Republic of the
Supreme Court
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SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO |
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G.R. No. 161220 |
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and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO |
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substituted by their heirs, namely: |
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Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and |
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Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and |
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SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and |
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Present: |
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ROSIE M. BENATIRO, |
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Respondents, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
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- versus - |
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Chairperson, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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July 30, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking to annul the
Decision[1] dated
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with
nine children, namely:
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty.
Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten),
filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition[4] for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special
Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner.” The petition was
opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate
of the late Evaristo Cuyos
and including the undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona
Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor
of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian
who may qualify as such administratrix after posting
a nominal bond of P1,000.00.[6]
Subsequently, in the Order[7] dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing was called
on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco, together with their
respective counsels, appeared; that
Atty. Yray, Francisco’s counsel, manifested
that the parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that
both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed
to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare
the project of partition for the approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within
30 days from
In his Commissioner's Report[8] dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo
stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by
telegrams to all the heirs to cause their
appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon,
Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are
located, for a conference or
meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents
Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos
failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three heirs could not
be located in their respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs
present resided outside the province of Cebu, they
decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his
Report that the heirs who were present:
1.
Agreed to consider all income of the properties of
the estate during the time that Francisco Cuyos, one
of the heirs, was administering the properties of the estate (without
appointment from the Court) as having been properly and duly accounted for.
2.
Agreed to consider all income of the properties of
the estate during the administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs
as having been properly and duly accounted for.
3.
Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been withdrawn.
4.
Agreed not to partition the properties of the
estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00
subject to the condition that should any of the heirs would be in a position to
buy the properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just
receive only Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) each.
5.
Agreed to equally divide the administration
expenses to be deducted from their respective share of P4,000.00.[9]
The Report further stated that Columba
Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba),
one of the heirs, informed all those present in the conference of her desire to
buy the properties of the estate, to which everybody present agreed, and considered her the
buyer. Atty. Taneo
explained that the delay in the submission of the Report was due to the request
of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to make some consultations
on what was already agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976
that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the information that
respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be given the
sum of P5,570.00 as
her share of the estate, since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to
her in order to defray their father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued the
assailed Order[10] dated
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and
conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same being not contrary
to law, said compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the commissioner
is hereby approved. The Court hereby
orders the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale
covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba
Cuyos Benatiro after the
payment to her of the sum of P36,000.00. The said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the
claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid
for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the
heirs. [11]
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for
the sum of P5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly disregarded by the heirs
present during the conference.
In an Order[12] dated
On P36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian,
Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax
Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled
and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133
and 20-14134, were issued in Columba’s name; and that later on, Original Certificates of
Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba;
that some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of
petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer certificates
of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently discovered the
existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of
Justice, which on
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at
the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.[15]
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation[16] of the other heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia,
Numeriano,[17] and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order
dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court. They
alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was null and void and of no
effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and
irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming
their share of their father's estate;
that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares
executed an affidavit, as well as the unnotarized
statement of Gloria stating that no
meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the estate of their parents
and that they never
received any payment from the supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report
was done in close confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the Commissioner's
recommendation, should the same be
approved by the probate court; that since the report was a falsity, any order
proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance
of the certificates of titles in favor of respondents were tainted with fraud
and irregularity, since the CFI which issued the assailed order did not
appear to have been furnished a copy of
the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not in custodia legis of the consideration of
the sale, as directed in its
Order so that it could divide the remainder of the consideration equally among
the heirs after paying all the administration expenses and estate taxes; that
the intestate case had not yet been terminated as the last order found relative
to the case was the appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that they
never received their corresponding share in the inheritance; and that the act
of petitioners in manifest connivance with administrator Lope amounted to a
denial of their right to the property without due process of law, thus, clearly showing that
extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered
the assailed order dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was
preposterous, as respondents were
represented by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this was
only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment
within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the six
parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to
the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud
attended the issuance of the assailed order; that Numeriano
executed an affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18,
1988; that respondents were estopped from assailing
the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of finality.
On
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING
REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order issued
by the Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch XI
dated December 16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title issued in the name
of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro
and the subsequent transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered
reopened and proceedings thereon be continued.[18]
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to
be established was the veracity and truthfulness of the Commissioner’s Report, which was used by the trial
court as its basis for issuing the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement,
there was a need for all the concerned parties to be present in the conference; however, such was not the
scenario since in their separate sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the
decedent attested to the fact that no meeting or conference ever happened among
them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence,
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of an official duty,
the same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence to prove the
contrary.
