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
July 9,
2008 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent
Benedicto F. Suganob was employed as Chief Cook for petitioners for almost ten
years on board various vessels of petitioners.
His last employment contract with petitioners was on board M/V Mekong
Star where he was hired for a period of ten months starting
Upon
his arrival in the
As Suganob was totally incapacitated, he sought his permanent
disability compensation and other benefits from petitioners who refused his
request. Hence, on
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering respondents [herein petitioners] to pay complainant
[Suganob] jointly and severally the following:
1. 120 [days] sickness benefits as
provided for under the POEA Standard Employment Contract which is equivalent to
US$3,036.00;
2. Permanent disability benefits
equivalent to US$60,000.00 as provided for under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract;
3. 10% of the total award
recovered as attorney’s fees.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of
merit.
So Ordered.[6]
Not satisfied with the foregoing decision, petitioners
interposed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). The NLRC issued a Notice of
Conference setting the case for conference in order to give the parties an
opportunity to settle the case amicably.
However, the parties failed to settle amicably. Thus, on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is remanded to the Arbitration branch of origin for further proceedings to determine the degree of impediment of complainant [Suganob] with the aid of either a private or public physician to be chosen or agreed upon by the parties.
SO
ORDERED.[8]
From the
said decision, Suganob filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review[9]
which the appellate court treated as a petition for certiorari. Despite the objection of petitioners that the
remedy availed of by Suganob was incorrect, the Court of Appeals also later
rendered judgment in favor of Suganob on
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of public respondent
[NLRC] are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Labor
Arbiter REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with modification that the
award of attorney’s fees is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioners now come before us raising the following
issues:
I.
The Court of Appeals
committed serious errors when it entertained private respondent’s erroneous
petition under Rule 43 and treated the same as being filed under Rule 65.
II.
The Court of Appeals
committed serious error when it nullified and annulled the decision of the NLRC
despite the absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion on the latter’s
part.
III.
The Court of Appeals
committed serious errors when it reinstated and affirmed the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter awarding disability benefits to the respondent notwithstanding
the established facts that respondent’s illness is not work-related and that
respondent has already been declared fit to work.
IV.
The Court of Appeals
committed serious error in affirming the Labor Arbiter’s award of sickness
allowance/wages without any legal and/or factual basis.[11]
Simply put, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in treating
Suganob’s petition as one filed under Rule 65?; (2) Is Suganob entitled to
disability benefits?; and (3) Is Suganob entitled to sickness allowance/wages?
On the first issue, petitioners
contend that Suganob’s petition before the Court of Appeals should have been
dismissed outright since he availed of the wrong remedy. They stress that in the case of St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,[12]
the Court held that decisions of the NLRC should be brought to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[13]
For
his part, Suganob avers that technical rules of procedure should not be
strictly applied in labor cases. He
argues that the Court of Appeals acted accordingly when it decided the case
based on the issues raised and not through a mere technicality. Further, Suganob asserts that the kind of
pleadings filed before the Court is not determined by its title but rather by
its content.
Petitioners’
contention lacks merit. The policy of
our judicial system is to encourage full adjudication of the merits of an
appeal. Procedural niceties should be
avoided in labor cases as the provisions of the Rules of Court are applied only
in a suppletory manner. Indeed, rules of
procedure may be relaxed to relieve a party of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of noncompliance with the process required.[14] Moreover, averments in the pleadings, not the
title, are controlling[15]
in determining the nature of the proceeding.
Suganob
categorized his petition before the Court of Appeals as a petition for review
on certiorari (under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure). However, the contents of his petition clearly
reveal that the petition filed complied with the requirements of a petition for
certiorari, albeit wrongly captioned as one for a petition for review under
Rule 43. Courts look beyond the form and
consider substance as circumstances warrant.
Thus, we rule that the Court of Appeals correctly treated Suganob’s petition under Rule 43 as one being filed under
Rule 65.
As
to the second issue, petitioners contend Suganob is not entitled to disability
benefits because his illness is not work-related. They stress that the company-designated
physician declared him fit to work provided he maintains his medications. Also, even if Suganob’s arthritis is
work-related, the same is not a total and permanent disability as to entitle
him to an award of US$60,000. Corollary
to this, petitioners aver that the NLRC is correct in remanding the case to the
labor arbiter for further proceedings to determine the degree of impediment of Suganob.
Suganob,
for his part, alleges that he is entitled to disability benefits for total and
permanent disability since he can no longer engage himself as a seafarer. If indeed petitioners found him fit for work,
he would have been re-employed after he was medically repatriated; however, he
was not. Suganob adds that the decision
to remand the case to the labor arbiter would merely delay the proceedings of
the case.
