Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
ALBERTO P. OXALES, G.R.
No. 152991
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus
- QUISUMBING*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
AZCUNA,** and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
UNITED
LABORATORIES, INC.,
Respondent. July 21, 2008
x - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
HOW should a private company retirement plan for employees be implemented
vis-à-vis The Retirement Pay Law (Republic Act No. 7641)?
Papaano ipapatupad
ang isang plano ng pribadong kompanya para sa pagreretiro ng mga empleyado sa
harap ng Batas ng Pagbabayad sa Pagreretiro (Batas Republika Blg. 7641)?
We
address the concern in this appeal by certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the Resolution[2]
and Decision[3] of the
Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), respectively,
dismissing petitioner Alberto P. Oxales’ complaint for additional retirement
benefits, recovery of the cash equivalent of his unused sick leaves, damages,
and attorney’s fees, against respondent United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB).
The Facts
Sometime in 1959, UNILAB established
the United Retirement Plan (URP).[4] The plan is a comprehensive retirement program
aimed at providing for retirement, resignation, disability, and death benefits of
its members. An employee of UNILAB becomes
a member of the URP upon his regularization in the company. The URP mandates the compulsory retirement of
any member-employee who reaches the age of 60.
Both UNILAB and the employee
contribute to the URP. On one hand, UNILAB
provides for the account of the employee an actuarially-determined amount to
Trust Fund A. On the other hand, the employee
chips in 2½% of his monthly salary to Trust Fund B. Upon retirement, the employee gets both
amounts standing in his name in Trust Fund A and Trust Fund B.
As retirement benefits, the employee
receives (1) from Trust Fund A a lump sum of 1½ month’s pay per year of service
“based on the member’s last or terminal basic monthly salary,”[5]
and (2) whatever the employee has contributed to Trust Fund B, together with
the income minus any losses incurred.
The URP excludes commissions, overtime, bonuses, or extra compensations
in the computation of the basic salary for purposes of retirement.
Oxales joined UNILAB on
In computing the retirement benefits
of Oxales based on the 1½ months for every year of service under the URP, UNILAB
took into account only his basic monthly salary. It did not include as part of the salary base
the permanent and regular bonuses, reasonable value of food allowances, 1/12 of
the 13th month pay, and the cash equivalent of service incentive leave.
Thus, Oxales received from Trust Fund
A P1,599,179.00,
instead of P4,260,255.70.
He also received P176,313.06, instead of P456,039.20 as cash equivalent of his
unused sick leaves. Lastly, he received P397,738.33 from his contributions to
Trust Fund B. In sum, Oxales received
the total amount of P2,173,230.39 as his retirement benefits.
On P1,775,907.23 more in retirement pay
and unused leave credits. He insisted that
his bonuses, allowances and 13th month pay should have been factored in the
computation of his retirement benefits.[6]
On
Disgruntled, Oxales filed a complaint
with the Labor Arbiter for (1) the correct
computation of his retirement benefits, (2) recovery of the cash equivalent of his
unused sick leaves, (3) damages, and (4) attorney’s fees. He argued that in the computation of his
retirement benefits, UNILAB should have included in his basic pay the following,
to wit: (a) cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days service incentive
leave; (b) 1/12th of 13th month pay; and (c) all other benefits he has been
receiving.
Efforts were exerted for a possible
amicable settlement. As this proved
futile, the parties were required to submit their respective pleadings and position
papers.
Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA
Dispositions
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The
Labor Arbiter held that the URP clearly excludes commission, overtime, bonuses,
or other extra compensation. Hence, the
benefits asked by Oxales to be included in the computation of his retirement
benefits should be excluded.[9]
The
Arbiter also held that the inclusion of the fringe benefits claimed by Oxales
would put UNILAB in violation of the terms and conditions set forth by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (
Oxales
appealed to the NLRC. On
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision is ordered affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The NLRC ruled
that the interpretation by Oxales of R.A. No. 7641 is selective. He only culled the provisions that are
beneficial to him, putting in grave doubt the sincerity of his motives. For instance, he claims that the value of the
food benefits and other allowances should be included in his monthly salary as
multiplicand to the number of his years of service with UNILAB. At the same time, however, he does not intend
to reduce the 1½ month salary as multiplier under the URP to ½ under R.A. No.
