|
PEOPLE OF THE Petitioner,
-
versus - BENJAMIN
“KOKOY” T. ROMUALDEZ and THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), Respondents. |
G.R. No. 166510
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO
MORALES,
AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, velasco, JR., NACHURA, REYES, leonardo-de castro, and brion, JJ. Promulgated: July 23, 2008 |
|
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
||
|
|
||
DECISION
|
||
|
|
||
BRION, J.:
|
||
|
|
||
We resolve the Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court by the
People of the Philippines (People),
assailing the Resolutions dated 22 June 2004[1]
and 23 November 2004[2]
of the Sandiganbayan in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26916 entitled People of the
ANTECEDENTS
The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charged Romualdez before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information[3]
reads:
That on or about and during the period from 1976 to February
1986 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Benjamin “Kokoy”
Romualdez, a public officer being then the Provincial Governor of the Province
of Leyte, while in the performance of his official function, committing the
offense in relation to his Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally with evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the Government in the
following manner: accused public officer being then the elected Provincial
Governor of Leyte and without abandoning said position, and using his influence
with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself
appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the
People’s Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and
United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such
appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the
Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible with his position
as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby enabling himself to collect dual
compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial
Government of Leyte in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-six Thousand Nine
Hundred Eleven Dollars and 56/100 (US $276,911.56), US Currency or its
equivalent amount of Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine
Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three Hundred
Forty-eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) both Philippine Currencies,
respectively, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the
aforementioned amount of P5,806,709.50.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Romualdez moved to quash the
information[4] on
two grounds, namely: (1) that the facts alleged in the information do
not constitute the offense with which the accused was charged; and (2) that
the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription. He argued that the acts imputed against him
do not constitute an offense because: (a) the cited provision of the law
applies only to public officers charged with the grant of licenses, permits, or
other concessions, and the act charged – receiving dual compensation – is
absolutely irrelevant and unrelated to the act of granting licenses, permits,
or other concessions; and (b) there can be no damage and prejudice to the
Government considering that he actually rendered services for the
dual positions of Provincial Governor of Leyte and Ambassador to foreign
countries.
To support his prescription argument, Romualdez
posited that the 15-year prescription under Section 11 of RA 3019 had lapsed since
the preliminary investigation of the case for an offense committed on or about and during the period from 1976
to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division of the
Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman. He argued that there was no interruption of
the prescriptive period for the offense because the proceedings undertaken under
the 1987 complaint filed with the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
were null and void pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cojuangco Jr. v. PCGG[5]
and Cruz Jr [sic].[6] He likewise argued that the Revised Penal
Code provision[7]
that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines
should not apply to his case, as he was charged with an offense not covered by the
Revised Penal Code; the law on the prescription of offenses punished under
special laws (Republic Act No. 3326) does not contain any rule similar to that
found in the Revised Penal Code.
The People opposed the motion to quash
on the argument that Romualdez is
misleading the court in asserting that Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 does not apply
to him when Section 2 (b) of the law states that corrupt practices may be
committed by public officers who include “elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.”[8] On the issue of prescription, the People
argued that Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel,
and that prescription is a matter of technicality to which no one has a vested
right. Romualdez filed a Reply to this
Opposition.[9]
The Sandiganbayan granted Romualdez’
motion to quash in the first Resolution assailed in this petition. The Sandiganbayan stated:
We
find that the allegation of damage and prejudice to the Government in the
amount of P5,806,709.50 representing the accused’s compensation is without
basis, absent a showing that the accused did not actually render services for
his two concurrent positions as Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte
and as Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
and United States of America. The
accused alleges in the subject Motion that he actually rendered services to the
government. To receive compensation for
actual services rendered would not come within the ambit of improper or illegal
use of funds or properties of the government; nor would it constitute unjust
enrichment tantamount to the damage and prejudice of the government.
