Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
RODOLFO D. GARCIA, G.R. No. 162868
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus
- Chairperson,
QUISUMBING,*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES and/or
CRISTINA
W. TRINIDAD, Promulgated:
Manager,
Catering Operations,
Respondents.
x - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
WHO is the employer of petitioner – respondent
Philippine Airlines or the latter’s contractor, Stellar Industrial Services,
Inc.?
The question has been adjudged
previously and is now barred from being relitigated under the doctrine of res judicata, a rule which pervades
every well-regulated system of jurisprudence.
It is founded upon two (2) grounds, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an
end to litigation, interest reipublicae
ut sit finis litumi (sa kapakanan ng Estado ay kailangang
magkaroon ng wakas ang kaso); and (2) the hardship on the individual
that he should be vexed twice for the same cause, memo debet bis vexari et eadem causa (sinuman ay di dapat bagabagin ng
makalawa sa iisang dahilan).[1]
The doctrine finds application in
this petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision[2] and
Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), absolving private respondent Philippine Airlines (
The Facts
Stellar Industrial Services, Inc.
(Stellar) had a standing agreement to supply
During
the course of his employment, petitioner received a warning from Stellar for
absences incurred. The Memorandum, dated
TO : GARCIA, Rodolfo
NUEDA, Ferdinand
FROM : Vice
President Comptroller
SUBJECT : LAST
WARNING
DATED :
Our attention was called by our
client Philippine Airlines – Inflight Kitchen regarding your failure to report
for work last
Your absences has (sic) caused inconvenience in the
operation of our client. Let this serve
as our last warning, any repetition or violation of any
company rules and regulations will constrain us to terminate your services with
us.
(SGD.)
CARLOS P. CALLANGA[4]
On
In a Memorandum
dated
TO : Mr. Oscar Lluz
Operations Manager Stellar Industrial
Services
FROM : Manager-Catering Operations
SUBJECT : MR. RODOLFO GARCIA
We would like to request for
the immediate replacement of Mr. Rodolfo Garcia.
He has failed to meet the
performance requirement of a helper at Catering Operations.
Hereunder are the observations
of his superiors from January 8 to the present.
01. Always late in completing assigned tasks.
02. Must be consistently prodded to meet deadlines.
03. Unable to identify and carry out work
priorities and needs assistance from co-workers.
Worst of all, he was caught
selling cigarettes while on duty.
We
hope you will act on our request immediately.
(SGD.) CRISTINA W. TRINIDAD[5]
Consequently, in a letter dated
Petitioner,
in a letter-reply dated
Mr. Cesar Lluz
Operation Manager
Stellar Industrial
Services
Cibeles Bldg., Ayala
Dear Sir:
These are
my answers to the charges against me as inscribed in a letter of MS. Cristina
W.
As to the
allegation that I was always late in completing assigned task, this was not
true because works in the Catering Service has (sic) no ending due to the nature of
As to the
allegation that I must constantly (be) prodded to meet deadlines, (this) was
not correct because of the above reasons.
As to the
allegation that I was not able to identify and carry out work priorities and
needs assistance from co-workers was not also (sic) correct because I always have a companion in the performance
of my job because the nature of the work calls for it.
And as to the last allegation that I was caught selling cigarettes while on duty was not also tru (sic) because how can I sell cigarettes when I was surrounded by heavy works and the mess in my hands while on duty will make them spoiled. The cigarettes inside my pocket was (sic) only for my personal consumptions (sic).
I hope these answers will enlighten my case and I am looking forward that I will be given merit considering that I am connected with the service for a period of fourteen (14) years without being apprehended/complained of misconduct unbecoming.
Yours truly,
(Sgd.)
RODOLFO
GARCIA[7]
Dissatisfied
with petitioner’s explanation, Stellar subsequently terminated his employment.
In
1992, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Stellar
and Lluz, as well as
It appears that sometime in 1988, Stellar
employees assigned at
On
On
NLRC Ruling
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of
complainant herein to be illegal and unauthorized; consequently, ordering
herein respondents jointly and severally without loss of seniority rights and
privileges and with full backwages counted from the date of his dismissal until
actual reinstatement which up to the date of
the promulgation of this Decision has already amounted to TWO HUNDRED P240,475.21) pesos, broken down as follows:
Backwages
in the sum of P218,810.02;
13th Month pay in the sum of P18,234.16;
Service Incentive Leave pay in the sum of P3,431.03;
subject to
adjustment if payroll or physical reinstatement is denied.
It
appearing that complainant has been represented by counsel in the litigation of
this case, said counsel is hereby awarded
the sum of ten (10%) percent of the total award as and for attorney's fees in
the amount of TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND P24,047.52) pesos, subject also for adjustment.