7641.[13]
The
NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that the provisions of R.A. No. 7641 do not
apply in view of the URP. The NLRC also
took into account the fact that the benefits granted to Oxales by virtue of the
URP was even higher than what R.A. No. 7641 requires.[14]
His
motion for reconsideration having been denied, Oxales filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In a decision promulgated on
Just like the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA also held that R.A. No. 7641 is applicable
only in the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for the
retirement benefits of employees in an establishment.[16]
Finally, the CA denied the claim of Oxales
to moral and exemplary damages. According
to the appellate court, he failed to prove the presence of bad faith or fraud
on the part of UNILAB. His mere allegations
of having suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and mental anguish are
not enough. No premium should be placed
on the right to litigate.[17]
Left with no other option, Oxales filed
the present recourse under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18]
Issues
In
his Memorandum,[19] Oxales
raises the following issues for Our disposition, to wit:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCORDING TO PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE, SUCH ERRORS IN THE COMPUTATION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS OF PETITIONER SHOULD BE CORRECTED IN A SPECIAL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN INCORRECTLY INTERPRETING THE URP TO EXCLUDE SEVERAL REMUNERATIONS FROM THE SAID SALARY BASE;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN TOTALLY IGNORING THE ISSUE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN INCORRECTLY INTERPRETING THE URP TO EXCLUDE PERMANENT AND REGULAR ALLOWANCES FROM THE SALARY BASE FOR COMPUTING RETIREMENT BENEFITS OF PETITIONER;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN INCORRECTLY INTERPRETING THE URP TO EXCLUDE PERMANENT AND REGULAR REMUNERATIONS MISLABELED AS BONUSES FROM THE SALARY BASE FOR COMPUTING THE RETIREMENT BENEFITS OF THE PETITIONER;
5. WHETHER OR NOT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN INCORRECTLY INTERPRETING THE URP TO EXCLUDE
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE INTERPRETATION OF R.A. NO. 7641 WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE SAID LAW IS APPLICABLE ONLY IN THE ABSENCE OF RETIREMENT PLAN OR AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR THE RETIREMENT BENEFITS OF EMPLOYEES IN AN ESTABLISHMENT;
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFINITION OF “SALARY” UNDER THE IMPLEMENTING RULES OF R.A. NO. 7641 SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE THE PERMANENT AND REGULAR REMUNERATIONS OF PETITIONER IN THE SALARY BASE FOR COMPUTING RETIREMENT BENEFITS;
8. WHETHER OR NOT THE LABOR ARBITER, THE NLRC, AND COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IGNORING AND NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUES REGARDING PETITIONER’S UNPAID CASH EQUIVALENT OF THE UNUSED SICK LEAVE CREDITS;
9. WHETHER OR NOT
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE NLRC GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN ITS FAILURE TO PROPERLY INTERPRET THE URP IN DETERMINING THE
EMPLOYMENT PERIOD OF PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPUTING RETIREMENT
BENEFITS;
10. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT REINSTATING THE MEDICAL RETIREMENT BENEFITS OF PETITIONER;
11. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN TOTALLY AND ARBITRARILY IGNORING THE ISSUE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING A DECISION IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS WHICH IN EFFECT DENIED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS;
12. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN LIKEWISE RENDERING A DECISION IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT DECISIONS SHOULD EXPRESS CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED;
13. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES TO PETITIONER;
14. WHETHER OR NOT
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD GRANT PETITIONER UNPAID RETIREMENT PAY, UNPAID CASH
EQUIVALENT OF UNUSED LEAVE CREDITS, REINSTATEMENT OF MEDICAL BENEFITS, MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.[20] (Underscoring supplied)
The issues posed by Oxales may be compressed
as follows: first, whether in the computation of his retirement and sick
leave benefits, UNILAB should have factored such benefits like bonuses, cash
and meal allowances, rice rations, service incentive leaves, and 1/12 of the 13th
month pay; second, whether R.A.
No. 7641 is applicable for purposes of computing his retirement benefits; and third, whether UNILAB is liable
for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Our Ruling
The clear language of the URP should be respected.
A retirement plan in a
company partakes the nature of a contract, with the employer and the employee
as the contracting parties. It creates a
contractual obligation in which the promise to pay retirement benefits is made
in consideration of the continued faithful service of the employee for the
requisite period.[21]
The employer
and the employee may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions
as they may deem convenient.[22]
In Allgeyer
v. Louisiana,[23]
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge,[24]
Coppage v.