Jurisprudence
has established what “evident bad faith” and “gross negligence” entail, thus:
In order to be held guilty of
violating Section 3 (e), R. A. No. 3019, the act of the accused that caused
undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross
inexcusable negligence. But
bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the law, the
“bad faith” must be “evident”.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx. “Gross negligence” is characterized by the
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a willful or omitting to
act in a willful or intentional manner displaying a conscious indifference to consequences
as far as other persons may be affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The
accused may have been inefficient as a public officer by virtue of his holding
of two concurrent positions, but such inefficiency is not enough to hold him
criminally liable under the Information charged against him, given the elements
of the crime and the standards set by the Supreme Court quoted above. At most, any liability arising from the
holding of both positions by the accused may be administrative in nature.
x
x x
However,
as discussed above, the Information does not sufficiently aver how the act of
receiving dual compensation resulted to undue injury to the government so as to
make the accused liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.[10]
The Sandiganbayan
found no merit in Romualdez’ prescription argument.
The People moved to reconsider this Resolution,
citing “reversible errors” that the
Sandiganbayan committed in its ruling.[11] Romualdez opposed the People’s motion, but
also moved for a partial reconsideration of the Resolution’s ruling on
prescription.[12] The People opposed Romualdez’ motion for
partial reconsideration.[13]
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan denied via the second assailed Resolution[14]
the People’s motion for reconsideration under the following terms –
The
Court held in its Resolution of June 22, 2004, and so maintains and sustains,
that assuming the averments of the foregoing information are hypothetically
admitted by the accused, it would not constitute the offense of violation of Section
3 (e) of RA 3019 as the elements of (a) causing undue injury to any party,
including the government, by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties, and (b) that the public officer acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, are wanting.
As
it is, a perusal of the information shows that pertinently, accused is being
charged for: (a) having himself appointed as ambassador to various posts while
serving as governor of the
Even
assuming that the appointee influenced the appointing authority, the appointee
only makes a passive participation by entering into the appointment, unless it
is alleged that he acted in conspiracy with his appointing authority, which,
however, is not so claimed by the prosecution in the instant case. Thus, even if the accused’s appointment was
contrary to law or the constitution, it is the appointing authority that should
be responsible therefor because it is the latter who is the doer of the alleged
wrongful act. In fact, under the rules on payment of compensation, the
appointing authority responsible for such unlawful employment shall be
personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the appointment been
lawful. As it is, the appointing
authority herein, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos has been laid to rest, so
it would be incongruous and illogical to hold his appointee, herein accused,
liable for the appointment.
Further,
the allegation in the information that the accused collected compensation in
the amounts of Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine Pesos
and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three Hundred
Forty Eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) cannot sustain the theory of the
prosecution that the accused caused damage and prejudice to the government, in
the absence of any contention that receipt of such was tantamount to giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to any party and to acting with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Besides receiving compensation is an incident
of actual services rendered, hence it cannot be construed as injury or damage
to the government.
It likewise found
no merit in Romualdez’ motion for partial reconsideration.
THE PETITION AND THE
PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS
The People filed the present
petition on the argument that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in quashing the Information based on the reasons it stated in the
assailed Resolutions, considering that:
a.
Romualdez cannot be legally appointed as an
ambassador of the Republic of the
b. Romualdez cannot receive compensation for his
illegal appointment as Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines and for his
services in this capacity; thus, to so pay him is to make illegal payment of
public funds and cause undue injury to the government under Section 3 (e) of RA
3019; and
c. The
Sandiganbayan went beyond the ultimate facts required in charging a violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and delved into matters yet to be proven during
trial.
Required to comment on the petition, Romualdez filed a Motion
to Dismiss with Comment Ad Cautelam.[15]
He argued that the filing of the present
Rule 65 petition is improper, as a petition filed under Rule 45, instead of
Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy, considering that
the assailed Resolutions are appealable. He cited in support of this contention
the ruling that an order granting a
motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order; it is not merely
interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable.[16] He further argued that the present petition was
belatedly filed, as the People filed it beyond the 15-day reglementary filing period
for a Rule 45 petition. On the
substantive issues raised in the petition, he argued that the factual averments
in the Information do not constitute the offense charged and that the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished by prescription.
