Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

 

 

 

          G.R. No. 166211 - Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Nepthally B. Sallao and Asian Terminals, Inc. (Mariveles) Workers’ Union

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            SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

         

 

VELASCO, JR., J.

 

          I concur with the well-written ponencia of my esteemed colleague.  However, I would like to register my observations in relation to the statement that “with regard to the requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be heard, and not that of an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held.”[1]  Moreover, elucidation is needed on the concluding statement that “even if no face-to-face hearing was conducted, the requirement of due process had been met since he was accorded a chance to explain his side of the controversy.”

         

The aforementioned conclusions are correct when applied to the instant case.  While no hearing or conference was conducted by petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc. in September 1998 when the administrative proceedings were held against respondent Sallao, the absence thereof does not constitute a breach of the procedural due process for such was the settled jurisprudence as enunciated in MBTC v. Barrientos, G.R. No. 157028, Jan. 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 311 and other related cases.

 

          However, on June 29, 2007, the Court in King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac,[2] explained that the requirement of a hearing or conference is an indispensable element of procedural due process, thus:

 

          Due process under the Labor Code involves two aspects:  first, substantive - the valid and authorized causes of termination of employment under the Labor Code; and second, procedural – the manner of dismissal.  In the present case, the CA affirmed the findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC that the termination of employment of respondent was based on a “just cause.”  This ruling is not at issue in this case.  The question to be determined is whether the procedural requirements were complied with.

 

            Art. 277 of the Labor Code provides the manner of termination of employment, thus:

 

Art. 277.  Miscellaneous Provisions. – x x x  

 

      (b)  Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.  Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.  The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer.

 

            Accordingly, the implementing rule of the aforesaid provision states:

 

SEC. 2.  Standards of due process; requirements of notice. – In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:

 

      1.  For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:

 

      (a)  A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity with which to explain his side.

 

      (b)  A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.

 

      (c)  A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.

 

      In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee’s last known address.

 

            To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:

 

            (1)        The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period.  “Reasonable opportunity” under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense.  This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult  a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint.  Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees.  Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.

 

            (2)        After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1)  explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management.  During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice.  Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.

 

            (3)        After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment.

 

         In the instant case, KKTI admits that it had failed to provide respondent with a “charge sheet.”  However, it maintains that it had substantially complied with the rules, claiming that “respondent would not have issued a written explanation had he not been informed of the charges against him.”

 

            We are not convinced.

 

            First, respondent was not issued a written notice charging him of committing an infraction.  The law is clear on the matter.  A verbal appraisal of the charges against an employee does not comply with the first notice requirement.  In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC, the Court held that consultations or conferences are not a substitute for the actual observance of notice and hearing.  Also, in Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Mesano, the Court, sanctioning the employer for disregarding the due process requirements, held that the employee’s written explanation did not excuse the fact that there was a complete absence of the first notice.

 

            Second, even assuming that petitioner KKTI was able to furnish respondent an Irregularity Report notifying him of his offense, such would not comply with the requirements of the law.  We observe from the irregularity reports against respondent for his other offenses that such contained merely a general description of the charges against him.  The reports did not even state a company rule or policy that the employee had allegedly violated.  Likewise, there is no mention of any of the grounds for termination of employment under Art. 282 of the Labor Code.  Thus, KKTI’s “standard” charge sheet is not sufficient notice to the employee.

 

            Third, no hearing was conducted.  Regardless of respondent’s written explanation, a hearing was still necessary in order for him to clarify and present evidence in support of his defense.  Moreover, respondent made the letter merely to explain the circumstances relating to the irregularity in his October 28, 2001 Conductor’s Trip Report.  He was unaware that a dismissal proceeding was already being effected.  Thus, he was surprised to receive the November 26, 2001 termination letter indicating as grounds, not only his October 28, 2001 infraction, but also his previous infractions.

 

 

Article 277 of the Labor Code speaks of a “written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the [employee] ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative”.  The Court, in the Metrobank (MBTC) case, gave such provision a myopic and restrictive interpretation which appears off-tangent to the constitutional protection to labor.  This strict interpretation was discarded in King of Kings Transport for the following reasons:

 

1.       The first written notice containing the charges does not encompass the 2nd requisite of opportunity to be heard.  Note should be taken of the conjunctive “and” which means that the written notice should be distinct from the opportunity to be heard.  While it may be conceded that the first notice gives the employee reasonable opportunity to explain his side, such does not cover the 2nd requisite of ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative which will necessitate the conduct of a hearing or conference to give the laborer the chance to respond to the charge, present evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.  “Ample” means full and more than adequate chances to be heard and defend himself against the charges leveled on him.  Without the hearing or conference, the written reply or answer to the first notice is insufficient to fully explain and support his defenses, present evidence in support of his defenses due to time constraints in the preparation of the answer and rebut the evidence of the employer since the first notice does not usually contain the evidence intended to support the charges.  In addition, the employee’s counsel or representative can better articulate his defenses in an actual hearing than by just merely relying on a written reply or answer.

 

 2.      The Secretary of Labor is given the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the Labor Code.  Pursuant to such rule-making power, he approved the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which provides in part:

 

Sec. 2.  Standards of due process, requirements of notice.—

 

x x x x

 

I.

 

x x x x

           

            (b)        A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.[3]

 

 

Any rule or regulation in the implementation of a law issued by the rule-making authority has the force and effect of law.[4]

 

3.       The constitutional provisions on protection to labor and social justice dictate that a liberal interpretation be accorded Article 277 of the Labor Code on the requirement giving an employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself.

 

Thus, I submit that effective June 29, 2007 when the King of Kings Transport v. Mamac was promulgated, the prevailing rule is that the hearing or conference is one of the vital requirements of procedural due process in the dismissal of employees.  Non-compliance therewith would be a ground for the imposition of the indemnity of PhP 30,000.

 

 

         

                                                          PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.



                [1] Decision, p. 6.

                [2] G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 116, 123-127.

                [3] Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Book V, Rule XXIII.

                [4] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996, 261 SCRA 236; De La Salle University Medical Center and College of Medicine v. Laguesma, G.R. No.102084, August 12, 1998, 294 SCRA 141.