SECOND DIVISION
|
ALDEGUER & CO., INC./LOALDE
BOUTIQUE,
Petitioner, - versus - HONEYLINE TOMBOC,
Respondent.
|
G.R. No. 147633 Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: July
28, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
In 1993, Aldeguer and Co.,
Inc./Loalde Boutique (petitioner), a corporation engaged in the retail and
wholesale of Loalde brand products, hired Honeyline Tomboc (respondent).
Petitioner promoted respondent in
1996 as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of its Loalde Ayala Boutique (Loalde Ayala) in the
1. Monitors daily the inventory status of the stocks per product line and per product class
2. Coordinate with the area manager with the following matters
a. stock requirement
b. maintenance of the boutique
c. new directives of the mall management
d. customer’s problems
e. other boutique problems
3. Supervises the sales staff assigned in the respective boutiques
4. Implements the company rules and regulations
5. Checks the PR and deposit slips prepared by the cashier against the sales tally report
6. As per internal control, the OIC is not allowed to handle cashiering except [in] emergency cases which must have prior approval by the management. Keyholding of the cash drawer is the responsibility of the cashier.
7. Must at all times submit a written memo of any irregular incident that may occur inside the boutique or if there’s any deviation [from] company policy due to circumstances.[1]
After conducting an audit of sales in
Loalde Ayala, petitioner concluded that respondent misappropriated P28,137.70[2]
which is a just cause for termination under Art. 282 of the Labor Code,[3] and
accordingly notified her on
Aside
from these undeposited cash collections, there are reports submitted by three
(3) cashiers who were assigned in the Loalde Boutique that you, being the OIC
in the boutique meddles [sic] [with] the cash for deposit, and
delaying [sic] such for more than three (3) days. This has prompted the management to believe
that you were really using the money.[4] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent thereupon filed on
In her Position Paper,[6] respondent
gave the following version:
After being cleared of her
accountabilities on
In the same Position Paper, respondent
posited that she was terminated from employment because she refused to sign a
voucher acknowledging receipt of wage differentials which she did not in fact receive.[8]
From the records, it is gathered that
at the scheduled conciliation conference before the Labor Arbiter, petitioner
sent no representative.[9] And it twice failed to send any representative
at the formal hearing of the case. Further, it failed to submit its position
paper,[10]
drawing the Labor Arbiter to declare on
It is its
policy to require a boutique-in-charge to conduct a “cash count . . . every end
of the day or on the first hour of the following day after her day off [and
a]ny collection for the day must be deposited without fail on the succeeding
banking day.”[14]
On
|
Official Receipt Number |
Date |
Amount |
|
6565 |
|
|
|
6582 |
|
5,542.50 |
|
6586 |
|
10,035.40 |
|
6801 |
|
12,090.00 |
|
6802 |
|
9,203.40 |
|
6803 |
|
6,844.30 |
When asked to explain, respondent
claimed that the amounts were all deposits-in-transit, meaning, the bank had
already picked up the amounts but had not yet returned the validated deposit slips.[16]
Respondent
having been scheduled to go on vacation leave starting May 20, 1997, she was
asked to and did report for work on even date during which she conferred with
Nenita and the General Boutique and Sales Manager Cora Anzano. At the conference, respondent maintained that
the questioned amounts were already deposited in the bank. Petitioner’s bank passbook did not, however, reflect
the amounts covered by the last three above-indicated official receipts.[17]
Investigation
showed that deposits on P28,137.70
covering the said period.
On her scheduled
return to work on
Respondent
committed other irregularities in the past.
Thus, on P46,491.35
and when made to account therefor, she claimed that a representative of
Solidbank Mandaue picked up the amount on the morning of the same day. The bank denied her claim, however.
Verification
with the bank revealed that the cash sales for February 15 and 16, 1997 were
deposited only on
On another
occasion or on April 24, 1997, respondent instructed an employee, Jocelyn, to
issue an official receipt for P4,307.25 antedated April 3, 1997, and another
for P6,030.30 antedated April 18, 1997, to cover amounts which Loalde
Ayala received on those dates and which were being traced by the head
office.