The People, on the other hand, asserted in reply[17]
that while a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, or that certiorari is not a substitute for the
lost remedy of an appeal, the rule may be relaxed when the issue raised is
purely legal, when public interest is involved, and in case of urgency. It also argued that certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal would be slow,
inadequate, and insufficient; and that it is within this Court’s power to
suspend or exempt a particular case from the operation of the rules when its
strict application will frustrate rather than promote justice. Thus, the People asked for a review of the
case based on substantial justice and the claimed merits of the instant
petition.
Romualdez countered in
his Rejoinder[18] that
the assailed Resolutions, being final, can no longer be questioned, re-opened,
or reviewed; that public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts become final and irrevocable at some
definite date fixed by law. Citing the
express provision of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1606, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8249 (which provides that decisions
and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court
by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court), he argued that certiorari cannot be availed of because
of the availability of appeal.
These submissions bring
to the fore the threshold issue of whether the present petition may be given
due course given the Rule 65 mode of review that the People used. As will be seen below, our examination of this
threshold issue leads to the consideration of the grave abuse of discretion
issue.
OUR RULING
The Threshold Issue
The
Sandiganbayan ruling granting Romuldez’ motion to quash the Information shall,
upon finality, close and terminate the proceedings against Romuldez; hence, it
is a final ruling that disposes of the case and is properly reviewable by
appeal.[19]
The appeal, as Romualdez correctly maintains, is through Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606 (as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8249),
which provides that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan are appealable
to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45.
Significantly,
the People does not deny at all that the mode of review to question a
Sandiganbayan final ruling is by way of Rule 45, as the above cited provision
requires. It only posits that this
requirement does not foreclose the use of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of
discretion when the issue is purely legal, when public interest is involved, or
in case of urgency. In short, the People
asks us to relax the application of the rules on the modes of review.
The
purpose and occasion for the use of Rules 45 and 65 as modes of review are
clearly established under the Rules of Court[20]
and related jurisprudence.[21] Rule
45 provides for the broad process of appeal to the Supreme Court on pure errors
of law committed by the lower court.
Rule 65, on the other hand, provides a completely different basis for
review through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. The writ is extraordinary because it solely
addresses lower court actions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. By express provision, Rule 65 is the proper
remedy when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Thus, the
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive; certiorari is not allowed when a party to a
case fails to appeal a judgment or final order despite the availability of that
remedy; a petition for certiorari
cannot likewise be a substitute for a lost appeal.[22]
Cases
on the choice between the Rule 45 and Rule 65 modes of review are not novel. Because
of the spirit of liberality that pervades the Rules of Court[23]
and the interest of substantial justice that we have always believed should be
upheld,[24]
we have had occasions to relax the strict rules regulating these modes of
review. However, these occasions are few
and far between and have always been attended by exceptional circumstances;
otherwise, the exceptions would displace the general rule, rendering useless the
distinctions painstakingly established through the years to foster procedural
orderliness.
In
Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan[25]
we allowed a Rule 65 petition, notwithstanding that the proper remedy is a Rule
45 appeal, to review a Sandiganbayan Decision in view of the importance of the issues raised in the case. We similarly allowed a review under Rule 65 in
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Third
Division)[26]
and Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Special
First Division)[27]
– cases on ill-gotten wealth – on the reasoning that the nature of the cases was
endowed with public interest and involved public policy concerns. In the latter Republic v. Sandiganbayan case, we added that substantial justice
to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or
perfection of form, should be relentlessly and firmly pursued. In the past, we have likewise allowed a
similar treatment on the showing that an appeal was an inadequate remedy.[28] That we can single out for special treatment
cases involving grave abuse of discretion is supported by no less than the second
paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides:
Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversy
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Under this
provision, action on grave abuse of discretion is not only a power we can
exercise; more than this, it is a duty we must discharge.
