SECOND DIVISION
|
PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC. and PARAMOUNT
GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioners, - versus - PYRAMID
LOGISTICS AND TRUCKING CORPORATION (formerly PANACOR INTEGRATED WAREHOUSING
AND TRUCKING CORPORATION),
Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 165147 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR. and BRION, JJ.
Promulgated: July
9, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The issue, in the main, in the
present case is whether respondent, Pyramid Logistics and Trucking Corporation
(Pyramid), which filed on November 7, 2001 a complaint,[1]
denominated as one for specific
performance and damages, against petitioners Philippine First Insurance
Company, Inc. (Philippine First) and Paramount General Insurance Corporation
(Paramount) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1609, paid the correct docket fee; if in the negative, whether the complaint
should be dismissed or Pyramid can still be ordered to pay the fee.
Pyramid sought to recover the
proceeds of two insurance policies issued to it, Policy No. IN-002904 issued by
petitioner
In its complaint, Pyramid alleged
that on November 8, 2000, its delivery van bearing license plate number PHL-545
which was loaded with goods belonging to California Manufacturing Corporation
(CMC) valued at PESOS NINE HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY NINE AND
SEVEN/100 (P907,149.07) left the CMC Bicutan
Warehouse but the van, together with the goods, failed to reach its destination
and its driver and helper were nowhere to be found, to its damage and
prejudice; that it filed a criminal
complaint against the driver and the helper for qualified theft, and a claim
with herein petitioners as co-insurers of the lost goods but, in violation of petitioners’
undertaking under the insurance policies, they refused without just and valid
reasons to compensate it for the loss;
and that as a direct consequence of petitioners’ failure, despite
repeated demands, to comply with their respective undertakings under the
Insurance Policies by compensating for the value of the lost goods, it suffered
damages and was constrained to engage the services of counsel to enforce and
protect its right to recover compensation under said policies, for which
services it obligated itself to pay the sum equivalent to twenty-five (25%) of
any amount recovered as and for attorney’s fees and legal expenses.[2]
Pyramid thus prayed
. . . that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered, ordering [herein petitioners] to comply with their obligation under their respective Insurance Policies by paying to [it] jointly and severally, the claims arising from the subject losses.
THAT, [herein petitioners] be adjudged jointly and severally to pay to [it], in addition to the foregoing, the following:
1. The sum of PHP 50,000.00 plus PHP 1,500.00 for each Court session attended by counsel until the instant [case] is finally terminated, as and for attorney’s fees;
2. The costs of suit[;][3] (Underscoring supplied)
and for other reliefs
just and equitable in the premises.[4]
Pyramid was assessed P610
docket fee, apparently on the basis of the amount of P50,000 specified in the prayer representing
attorney’s fees, which it duly paid.[5]
Pyramid later filed a 1st
Amended Complaint[6]
containing minor changes in its body[7]
but bearing the same prayer.[8] Branch 148 of the Makati
RTC to which the complaint was raffled admitted the Amended Complaint.[9]
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction, Pyramid not having paid the
docket fees in full, arguing thus:
x x x x
In the body of the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleged that the goods belonging to California Manufacturing Co., Inc. (CMC) is [sic] “valued at Php907,149.07” and consequently, “plaintiff incurred expenses, suffered damages and was constrained to engage the services of counsel to enforce and protect its right to recover compensation under the said policies and for which services, it obligated itself to pay the sum equivalent to twenty-five (25%) of any recovery in the instant action, as and for attorney’s fees and legal expenses”.
On the other hand, in the prayer in the Complaint, plaintiff deliberately omitted to specify what these damages are. x x x
x x x x
Verily, this deliberate omission by the plaintiff is clearly intended for no other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing fee if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee. In fact, the docket clerk in the instant case charged the plaintiff a total of Php610.00 only as a filing fee, which she must have based on the amount of Php50,000.00 [attorney’s fees] only.[10] (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners cited[11] Manchester Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals[12] which
held:
x x x [A]ll complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted or admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
They cited too Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion[14]
which held that “[i]t is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
nature of the action.”[15]
Petitioners thus concluded:
With the above cases as a backdrop, the Supreme Court, in revising the rules of pleading and practice in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, added a tenth ground to a Motion to Dismiss – to wit, “[t]hat a condition precedent for filing claim [sic] has not been complied with.[“]
On the contrary, if plaintiff would insist that its claim against the defendants is only Php50,000.00 plus Php 1,500.00 as appearance fee per court hearing, then it follows that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over this case, not this Honorable Court. Such amount is way below the minimum jurisdictional amount prescribed by the rules in order to confer jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
To the
Motion to Dismiss Pyramid filed its Opposition,[17]
alleging that if there was a mistake in the assessment of the docket fees,
the trial court was not precluded from acquiring jurisdiction over the
complaint as “it has the authority to direct the mistaken party to
complete the docket fees in the course of the proceedings . . .”[18]
The Opposition merited a Reply[19]
from petitioners.
