Republic of the
Supreme Court
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HONDA CARS MAKATI,
INC., |
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G.R. No. 165359 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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QUISUMBING,* J., |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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- versus - |
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Chairperson, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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COURT OF APPEALS
and |
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MICHAEL P. BASSI, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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July 14, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before
us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the Resolutions dated
Honda
Cars Makati, Inc. (petitioner) is engaged in the sale and service of
brand new Honda cars. Michael P. Bassi (private respondent) was employed by petitioner on
September 2, 1996 as Tinsmith II until he became petitioner's car body repair leadman, a position in which he was given access to
and was entrusted with tools and spare parts in petitioner's Body and Paint
Shop (BPS) premises, particularly in the tinsmith crib room which he was tasked
to maintain, with a monthly salary of P11,300.00.
On June
2, 2001, JT Abrazado (Abrazado), petitioner's BPS
Service and Administration Supervisor, submitted an Incident Report regarding
the pull-out of scrap parts from petitioner's premises. The Report narrated that on
Private
respondent was made to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for the incident. He submitted his
written explanation denying the accusation as without any truth and basis in
fact. Private respondent attended and
participated in the formal hearing conducted by the Investigation
Committee.
In a
Memorandum[3] dated
On
On
“Although
Mike denied the allegation that he gave Mr. Maglalang the box nor connived with the guard-on-duty
for the release of the parts/items without appropriate
authorization/documentation, it was evident that he played a significant part
in the execution of a pre-conceived plan to pull out
the said box for Mr. Maglalang's use and/or personal
gain. This
was established when he allowed Mr. Maglalang to
survey the contents of the crib room and the workshop area despite the fact
that he knew that both areas are considered restricted to authorized personnel
only. Furthermore,
he allowed Mr. Maglalang to instruct Tony
Cordova of City Service to bring the box to the L300 van and pull out the said
box without the required material gate pass. He was negligent of his duty for
failing to ensure that all scrap materials are well disposed of to protect the
company from individuals who would take advantage.”
OFFENSE: Breach of Management's Trust and Confidence.
RECOMMENDED SANCTION: Termination [5]
Private respondent then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA)
a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of incentive for perfect attendance for
five years, and damages. Private respondent alleged that
there was no valid cause for his dismissal; that the basis of petitioner's loss
of trust and confidence must be real, not imaginary or out of fear; that there was no concrete
basis for his dismissal; and that he had worked at his level best and often
received commendations for his satisfactory performance.
In its
Reply, petitioner argued that private respondent's attempt to commit qualified
theft or pilferage in connivance with Maglalang, together with the spot
inspection on private respondent's
locker and shoe box, which yielded old and new tools and spare parts, created a reasonable ground for petitioner to believe
that private respondent was involved in theft and pilferage of reusable items;
that he could no longer be trusted, as his position gave him unhampered access to said
items, thus, the decision to
terminate him; and that his commendations referred to perfect health
condition and attendance and an “extra mile” award
in the name of service, but did not involve honesty and integrity matters.
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is entered FINDING respondent company to have illegally
dismissed complainant thus, ORDERING it to reinstate him to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and privileges and to pay him full backwages inclusive of 13th month pay, leave benefits and/or 5-day SILP
per year of service, allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent reckoned from date of illegal
dismissal on 20 July 2001 until actually reinstated, tentatively computed as
basic salary P135,600.00
(P11,300.00 x 12 months),
plus 13th month pay P11,300.00 (1/12 of basic salary), plus 5 day SILP of P1,883.00 (P11,300.00/30 days x
5), total as of date of this decision to P148,783.33.
All other claims of
complainant are dismissed for lack of merit. [7]
The LA
found that the fact that private respondent was seen incidentally in the
company of Maglalang and that he was seen by his
immediate superior Abrazado as the one who took the
subject box from the tinsmith crib room, where all the replaced parts were
kept, and handed it to Maglalang, was not the kind of substantial
evidence that would lead to a reasonable conclusion that private respondent
was indeed in complicity in the attempt to take out the unauthorized contents
of the box from the premises; these pieces of evidence are not direct, but mere suppositions and conjectures.