The
obligations arising from the agreement between the employer and the employee have
the force of law between them and should be complied with in good faith.[29] However, though the employer and the employee
are given the widest latitude possible in the crafting of their contract, such
right is not absolute. There is no such
thing as absolute freedom of contract. A
limitation is provided for by the law itself. Their stipulations, clauses, terms, and
conditions should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.[30] Indeed, the law respects the freedom to
contract but, at the same time, is very zealous in protecting the contracting parties
and the public in general. So much so
that the contracting parties need not incorporate the existing laws in their
contract, as the law is deemed written in every contract. Quando abest, proviso parties, adest
proviso legis. When the provision of the party is
lacking, the provision of the law supplies it. Kung
may kulang na kondisyon sa isang kasunduan, ang batas ang magdaragdag dito.
Viewed from
the foregoing, We rule that Oxales is not entitled to the additional retirement
benefits he is asking. The URP is very
clear: “basic monthly
salary” for purposes of computing the retirement pay is “the basic monthly
salary, or if daily[,] means the basic rate of pay converted to basic monthly
salary of the employee excluding any commissions, overtime, bonuses, or
extra compensations.”[31] Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius. The
inclusion of one is the exclusion of others.
Ang pagsama ng isa, pagpwera naman sa iba.
The URP is not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy to merit its nullification. We, thus, sustain it. At first blush, the URP seems to be
disadvantageous to the retiring employee because of the exclusion of commissions, overtime, bonuses, or
extra compensations in the computation of the basic monthly salary. However,
a close reading of its provisions would reveal otherwise. We quote with approval the explanation of the NLRC
in this regard, viz.:
x x x the
United Retirement Plan of the respondent [Unilab] has a one and one-half months salary for every year of
service as the basis of entitlement. Under the new law, only one-half month of the
retiree’s salary inclusive however, of not more than five (5) days of service
incentive leave and one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay are used as the
bases in the retirement benefits computation.
Mathematically speaking therefore,
complainant’s [Oxales] benefits
received amounting to P1,599,179.00 under Trust Fund A together with the
cash equivalent of his unused leaves which has an amount of P176,313.06
and his contribution in the Trust Fund B amounting to P397,738.33 are
way above the entitlement he could have received under Republic Act 7641, otherwise
known as the New Retirement Law.[32]
(Underscoring supplied)
Both law[33]
and jurisprudence[34]
mandate that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations
shall control. Thus, if the terms of a writing are plain and
unambiguous, there is no room for construction, since the only purpose of
judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty.[35]
Only where the language of a contract is ambiguous and uncertain that a court
may, under well-established rules of construction, interfere to reach a proper
construction and make certain that which in itself is uncertain.[36] Where the language of a contract is plain and
unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic
facts or aids.[37]
R.A. No. 7641 does not apply in view of the URP which
gives to the retiring employee more than what the law requires; the supporting
cases cited by Oxales are off-tangent.
R.A. No. 7641, otherwise known as
“The Retirement Pay Law,” only applies in a situation where (1) there is no
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract
providing for retirement benefits for an employee; or (2) there is a collective
bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract providing for
retirement benefits for an employee, but it is below the requirements
set for by law. The reason for the first
situation is to prevent the absurd situation where an employee, who is
otherwise deserving, is denied retirement benefits by the nefarious scheme of
employers in not providing for retirement benefits for their employees. The reason for the second situation is
expressed in the latin maxim pacta
privata juri publico derogare non possunt.
Private contracts cannot derogate from the public law. Ang kasunduang pribado ay hindi makasisira
sa batas publiko. Five (5)
reasons support this conclusion.
First, a plain reading of the Retirement
Pay Law. R.A. No. 7641 originated from
the House of Representatives as House Bill 317 which was later consolidated
with Senate Bill 132. It was approved on
Art. 287. Retirement. – Any employee may be
retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective
bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case
of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement
benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective
bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, that an employee’s
retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall
not be less than those provided herein.
In
the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits
of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the
age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is
hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5)
years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement
pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service,
a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Unless
the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term ‘one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean
fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash
equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves. (Underscoring supplied)
Second, the legislative history
of the Retirement Pay Law. It may be
recalled that R.A. No. 7641 traces back its history in the case of Llora
Motors, Inc. v. Drilon.[39] In this case, the Court held that the then
Article 287 of the Labor Code[40]
and its Implementing Rules[41]
may not be the source of an employee’s entitlement to retirement pay absent the
presence of a collective bargaining agreement or voluntary company policy that
provides for retirement benefits for the employee.[42]
Third, the
legislative intent of the Retirement Pay Law. A reading of the explanatory note of Representative
Alberto S. Veloso would
show why Congress sought to pass the Retirement Pay Law: many employers refuse or neglect to adopt a
retirement plan for their employees because of the absence of any legal
compulsion for them to do so, thus:
When the Labor Code came
into effect in 1974, retirement pay had, as a matter of course, been granted to
employees in the private sector when they reach the age of sixty (60)
years. This had practically been the
rule observed by employers in the country pursuant to the rules and regulations
issued by the then Minister of Labor and Employment to implement the provisions
of the Labor Code, more particularly, where there is no provision for the same
in the collective bargaining agreement or retirement plan of the establishment.