By Order
of
x x x x
Indeed, a perusal of the Complaint reveals that while plaintiff made mention of the value of the goods, which were lost, the prayer of plaintiff did not indicate its exact claim from the defendants. The Complaint merely prayed defendants “to comply with their obligation under their respective insurance policies by paying to plaintiff jointly and severally, the claims arising from the subject losses” and did not mention the amount of PHP907,149.07, which is the value of the goods and which is also the subject of insurance. This resulted to the assessment and payment of docket fees in the amount of P610 only. The Court, even without the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant, actually noted such omission which is actually becoming a practice for some lawyers. For whatever purpose it may be, the Court will not dwell into it. In this instant case, this being for specific performance, it is not dismissible on that ground but unless proper docket fees are paid, the Court can only grant what was prayed for in the Complaint.
x x x x[21] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration[22]
of the denial of their Motion to Dismiss having been denied[23]
by Order of
Petitioners
did indeed eventually file before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari (With Preliminary Injunction and Urgent Prayer for Restraining
Order)[26]
posing the following two of three queries, viz:
First. Does [Pyramid’s] deliberate omission to pay the required correct docket and filing fee vest the trial court [with] jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the instant case?
Second. [Is] the instant case an action for specific performance or simply one for damages or recovery of a sum of money?
x x x x[27]
By Decision of June 3, 2004,[28]
the Court of Appeals partially granted petitioners’ petition for certiorari by
setting aside the trial judge’s assailed orders and ordering Pyramid to file
the correct docket fees within a reasonable time, it holding that while the
complaint was denominated as one for specific performance, it sought to recover
from petitioners Pyramid’s “claims arising from the subject losses.” The appellate court ratiocinated:
x x x x
Indeed, it has been held that “it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.” To determine the docket fees, it is necessary to determine the true nature of the action by examining the allegations of the complaint. x x x
x x x x
While the captions of the complaint and 1st amended complaint denominated the case as one for “Specific Performance and Damages”, the allegations and prayer therein show that the specific performance sought by private respondent was for petitioners to “comply with their obligation under their respective Insurance Policies by paying to plaintiff jointly and severally, the claims arising from the subject losses” as well as the attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Obviously, what constitutes specific performance is the payment itself by petitioners of private respondent’s claims arising from the losses it allegedly incurred. x x x[29]
x x x x
Public respondent should have ordered private respondent to pay the correct docket fees on the basis of the allegations of the complaint. x x x
x x x x
While it has been held in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals x x x that “any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement of specifying the amount of damages not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record,” this rule was relaxed in subsequent cases, wherein payment of the correct docket fees was allowed within a reasonable time. . .
x x x x[30] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially
granted. The Orders dated
Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[32]
of the appellate court’s decision.
Pyramid filed its Comment and Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration,[33] arguing
thus:
x x x x
In the present case, [Pyramid] thru its Complaint simply sought from petitioners compliance with their contractual undertaking as insurers of the goods insured which were lost in [its] custody. Private respondent did not specify the extent of petitioners’ obligation as it left the matter entirely in the judgment of the trial court to consider. Thus, the Complaint was labeled “Specific Performance” which [Pyramid] submitted to the Clerk of Court for assessment of the docket fee, after which, it paid the same based on the said assessment. There was no indication whatsoever that [Pyramid] had refused to pay; rather, it merely argued against petitioners’ submissions as it maintained the correctness of the assessment made.[34] (Underscoring supplied)
By
Resolution of
. . . WHEN IT APPLIED
IN THE INSTANT CASE THE LIBERAL RULE ENUNCIATED IN SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. (SIOL) VS.
. . . WHEN IT DID
NOT APPLY THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE TRIBUNAL IN MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION VS. GARCIA, 143 SCRA 178, TAN VS. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, 125 SCRA
302, AND
Petitioners
invoke the doctrine in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals[38] that a pleading which does not specify in the
prayer the amount sought shall not be admitted or shall otherwise be expunged,
and that the court acquires jurisdiction only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee.[39]
Pyramid,
on the other hand, insists, in its Comment on the Petition,[40]
on the application of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion[41] and subsequent rulings relaxing the Manchester ruling by allowing payment of
the docket fee within a reasonable time, in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee.[42]
In Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum,
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 [of this Court which was issued based on the Manchester ruling[44]] that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent “amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading,” the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing the awards of claims not specified in the pleading – i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading – as to which the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis of the “sum claimed,” on the one hand, or the “value of the property in litigation or the value of the estate,” on the other. . .
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, “specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of filing fees in any case.”