We
rule against remanding the case to the labor arbiter since it will only cause
further delay and may frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a
futile exercise, as in all probability the case would eventually end up with
this Court.[16] Also, this Court has repeatedly ruled that
delay in the settlement of labor cases cannot be countenanced. Not only does it involve the survival of an
employee and his loved ones who are dependent on him for food, shelter,
clothing, medicine and education, it also wears down the meager resources of
the workers.[17]
Apropos
the appropriate disability benefits that respondent is entitled to, we find
that Suganob is entitled to Grade 1[18]
disability benefits which corresponds to total and permanent disability. As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, the medical certificate issued by petitioners’ company physician do
not conflict with that issued by the physician chosen by Suganob. The medical certificate issued on
Disability
is intimately related to one’s earning capacity. It should be understood less on its medical
significance but more on the loss of earning capacity.[20] To be entitled to Grade 1 disability
benefits, the employee’s disability must not only be total but also permanent.
Permanent
disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120
days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.[21] Clearly, Suganob’s disability is permanent
since he was unable to work from the time he was medically repatriated on
Total disability, on the other hand,
does not mean absolute helplessness. In
disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather
the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.[22] Total disability does not require that the
employee be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be
such that the employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom. Both the company-designated physician and
Suganob’s physician found that Suganob is unfit to continue his duties as a
Chief Cook since his illness prevented him from continuing his duties as
such. Due to his illness, he can no
longer perform work which is part of his daily routine as Chief Cook like
lifting heavy loads of frozen meat, fish, water, etc. when preparing meals for
the crew members. Hence, Suganob’s
disability is also total.
Lastly,
petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the labor
arbiter’s decision awarding 120-day sickness allowance to Suganob. They point out that Suganob has in fact
received said illness allowance during the period that he was under treatment
by petitioners’ physicians.
Suganob,
however, counters that he is entitled to said sickness allowance because under
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment
Contract, a seafarer who is medically sick is entitled to sickness allowance
for no less than 120 days.
We
rule for Suganob. Section 20, par. B, sub-par. 3 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract states,
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical
treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent
disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case
shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.[23]
Here,
Suganob was unable to work for a period of more than 120 days. It is therefore correct that he be awarded
his 120-day sickness wages as required by the POEA Standard Employment
Contract.
No doubt Suganob became sick in the
course of his employment with petitioners because he was declared to be healthy
prior to his departure. This is
corroborated by the fact that he was subjected to thorough examination before
boarding M/V Mekong Star. Had he not
been found fit to work prior to his departure, he would not have been allowed
to board said ship. Without a doubt,
Suganob acquired his illness in the course of his employment with petitioners.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 59-74. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Jose C. Mendoza concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4] Records, p. 2.
[5] Rollo, pp. 85-99.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] G.R. No. 130866,
[13]
[14] Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 146125,
[15] Cruz
v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 140422,
[16] Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154448, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 267, 278, citing Fernandez v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 105892, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 149, 170.
[17]
[18] Department Order No. 4, Series of 2000, Amended Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels,
adopted on
SECTION 32.
Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases
Including Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted
HEAD
x x x x
3. Severe paralysis of both upper or lower extremities or one upper and one lower extremity.....Gr. 1
x x x x
6. Severe mental disorder or Severe Complex Cerebral function disturbance or
post-traumatic psychoneurosis which require regular aid and attendance
as to render worker permanently unable to perform any work…………………………………Gr. 1
x x x x
9. Incurable imbecility…………………………………………………………………………….Gr. 1
FACE
x x x x
4. Complete loss of the power of mastication and speech function………………………………..Gr.1
x x x x
EYES
1. Blindness or total and permanent loss of vision of both eyes…………………………………...Gr.1
x x x x
CHEST-TRUNK-SPINE
x x x x
8. Injury to the spinal cord as to make walking impossible even with the aid of a pair of crutches………………………………………………………………………………………….Gr.1
9. Injury to the spinal cord resulting to incontinence of urine and feces…………………………..Gr.1
ABDOMEN
x x x x
3. Severe residuals of impairment of intra-abdominal organs which
requires regular aid and attendance that will unable worker to seek
any gainful employment…………………………………………………………………………Gr.1
x x x x
PELVIS
1. Fracture of the pelvic rings as to totally incapacitate worker to work…………………………..Gr.1
x x x x
HANDS
1. Total loss of use of both hands or amputation of both hands at wrist joints or above…………..Gr.1
x x x x
SHOULDER AND
ARM
x x x x
14. Total paralysis of both upper extremities………………………………………………………Gr. 1
x x x x
LOWER
EXTREMITIES
x x x x
10. Loss of both feet at ankle joint or above………………………………………………………..Gr. 1
x x x x
33. Failure of fracture of both hips to unite………………………………………………………...Gr. 1
x x x x
35. Paralysis of both lower extremities……………………………………………………………..Gr. 1
x x x x
[19] Rollo, p. 69.
[20]
[21] Government
Service Insurance System v.
[22] Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123891, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 47, 53.
[23] Rollo, p. 256.