At present, however,
such benefit of retirement pay is no longer available where there is no
collective agreement thereon or any retirement plan at all. This is so because, in a decision of the
Supreme Court (Llora Motors vs. Drilon and NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 82895,
November 7, 1989), it was held that the grant of such benefit under the rules
implementing the Labor Code is not supported by any express provision of the
Labor Code itself. In short, there is no
specific statutory basis for the grant of retirement benefits for employees in
the private sector reaching the age of 60 years.
Since the time of such
nullification by the Supreme Court of said implementing rules on retirement pay
for private sector employees, many employers simply refuse or neglect to adopt
any retirement plan for their workers, obviously emboldened by the thought
that, after said ruling, there is no longer any legal compulsion to grant such
retirement benefits. In our continuous quest to promote social justice, unfair
situations like this, productive of grievance or irritants in the
labor-management relations, must immediately be corrected or remedied by
legislation.
(Underscoring supplied)
Fourth, the title of the Retirement Pay Law. The complete title of R.A. No. 7641 is “An Act
Amending Article 287 of Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise
Known as the Labor Code of the
Fifth, jurisprudence. In Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[43]
the Court held that R.A. No. 7641 “is undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a labor protection
measure and as a curative statute that – absent a retirement plan devised by,
an agreement with, or a voluntary grant from, an employer – can respond, in
part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during their twilight
years soon following their life of labor.”[44]
In
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[45]
the Court held that Article
287 of the Labor Code “makes clear the intention and spirit of the law to give
employers and employees a free hand to determine and agree upon the terms and
conditions of retirement,”[46]
and that the law “presumes that employees know what they want and what is good
for them absent any showing that fraud or intimidation was employed to secure
their consent thereto.”[47]
Lastly, in Brion v.
South Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church,[48]
the Court ruled that a reading of Article 287 of the Labor Code would reveal
that the “employer and employee are free to stipulate on retirement benefits,
as long as these do not fall below floor limits provided by law.”[49]
We are aware of the several cases cited
by Oxales to support his claim that the computation of his retirement benefits
should not have been limited to the basic monthly salary as defined by the URP.
However, these cases negate, rather than
support, his claim.
In Villena v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[50]
the “compulsory retirement”
of Villena was, in fact, an illegal dismissal in disguise. Thus, the Court ordered the Batangas, Laguna,
Tayabas Bus Co. to pay Villena “his full backwages, allowances, and other
benefits for a period of three (3) years after his illegal dismissal on
The distinction between Villena with the instant case is readily
apparent. The Court used the regular
compensation of Villena in computing his retirement benefits because the
provision of the
In Planters Products, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[52] the petitioning employees were given
termination benefits based on their basic salary. However, Planters Products, Inc. had
integrated the allowances of its remaining employees into their basic salary. Thus, it was the basic salary that increased. Also, it was the basic salary as increased
(not the basic salary and allowances) which still formed the basis for the
computation of the termination benefits of the remaining employees of the
company. The Court held that fairness
demanded that the terminated employees receive the same treatment.[53]
Clearly, such situation is absent
here.
In Manuel
L. Quezon University v. National Labor Relations Commission,[54] the issue raised was whether
respondents are entitled to the retirement benefits provided for under R.A. No.
7641, even if petitioner has an existing valid retirement plan. The Court held that the coverage of the law “applies
to establishments with existing collective bargaining or other agreements or
voluntary retirement plans whose
benefits are less than those prescribed under the proviso in question.”[55]
Admittedly,
this Court held in the case of Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission[56]
that not only the basic salary but also the “allowances” (like transportation
and emergency living allowances) and “earned sales commissions” should be taken
into consideration in computing the backwages and separation pay of the
employee. However, a closer examination
of the case would show that the
Clearly then, R.A. No. 7641 does not
apply because the URP grants to the retiring employee more than what the law
gives. Under the URP, the employee
receives a lump sum of 1½ pay per year of service, compared to the minimum ½
month salary for every year of service set forth by R.A. No. 7641.