In
the spirit embodied in this constitutional provision and in the interest of
substantial justice, we will not hesitate to deviate from the strict application
of our procedural rules when grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction is properly and substantially alleged in a petition filed after the lapse of the period for
appeal under Rule 45 but prior to the lapse of the period for filing a Rule 65
petition. Conceptually, no major
deviation from the rules in fact transpires in doing this. Under established
jurisprudence, decisions and rulings rendered without or with lack or excess of
jurisdiction are null and void,[29]
subject only to the procedural limits on the right to question them provided
under Rule 65.[30]
It is for this reason that a decision that lapses to finality fifteen (15) days
after its receipt can still be questioned, within sixty (60) days therefrom, on
jurisdictional grounds, although the decision has technically lapsed to
finality. The only deviation in terms of
strict application of the Rules is from what we have discussed above regarding
the basic nature of a petition for certiorari as expressly laid down by
Rule 65; it is available only when there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and thus is not
allowed as a substitute when a party fails to appeal a judgment or final order
despite the availability of that remedy.[31]
Under these terms, if the Sandiganbayan merely legally erred while acting within the
confines of its jurisdiction, then its ruling, even if erroneous, is properly
the subject of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, and any Rule 65 petition subsequently filed will be for naught. The Rule 65 petition brought under these
circumstances is then being used as a substitute for a lost appeal. If, on the
other hand, the Sandiganbayan ruling is attended
by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
then this ruling is fatally defective on jurisdictional ground and we should
allow it to be questioned within the period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
notwithstanding the lapse of the period of appeal under Rule 45. To reiterate, the ruling’s jurisdictional defect
and the demands of substantial justice that we believe should receive primacy
over the strict application of rules of procedure, require that we so act.
The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
Romualdez’ motion to quash
that gave rise to the present case was
anchored on Section 3 (a) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
Section 3. Grounds. -
The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the facts
charged do not constitute an offense;
x x x x
The determinative test in appreciating a motion
to quash under this rule is the sufficiency of the averments in the
information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by law without
considering matters aliunde.[32] As Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires, the information only needs to state the ultimate facts;[33]
the evidentiary and other details can be provided during the trial.[34]
The legal provision under
which Romuldez stands charged – Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 – on the other hand provides:
Sec. 3.
Corrupt practices by public
officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practice of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices of government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
Reduced
to its elements, a violation under this provision requires that:[35]
1.
The accused must be a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2.
He must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence in the
discharge of his functions; and
3. His action caused undue injury to any party, including the government,
or gave a private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
Whether the Sandiganbayan
acted correctly, or committed errors of law while in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, or gravely abused its discretion in quashing the information, are
to be determined based on the application of the standards in evaluating a
motion to quash, in light of the elements and terms of the offense with which
the accused stands charged. The
Sandiganbayan acts correctly or commits errors
of law depending on its conclusions if – based solely on the “four corners”
of the information as jurisprudence mandates,[36]
independently of any evidence whether prima
facie or conclusive, and hypothetically assuming the truth of all the
allegations in the Information – it rules on whether all the elements of the
offense as defined by law are present.
On the other hand, it acts with
grave abuse of discretion if its ruling is a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or if it rules in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; or if
it acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to action
outside the contemplation of law.[37]
Our reading of the
Information, based on the elements of the offense, shows us that the first
element of the offense is reflected in the allegation that the “accused
BENJAMIN ‘KOKOY’ ROMUALDEZ, a public officer being then the Provincial Governor
of the Province of Leyte, while in the performance of his official function,
committing the offense in relation to his Office… .” In plain terms, the accused
was then a public officer discharging official functions.
