Republic of the
Supreme Court
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ROGELIA DACLAG
and |
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G.R. No. 159578 |
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ADELINO DACLAG
(deceased) |
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Substituted by
RODEL M. DACLAG |
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and ADRIAN M.
DACLAG, |
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Present: |
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Petitioners, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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- versus - |
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Chairperson, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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ELINO MACAHILIG, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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ADELA MACAHILIG |
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NACHURA, and |
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CONRADO
MACAHILIG, |
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REYES, JJ. |
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LORENZA HABER and |
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BENITA |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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July 28, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision[1] dated
The antecedent
facts:
During their
lifetime, the spouses Candido and Gregoria
Macahilig were the owners of seven parcels of land,
all located in Numancia, Aklan. They had seven children, namely: Dionesio, Emeliano, Mario,
Ignacio, Eusebio, Tarcela
and Maxima.
On
One of the
properties partitioned in the Deed was a parcel of irrigated riceland located at Poblacion, Numancia, Aklan, with an area of
1,896 square meters declared in the name of Maxima under Tax Declaration No.
644 which was denominated as “Parcel One.” This Parcel One was divided between Vicenta Macahilig Galvez for the heirs of Mario Macahilig,
who was given the one half southern portion of the land; and Adela Macahilig for the heirs of Eusebio Macahilig, who got the
one half northern portion. The Deed was
notarized by Municipal Judge Francisco M. Ureta in
his capacity as ex-officio notary public. The heirs of Eusebio Macahilig are the herein
respondents.
On
On
On
On
Respondents
alleged that they were the lawful owners and previous possessors of the one half northern portion of Parcel One by virtue of a Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition; that since they were all residents of Caloocan City, their land was possessed by their first
cousin, Penicula Divison Quijano, Maxima's daughter, as
tenant thereon, as she was also in possession of the one half southern portion
as tenant of the heirs of Mario Macahilig; that
sometime in 1983, upon request of Maxima
and out of pity for her as she had no share in the produce of the land, Penicula allowed Maxima to farm the land; that without
their knowledge, Maxima illegally sold on May 23, 1984, the entire riceland to petitioners, who are now in possession of the
land, depriving respondents of its annual produce valued at P4,800.00.
In their Answer
with Cross-Claim, petitioners contended that: petitioner Rogelia
had been the registered owner of the entire riceland
since 1984 as evidenced by OCT No. P-13873; her title had become
incontrovertible after one year from its issuance; they purchased the subject
land in good faith and for value from co-defendant Maxima who was in actual
physical possession of the property and who delivered and conveyed the same to
them; they were now in possession and usufruct of the land since then up to the
present; respondents were barred by laches for the
unreasonable delay in filing the case.
They also filed a cross-claim against Maxima for whatever charges,
penalties and damages that respondents may demand from them; and they prayed that
Maxima be ordered to pay them damages for the fraud and misrepresentation
committed against them.
Respondents
subsequently filed an Amended Complaint, upon learning that petitioners were
issued OCT No. 13873 by virtue of their free patent application, and asked for
the reconveyence of the one half northern portion of
the land covered by such title.
The land in
question was delimited in the Commissioner's Report and sketch submitted by
Bernardo G. Sualog as the one half northern portion, which had an area of 1178 sq. meters. The Report and the sketch were approved by the
RTC on
For failure of
Maxima to file an answer, the RTC declared her in default both in the complaint
and cross-claim against her.
After trial, the
RTC rendered its Decision[7] dated
WHEREFORE,
finding preponderance of evidence in favor of plaintiffs [respondents],
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
The
deed of sale dated
2.
The
plaintiffs are hereby declared the true and lawful owners and entitled to the
possession of the northern one-half (1/2) portion of the land described under
paragraph 2 of the amended complaint and designated as Exhibit “F-1” in the
commissioners’ sketch with an area of 1,178 square meters;
3.
The
defendants-spouses Adelino and Rogelia
Daclag [petitioners] are hereby ordered and directed
to vacate the land described in the preceding paragraph and restore and deliver
the possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
4.
The
defendants are ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance
in favor of the plaintiffs over the land described in paragraph 2 hereof;
5.
The
defendants are ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay the plaintiffs ten (10) cavans of palay per annum beginning the second cropping of 1984 until
the time the possession of the land in question is restored to the plaintiffs;
and
6.
