Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
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EDDIE PACQUING, |
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G.R. No. 157966 |
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RODERICK CENTENO, |
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JUANITO M. GUERRA, |
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Present: |
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CLARO DUPILAD, JR., |
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LOUIE CENTENO, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., |
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DAVID REBLORA** and |
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Chairperson, |
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RAYMUNDO*** ANDRADE, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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Petitioners, |
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NACHURA, and |
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- versus - |
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REYES, JJ. |
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COCA-COLA |
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Promulgated: |
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INC.,**** |
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January 31,
2008 |
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Respondent. |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]
dated
The factual
background of the case is as follows:
Eddie Pacquing, Roderick Centeno, Juanito M. Guerra, Claro Dupilad, Jr., Louie Centeno,
David Reblora, Raymundo
Andrade (petitioners) were sales route helpers or cargadores-pahinantes
of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (respondent), with the length of
employment as follows:
Name Date Hired Date
Dismissed
Eddie P. Pacquing
Roderick Centeno
Juanito M. Guerra
Claro Dupilad, Jr.
David R. Reblora
Louie Centeno
Raymundo Andrade
Petitioners were
part of a complement of three personnel comprised of a driver, a salesman and a
regular route helper, for every delivery truck.
They worked exclusively at respondent's plants, sales offices, and
company premises.
On
In their
Position Paper,[5]
petitioners alleged that they should be declared regular employees of
respondent since the nature of their work as cargadores-pahinantes
was necessary or desirable to respondent's usual business and was directly
related to respondent's business and trade.
In its Position Paper,[6]
respondent denied liability to petitioners and countered
that petitioners
were temporary workers who were engaged for a five-month period to act as
substitutes for an absent regular employee.
On
On
On October 17,
2000, respondent filed an Opposition to Appeal[10]
alleging that with the exception of Roderick and Louie Centeno,
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter has become final and executory
as regards the other complainants who did not indicate their consent to the
filing of the appeal by proper verification or grant of authority; that even if
the appeal is effective with respect to all complainants, the Labor Arbiter was
correct in finding that complainants are not regular employees of the
respondent.
On
On
On
On
Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[19]
but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution[20]
dated
Petitioners then
filed the present petition raising the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE
PETITIONER (sic) DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THREE OUT OF THE EIGHT PETITIONERS TO
AFFIX THEIR SIGNATURES (sic) THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM
SHOPPING.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTIONS OF
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED OR DEVIATED FROM THE PREVAILING DOCTRINE OR
LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HIGH TRIBUNAL THAT VERIFICATION IS MERELY
A MATTER OF FORM AND NON-COMPLIANCE THEREWITH DOES NOT RENDER THE PLEADING
FATALLY DEFECTIVE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONCLUSIONS AND
DECISIONS OF THE LABOR ARBITER [sic] NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION [sic]
IN ACCORDANCE WITH EVIDENCE, JURISPRUDENCE, LABOR LAWS, STATUTES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES PROPITIOUS TO THE PETITIONERS.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE
DECLARED REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF COCA-COLA AND THUS ENTITLED TO BE REINSTATED WITH
BACKWAGES FROM THE DATE OF THEIR DISMISSAL UP TO THE DATE OF THEIR ACTUAL REINSTATEMENT,
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.[21]
Petitioners
contend that the absence of the signatures of the three other petitioners in
the verification and certification against forum-shopping in the Petition for Certiorari
before the CA was not fatal since verification is merely a matter of form of
pleading and non-compliance does not render the pleading fatally defective;
that the absence of the signature of the six other complainants in the
verification in the appeal memorandum was not fatal since technicalities have no room in labor
cases; that petitioners are regular employees of respondent since they have
been employed for more than one year and perform functions necessary to
respondent's business.
Respondent,
on the other hand, argues that petitioners' blatant violation of and
non-compliance with procedural rules should not be countenanced; that the
petition seeks an evaluation of evidence and factual findings of the CA and the
NLRC which is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where only questions of law are
entertained.
The
petition is impressed with merit.