The LA
further found that on June 4, 2001, private respondent was authorized by
Manager Afable to go to the dismantled parts storage
room to determine which scrap materials may be disposed and those which may be
reused; that if ever private respondent erred in his determination as to the
scrap items, since Abrazado declared that the contents of the box were only of
“minimum damage” and ought not to have been disposed of, such could not be immediately
attributed to him as his supposed complicity in the attempted theft; and that even if the
contents of the box varied with the contents listed in the gate pass submitted
for the approval of Afable,
it was not private respondent who made the gate pass or the one charged to do
the inspection/inventory and listing of items for gate pass purposes. The LA concluded that it would be incredible to believe
that private respondent would just destroy his track record of exemplary
performance and promotions, as there was no proven past offense of similar nature.
On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in its Decision[8] dated
The NLRC
found that although petitioner averred that Abrazado
actually saw private respondent
hand the box to Maglalang to prove private
respondent's direct complicity in the attempt to pull out a box containing
reusable parts from petitioner's premises, Abrazado's
averment was not supported by his affidavit; that under the NLRC rules, the
affidavit of witnesses shall take the place of the latter's direct testimony; thus, failure to present his
direct testimony in the form of affidavit made his averment hearsay, which cannot be considered as
evidence; that private respondent's alleged breach of duty when he gave out a
box containing items that were not
scrap parts for disposal, anchored on the presumption that said box was indeed
handed by private respondent to Maglalang, was not
proven since the only evidence respecting this factual averment was also the
hearsay testimony of Abrazado.
The NLRC also found that even the
report submitted by petitioner's Investigation Committee did not categorically
state that private respondent handed any box to Maglalang;
that the Committee's finding that private respondent allowed Maglalang to walk around the crib room and workshop areas
despite the fact that said place was considered restricted did
not prove that private respondent knew of Maglalang's
intention to pull out a box of allegedly reusable parts; and that the
Committee's finding that private respondent allowed the pulling out of the box
without gate a pass was not proven, as
no evidence was shown that it was part of private respondent's duty to prepare or even oversee the
preparation of the gate pass.
The NLRC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
in a Resolution[9] dated
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari assailing
the NLRC ruling. On
A
perusal of the Petition for Certiorari at bar reveals that petitioner did not
append the Complaint and Decision dated
Petitioner subsequently filed a Compliance and Motion for
Reconsideration and for Admission of Attached Complaint and Decision, which was denied by the CA
in its Resolution dated
Hence, herein petition on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING HCMI'S PETITION AND IN SUBSEQUENTLY DENYING HCMI'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION OF DISMISSAL;
II. THE HONORABLE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN (A) HOLDING
THAT THE FAILURE OF HCMI TO PRESENT THE DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ABRAZADO, IN THE
FORM OF AFFIDAVIT, MAKES HCMI'S AVERMENT ABOUT BASSI'S COMPLICITY IN THE
PILFERAGE HEARSAY; (B) DISMISSING HCMIS' APPEAL AND AFFIRMING THE LABOR
ARBITER'S DECISION; AND (C)
DENYING HCMI'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Petitioner
contends that the CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition
for its failure to append the complaint and the LA decision to its petition, which was irrelevant to the issue
raised in its petition; that petitioner was only assailing the NLRC decision as
well as its Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which
documents were attached to the petition; and that its submission of copies of the complaint and the LA decision, with its motion for reconsideration,
should be considered substantial compliance.