The CA
noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held
accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioner’s Report never mentioned the
names of the heirs who were present in
the alleged conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the
names of those who were present were equally essential, if not even more
important, than the names of those who were absent; (2) the Report
also failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from the
attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as
regards the agreed mechanisms for the estate’s settlement; (3) there was lack or
absence of physical evidence attached to the report indicating that the
respondents were indeed properly notified about the scheduled conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence
of the respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise agreement
did not stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that
notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten and
Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as notice to
the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos;
that a lawyer’s authority to compromise cannot be simply presumed, since what was required was
the special authority to compromise on behalf of his client; that a compromise agreement
entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void
and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;[19] that being a void compromise agreement, the assailed
Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles
obtained by herein petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the initial
transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise
agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void and
had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the
sum of P36,000.00 to
the administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting that he
received his share of the proceeds but
without indicating the exact amount that he received; that even so, such
alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial court’s
order for the administratix to execute the deed of
sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of Columba
Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the sum of P36,000.00; that said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses
and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order
of the Court, be divided equally
among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court
nor was said money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that
the Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been terminated and
that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels
of land, which included the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and
the issuance of new Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud.
Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise agreement, the certificates of title
and the transfers made by petitioners
through fraud cannot be made a legal basis of their ownership over the properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the expense of the
respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud attendant in this case
was one of extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully
litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by petitioners to assert
their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether
or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper
remedy where the aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies, such as new
trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take through their
own fault.
Whether or not the
Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old
Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which enjoys a strong presumption of
regularity - based merely on
belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said official act.
Whether
or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic
fraud existed which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. [20]
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance
executed by the heirs of Lope Cuyos[21] and respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares[22] on P4,000.00 in payment of his share, which could be the reason
why he refused to sign the Special Power of
Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a
reversible error in annulling the CFI Order dated
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character[25] and will not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse
by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose
strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section
1. Coverage. — This Rule shall
govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner.
Section
2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall
not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based
"only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,"
jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.[26]
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of
fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.[27] Extrinsic fraud
exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside
of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from
presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by
the prevailing party.[28] Fraud is regarded
as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting
his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not
to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The
overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court. [29]
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI
Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the
ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the
assailed order is void for lack of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was
appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and to
prepare the project of partition for submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the
heirs. In his Commissioner’s Report,
Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of
all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos
and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the
conference scheduled on
However, there is nothing in the records that would
establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by
telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled conference were indeed sent
to the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of
the heirs, who was presumably present in the conference, as she was not mentioned as
among those absent, had executed an affidavit[30] dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not
called to a meeting nor was there
any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. While Patrocenia
had executed on December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance[31] regarding this case, it was only for the reason that the
subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and that she had already received her corresponding
share of the purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that retracted
her previous statement that she was not called to a meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement[32] that there was no meeting held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneo’s holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs
indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the
estate properties, since they were not even required to sign anything to
show their attendance of the alleged meeting.
In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures
of the alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was
for the heirs to arrive at a compromise agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs
must be present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity
to protect their interests. Considering that
no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying
their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the Report be signed by the
heirs to prove that a conference among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in
the Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an
officer of the court and a disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m)
of the Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that
everything done by an officer in connection with the performance of an official
act in the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption may be overcome
by evidence to the contrary. We find the
instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of the names of the persons present in
the conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs in the Commissioner's
Report, as well as absence of
evidence showing that respondents were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of
irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in
ruling that the conference was not held
accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification[33] dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of Court of
the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of the Commissioner’s Report were sent
to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten
and Yray as enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the
accompanying registry receipts.[34]
In Cua v. Vargas,[35] in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively
notified of and bound by
an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has
been duly published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that
persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice
that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition
is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in
the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with
the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute
constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in
it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication
is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this
connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never
signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence
only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made
without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what
matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise
agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the Commissioner's
Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that
the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report
despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity
thereto. The CFI adopted the Report
despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the
conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to
be heard. The
CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that
no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ contentions that all
the parties in the intestate estate proceedings in the trial court were duly
represented by respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs
agreed to settle the case amicably, they manifested such intention through
their lawyers, as stated in the Order
dated January 30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person need not hire his own lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented by the
judicial administrator who retains the services of a counsel; that a judicial
administrator is the legal representative not only of the estate but also of
the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he represents; that when the
trial court issued the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976 approving the
Commissioner's Report, the parties’ lawyers were duly served said copies of the
Order on December 21, 1976 as shown by the Certification[37] dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court;
that notices to lawyers should be considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by
counsel, service of notices of orders and pleadings shall be made upon the
lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the respondents
could have taken the appropriate remedy such as a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a
petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time, but they failed to do so
without giving any cogent reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the
Commissioner’s Report was received by Attys. Yray and
Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and
Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the other heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed
before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was Gloria’s
counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was
Francisco’s lawyer when he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of
administration and his Motion to Order administrarix
Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the estate. Thus, the other heirs who were not
represented by counsel were not given any notice of the judgment approving the
compromise. It was only sometime in
February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax declarations covering the
parcels of land, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax Declarations were
issued in Columba’s name, and Original Certificates of
Titles were subsequently issued in favor of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment
for lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
source of any right or of any obligation.[38]
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,[39] we stated the consequences of a void judgment,
thus:
A void judgment never
acquires finality. Hence, while
admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the
aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic,
x x
x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect
accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared
inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is
attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal
or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect,
impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily,
no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void
judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties
litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment
is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect. Hence, it can
never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a
lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.”[40] (Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed
anytime, collaterally or in a
direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.[41] Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order
approving it must be declared null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents
are barred from assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its
finality on ground of laches and estoppel.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an
action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within
four years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by
laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or
"stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[42]
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.[43] The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be used to
defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the
principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice
would result.[44]
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order
only sometime in February 1998 and filed the petition for annulment of judgment
in 2001. Moreover, we find that
respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling
the assailed order. It bears stressing
that an action to declare the nullity of a void
judgment does not prescribe.[45]
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is
void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, it is
non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of
Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles
pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error was thus committed by the
CA in annulling the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED and the Decision dated
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN
T. REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and concurred
in by Justices Cancio C. Garcia (former member of
this Court) and Mariano C. del Castillo; rollo, pp. 32-39.
[2]
[3] Entitled, “Heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Petitioners, v.
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, Sps. Gorgonio Benatiro
and Columba Cuyos-Benatiro
and Sps. Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro,
Respondents.”
[4] CA rollo, p.32
[5] Rollo, pp. 81-84.
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo, pp. 56-59.
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 60-63.
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp. 79-80.
[14] CA rollo, p. 62.
[15]
[16] CA rollo, pp. 24-26; Special Power of Attorney.
[17] Refused to
sign the Special Power of Attorney.
[18] Rollo,
p. 39.
[19] G.R. No. 90974,
[20] Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Ramos v. Combong, Jr., G.R. No. 144273,
[26] Intestate Estate of the Late Nimfa Sian v. Philippine National
Bank, G.R. No. 168882, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 662, 668 citing Mercado
v. Security Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 160445, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA
501, 514; Alaban v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 697, 707; Hi-Tone Marketing
Corporation v. Baikal Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 149992, August 20, 2004,
437 SCRA 121, 131; Salonga v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 111478, March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 534, 542; Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91486,
January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 635, 650; Heirs of Pael
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133547, February 10, 2000, 325 SCRA 341, 358;
Lapulapu Development & Housing
Corporation v. Risos, G.R. No. 118633, September
6, 1996, 261 SCRA 517, 524; Regidor v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78115, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA 530, 534.
[27] Rules of Court,
Rule 47,
Section 2.
[28] Alba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
164041,
[29] Tolentino v. Leviste, G.R. No. 156118,
[30] CA rollo, p. 64.
[31]
[32] CA rollo, p. 67.
[33] Rollo, Annex “H”, p. 64.
[34]
[35] G.R. No. 156536,
[36]
[37] Rollo, Annex “H”, p. 64.
[38] Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo, 417 Phil. 303, 316, 318 (2001).
[39] G.R. No. 111610,
[40] Id.at
35-36.
[41] Intestate Estate of the Late Nimfa Sian v. Philippine National
Bank, supra note 26, at 670.
[42] Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125837,
[43] Far East Bank and
Trust Company v. Querimit, 424 Phil. 721, 732 (2002).
[44] Ang Ping v. Court of
Appeals, 369 Phil. 607,
616 (1999).
[45] See
Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank v. King, G.R. No. 78252, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA 60, 69 citing Ang Lam v. Rosillosa
and Santiago, 86 Phil.
447, 45 (1950); Vda de Macoy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95871,
February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA
244, 252.