The
second element appears in the averment that the “accused… willfully,
unlawfully and criminally with evident
bad faith …” and the more
particular averment that
“accused public
officer being then the elected Provincial Governor of Leyte and without
abandoning said position, and using his influence with his brother-in-law, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as
Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the People’s Republic of China
(Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America
(Washington D.C.), knowing fully
well that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing
laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible with
his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte.” In short, while being the elected Governor and in “evident
bad faith,” he had himself appointed to the incompatible position of ambassador.
Finally,
the last element corresponds to the allegation that the “accused… cause[d] undue injury to the Government,” supported further by
the particular allegation “thereby enabling himself to collect dual
compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial
Government of Leyte in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-six thousand Nine
Hundred Eleven Dollars and 56/100 (US $276,911.56), US Currency or its
equivalent amount of Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine
Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three
Hundred Forty-eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) both Philippine Currencies,
respectively, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the
aforementioned amount of P5,806,709.50.” Thus, attended by and as a result of the
second element, the accused caused undue injury to the government by collecting
dual compensation from the two incompatible positions he occupied.
In its first Resolution, the Sandiganbayan
concluded that (1) “the allegation of damage and prejudice to
the Government . . . is without basis, absent a showing that the accused did
not actually render services for his two concurrent positions. . . and
that (2) [T]he accused alleges in the subject Motion that he actually
rendered service to the government. To
receive compensation for actual services rendered would not come within the
ambit of improper or illegal use of funds or properties.”[38] After citing jurisprudence defining
evident bad faith and gross negligence, it went on to state that (3) the
accused may have been inefficient as a public officer by virtue of his holding
of two concurrent positions, but such inefficiency is not enough to hold him criminally liable under the
Information charged against him,
given the elements of the crime and the standards set by the Supreme Court …. At
most, any liability arising from the holding of both positions by the accused
may be administrative in nature.”[39]
[underscoring supplied]
In the second Resolution,
on the other hand, the Sandiganbayan concluded: (1) on the allegation
that Romualdez had himself appointed as Ambassador while concurrently serving
as Provincial Governor, that it “finds
that accused cannot be held criminally liable, whether or not he had
himself appointed to the position … because the act of appointment is something
that can only be imputed to the appointing authority … Even assuming that the
appointee influenced the appointing authority, the appointee only makes a
passive participation by entering into the appointment, unless it is alleged
that he acted in conspiracy with his appointing authority …”;[40]
and (2) on the matter of dual compensation, that the
allegation … cannot sustain the theory of the prosecution that the accused
caused damage and prejudice to the government, in the absence of any
contention that receipt of such was tantamount to giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to any party and to acting with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross excusable negligence; besides, receiving
compensation is an incident of actual services rendered, hence it cannot be
construed as injury or damage to the government.”[41]
To put our discussions in
perspective, we are not here primarily engaged in evaluating the motion to
quash that Romualdez filed with the Sandiganbayan. Rather, we are evaluating – on the basis of
the standards we have defined above – the propriety of the action of the Sandiganbayan
in quashing the Information against Romualdez.
Based on these
considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan’s actions grossly violated the
defined standards. Its conclusions are based on considerations that either not
appropriate in evaluating a motion to quash; are evidentiary details not
required to be stated in an Information; are matters of defense that have no place
in an Information; or are statements amounting to rulings on the merits that a
court cannot issue before trial.
To illustrate, in the
first Resolution, the Sandiganbayan saw no basis for the allegation of damage
and prejudice for the failure of the Information to state that Romualdez did
not render service in the two positions which he occupied. The element of the offense material to the
“damage and prejudice” that the Sandiganbayan refers to is the “undue injury”
caused to the government by Romualdez’ receipt of compensation for the incompatible
positions that he could not simultaneously occupy. The
allegation of “undue injury” in the Information, consisting of the extent of
the injury and how it was caused, is complete.