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money and damages and there is no statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will “not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.” In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, Pyramid captioned its
complaint as one for “specific performance and damages” even if it was, as the
allegations in its body showed, seeking in the main the collection of its
claims-sums of money representing losses the amount of which it, by its own
admission, “knew.”[46] And, indeed, it failed to specify in its
prayer in the complaint the amount of its claims/damages.
When Pyramid amended its complaint,
it still did not specify, in its prayer, the amount of claims/damages it was
seeking. In fact it has the audacity to
inform this Court, in its Comment on the present Petition, that
x x x In the natural order of things, when a litigant is given the opportunity to spend less for a docket fee after submitting his pleading for assessment by the Office of the Clerk of Court, he would not decline it inasmuch as to request for a higher assessment under the circumstances [for such] is against his interest and would be senseless. Placed under the same situation, petitioner[s] would certainly do likewise. To say otherwise would certainly be dishonest,[47]
which comment drew petitioners to conclude
as follows:
[This] only shows respondent’s dishonesty and lack of regard of the rules. Following this line of reasoning, respondent would do everything if only for it to spend less for the filing fee, even to the extent of circumventing and defying the rule on the payment of the filing fee.
In spite of the fact that the respondent was already caught in the quagmire of its own cobweb of deception, it further justified its unethical act by ratiocinating that “placed under the same situation, petitioner would certainly do likewise, to say otherwise would certainly be dishonest”. This attitude of the respondent is very alarming! Having been caught red-handed, the honorable thing that respondent should have done is admit its own violation rather than justify an act which it knows is a clear contravention of the rules and jurisprudence.[48] (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Pyramid’s
following justification for omitting to specify in the prayer of its complaint
the amount of its claims/damages, viz:
x x x x
x x x While respondent knew its losses and alleged them in the
body of the Complaint, it was not aware of the extent of petitioners’
respective liability under the two insurance policies. The allegation of respondent’s losses,
albeit, without repeating them in its prayer for relief was not motivated by an
intention to mislead, cheat or defraud the Court. It just left the matter of liability arising
from two separate and distinct Insurance Policies covering the same insurable
risk for the trial court’s determination, hence, respondent came up with
an action for “specific performance[,]”[49] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
fails
to impress.
As the salient allegations of Pyramid’s complaint
show and as priorly stated, they constitute, in the
main, an action for collection of its claims it admittedly “knew.”
Assuming arguendo
that Pyramid has other claims the amounts of which are yet to be determined by
the trial court, the rule established in
x x x x
Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted
paragraph 3 of the [Sun Insurance] ruling of this Court wherein it
stated that “where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading,
or if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment” by considering it to mean that where in the body and
prayer of the complaint there is a prayer xxx the amount of which is left to
the discretion of the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being
sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
x x x While it is true that the determination of certain
damages x x x is left to
the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming
such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the
court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the
appropriate docket fees. The exception
contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are
left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may
arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading
for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as
to the amount thereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
If respondent Pyramid’s counsel had
only been forthright in drafting the complaint and taking the cudgels for his
client and the trial judge assiduous in applying Circular No. 7 vis a vis prevailing
jurisprudence, the precious time of this
Court, as well as of that of the appellate court, would not have been
unnecessarily sapped.
The Court at this juncture thus reminds
Pyramid’s counsel to observe Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Ethics which enjoins
a lawyer to “exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice,” and Rule 12.04 of the same Canon
which enjoins a lawyer “not [to] unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.” And the Court reminds too the trial judge to bear
in mind that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the
pleadings[51] and to keep
abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard
that magistrates must be the embodiments of competence, integrity and
independence.[52]
WHEREFORE, in
light of the foregoing discussions, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Records, pp. 1-5.
[2]
[3]
[4] Ibid.
[5]
[6]
[7] Vide
id. at 22-24.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] G.R. No. L-75919,
[13]
[14] G.R. Nos. 79937-38,
[15]
[16] Records, pp. 35-36.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
[21] Records, p. 65.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] CA rollo, pp. 2-22.
[27]
[28] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with the concurrence of
Associate Justices Portia Aliño Hormachuelos
and Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, id. at 82-94.
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36] Rollo, pp. 3-23.
[37] Rollo, p. 7.
[38] Supra note 12.
[39] Vide
id. at 569; rollo, pp. 8-9.
[40] Rollo, pp. 61-64.
[41] G.R. Nos. 79937-39,
[42] Vide
id. at 285; rollo, p. 82.
[43] G.R. Nos. 88075-77,
[44] Vide
id. at 442; Supreme Court Circular No.
7-88,
[45] Tacay v. Regional
Trial Court of Tagum,
[46] Vide
Pyramid’s Memorandum dated
[47] Rollo, p. 63.
[48]
[49]
[50] G.R. No. 88421,
[51] Vide
Reyes Alsons
Development and Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 153936,
[52] Vide Cabañero v. Judge Cañon, 417 Phil. 754, 785 (2001).