The
defendants are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs reasonable
attorney’s fees in the amount of P3,000.00 plus
cost of the suit.[8]
The RTC found
that respondents were able to establish that Parcel One was divided between the
heirs of Mario and the heirs of Eusebio, with the
former getting the one half southern portion and the latter the one half
northern portion embodied in a Deed of Extra-judicial partition, which bore Maxima's thumbmarks; that nobody
questioned the Deed's validity, and no evidence was presented to prove that the
document was not validly and regularly executed; that Maxima also executed a
duly notarized Statement of Conformity dated March 19, 1982 with the conformity
of her husband, Pedro. The RTC concluded
that when Maxima executed the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners on
In disposing the
issue of whether petitioners could be considered innocent purchasers for value,
the RTC ruled that petitioners could not even be considered purchasers, as they
never acquired ownership of the land since the sale to them by Maxima was void;
and that petitioners' act of reflecting only the price of P5,000.00 in the Deed of Sale to avoid paying taxes to the BIR
should be condemned for defrauding the government and thus should not be given
protection from the courts.
The RTC further ruled that since
petitioners were able to obtain a free patent on the whole land in petitioner Rogelia's name, reconveyance to
respondents of the 1,178 sq. meter northern portion of the land was just and
proper; that the respondents were entitled to a share in the harvest at two croppings per year after deducting the share of the tenant;
that since Maxima died in October 1993, whatever charges and claims petitioners
may recover from her expired with her.
Aggrieved,
petitioners filed their appeal with the CA.
On
The CA ruled
that since Maxima had no right to sell the land as she was not the rightful
owner thereof, nothing was conveyed to petitioners; that a person who acquired
property from one who was not the owner and had no right to dispose of the
same, obtained the property without right of title, and the real owner may
recover the same from him.
The CA found
that since respondents were unaware of the sale, it was not a surprise that
they did not question petitioners' application for a free patent on the subject
land; that the possession by Maxima of the subject land did not vest ownership in
her, as her possession was not in the concept of an owner; and that petitioners
were not purchasers in good faith. It also found that the right to enjoy
included the right to receive the produce of the thing; that respondents as
true owners of the subject land were deprived of their property when Maxima
illegally sold it to petitioners; and thus, equity demanded that respondents be
given what rightfully belonged to them under the principle that a person cannot
enrich himself at the expense of another.
Hence, herein
petition on the following grounds:
A.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT
HEREIN PETITIONERS HAD NO VALID TITLE OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION.
B.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT
PURCHASERS OR BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH.
C.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO PAY
PER ANNUM BEGINNING THE SECOND CROPPING OF 1984 UNTIL THE TIME THE POSSESSION
OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IS RESTORED TO THE PLAINTIFFS [respondents].[9]
The issues for
resolution are (1) whether Maxima was the previous owner of Parcel One, which
included respondents' one half northern portion, now covered by OCT No. P-13873; 2) whether petitioners could validly invoke the defense of
purchasers in good faith; and (3) whether reconveyance
is the proper remedy.
Preliminarily, we would like to
state the inescapable fact that the Extra-judicial partition of the estate of Candido Macahilig involving the
seven parcels of land was made only between Maxima and the heirs of her two
deceased brothers Mario and Eusebio.
Section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.
- If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action for partition. x x x
The
fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Records do not
show that there has been any case filed by the other heirs who had not
participated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and were questioning the
validity of such partition. Thus, the
resolution of the present case concerns only the issues between the parties
before us and will not in any way affect the rights of the other heirs who have
not participated in the partition.
The first two issues raised for
resolution are factual. It is a settled
rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is
not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake
the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during
the trial of the case, considering that the findings of facts of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the Court.[10] While jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court, namely: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, could justify a different
conclusion,[11]
none of these exceptions has been shown to apply to the present case and,
hence, this Court may not review the findings of fact made by the lower
courts.
We find no cogent reason to depart
from the findings of both the trial court and the CA that Maxima was not the
owner of the land she sold to petitioners, and that the one half northern
portion of such land was owned by the respondents; that Maxima had no right to
dispose of the land and, thus, she had no right to convey the same.
To repeat, records show that Maxima
entered into a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with the heirs of her two
deceased brothers, namely: Mario and Eusebio, over
seven parcels of land owned by Candido and Gregoria Macahilig. One of these lands was the irrigated riceland with an area of 1,896 sq. meters which, per the
Deed of Partition, was divided between the heirs of Mario and Eusebio; and the former got the one half southern portion, while the latter got the one half northern portion.