Preliminarily, we note that petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review under
Rule 45. Considering, however, that petitioner is assailing the
Resolutions of the CA dismissing its petition outright, petitioner's resort to a petition for
certiorari under Rule
65 is proper.[11]
In Donato v. Court of Appeals,[12] we held:
The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a
decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of
jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper
remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
said Rules. As enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona:
Anent the first issue,
in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it
is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable
only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the
act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which
is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Inasmuch as the present petition
principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws
involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the
ambit of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. [13]
While
the complaint, as well as the LA
decision, is relevant to the petition, as petitioner assailed the
NLRC decision which affirmed the LA's decision declaring private respondent’s dismissal as illegal; petitioner's failure to
append them in its petition is not fatal, since their contents could be found in petitioner's
Notice and Memorandum on appeal filed with the NLRC. Petitioner's memorandum tackled and disputed each factual finding of the LA which was attached to the petition filed with the CA. The CA could determine from this document, together with the other
pleadings filed, whether the petition for certiorari can make
out a prima facie case.
In Molina v. Court of
Appeals,[14] we held that failure to attach all pleadings and
documents is not a sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. In appropriate
cases, the courts may liberally construe procedural rules in order to meet and
advance the cause of substantial justice.[15] We have held
that lapses in the literal observation of a procedural rule will be overlooked
when they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an honest mistake
or unforeseen accident, and when they have not prejudiced the adverse party or deprived the court of its
authority.[16]
In this
case, petitioners' failure to append the complaint and the LA decision does not touch on public policy; nor do they deprive the
appellate court of its authority or prejudice or
adversely affect the private respondent.
Moreover,
two days after petitioner's receipt of the CA Resolution dismissing its
petition, it filed a
Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of Attached Complaint and LA Decision, which amounted to
substantial compliance. Petitioner
corrected the purported deficiency by submitting copies of the same. However, despite such submission, the CA
still denied petitioner's motion.
In Jaro v.
Court of Appeals,[17] we held that the subsequent submission of requisite
documents constituted substantial compliance with procedural rules, thus:
There is ample jurisprudence
holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may call
for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, we ruled that the subsequent submission of the missing
documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial
compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these two
cases to comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What
we found noteworthy in each case was the fact that the petitioners therein
substantially complied with the formal requirements. We ordered the remand of the
petitions in these cases to the Court of Appeals, stressing the ruling that by
precipitately dismissing the petitions the appellate court clearly put a
premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.[18]
The same
leniency should be applied to the instant case, considering that petitioner subsequently submitted with
its motion for reconsideration the complaint as well as the LA decision. Petitioner has demonstrated willingness to comply with the requirements
set by the rules.
While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to
promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and the swift unclogging of
court dockets is a laudable objective, they nevertheless must not be met
at the expense
of substantial justice.[19] Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the
rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of
justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid
application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the
primary objective of the rules; that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the
substantive rights of the other party. Every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[20]
Thus, in
dismissing the petition for certiorari, we find that the CA had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on
technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.
Petitioner’s claim that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the failure of petitioner
to present the direct testimony of Abrazado in the
form of an affidavit
made petitioner's averment about private respondent's complicity in the pilferage hearsay, since cases may be decided
on the basis of verified position papers of the parties, accompanied by
affidavits of witnesses and such other authentic documents as are relevant;
that Abrazado's Incident Report attached to its
position paper filed with the LA stated that private
respondent handed over a big box to Maglalang; that such Report was made in Abrazado's
professional capacity in the performance of his duty and in the ordinary course
of business or duty; that the NLRC should have upheld private respondent's
dismissal on at least two grounds, namely, loss of trust and confidence, and willful disobedience or
insubordination, cannot be resolved in the
present petition for certiorari as they are best addressed to
the CA for proper resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 82812.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions
dated March 31, 2004 and August 3, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82812 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition of CA-G.R. SP No. 82812.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* In lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special
Order No. 508 dated
[1] Penned
by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Roberto A.
Barrios and Fernanda Lampas Peralta; rollo, p. 20.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] See Lim
v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 149748,
[12] 462 Phil. 676 (2003).
[13]
[14] 443 Phil. 123 (2003).
[15]
[16]
[17] 427 Phil. 532 (2002).
[18]
[19] Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara, G.R.
No. 142937, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA 41, 53, citing Wack
Wack Golf and Country Club v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 149793, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 280, 294; General
Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 Phil. 425,
428 (2002).
[20] Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.