THIRD DIVISION
|
Re: CONVICTION OF JUDGE
ADORACION G. ANGELES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 121, IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR CHILD
ABUSE |
A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: January 31,
2008 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is yet another administrative
case confronting respondent Adoracion G. Angeles (respondent), Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City (sala) filed by
the Office of the Court Administrator[1]
(OCA) recommending that she be suspended pending the outcome of this
administrative case.
The Facts
On
On
1. Judge Angeles now stands convicted on two counts of a crime, child abuse under Republic Act 7610, which involves moral turpitude. Until she clears her name of such conviction, her current moral qualification to do the work of a judge is under a dark cloud. Litigants seeking justice in our courts are entitled to a hearing by judges whose moral qualifications are not placed in serious doubt.
2. Although her conviction is not yet final, the presumption of innocence that Judge Angeles enjoyed during the pendency of the trial has already been overcome by its result. The presumption today is that she is guilty and must clear her name of the charges.
x x x x
It simply would not be right to have a person presumably guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude to hear and adjudicate the cases of others.
3. Under section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, since the RTC of Quezon City convicted Judge Angeles of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, she no longer has a right to bail and, therefore, should ordinarily be held in prison pending adjudication of her appeal. That the RTC of Quezon City chose
to exercise its discretionary power to nonetheless grant her bail does not change the fact that, except for the bail, Judge Angeles’ rightful place by reason of conviction is within the confinement of prison.
It would seem incongruous for the Supreme Court to allow convicted felons out on bail to hear and adjudicate cases in its courts.
4. Finally, as a sitting judge who wields power over all persons appearing before her and has immeasurable influence within the judicial system as one of its members, Judge Angeles could definitely cause pressure to bear, not only on the members of the Court of Appeals and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but also on the Office of the Solicitor General that prosecutes her case on appeal. Only temporary suspension from official function, pending resolution of her case, will neutralize her judicial clout and clear the air of any kind of suspicion that justice is not going well in her case.
On
On the basis of SSP Velasco's letter
and by virtue of this Court's Resolution[7]
dated
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this administrative complaint be given due course and, respondent be ordered to file her Comment within ten (10) days from receipt. Considering the evidence is prima facie strong, it is respectfully recommended that she be INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED pending the outcome of the instant case or until further orders from this Court. It is further recommended that after the Comment is filed, the administrative proceeding be suspended to await the final outcome of the criminal cases filed against her.
In a Resolution[10]
dated September 18, 2006, this Court's Second Division approved all of these
recommendations, thus, suspending respondent from performing her judicial
functions while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases or until
further orders from this Court.
On
On the other hand, on
Correlatively, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Caloocan, Malabon, Navotas Chapter (IBP-CALMANA Chapter),
through its Public Relations Officer (PRO) Atty. Emiliano A. Mackay, wrote a
letter[14]
dated October 18, 2006 addressed to the Second Division of this Court inquiring
as to the effectivity of the Resolution suspending the respondent so as not to sow
confusion among the legal practitioners and party litigants with pending cases
before the respondent's sala. Likewise, the IBP-CALMANA Chapter manifested that
respondent did not cease to perform her judicial functions as evidenced by a
Commitment Order[15]
issued by respondent on
In her Reply[18]
to SSP Velasco's Opposition, respondent admitted that she continued discharging
her bounden duties in utmost good faith after filing her motion for
reconsideration. She averred that she did not have the slightest intention to
defy or ignore this Court's Resolution which did not categorically state that
the said suspension is immediately executory. Respondent reiterated her
arguments against the suspension order on the grounds that she was deprived of
due process; that her conviction is not yet final; and that the crimes for
which she was convicted have nothing to do with the discharge of her official
duties. Lastly, respondent claimed that the instant case is but another
harassment suit filed against her by SSP Velasco because she earlier filed an
administrative complaint against the latter for maliciously indicting
respondent with respect to another case of child abuse.
On
On
On October 30, 2006, SSP Velasco filed
an Administrative Complaint against respondent for violation of the Court's
Circulars, the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, and for Gross Misconduct, asseverating, among others, that the
suspension order was immediately executory[22]
and that integrity as mandated by the New Code of Judicial Conduct is essential
not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
In her Comment,[23]
respondent, in addition to her previous contentions, argued that the Resolution
dated September 18, 2006 ordering her suspension was issued only by a Division
of this Court contrary to Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
provides that “the Supreme Court en banc
shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.”
On
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated
Upon verification, it appears that the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Second Division, indeed failed to attach a copy of the OCA
complaint to the copy of our resolution dated
Respondent was then given a fresh
period of ten (10) days from the receipt of the OCA Administrative Complaint
within which to file her comment.