Beyond this allegation are matters that are already in excess of what a
proper Information requires. To
restate the rule, an Information only needs to state the ultimate facts
constituting the offense, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts
alleged amounted to undue injury or damage – matters that are appropriate for the
trial. Specifically, how the two positions of Romualdez were incompatible with
each other and whether or not he can legally receive compensation for his two
incompatible positions are matters of detail that the prosecution should adduce
at the trial to flesh out the ultimate facts alleged in the Information. Whether or not compensation has been earned
through proper and commensurate service is a matter in excess of the ultimate
facts the Information requires and is one
that Romualdez, not the Information, should invoke or introduce into the case
as a matter of defense.
From another perspective,
the Sandiganbayan’s view that the Information should have alleged that services
were not rendered assumes that Romualdez can occupy two government positions
and can secure compensation from both positions if services were rendered. At the
very least, these are legally erroneous
assumptions that are contrary to what the then prevailing laws provided. Article XII (B), Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution provides that:
Unless otherwise provided
by law, no elective official shall be eligible for appointment to any office or
position during his tenure except as Member of the Cabinet.
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 807 Providing for the Organization of the Civil
Service Commission states in its Section 44 that –
Limitation on Appointment. – No elective official
shall be eligible for appointment to any office or position during his term of
office.
On the matter of double compensation, the 1973
Constitution likewise has a specific provision – Article XV, Section 5
– which states:
SEC. 5. No
elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional or
double compensation unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept, without
the consent of the Batasang Pambansa, any present, emolument, office or title
of any kind from any foreign state.
Neither the Sandiganbayan nor Romuladez
has pointed to any law, and we are not aware of any such law, that would exempt
Romualdez from the prohibition of the above-cited provisions.
In the context of ruling
on a motion to quash, the allegation that
services were not rendered that the Sandiganbayan wished to require, not being a fact material to the elements
of the offense, is an extraneous matter
that is inappropriate for the Sandiganbayan to consider for inclusion in
the Information. That the Sandiganbayan
has a fixation on this approach is patent from a reading of the second assailed
Resolution when the Sandiganbayan, following the same line of thought, once
more insisted that “receiving
compensation is an incident of actual services rendered, hence it cannot be
construed as injury or damage to the government.” Thus
again, the Sandiganbayan grossly erred in the same manner it did in the first
Resolution.
For the Sandiganbayan to assume,
too, and to conclude, that there was no damage and prejudice since there was no
illegality in being compensated for actual services rendered, is to pass upon the
merits of the case – a task premature for the Sandiganbayan to undertake at the
motion-to-quash stage of the case. In so doing, the Sandiganbayan prematurely
ruled on at least two matters.
First, the Sandiganbayan either assumed as correct, or admitted for
purposes of the motion to quash, the defense allegation that Romualdez rendered
services, when this is a disputed evidentiary matter that can only be
established at the trial. Second, and as
already mentioned above, the legal status of the receipt of compensation for
each of two incompatible offices is, at best, legally debatable. The Sandiganbayan repeated this premature
ruling on the merits of the case in its subsequent statement in the first
Resolution that “the accused may have
been inefficient as a public officer by virtue of his holding of two concurrent
positions, but such inefficiency is
not enough to hold him criminally liable under the Information charged against
him, given the elements of the crime and the standards set by the Supreme Court
… At most, any liability arising from the holding of both positions by the accused
may be administrative in nature.”[42]
Worse than the premature
ruling it made in the above-quoted conclusion was the patent speculation that the Sandiganbayan undertook in considering
“inefficiency” and arriving at its conclusion. Still much worse was its misreading of
what a violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019 involves. Correctly understood, it is not the holding
of two concurrent positions or the attendant efficiency in the handling of
these positions, but the causing of
undue injury to the government that
is at the core of a Section 3(e) violation.
The same misreading was evident when the Sandiganbayan stated in its
second Resolution that “the accused
cannot be held criminally liable, whether or not he had himself appointed to
the position of the ambassador, while concurrently holding the position of
provincial governor, because the act of appointment is something that can only
be imputed to the appointing authority.”