Oxales is trying to have the best of
both worlds. He wants to have his cake
and eat it too: the 1½ months formula under the URP, and the inclusion of the
value of food benefits and other allowances he was entitled to as employee of
UNILAB with his monthly salary as the multiplicand of his number of years in
the service. This he should not be permitted
to do, lest a grave injustice is caused to UNILAB, and its past and future
retirees.
We agree
with the NLRC observation on this score:
As
an illustration, Complainant claims that
his monthly salary as the multiplicand of his number of years in the service
should include the value of the food benefits and other allowances he was
entitled while in the employ of respondent.
However, he did not even, by implication, intend to reduce the 1½ month
salary as multiplier under the URP to ½ under the law he invoked. This is a sign of covetousness, unfair both
to the employer and those employees who have earlier retired under said plan.[58]
Oxales is not entitled to the reinstatement of his
medical benefits, which are not part of the URP. Corollarily, he is not also entitled to moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Oxales
claims that UNILAB unilaterally revoked his medical benefits, causing him
humiliation and anxiety. This, he
argues, entitles him to moral damages, exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees.
We
cannot agree. The records bear out that
after Oxales retired from UNILAB, he chose to join a rival company, Lloyds
Laboratories, Inc. As UNILAB correctly
puts it, “[i]f any employer can legally and validly do the supreme act of
dismissing a disloyal employee for having joined or sympathized with a rival
company, with more reason may it do the lesser act of merely discontinuing a
benefit unilaterally given to an already-retired employee.”[59] As a retired employee, Oxales may not claim a
vested right on these medical benefits.
A careful examination of the URP would show that medical benefits are not
included in the URP.
Indeed, while there is nothing wrong
in the act of Oxales in joining a rival company after his retirement, justice
and fair play would dictate that by doing so, he cannot now legally demand the
continuance of his medical benefits from UNILAB. To rule otherwise would result in an absurd
situation where Oxales would continue to receive medical benefits from UNILAB
while working in a rival company. We
note that these medical benefits are merely unilaterally given by UNILAB to its
retired employees.
We
are not unaware of this Court’s pronouncement in Brion v. South Philippine
Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.[60] However, Oxales’ plight differs from Brion because the URP does not expressly cover
medical benefits to retirees. In
contrast, the retired employee in Brion had acquired a vested right to
the withheld benefits.
The claim of Oxales to moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees must also be denied for want of basis in
law or jurisprudence. On this score, We
echo the pronouncement of the Court in Audion v. Electric Co., Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[61]
to wit:
Moral and exemplary damages are
recoverable only where the dismissal of an employee was attended by bad faith
or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The person claiming moral damages must prove
the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always
presumes good faith. It is not enough
that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as
the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably, such action must be shown to have
been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive, and bad faith or ill
motive under the law cannot be presumed but must be established with clear and
convincing evidence. Private respondent predicated his claim for such damages
on his own allegations of sleepless
nights and mental anguish, without establishing bad faith, fraud or ill motive
as legal basis therefor.
Private respondent not being
entitled to award of moral damages, an award of exemplary damages is likewise
baseless. Where the award of moral and exemplary damages is eliminated, so must
the award for attorney’s fees be deleted. Private respondent has not shown that he is
entitled thereto pursuant to Art. 2208 of the Civil Code.[62]
(Citations omitted)
Here, there was no dismissal, as
Oxales was retired by UNILAB by virtue of the URP. He was also paid his complete retirement
benefits.
Epilogue
It is not
disputed that Oxales has worked tirelessly for UNILAB. For one thing, he has spent a considerable
amount of years with the company. For
another, he has contributed much to its growth and expansion. However, even as We empathize with him in his
time of great need, it behooves Us to interpret the law according to what it
mandates.
We reiterate the time-honored
principle that the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes
neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. While the Constitution is committed to the
policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, management
also has its own rights, which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair play. Out of its
concern for those with less privilege in life, this Court has inclined more often
than not toward the employee and upheld his cause with his conflicts with the
employer. Such favorable treatment,
however, has not blinded the Court to rule that justice is in every case for
the deserving. Justice should be
dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and
doctrine.[63]
WHEREFORE, the
appealed Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Vice Associate Justice Minita V.
Chico-Nazario. Justice Nazario is on
official leave per Special Order No. 508 dated
** Designated as additional member vice
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per raffle dated
[1] Rollo,
pp. 122-128; Annex “A.” CA-G.R. SP No.
55528. Penned by Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Eliezer
R. De Los Santos, concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4] Annex “C.”
[5] United Retirement Plan, Art. V, Sec. 1(a).
