THIRD DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Petitioners, - versus - JOSEPH TERRADO, and
HONORABLE Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 148226
Present: QUISUMBING, J.,* YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: July 14,
2008 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The Case
Before
the Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] assailing the April 6, 2001 Decision[2] of
Honorable Judge Salvador P. Vedaña of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
68, of Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. L-5813, People v. Joseph Terrado, a.k.a. “Hapon,” finding the accused “Hapon”
not guilty of Carnapping (punished under Republic Act 6538, otherwise known as
the “Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972”).
Accused Joseph Terrado was charged with
Carnapping in the Information filed by 4th Assistant Prosecutor
Abraham L. Ramos II, dated
That on or about 8th
day of August, 1997 in the afternoon, in barangay Malindong, Municipality of
Binmaley, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a fan knife (balisong), by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there threaten with fan knife, Leoncio
Dalmacio driver of motorized tricycle with Plate No. AE-8082 and thereafter
with intent to gain, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took and carted away
said motorized tricycle without the consent and against the will of Leoncio
Dalmacio and/or Marilyn Garcia.
Contrary
to R.A. 6538 [sic], as amended.[3]
The case was originally raffled to
Judge Nicodemo T. Ferrer of Branch 37, RTC.
On
On
On
On
The accused then filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA assailing the
orders of the trial court. Then, on
On
On
Trial of the case thereafter ensued.
For the prosecution, the following witnesses
were presented: Leoncio Dalmacio, PO1 Mardy delos
The version of the prosecution states
that in the afternoon of
For the defense, the accused claimed
that he was on his way to his parents-in-law at Libsong when he met Dalmacio
and asked him if he could borrow the tricycle.
Dalmacio answered in the affirmative and even told him: “Please put some
gasoline in it and I will go to my in-law.”[16] One of the witnesses, Joseph Estrada,
testified that on the day of the alleged incident, he saw the accused speaking
with Dalmacio. Afterwards, he saw Dalmacio
alight from the tricycle, then the accused took over the driver’s seat and left
in the direction of Lingayen. Dalmacio then
boarded a jeepney bound for Dagupan. Estrada testified that during the
conversation of the accused and Dalmacio, he heard no shouts or altercation between
the two.[17] The defense claimed that the accused
merely borrowed the tricycle from Dalmacio.
However, when accused was about to return the same, he hit a stone, lost
control of the tricycle and bumped a tree.[18] Three persons came and helped him
bring the tricycle back to the roadside.[19] The accused returned the tricycle at
around P8,000.00 as partial remuneration for the repair
which was estimated to cost P25,000.00.[20]
In its Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment ACQUITTING the
accused Joseph Terrado for violation of R.A. 6538 otherwise known as the
“Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.”
However,
as regard the civil liability of accused Joseph Terrado, the [court] hereby
orders him to pay the complainant Marilyn Garcia the following: 1) Actual
damages amounting to P25,000.00
– P8,000.00 = P17,000.00 and 2) Moral damages
amounting to P20,000.00.
SO
ORDERED.
The
prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration[21]
which the trial court denied in a Resolution[22]
dated
Aggrieved,
the complainants come to this Court via a
Petition for Certiorari seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision dated
The
issues which the petitioners raise before the Court may be summarized as
follows:
1.
WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF
VIOLATION OF RA 6538 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972;
2.
WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN
RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
The petitioners allege that there was misapprehension of facts,
and that the trial court reached its conclusion based entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction as the judgment of acquittal was rendered on dubious
factual and legal basis.
The
trial court’s decision is being questioned before us through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court. It may be noted that the petition was filed by the private
prosecutor and without the participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General.
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[23]
By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[24]
While
petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the imputation is premised on the averment that the trial court
reached its conclusions based on speculation, surmises and conjectures. As alleged by the petitioners, the accused
forcibly took the vehicle from the complainant’s driver and the public
respondent acquitted the accused for alleged failure to meet the element of
intent to gain.[25] Specifically, the allegations delve
on the misapprehension of facts by the trial court. Petitioners were persistent
that the records of the trial be reviewed, as they were not convinced by the
validity of the trial court’s factual conclusion.
It should be
remembered that, as a rule, factual matters cannot be normally inquired into by
the Supreme Court in a certiorari
proceeding. As earlier stressed, the present recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a
fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the
province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
which is extra ordinem – beyond the
ambit of appeal.[26]
At least, the
mistakes ascribed to the trial court are not errors of jurisdiction correctible
by the special civil action for certiorari,
but errors of judgment, which is correctible by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not
necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that the trial court committed a mistake in its judgment,
the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction
over the case.[27] For this reason, the dismissal of
the instant petition is called for.
In
our jurisdiction, availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal may be allowed in
cases where petitioner has clearly shown that the public respondent acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. However, and more serious than the procedural
infraction, if the petition merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings
of the court a quo, we would run
afoul of the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the
petition for certiorari into an
appeal, which is proscribed by the Constitution, the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.[28] Verdicts of acquittal are to be
regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The fundamental philosophy
behind the principle is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final
repose and to safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of
criminal processes. [29]
This Court cannot rule any other way.
Accused Joseph Terrado, after being acquitted of the crime charged, must be
afforded the protection against repeated attempts for conviction, in faithful
adherence to the constitutional rule against double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice Chairperson |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
*
In lieu of Associate Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 508, dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-31.
[2] Annex “A” of the Petition, id. at 32-51.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] Annex “C” of the Petition, id. at 53-54.
[5] Annex “B” of the Petition, id. at 52.
[6] Annex “D” of the Petition, id. at 55.
[7] Annex “E” of the Petition, id. at 56-57.
[8] Annex “F” of the Petition, id. at 58.
[9] Order dated
[10] Annex “I,” rollo, pp. 62-65.
[11] Annex “J,” rollo, pp. 68-69.
[12] Records, pp. 375-377.
[13] Records, pp. 383-385.
[14]
[15] Affidavit of Leoncio Dalmacio dated
[16] Petition for Review, pp. 15, rollo, p. 17.
[17] RTC Decision, rollo, p. 47.
[18] Petition for Review, p.15, rollo, p. 17.
[19]
[20] Testimony of Marilyn Garcia, RTC Decision, rollo, p. 44.
[21] Rollo, pp. 99-105.
[22]
[23] People v. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 1, 10 (2004).
[24] United
Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 156337,
[25] Petition, rollo, pp. 19-20.
[26] People v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 169, 182 (1999).
[27] Supra note 23.
[28] People v. Court of Appeals, supra note 26.
[29] People v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23, at 13.