The Sandiganbayan fared no better and
similarly gravely abused its discretion in the second Resolution when it
concluded that that there could be no damage and prejudice to the government “in the absence of any contention that
receipt of such was tantamount to giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to any party and to acting with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross excusable negligence.” That no allegation of “giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to any party” appears in the Information is due obviously to the
fact that this allegation is not necessary.
“Giving a private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference” is not an element that must necessarily
be alleged to complete the recital of how Section 3 (e) is violated because
it is only one of two alternative modes
of violating this provision, the other being causing “undue injury to any party, including the government.” In short, the Information is complete solely on the basis of the “undue injury”
allegation.
Even
a cursory examination of the Information would show that an allegation of
“evident bad faith” was expressly made, complete with a statement of how the
bad faith was manifested, that is, “being
then the elected Provincial Governor of Leyte and without abandoning such
position, and using his influence with his brother-in-law, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, [Romualdez] had himself appointed and/or assigned as
Ambassador to foreign countries...”. Whether this allegation can be
successfully proven by evidence or established through an analysis of the
nature of the power of appointment remains to be seen after trial, not at the motion-to-quash stage of the case. At this earlier stage, all that is
required is for this allegation to be an ultimate fact directly providing for
an element of the offense.
In
light of all these, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan grossly and egregiously
erred in the considerations it made and in the conclusions it arrived at when
it quashed the Information against Romualdez, to the point of acting outside
its jurisdiction through the grave abuse of discretion that attended its
actions. Its errors are so patent
and gross as to amount to action outside the contemplation of law. Thus, the declaration of the nullity of the
assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions is in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions dated
private respondent Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA Associate Justice |
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by then Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, now Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, with Associate Justices Roland B. Jurado and Efren N. dela Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 45-53;
[2] Penned by Justice Peralta, with then
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-de Castro (now a member of
this Court) and Justice dela Cruz, concurring; id., pp. 54-60.
[3]
[4]
[5] G.R.
No. 92319,
[6] Referring apparently to Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No.94595,
[7] Article
91.
[8] Rollo, pp. 110-113.
[9] Id., pp. 114-119.
[10] Supra note 1.
[11] Rollo, pp. 61-85.
[12] Id., pp. 120-128.
[13] Id., pp. 129-145.
[14] Supra
note 2.
[15] Rollo, pp. 174-223.
[16] The respondent cited Milo v. Salonga, L-37007,
[17] Rollo, pp. 232-253.
[18]
[19] People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156394, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 205, 216, citing People v. Sandiganbayan, 408 SCRA 672, 674 (2003) and Africa v. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 408, 417 (1998).
[20] See the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the mechanics of filing these petitions; for Appeals by Certiorari, Rule 45 and for Petition for Certiorari, Rule 65.
[21] See People
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 168188-89,
[22] Supra
note 19.
[23] Revised Rules of Court, Rule 1, Section 6.
[24] See the Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 837, citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368.
[25] G.R. No. 79543,
[26] G.R. No. 113420,
[27] G.R. No. 152154,
[28] Supra
note 19; See also Presidential Commission
on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100733, June 18, 1992, 210
SCRA 136, 148-149.
[29] Albay I Cooperative, Inc. v.
[30] Longino v. General, G.R. No. 147956, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 423; see also Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647.
[31] Supra
note 19.
[32] Poblete v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 150610, March
25, 2004, 426 SCRA 346, 351.
[33] Rule 117, Section 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint.
[34] See Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
109376, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 655.
[35] See Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
162314-17, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 377, 386.
[36] Supra note 31.
[37] See Lalican
v. Vergara, G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 518, and Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989, 170
SCRA 246.
[38] See the first assailed Resolution, quoted at pp. 4-5 of this Decision.
[39]
[40] See the Second assailed Resolution, quoted at pp. 4-5 of this Decision.
[41]
[42] See the first assailed Resolution, quoted at pp. 2-3 of this Decision.