While
the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed
by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient, the Court has stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which
were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice,
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provision regarding
the certificate of non-forum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that
the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.[22]
It does not, however, prohibit
substantial compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances,[23]
considering especially that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.[24]
In
recent decisions, the Court has consistently held that when all the petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the rules.[25]
In HLC
Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners
Association,[26]
it was held that the signature of only one of the petitioners substantially
complied with the Rules because all the petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or
defense. The Court said:
Respondents (who were plaintiffs in the trial
court) filed the complaint against petitioners as a group, represented by their
homeowners’ association president who was likewise one of the plaintiffs, Mr. Samaon M. Buat. Respondents
raised one cause of action which was the breach of contractual obligations
and payment of damages. They shared a common interest in the subject
matter of the case, being the aggrieved residents of the poorly constructed and
developed Emily Homes Subdivision. Due to the collective nature of the case,
there was no doubt that Mr. Samaon M. Buat could validly sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping in behalf of all his co-plaintiffs. In cases therefore where it is
highly impractical to require all the plaintiffs to sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping, it is sufficient, in order not to defeat the ends of
justice, for one of the plaintiffs, acting as representative, to sign the
certificate provided that xxx the plaintiffs
share a common interest in the subject matter of the case or filed the case as
a “collective,” raising only one common cause of action or defense.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[27]
In San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa,[28] the dismissed employees filed with the
NLRC a complaint for declaration as regular employees of San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) and for an illegal dismissal case, following SMC’s closure of its Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant. After an unfavorable ruling from the NLRC, the
dismissed employees filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA. Only three out of the
97 named petitioners signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. This Court ruled that given
the collective nature of the petition filed before the CA, which raised only
one common cause of action against SMC, the execution by the three petitioners of
the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with
the Rules.
More recently, in Espina
v. Court of Appeals,[29]
the Court held that the signatures of 25 out of the 28 employees who filed the
Petition for Certiorari in the CA,
likewise, constitute substantial compliance with the Rules. Petitioners therein raised one common cause of
action against M.Y. San and Monde, i.e.,
the illegal closure of M.Y. San and its subsequent sale to Monde, which
resulted in the termination of their services. They shared a common interest and common defense in the complaint for illegal
dismissal which they filed with the NLRC. Thus, when they appealed their case to the CA,
they pursued the same as a collective body, raising only one argument in
support of their rights against the illegal dismissal allegedly committed by
M.Y. San and Monde. There was sufficient
basis, therefore, for the 25 petitioners, to speak for and in behalf of their
co-petitioners, to file the petition in the CA.
In the
same vein, this is also true in the instant case where petitioners have filed
their case as a collective group, sharing a common interest and having a common single cause of action
against respondent. Accordingly, the
signatures of five of the eight petitioners in the Petition for Certiorari
before the CA constitute substantial compliance with the rules.
Contrary
to the CA's pronouncement, Loquias finds no application here. In said case, the co-parties were being sued
in their individual capacities as mayor, vice mayor and members of the
municipal board of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, who were criminally charged for allegedly withholding
the salary increases and benefits of the municipality’s health personnel. They were tried for alleged violation of
Republic Act No. 3019[30]
in their various respective personal capacities. Clearly, the conviction or acquittal of one
accused would not necessarily apply to all the accused in a graft charge.
As to the defective verification in the
appeal memorandum before the NLRC, the same liberality applies. After all, the requirement regarding
verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional.[31]
Such requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.[32]
Verification is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct
and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith.[33]
The court or tribunal may order the
correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading
although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends
of justice may thereby be served.[34]
Moreover, no less than the Labor Code
directs labor officials to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts
speedily and objectively, with little regard to technicalities or formalities;[35]
while Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides
that technical rules are not binding.[36]
Indeed, the application of technical
rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of
substantial justice.[37] Thus, the execution of the verification in
the appeal memorandum by only two complainants in behalf of the other
complainants also constitute substantial compliance.
Indeed,
it is more in accord with substantial justice and equity to overlook
petitioners' procedural lapses. Labor
cases must be decided according to justice and equity and the substantial
merits of the controversy.[38]
After all, the policy of our judicial
system is to encourage full adjudication of the merits of an appeal. Procedural niceties
should be avoided in labor cases in which the provisions of the Rules of Court
are applied only in suppletory manner. Indeed, rules of procedure may be relaxed to
relieve a part of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
noncompliance with the process required.[39]
For this reason, the Court cannot
indulge respondent in its tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to
boost its arguments. The strength of
one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases
in law and jurisprudence.[40]
The primordial
issue in the present petition is whether petitioners are regular employees of
the respondent.