Still on
another occasion, respondent falsified the signature of the bank teller on
deposit slips dated
By
Decision[21] of
The NLRC
upheld[22]
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and denied respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration,[23]
prompting her to file a Petition for Certiorari[24]
before the Court of Appeals.
By
Decision[25] of
In
reversing the NLRC decision, the Court of Appeals found the Labor Arbiter to
have “committed grave abuse of discretion when it admitted [herein
petitioner’s] Position Paper even if submitted almost two (2) months
late, aggravated by the fact that said Position Paper was unverified
and no copy thereof furnished [herein respondent]”[27]
(Underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied). And it found respondent to have been illegally
dismissed.[28] It further found that respondent was denied
due process as she was not afforded a chance to refute the charge of
misappropriation against her. Finally,
it found the charge to be “a product of [respondent’s] refusal . . . to sign a
fictitious voucher.”[29]
Hence, the
present petition[30] faulting
the Court of Appeals to have erred:
I. x x x IN HOLDING THAT THE LABOR ARBITER COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ADMITTED HEREIN PETITIONER’S POSITION PAPER ONE DAY AFTER THE CASE WAS DEEMED SUBMITTED FOR DECISION.
II. x x x IN BRUSHING ASIDE THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF BOTH THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER WHICH HELD THE TERMINATION OF RESPONDENT VALID BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. x x x IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF RESPONDENT TOMBOC AS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE HAS ESTABLISHED THE JUST CAUSE FOR RESPONDENT’S DISMISSAL.
IV.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN DISMISSING THE RESPONDENT.[31] (Underscoring supplied)
The
petition is impressed with merit.
A Labor Arbiter is mandated by law to use
every reasonable means to ascertain the facts of each case speedily and
objectively, without technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process.[32] Failure
to submit a
position paper on
time is not a
ground for striking it from
the records.[33] And lack of verification of petitioner’s position
paper is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, defect.[34]
In finding the admission of the
belatedly filed position paper of petitioner to have been attended with grave
abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals relied on, inter alia, the following pronouncement in Mañebo v. National Labor
Relations Commission:[35]
x x x Firstly, while it is true that the Rules of the NLRC must be liberally construed and that the NLRC is not bound by the technicalities of law and procedure, the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC itself must not be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious, and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. One such provision is Section 3, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which requires the submission of verified position papers within fifteen days from the date of the last conference, with proof of service thereof on the other parties. The position papers “shall cover only those claims and causes of action raised in the complaint excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall be accompanied by all supporting documents including the affidavits of their respective witnesses which shall take the place of the latter’s testimony.” After the submission thereof, the parties “shall . . . not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to and any cause or causes of action not included in the complaint or position papers, affidavits, and other documents.”[36] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In
finding Mañebo to have been denied
due process, this Court held:
[T]he Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in disregarding the
rule governing position papers by admitting the Supplemental Position Paper and Memorandum, which was not even accompanied by proof of service
to the petitioner or his counsel, and by taking into consideration, as basis for his decision, the alleged
facts adduced therein and the documents attached thereto.[37] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
As partly reflected in the
above-quoted portions of the decision in Mañebo, the Court noted that the labor arbiter principally
based its decision on the facts alleged in, and documents attached to the
therein respondent-employer’s “Supplemental Position Paper and
Memorandum,” no copy of which was even furnished the petitioner-employee Mañebo
to thus deny him due process.
In
the case at bar, petitioner submitted its Position Paper on
From the recital of the facts of the case
at bar then, respondent was not deprived of due process.
ON THE MERITS, petitioner has shown
just cause for the termination of respondent’s employment under Art. 282 of the
Labor Code on the ground of “fraud or willful breach by the employee of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative.”[39]
Nenita’s affidavit and audit report
are corroborated by petitioner’s Solidbank passbook showing that the P12,090.00
cash sales for May 11, 1997, P9,203.40 cash sales for May 12, 1997, and P6,844.30
cash sales for May 13, 1997 – all duly receipted[40] –
were not deposited in petitioner’s account with Solidbank.[41]
The claim of Jinky,
a cashier, in her affidavit that it was respondent who turned over the deposits
to the bank representative on
Respondent’s contention that the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ignored the Memorandum issued by petitioner on
boutique-in-charge is ordinarily not
allowed to handle cashiering, she may do so, however, if the need arises.[44] At any rate, Jinky
and some of the affiants stated in their affidavits that respondent interfered
with cashiering tasks, in violation of company policy.