Maxima affixed her thumbmark
to the Deed. This parcel of riceland was sold by Maxima to petitioners. However, Maxima, at the time of the execution
of the Deed of Sale over this parcel of land in favor of petitioner on
In fact, Maxima, with the conformity
of her husband Pedro, had even executed a Statement of Conformity, in which she
affirmed the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and conformed to
the manner of the partition of shares therein. She attested to the fact that the five parcels
of land subject of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, which were declared in
her name under different tax declarations, were actually properties of her
deceased parents; and that she waived all her rights over the lands or portions
thereof adjudicated to all her co-heirs.
Neither Maxima nor any of her heirs
ever questioned the validity of these two above-mentioned documents to which
she affixed her thumbmarks. Notably, when the instant complaint was filed
by respondents against Maxima and petitioners in 1991, in which respondents
claimed as basis of their ownership of the one half northern portion of the riceland was the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, Maxima,
while still living at that time, as she died in 1993, never denied the same. As already stated, she failed to file an
answer and was declared in default.
In a contract of sale, it is
essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is selling.[12] Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the
principal obligation of a seller is to transfer the ownership of the property
sold.[13] Also, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides
that the thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer the
ownership thereof at the time it is delivered.
Maxima's execution of the Deed of Sale selling
Parcel One, part of which is respondents' one half northern portion, was not
valid and did not transfer ownership of the land to petitioners, as Maxima had
no title or interest to transfer. It is
an established principle that no one can give what one does not have -- nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns
or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the
seller can transfer legally.[14]
Petitioners insist that Maxima owned
the subject land as shown by her actual and continuous possession of the same;
that it was declared in her name for taxation purposes; that throughout the
time that Maxima and her children were in possession of the property, she never
gave any share of the produce to respondents; and that Maxima even mortgaged
the land to a bank.
We are not persuaded.
Maxima's
possession of the subject land was by reason of her request to her daughter Penicula, who was installed by respondents as tenant after
the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, as Maxima wanted to farm
the land so that she could have a share in the produce, to which Penicula acceded out of pity.[15] It was also established that after the
execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, Penicula
as tenant was able to farm the subject land for one cropping year before she
allowed her mother Maxima to farm the land thereafter; and, at that time, Penicula gave the corresponding share of the produce of
that one crop year to Adela,[16] one of
herein respondents, thus establishing respondents' ownership of the subject
land. Evidently, Maxima's
possession of the land was not in the concept of an owner.
While the land was declared in Maxima's name for taxation purposes, it did not establish Maxima's ownership of the same. We have held that a tax declaration, by
itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership.[17] It is merely an indicium
of a claim of ownership.[18] Because it does not by itself give title, it
is of little value in proving one's ownership.[19] Petitioners' reliance on Maxima's
tax declaration in assuming that she owned Parcel One is an erroneous
assumption that should not prejudice the rights of the real owners.
The fact that a mortgage was
constituted on the land while the same was in Maxima's
name would not make Maxima the owner thereof.
Maxima's non-ownership of Parcel One was
clearly established by the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and the Statement
of Conformity, wherein she categorically declared that the land was actually
owned by her deceased parents, to which she separately affixed her thumbmarks. Both
documents showed declarations against her interest in the land. A declaration against interest is the best
evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.[20]
While petitioners were able to
secure a certificate of title covering Parcel One in petitioner Rogelia's name, their possession of a certificate of title
alone does not necessarily make them the true owners of the property described
therein. Our land registration laws do
not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.[21]
In Naval v. Court of Appeals,[22] we
held:
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title
over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission
of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself
at the expense of others. Its issuance
in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or
that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
x
x x notwithstanding the
indefeasibility of the
We find that reconveyance
of the subject land to respondents is proper. The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the free patent and certificate of
title are respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the property,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name,
to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.[24]
Respondents have
specifically prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore and reconvey to them the subject land. In an action for reconveyance,
the issue involved is one of ownership; and for this purpose, evidence of title
may be introduced. Respondents had
sufficiently established that Parcel One, covered by OCT No. P-13873, of which
respondents' northern one half portion formed a part, was not owned by Maxima
at the time she sold the land to petitioners. We have earlier discussed the evidence
presented by respondents establishing that Maxima had no claim of ownership
over the land sold by her to petitioners.
An action for reconveyance
prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration
of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.[25] Records show that while the land was
registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984,
the instant complaint for reconveyance was filed by
the respondents in 1991, and was thus still within the ten-year prescriptive
period.
Petitioners claim that they were
innocent buyers in good faith and for value; that there was no evidence showing
that they were in bad faith when they purchased the subject land; that Article
526 of the Civil Code provides that he is deemed a possessor in good faith who
is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it; and that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.