Generally, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is a factual matter that will
not be delved into by this Court, since only questions of law may be raised in
petitions for review.[41] Needless to stress, the established rule is
that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court not
being a trier of facts, does not normally embark on a
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the Court.[42]
This rule, however, has several
well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[43]
Exceptions (2) and (4) are present in the instant case.
The pivotal
question of whether respondent's sales route helpers or cargadores
or pahinantes are regular workers of respondent
has already been resolved in Magsalin v. National
Organization of Working Men,[44]
thus:
The basic law on the case is Article 280 of the
Labor Code. Its pertinent provisions read:
Art. 280. Regular and
Casual Employment. – The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer,
except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall
be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exists.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., is one of the
leading and largest manufacturers of softdrinks in
the country. Respondent workers have long been in the service of petitioner
company. Respondent workers, when hired, would go with route
salesmen on board delivery trucks and undertake the laborious task of loading
and unloading softdrink products of petitioner
company to its various delivery points.
Even while the language of law might have been
more definitive, the clarity of its spirit and intent, i.e., to ensure a
“regular” worker’s security of tenure, however, can hardly be doubted. In
determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular,
the applicable test is the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of
the employer. The standard, supplied by the law itself, is whether the work
undertaken is necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer, a fact that
can be assessed by looking into the nature of the services rendered and its
relation to the general scheme under which the business or trade is pursued in
the usual course. It is distinguished from a specific undertaking that is
divorced from the normal activities required in carrying on the particular
business or trade. But, although the
work to be performed is only for a specific project or seasonal, where a person
thus engaged has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the
performance is not continuous or is merely intermittent, the law deems the
repeated and continuing need for its performance as being sufficient to
indicate the necessity or desirability of that activity to the business or
trade of the employer. The employment of such person is also then deemed to be
regular with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.
The argument of petitioner that its usual business
or trade is softdrink manufacturing and that the work
assigned to respondent workers as sales route helpers so
involves merely “post production activities,” one which is not indispensable in
the manufacture of its products, scarcely can be persuasive. If, as so argued
by petitioner company, only those whose work are directly involved in the
production of softdrinks may be held performing
functions necessary and desirable in its usual business or trade, there would
have then been no need for it to even maintain regular truck sales route helpers. The nature of the work performed must be
viewed from a perspective of the business or trade in its entirety and not on a
confined scope.
The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and
the continuing need for their services clearly attest to the necessity or
desirability of their services in the regular conduct of the business or trade
of petitioner company. The Court of Appeals has found each of respondents to
have worked for at least one year with petitioner company. While this Court, in Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora,has upheld the legality of a fixed-term employment,
it has done so, however, with a stern admonition that where from the
circumstances it is apparent that the period has been imposed to preclude the
acquisition of tenurial security by the employee,
then it should be struck down as being contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy. The pernicious practice of having employees,
workers and laborers, engaged for a fixed period of few months, short of the
normal six-month probationary period of employment, and, thereafter, to be
hired on a day-to-day basis, mocks the law. Any obvious circumvention of the
law cannot be countenanced. The fact that respondent workers have agreed to be
employed on such basis and to forego the protection given to them on their
security of tenure, demonstrate nothing more than the serious problem of
impoverishment of so many of our people and the resulting unevenness between
labor and capital. A contract of employment is impressed with public interest.
The provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and
“the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships
from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each
other.”[45]
Under the principle of stare
decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled),[46]
it is the Court's duty to apply the previous ruling in Magsalin to the instant case. Once a
case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point
at issue, as in the case at bar, should be decided in the same manner.[47]
Else, the ideal of a stable jurisprudential system can never be achieved.