On March 15, 2007, respondent filed
her Comment[26] with
the following material assertions: (1) that CA Lock as Court Administrator and
who in behalf of the OCA stands as the complainant in this case, has no
personal knowledge of the facts, issues and evidence presented in the criminal
cases; (2) that the instant case,
filed eleven (11) years after the
criminal charges for child abuse were filed by Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay,
smacks of malice and bad faith on the part of CA Lock; (3) that CA Lock is a
friend and former subordinate of then
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Epimaco Velasco (Director Velasco), father
of
herein
party SSP Velasco, thus, CA Lock's ill motive against respondent is clear; (4)
that CA Lock should not use the OCA to harass a member of the judiciary; (5) that
the decision in the aforementioned criminal cases has not yet become final; (6)
that the acts for which she was convicted are totally alien to her official
functions and have nothing to do with her fitness and competence as a judge; (7)
that there is no wisdom in the
imposition of the suspension which in this case is preventive in character
because respondent cannot do anything through her office that could possibly
cause prejudice to the prosecution of the child abuse case; (8) that the
lifting of the suspension order retroacts to the date of its issuance; (9) that
the instant case should be struck down because the judgment of conviction was
contrary to law and jurisprudence; and (10) that under the circumstances, all
the charges were merely concocted by respondent's detractors in order to
embarrass, humiliate and vex her.
In his Motion for Reconsideration[27]
of this Court's Resolution dated
In response, respondent filed a
Comment/Opposition to the said motion with a Motion to Declare SSP Velasco in contempt
of Court[29]
due to this aforementioned statement. Respondent argued that such statement
betrays SSP Velasco's cheap and low perception of the integrity and
independence of this Court, of the CA and of the OSG. It also shows his utter
lack of respect for the judicial system. Moreover, respondent added that since
she was not furnished a copy of the OCA Administrative Complaint, the issuance
of the suspension order deprived her of her right to due process and prevented
her from fully ventilating her arguments. Respondent, likewise, questioned SSP Velasco's
legal personality in this case as it was the OCA which, motu proprio, initiated the filing of the said case.
In a Resolution dated
In her Reply[30]
to said Comment, respondent argued that it cannot be said that somebody could
cause pressure if no one is believed to be susceptible to pressure. Thus, the
use of this kind of language tends to degrade the administration of justice and
constitutes indirect contempt. She stressed that SSP Velasco's act of
misrepresenting himself as the complainant in this case while it is clear from
the Resolution of this Court that the OCA motu
proprio filed the same, is per se
contemptuous.
Meanwhile in its Memorandum,[31]
the OCA reiterated its earlier position that respondent should be suspended
pending the outcome of this administrative case. The OCA opined that the
Resolution lifting the suspension order was basically premised on the ground
that respondent was not accorded her right to due process. By filing her
Comment raising arguments against her suspension, respondent has fully availed
herself of such right. However, the OCA submitted that respondent's arguments
are devoid of merit on the following grounds: (1) the Court Administrator need
not personally know about the criminal cases of respondent because the instant
case is based on a public document, i.e.,
the decision of the RTC convicting the respondent of child abuse; (2) the fact
that said decision has not attained finality is of no moment for what is being
sought is merely preventive suspension. Thus, in the event that respondent is
acquitted in the criminal cases of which she stands accused, she will receive
the salaries and other benefits which she would not receive during her
suspension; (3) even if the acts of child abuse have no connection with respondent’s
official functions as a judge, it is established that the private conduct of
judges cannot be dissociated from their official functions; (4) respondent's
preventive suspension shall serve an important purpose: it will protect the image of the judiciary and preserve
the faith of the people in the same; and
(5) citing
the case of Leonida Vistan v. Judge Ruben
T. Nicolas,[32]
the RTC decision convicting respondent of child abuse is prima facie evidence that respondent committed the said crime which
indicates the moral depravity of the offender and, as such, warrants the
punishment of dismissal from the service. Thus, the OCA recommended that
respondent be suspended pending the outcome of this administrative case and
that the CA be directed to resolve the criminal cases with dispatch.
The Issues
There are two ultimate issues in this
case:
First,
whether or not grounds exist to cite SSP Velasco for indirect contempt of
Court; and
Second,
whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the respondent pending the
resolution of this administrative case.
The Court's
Ruling
We resolve the first issue in the
negative.
In Pilar
Barredo-Fuentes v. Judge Romeo C. Albarracin,[33]
we held:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.