Notably, petitioners bought the
property when it was still an unregistered land. The defense of having
purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered
land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of
the registered owner.[26]
In Ong
v. Olasiman[27] in which
a claim of good faith was raised by petitioner who bought an unregistered land,
we held:
Finally, petitioners' claim of good faith does not
lie too as it is irrelevant:
[T]he
issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant only where the
subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the same
from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean x x x in such case the purchaser who relies on the clean title
of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for
value. Since the properties in question are unregistered lands, petitioners as
subsequent buyers thereof did so at their peril. Their claim of having bought
the land in good faith, i.e., without notice that some other person has a right
to or interest in the property, would not protect them if it turns out, as it
actually did in this case, that their seller did not own the property at the
time of the sale. [28]
Petitioners claim that the subject
land is a public land, and that petitioners were issued title over this land in
1984; that respondents did not present any evidence to prove that the subject
land was already a private land prior to their acquisition and the issuance of a
free patent title to them; that the presumption that the subject land was
formerly part of the mass of alienable lands of public domain under the Regalian doctrine, and was regularly granted to petitioners
by way of free patent and certificate of title, remains incontrovertible in
favor of petitioner.
This issue was only raised for the
first time in petitioners' Memorandum filed with us. Well-settled is the rule that issues not
raised and/or ventilated in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal and cannot be considered for review — to consider questions belatedly
raised tramples on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[29]
Finally, we find no error committed
by the CA in affirming the RTC's order for
petitioners to pay respondents their corresponding share in the produce of the
subject land from the time they were deprived thereof until the possession is
restored to them. As aptly stated by the
CA, thus:
It is said that one of the attributes of ownership
is the right to enjoy and dispose of the the thing
owned, The right to enjoy included the right to
receive the produce of the thing. The plaintiffs-appellees,
as true owners of the subject land were deprived of their property when Maxima Divison illegally sold it to spouses Daclags.
As such, equtiy demands that the plaintiff-appeellees be given what rightfully belonged to them under
the time honored principle that a person cannot enrich himself at the expense
of another.
WHEREFORE, the petition
for review is DENIED. The Decision
dated
Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned
by Justice Ramon Mabutas, Jr. with the concurrence
of Justices Roberto A. Barrios (retired)
and Edgardo P. Cruz; rollo,
pp. 35- 44
[2] Penned
by Justice Roberto A. Barrios and concurred in by Justices Edgardo
P. Cruz and Eliezer R. delos
[3] Records,
Exhibit “A”; p. 113-116.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Per Judge Sheila Y. Martelino Cortes,
Records, pp. 161-167.
[8]
[9] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[10] Heirs of Dicman v. Cariño,
G.R. No. 146459,
[11] Id.,
citing Rivera v. Roman, G.R. No. 142402, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA
276; The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86; Aguirre v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 310, 319; C & S Fishfarm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil.
279 (2002).
[12] Noel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59550,
[13] Art.
1458. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself
to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other
to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.
[14] Naval
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167412, February 22, 2006, 483 SCRA 102,112
citing Consolidated Rural Bank (Cagayan Valley),
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132161, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 347,
363.
[15]
TSN,
[16] TSN,
[17] Titong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111141,
March 6, 1998, 287 SCRA 102, 115 citing Rivera
v. Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 57 (1995); Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74380, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 285, 296; De
Jesus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57092, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 307,
317.
[18] Id.,
citing Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339, 348.
[19]
[20] Noda v. Cruz-Arnaldo, No. L-57322,
[21] Heirs of Romana Ingjug
-Tiro v. Casals, G.R.
No. 134718,
[22] Supra
note 14, at 113.
[23]
[24] Mendizabel v. Apao,
G.R. No. 143185,
[25] Leyson v. Bontuyan,
G.R. No. 156357,
[26] Naval
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14, at 111; David v. Bandin,
No. L-48322,
[27] G.R.
No. 162045,
[28] Ong v. Olasiman,
supra note 27, at 472.
[29] Cruz
v. Fernando, G.R. No. 145470, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 173, 182; Department
of Agrarian Reform v. Franco, G.R. No. 147479, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA
74, 92-93; Gualberto v. Go, G.R. No.
139843, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA 671, 678; Philippine Banking Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 487, 503-04; De
Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136,
February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 94; Caltex
(Phils), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97753, August 10, 1992, 212
SCRA 448, 461;.BA Finance Corporation. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82040,