SO ORDERED.[14]
However, on appeal, the Third
Division of the NLRC reversed Labor Arbiter Tumanon, holding that petitioner
was “guilty of gross and habitual neglect and was consequently terminated for
cause and with due process.”[15] The NLRC declared that:
x x x
respondent Stellar appears to be an independent job contractor and not merely a
labor only contractor. Apart from the
fact that it has sufficient capitalization to the tune of more than a million
pesos, its workers perform work that are not necessary and desirable to the
business of
ACCORDINGLY,
premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and this
case DISMISSED for lack of merits (sic).
SO ORDERED.[16]
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its
CA Disposition
On certiorari, the CA “modified” both the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiter rulings, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
27 August 2001 Resolution of
respondent Commission in NLRC
SO ORDERED.[18]
In reality, however, the CA merely
sustained the NLRC ruling that Stellar is an independent contractor. The CA observed:
However, it
is only private respondent Stellar who is responsible to petitioner as the
former is an independent contractor. The issue whether or not Stellar is an independent
contractor or merely engaged in labor-only contracting was already addressed
and settled by the Highest Magistrate in a related case entitled Phil.
Airlines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 430
[2000], to wit:
“Aside from
these stipulations in the service agreement, other pieces of evidence support
the conclusion that STELLAR, not
Petitioner moved for partial
reconsideration asking that
Issues
Petitioner
submits the following assignment:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ABSOLVING
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ABSOLVING
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ABSOLVING
Simply stated, the essential issue is
whether
Our Ruling
Preliminarily,
We note that the instant petition was filed beyond the requested extension
period. Petitioner received a copy of
the CA
On its
merits, however, We resolve to deny the petition.
The CA correctly found that
The issue on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
We have
re-examined the record of this case and have found that P1,000,000.00.
x x x x
We must
remember that this case is principally for regularization and relies primarily
on the premise that
This
argument, however, falls flat on its face considering that P1.0 Million, since
this not limited to its janitorial department. This is evidenced by
We are
aware of the standards used to determine a “labor-only” contractor. As
On the
other hand, is
We cannot
subscribe to the position by
Neither is
the contention concerning the direct relation of complainants’ services to
x x x There is even no need for it to refute
petitioner’s contention that the activities are directly related to the
principal business of respondent bank.
x x x x
Viewed from
a different standpoint, the workers have no contractual tie to
x x x x
Because of
the absence of a juridical tie with them,
x x x x
All told, We
hereby rule that
Due to the failure to seasonably
appeal or question the NLRC ruling,[25] its
factual and legal findings have attained finality. Consequently, the holding that
Res judicata literally
means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment.”[26] Res
judicata is, in fine, a rule of preclusion to the end that facts or issues
settled by final judgment should not be tried anew.[27]
The principle of res judicata in actions in
personam is found in Section 49(b) and (c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
Sec.
49. Effects
of judgments. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
or judge of the
x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Res judicata has
two (2) concepts. The first is “bar
by prior judgment” under Rule 39, Section 47(b). This rule dictates that the judgment or decree
of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and
their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or
suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other
tribunal.[28] Stated otherwise, the judgment rendered in the
first case is an absolute bar to the subsequent action since said judgment is
conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain that
judgment but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that
purpose and which could have been adjudged therein.[29]
The second rule of res judicata is embodied in Rule 39, Section
47(c), and is known as “conclusiveness of judgment.” It provides that any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination
of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered
on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again
be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim or
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same. It refers to a situation where the judgment in
the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually
determined or which were necessarily included therein.[30]
The other elements being virtually
the same, the fundamental difference between the rule of res judicata as a bar by former judgment and as merely a rule on
the conclusiveness of judgment is that, in the first, there is an identity in
the cause of action in both cases involved whereas, in the second, the cause of
action in the first case is different from that in the second case.[31]
In this petition, res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment obtains. The concept
is applicable here as there is identity of parties and subject matter but not
of causes of action.
First, there is identity of parties between the two (2) cases. Petitioner was one of complainants in the
consolidated regularization cases and he is also the same party who initiated
this action. His denial of participation
in the regularization cases[32]
is negated by the records, as he was awarded wage differentials and P34,886.00.[34]
Second, there is identity of subject matter, defined as the matter
or thing with respect to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which a
wrong has been done.[35] It is quite clear that the issue and subject
matter resolved in the consolidated regularization cases is the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
However, identity of causes of action
is absent between the two (2) cases. Under
the rules, a cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.[36] In the regularization cases, the cause of
action is the deprivation of the status of a regular employee, while in this
petition, the cause of action is the dismissal of an employee without just
cause under our labor laws.