Being regular employees of respondent, petitioners are entitled to security of tenure, as provided
in Article 279[48]
of the Labor Code, and may only be terminated from employment due to just or
authorized causes. Because respondent failed to show such cause,[49]
the petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back
wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.[50]
On the claim for
moral and exemplary damages, there is no basis to award the same. Moral and exemplary damages are recoverable
only where the dismissal of an employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.[51]
The person claiming moral
damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and
convincing evidence, for the law always presumes good faith.[52]
Petitioners failed to prove bad faith,
fraud or ill motive on the part of respondent.[53]
Moral damages
cannot be awarded. Without the award of moral damages, there can be no award of
exemplary damages, nor attorney’s fees.[54]
WHEREFORE, the present
petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated November 25, 2002 and Resolution dated April 15, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68756 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners are declared regular employees of
the respondent. Respondent is ordered to
reinstate petitioners to their former positions with full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent,
computed from the date of their termination up to the time of their actual
reinstatement.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* In lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per
Special Order No. 484 dated
** Spelled as “Rablora” in other parts of the rollo.
*** Spellec as “Reymundo” in other
parts of the rollo.
**** The present petition impleaded the Court of Appeals as respondent. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the name of the Court of Appeals is deleted from the title.
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili
(now retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer
R. De los
[2]
[3] Including
Jovito C. Estolonio, who was
also a party-complainant in the NLRC and petitioner in the CA, but who no
longer joined in the present petition.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Namely: Eddie Pacquing,
Roderick Centeno, Juanito
M. Guerra, Louie Centeno, and Raymundo
Andrade.
[17]
[18] 392
Phil. 596 (2000).
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Iglesia ni Cristo
v. Ponferrada, G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 828; HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision
Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 139360, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 504,
508; Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Court of Appeals, 450 Phil. 532, 540 (2003); Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, 448 Phil. 302, 311
(2003); Twin Towers Condominium
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 208, 298 (2003).
[23] Solmayor
v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 153817, March
31, 2006; 486 SCRA 326, 341; Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, supra
note 22, at 311.
[24] Cua
v. Vargas, G.R. No. 156536,
October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 374, 390; Heirs
of Dicman v. Cariño,
G.R. No. 146459, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 240, 261; Heirs of Agapito T. Olarte
v. Office of the President of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165821, June 21,
2005, 460 SCRA 561, 566.
[25] Cua
v. Vargas, supra note 24; San
Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, G.R. No. 14911, June
28, 2005, 461 SCRA 392, 411, 412; Espina v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164582, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 327, 344-345.
[26] Supra
note 22.
[27]
[28] Supra
note 25.
[29] Supra
note 25.
[30] Otherwise
known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.”
[31] Valdecantos
v. People, G.R. No. 148852,
[32] Republic v. Lee Wai
Lam, 139 Phil. 265, 269 (1969).
[33]
[34] Torres v. Specialized
Packaging Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 465; Robern Development Corporation v. Judge
Quitain, 373 Phil. 773, 787 (1999).
[35] Article
221, as amended.
[36] Section
10. TECHNICAL RULES NOT BINDING. The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing
in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard for
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
(Emphasis supplied)
[37] Casimiro v. Stern Real Estate, Inc., G.R. No. 162233, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 463, 479;
Mayon Hotel & Restaurant v. Adana, G.R. No. 157634, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 609,
628.
[38] Garcia
v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R.
No. 160798, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 768, 780-781; EDI Staff Builders
International, Inc. v. Magsino, 411 Phil. 730
(2001).
[39] Garcia
v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
supra; Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 36
(2003).
[40] De
Ysasi III v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 104599,
[41] Sigaya v. Mayuga, G.R. No. 143254,
[42] Heirs
of Dicman v. Cariño, supra note 30; Bank of the Philippine Islands
v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 146021, March 10, 2006,
484 SCRA 261, 267-268; Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, September 30,
2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.
[43] Heirs
of Dicman v. Cariño, supra note 30, at 261-262; Bank of the
Philippine Islands v. Sarmiento, supra; Almendrala v. Ngo, supra.
[44] 451
Phil. 254 (2003).
[45]
[46] J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. v. Mariano, No.
L-33140,
[47] Pines City Educational
Center v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 96779,
[48] Art.
279 - Security of Tenure — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.
[49] The
Labor Code, Articles 282 to 284.
[50] The Labor Code, Article 279.
[51] Acuña
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
159832, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 658, 668; Ford
Philippines Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1 (1997).
[52] Acuña
v. Court of Appeals, supra; Equitable Banking Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 102467, June 13, 1997, 273 SCRA 352,
379.
[53] Acuña
v. Court of Appeals, supra; Audion Electric Co., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 106648, June 17, 1999, 308 SCRA 340, 355.
[54] Acuña
v. Court of Appeals, supra; Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 413 (1997).