In her Comment/Opposition with Motion
to Declare SSP Velasco in contempt of Court, respondent espoused the view that
SSP Velasco is guilty of indirect contempt for using language which tends to
degrade the administration of justice. But if this were so, respondent should
have availed herself of the remedy in accordance with Section 4, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
A charge of indirect contempt must be
filed in the form of a verified petition if it is not initiated directly by the court against which the contemptuous
act was committed. On previous occasions, we clarified that such petition is in
the nature of a special civil action. Certified true copies of related
documents must be submitted with the petition and appropriate docket fees must
be paid. The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. As Justice
Florenz D. Regalado has explained:
This new provision clarifies with a
regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While
such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the former
Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to
file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and
without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now
required in the second paragraph of [Section 4].[34]
On the charge of indirect contempt of
court, we therefore find that SSP Velasco's statement, while irresponsible, did
not necessarily degrade the administration of justice as to be considered
contumacious. The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must
be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. A lawyer's remarks
explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily assume
the level of contempt that justifies the court’s exercise of the power of
contempt.[35]
We note that SSP Velasco's statement was made in support of his argument for
the imposition of preventive suspension, i.e.,
to prevent the respondent from using her current position to alter the course
of the investigation and the disposition of the appealed criminal cases.
Nevertheless, SSP Velasco must bear in
mind that as a lawyer, he must be circumspect in his language. We remind him of
our admonition to all lawyers to observe the following Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read:
Canon 8. Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
A lawyer is an officer of the Court. It
is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not unnecessarily destroy
the people’s high esteem and regard for the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.
A lawyer's
language may be forceful but should always be dignified;
emphatic
but respectful, as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should
be gracious to both court and opposing counsel, and should use such language as
may be properly addressed by one person to another.[36]
We likewise resolve the second issue in
the negative. The Court cannot fully agree with the recommendation of the OCA.
Pertinent is our ruling in Emmanuel Ymson Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles,[37]
which involved the same parties and where we held:
An act unrelated to a judge's discharge of judicial functions may give rise to administrative liability even when such act constitutes a violation of penal law. When the issue is administrative liability, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. Conversely, conviction in the criminal case will not automatically warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative case. We emphasize the well-settled rule that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to it.
In Nuñez
v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga,[38]
the Court held that the mere existence of pending criminal charges against the respondent-lawyer
cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of the latter. To hold
otherwise would open the door to harassment of attorneys through the mere
filing of numerous criminal cases against them.
By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent’s
conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We agree
with respondent's argument that since her conviction of the crime of child
abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet attained
finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of
innocence. It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating
the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption
of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the
evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this
manner, the presumption of innocence continues.[39]
In Mangubat
v. Sandiganbayan,[40]
the Court held that respondent Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of
discretion, correctible by certiorari,
when it ruled that despite her
convictions, "Preagido has still
in her favor the constitutional presumption of innocence x x x (and until) a
promulgation of final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate prevails."
The Court therein further held that such ruling is not bereft of legal or
logical foundation and cannot, in any sense, be characterized as a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment. So also
must we hold in this case.
Moreover, it is established that any
administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly
penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal
or disbarment.[41]
As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges may be used as
tools to harass them and may in the long run create adverse consequences. The
OCA, as well as SSP Velasco, failed to prove that other than the fact that a
judgment of conviction for child abuse was rendered against the respondent, which
is still on appeal, there are other lawful grounds to support the imposition of
preventive suspension. Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the
resolve that, while it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent as the same is not a penalty,[42]
the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having
been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best.[43]
Likewise, we consider respondent's
argument that there is no urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the
criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she cannot, by using her present
position as an RTC Judge, do anything to influence the CA to render a decision
in her favor. The issue of preventive
suspension has also been rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this
administrative case.
However, even as we find that the OCA
and SSP Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds to warrant
the imposition of preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive
language in respondent's pleadings, not only against SSP Velasco but also
against former CA Lock. To reiterate our previous ruling involving the
respondent, her use of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly below
the standard expected of an officer of the court. The esteemed position of a
magistrate of the law demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in conduct
and in language.[44] Illustrative are the following statements: “CA
Lock's hostile mindset and his superstar complex”;[45]
“In a frenzied display of arrogance and power”;[46]
“(CA Lock's) complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the trial
court”;[47]
and “when (CA Lock) himself loses his objectivity and misuses
the full powers of his Office to persecute
the object
of his fancy, then it is time for him to step
down.”[48]
In the attempt to discredit CA Lock, respondent
even dragged CA Lock's son into the controversy, to wit:
It is noteworthy to mention that CA
Lock’s hostile attitude was aggravated by his embarrassment when the
undersigned mentioned to him that she knew how he used his influence to secure
a position for his son at the RTC Library of Pasay City which was then managed
by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that his son be assigned to
the library to enable the latter to conveniently adjust his schedule in
reviewing for the bar examination.
Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the respondent said: “A reading of the
motion for reconsideration readily discloses that it is mainly anchored on SSP
Velasco’s malicious speculations about the guilt of the undersigned. Speculations, especially those that emanate
from the poisonous intentions of attention-seeking individuals, are no different
from garbage that should be rejected outright”;[49]
and “His malicious insinuation is no
less than a revelation of his warped
mindset that a person’s position could cause pressure to bear among
government officials. This brings forth
a nagging question. Did SSP Velasco use his position at the DOJ to ‘cause pressure to bear’
and obtain a favorable disposition of the administrative cases lodged against
him by the undersigned? Is he afraid of
his own ghost?”[50]
It must be stressed again that, as a
dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all
times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. She must maintain composure and
equanimity. The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge
and imposes a number of restrictions. This is
the price that
judges
have
to pay for accepting
and occupying their exalted
positions in the administration of justice.[51]
One final word. The parties herein have admitted in their
various pleadings that they have filed numerous cases against each other. We do not begrudge them the prerogative to
initiate charges against those who, in their opinion, may have wronged
them. But it is well to remind them that
this privilege must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly lawful
grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give them the right
to institute shotgun charges with reckless abandon, or allow their disagreement
to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that of two irresponsible
children.
Judge Angeles and SSP Velasco should
bear in mind that they are high-ranking public officers whom the people look up
to for zealous, conscientious and responsive public service. Name-calling hardly becomes them.
Cognizant of the adverse impact and
unpleasant consequences this continuing conflict will inflict on the public
service, we find both officials wanting in the conduct demanded of public
servants.
WHEREFORE,
the instant administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Nevertheless, respondent Adoracion G.
Angeles, Presiding Judge of the
Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of
the Department of Justice is hereby WARNED
that he should be more circumspect in the statements made in his pleadings and that
a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. The motion to cite
him for contempt is DENIED for lack
of merit.
The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resolve CA-G.R. CR No.
30260 involving respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles with dispatch.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
* In
lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 484
dated
[1] Then headed by retired Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock.
[2] Rollo, pp. 42-67.
[3] Otherwise
known as "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination." Approved on
[4] Particularly
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30260; respondent's Appellant's Brief before the CA;
rollo, pp. 78-156.
[5]
[6] Letter of Indorsement; id. at 9.
[7] Through said Resolution, the Court authorized the OCA, as a matter of public policy, to initiate motu proprio the filing of administrative proceedings against judges and/or employees of the inferior courts who have been convicted and/or charged before the Sandiganbayan or the courts.
[8] Rollo, pp. 1-5.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Dated
[21] Memorandum dated
[22] Citing Dr. Edgardo Alday v. Judge Escolastico Cruz, 376 SCRA 12 (2002).
[23]
Dated
[24] Rollo, pp. 225- 233.
[25] Among these pleadings are: 1) Reply to the Supplement to the Opposition filed on November 13, 2006 by the respondent; (2) Reply to respondent's Comment dated November 22, 2006 filed by SSP Velasco on November 29, 2006; (3) Rejoinder filed by respondent on December 7, 2006; (4) Reply to Rejoinder filed by SSP Velasco on December 13, 2006; (5) Comment on the Reply to the Rejoinder filed by respondent on December 21, 2006; and (6) an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Early Resolution filed by respondent on January 12, 2007.
[26] Dated
[27] Dated
[28] Citing Item No. 4 of SSP Velasco's letter to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban; supra note 5 and paragraph 12 of the instant motion (with minor modifications).
[29] Dated
[30] Dated
[31] Dated
[32] Resolution for A.M. No. MTJ-87-79
dated
[33] A.M.
No. MTJ-05-1587,
[34] Sesbreño v. Igonia, A.M. No. P-04-1791,
January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 243, 251-252, citing Land Bank of the Phil. v. Listana, Sr., 455 Phil. 750 (2003), which
further cited Justice Florenz D.
Regalado as Vice-Chairperson of the
Revision of the Rules of Court Committee that drafted the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
[35] Soriano
v. Court of Appeals, 416
Phil. 226, 253 (2001).
[36] Nuñez
v. Astorga, A.C. No. 6131, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 353, 364.
[37] A.M.
No. RTJ-05-1908,
[38] Supra note 36, at 361-362.
[39] People of the Philippines v. Cesar Galvez,
G.R. No. 157221, March 30, 2007, citing People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, 726-727
(1995) (Emphasis supplied).
[40] 227
Phil. 642, 646 (1986) (Emphasis supplied).
[41] Emmanuel Ymson Velasco v. Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles, supra note 37,
citing Mataga v. Judge Rosete, 440 SCRA 217 (2004).
[42] Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96131, September 6, 1991, 201
SCRA 417, 422-423.
[43] Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr., A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1460, A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
and A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988,
[44] Emmanuel Ymson Velasco v. Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles,
supra note 37, citing Cua Shuk Yin v.
Perello, 474 SCRA 472 (2005).
[45] Comment, supra note 26, item no. 7.
[46] Referring to CA Lock when the same directed a team to conduct judicial audit in respondent's sala; id. item no. 8.
[47]
[48]
[49] Comment/Opposition, supra note 29, item no. 11(Emphasis supplied).
[50]
[51] Re: Anonymous Complaint dated