Applying the rule on conclusiveness
of judgment to this case, the parties are now precluded from relitigating the
same issue of the existence of an employment relationship between
Although it does not have the same
effect as bar by prior judgment which precludes subsequent actions,
conclusiveness of judgment operates as estoppel with respect to matters in
issue or points controverted, on the determination of which the finding or
judgment was anchored.[37]
Where material facts or questions,
which were in issue in a former action, were judicially determined, such facts
are res judicata.[38] In
Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi,[39] the
Court held that “(w)hen a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such
trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them. Clearly, there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject, once it is
fully and fairly adjudicated.”
Res judicata requires that stability be accorded
to judgments. Controversies once decided on the merits shall remain in
repose for there should be an end to litigation which, without the doctrine,
would be endless.[40] As We declared in Camara v. Court of Appeals,[41] both concepts of res judicata are:
x x
x founded on the principle of estoppel, and are based on the salutary policy
against unnecessary multiplicity of suits. Like the splitting of causes of
action, res judicata is in pursuance
of such policy. Matters settled by a Court’s final judgment should not be
litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled merely
burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and
wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier causes. As
the Roman maxim goes, Non bis in edem.[42]
The regularization cases initiated
and participated in by petitioner are now final and executory, and the issues
resolved in that case should no longer be disturbed. Nothing is more settled in law than that when
a judgment becomes final and executory it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the highest court of the land. The reason is grounded on the fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some
definite date fixed by law.[43]
Verily, res
judicata now bars petitioner
from reopening, by way of this petition, the issue of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between him and
Nevertheless, petitioner insists that
We again resolve the issue by looking at “evidentiary facts of
employer-employee relationship.”[44]
At the same time, he maintains that he raises questions of law.[45]
Evidently, the issues raised by the
petitioner pertain to factual matters. If
We were to determine these factual issues, We shall have to examine the
documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the factual allegations in the
pleadings. In doing so, We shall have to
consider the following elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship:
(a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c)
the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee
with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. Of these elements, the so-called “control
test” is the most important.[46]
Obviously, an evaluation of the
above-mentioned factual matters is embraced by the proscription found in Rule
45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states that an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court “shall
raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.”
Petitioner asks Us to exempt him from
the proscription considering the contrasting findings of the Labor Arbiter, on
one hand, and the NLRC and the CA on the other.
However, well-settled
is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the lower courts or
administrative bodies are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be
disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons. The findings of the CA by itself, which are
supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of review by the
Supreme Court.[47]
We find no cogent reason
to disturb the NLRC and the CA findings as these are supported by substantial
evidence. On the other hand, We cannot rely on the findings of the
Labor Arbiter about the existence of an employer-employee relationship. His decision[48] fails
to shed light on what specific findings of fact convinced him that Stellar is a
labor-only contractor, and that
Moreover, even if We relax the rule, We
notice an abject failure of the petitioner to attach to the petition and subsequent pleadings, proof of
these alleged facts of employment relationship. There is a patent dearth of evidence in the
records to convince Us that the following material allegations exist, namely:
that petitioner’s duties were necessary and desirable to the business of
Instead, petitioner merely offered factual
assertions which are unfortunately not supported by proof, documentary or
otherwise. We cannot accept this as
substantial evidence that is necessary to make a finding of an
employer-employee relationship. It is
elementary that he who alleges a fact must prove it, and a mere allegation is
not evidence.[49]
On the basis of the pleadings and
evidence before Us, We cannot accept the claim that petitioner was
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Vice Associate Justice Minita V.
Chico-Nazario. Justice Nazario is on
official leave per Special Order No. 508 dated
[1] Malayang Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Balanced
Food v. Pinakamasarap Corporation, G.R.
No. 139068,
[2] Rollo, pp. 23-33. Penned by Associate
Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis
and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring.
Dated
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] CA rollo, pp. 82-117; Annex “1.”
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Asia Traders
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152537,
[23] NLRC
[24] Rollo, p. 186;
Annex “1.”
[25]
[26] Williams v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
166177,
[27] Tengco, Jr. v.
Marcelo, G.R. No. 159877,
[28] Arcadio v. Carriaga, Jr., G.R. Nos.
75109-10,
[29]
[30] Del Rosario v.
Far East Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 150134,
[31] Arcadio v. Carriaga, Jr., supra note 28.
[32] Rollo, p. 153.
[33]
[34]
[35].Taganas v. Emuslan, G.R. No. 146980,
[36] Rules of Court, Rule 2, Sec. 2.
[37] Camara v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
100789,
[38] Republic v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 103412,
[39] G.R. No. 133913,
[40] Nacuray v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
Nos. 114924-27,
[41] Supra note 37.
[42] Camara v. Court of Appeals, id. at
163-164.
[43]
[44] Rollo, p. 155.
[45]
[46] Brotherhood Labor
Unity Movement of the
[47] Pimentel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117422,
[48]
[49] P.T. Cerna Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91622,
[50] Rollo, p. 205.
[51]
[52]
[53]