On respondent’s claim that petitioner
framed her up in retaliation for her refusal to sign a voucher showing receipt
of payment of wage differentials which she never received,[45] the
same fails. The copy of the voucher dated
April 1996 which respondent presented shows that she did, in fact, sign it.[46]
IN FINE, the Court finds that respondent’s
employment was terminated for just cause.
It finds, however, that
petitioner failed to observe the requirements of procedural due process.
The rules implementing Book VI of the
Labor Code require the following in the termination of employment based on just
causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
x x
x x
(i) A written notice on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity to which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
x x x x[47]
The Court of Appeals correctly found,
however, that “x x x [i]nstead of complying with the two (2) written notice
requirement[s], [herein petitioner] in one, single notice, ordered [herein
respondent’s] dismissal x x x.”[48] Thus, its
Effective
Should
you want to get your personal belongings in the boutique, you have to course
everything through the General Boutique & Sales Manager, Ms. Cora G.
Anzano. The latter will handle the
withdrawal of your personal things in the boutique, and shall turn-over
everything to you personally. Ms. Anzano
will be at the Ayala Boutique tomorrow morning,
You
have to take heed of this directive to avoid a more drastic action.[49]
Such single notice does not comply
with the requirements of the law.[50]
Petitioner argues, however, that “respondent
was terminated not only for the offenses she committed [in] May 1997 but also
for the other offenses particularly those committed [in] February 1997 for
which she was already required to explain in writing x x x.”[51] (Emphasis
in the original, underscoring supplied).
The argument fails. For, for the first notice requirement to be
satisfied, the following conditions must be met:
[T]he first notice must inform outright the employee that an investigation will be conducted on the charges particularized therein which, if proven, will result to his dismissal. Such notice must not only contain a plain statement of the charges of malfeasance or misfeasance but must categorically state the effect on his employment if the charges are proven to be true.
This notice will afford the employee an opportunity to avail [of] all defenses and exhaust all remedies to refute the allegations hurled against him for what is at stake is his very life and limb[,] his employment. Otherwise, the employee may just disregard the notice as a warning without any disastrous consequence to be anticipated. Absent such statement, the first notice falls short of the requirement of due process. x x x[52]
Petitioner having failed to comply
with the first notice requirement, respondent
is, following Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,[53]
entitled to indemnity in
the form of nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.
WHEREFORE, the February 27, 2001 Decision of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The January 12, 1999 Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED
with the MODIFICATION that petitioner,
Aldeguer &. P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] NLRC records, p. 22.
[2]
[3] Art. 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. (Underscoring supplied)
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] CA rollo, pp. 2-26.
[25] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with the concurrence of Associate Justices Hilarion
L. Aquino and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] Rollo, pp. 10-44.
[31]
[32] ABS-CBN Broadcasting Network v.
Nazareno, G.R. No. 164156, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 204, 222.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Vide
Rural Bank of Alaminos Employees
[35] G.R. No. 107721,
[36]
[37]
[38] Vide
NLRC records, p. 52.
[39] Labor Code, Article 282 (c).
[40] NLRC records, pp. 70-72.
[41]
[42]
[43] Rollo, p. 128. Vide
records, p. 22.
[44] Records at 90.
[45]
[46]
[47] Rules Implementing Book VI, Rule I, Section 2.
[48] CA rollo, p. 343.
[49] NLRC records, p. 26.
[50] Vide
Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative,
Inc. v. Faburada, 419 Phil. 147, 157 (2001).
[51] Rollo, p. 173.
[52] Maquiling v. Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, Inc., G.R. No. 143384,
[53] G.R. No. 158693,