[6] Annex “L.”
[7] Annex “L-1.”
[8] Rollo,
p. 169.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Brion v. South Philippine Union Mission of
the Seventh Day Adventist Church, G.R. No. 135136,
[22] See
Civil Code, Art. 1306.
[23] 165 US 578, 591.
[24] 246 US 357, 373, 374.
[25] 236 US 1, 10, 14.
[26] 208 US 161.
[27] 198 US 45, 49.
[28] 208 US 412, 421.
[29] See
Civil Code, Art. 1159; Pichel v. Alonzo,
G.R. No. L-36902,
[30] Id.,
Art. 1306.
[31] Rollo, p. 131; United Retirement Plan,
Art. II, Sec. 1(j). (Emphasis supplied.)
[32]
[33]
Civil Code, Art. 1370. See also Rules of Court, Rule 130, Secs. 10-19 on
Interpretation of Documents.
[34] Chinchilla v. Rafel, 39 Phil. 888 (1919);
Escario v. Regis, 31 Phil. 618 (1915);
De Lizardi v. Yaptico, 30 Phil. 211
(1915); Nolan v. Majinay, 12 Phil.
559 (1909); Nolan v. Majinay, 12
Phil. 140 (1908); Palacios v.
[35]
17A Am. Jur. 2d § 337, citing Binghamton
Bridge, 70 US 51, 18 L. Ed. 137; South
Hampton Co. v. Stinnes Corp., (CA5 Tex) 733 F. 2d 1108, 38 UCCRS 1137; Murray v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corp., (SD W Va) 591 F. Supp. 1550, affd without op. (CA4 W Va) 767 F. 2d
912; Schulist v. Blue Cross of Iowa, (ND
Ill) 553 F. Supp. 248, 4 EBC 1193, aff’d (CA7 Ill) 717 F. 2d 1127, 4 EBC 2237; P & S Business, Inc. v. South Cent. Bell
Tel.
[36]
[37]
[38] CJC Trading, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 115884,
[39]
G.R. No. 82895,
[40]
Article 287. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired upon reaching the age
established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement or other applicable
employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee
shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned
under existing laws and any collective bargaining or other agreement.
[41]
Section 13. Retirement. – In the
absence of any collective bargaining agreement or other applicable agreement
concerning terms and conditions of employment which provides for retirement at
an older age, an employee may be retired upon reaching the age of sixty (60)
years.
Section 14. Retirement Benefits. – (a) An employee who is retired
pursuant to a bona-fide retirement plan or in accordance with the
applicable individual or collective agreement or established employer policy
shall be entitled to all the retirement benefits provided therein or to
termination pay equivalent at least to one-half month salary for every year of
service, whichever is higher, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year.
(b) Where both the employer and the
employee contribute to the retirement plan, agreement or policy, the employer’s
total contribution thereto shall not be less than the total termination pay to
which the employee would have been entitled had there been no retirement fund. In case the employer’s contribution is less
than the termination pay the employee is entitled to receive, the employer
shall pay the deficiency upon the retirement of the employee.
(c) This Section shall apply where the
employee retires at the age of sixty (60) years or older. (Rules to Implement the Labor Code, Book VI,
Rule I, Sec. 14.)
[42] Llora Motors, Inc. v. Drilon, supra note
39, at 181-187.
[43]
G.R. No. 110861,
[44] Oro Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, id. at 112.
[45]
G.R. No. 95940,
[46] Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, id. at 173.
[47]
[48]
G.R. No. 135136,
[49] Brion v. South Philippine Union
[50]
G.R. No. 90664,
[51] Villena v. National Labor Relations
Commission, id. at 693.
[52]
G.R. Nos. 78524 & 78739,
[53] Planters
Products, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, id. at 339.
[54]
G.R. No. 141673,
[55]
[56]
G.R. Nos. 50999-51000,
[57]
Article XIV. Retirement Gratuity.
Section 1(a). Any employee, who is separated from employment,
due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off not due to the fault of
said employee shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount
equivalent to one (1) month’s salary per year of service. One month of salary shall be deemed equivalent
to the salary at date of retirement; years of service shall be deemed
equivalent to total service credits, a fraction of at least six months being
considered as one year, including probationary employment. (Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission,
id. at 613, citing rollo, p. 71.)
[58] Rollo, p. 180.
[59]
[60] Supra note 48.
[61]
G.R. No. 106648,
[62] Audion v. Electric Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, id. at 355.
[63] Revidad v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 111105,