PADILLA MACHINE SHOP, G.R. No. 175960
RODOLFO PADILLA and
LEONARDO PADILLA,
Petitioners, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
RUFINO A. JAVILGAS,
Respondent. Promulgated:
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This
petition for review assails the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated
On
Javilgas alleged
that in January 1998, he was hired by Padilla Machine Shop, located at
Javilgas
further alleged that in April 2002, Rodolfo Padilla called him by telephone and
told him to “stop working,” but “without giving any reason therefor.” He stopped reporting for work and sued
petitioners for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for the payment of backwages,
pro rated 13th month pay, separation pay, and moral and exemplary
damages.
On the
other hand, petitioner Rodolfo Padilla (Rodolfo), proprietor of Padilla Machine
Shop, alleged that in 1999, SSS and Medicare contributions were deducted from
Javilgas’ salary and remitted to the SSS; that in 2000, they (petitioners)
submitted a report to the SSS that Javilgas had voluntarily left and abandoned
his work, and transferred to another shop, Raymond Machine Shop, located within
the same vicinity as Padilla Machine Shop; that some months after, Javilgas
returned and pleaded to be re-employed with them; that Rodolfo Padilla took
Javilgas back to work, but their customers were not satisfied with the quality
of his work; hence Javilgas was assigned to the Novaliches branch; that
Javilgas incurred numerous absences in the Novaliches branch; that Javilgas had
opened his own machine shop and even “pirated” the clients of petitioners; and
finally, Javilgas again voluntarily left Padilla Machine Shop without prior notice.
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding Complainant
to have been illegally dismissed. Concomitantly, Respondents are ordered
jointly and severally to pay Complainant the following:
P232,065.92 – representing backwages;
50,400.00 –
representing separation pay;
18,571.00
– representing 13th month pay
P301,036.92 – Total
Ten percent of the total award as attorney’s fees.
The claim of non-remittance of SSS contribution is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners
appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we give due course to the
appeal of respondents. Consequently, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter below is
hereby reversed and set aside and a new decision is entered dismissing the
instant case for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The NLRC found
no sufficient evidence to show that Javilgas was dismissed or prevented from
reporting for work; that Javilgas could not categorically state when he was
dismissed: in his complaint, he claimed to have been dismissed on February 27,
2002, but in subsequent pleadings he alleged he was dismissed in mid-April, 2002.
Relying on the principle enunciated in Chong Guan Trading v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[6] it
ruled that where Javilgas was never notified of his dismissal nor was he
prevented from returning to work, there could be no illegal dismissal. The NLRC also found the telephone conversation
between Javilgas and Rodolfo Padilla – where the latter told the former to stop
reporting to work – self-serving, conjectural and of no probative value,
especially where Javilgas himself declares that he was told by Rodolfo not to
report to work without giving any reason
therefor. In fine, the NLRC held
that Javilgas voluntarily resigned, and not illegally dismissed.
On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter. It held that the burden of
proof is on the petitioners, to show that Javilgas was dismissed for a valid
and just cause. As to the inconsistency
in the dates of Javilgas’ termination, the appellate court noted that it was a
case of miscommunication between Javilgas and the person who filled up the
entries in the pro forma labor complaint
in his behalf; Javilgas was found to be illiterate, as he did not even get to
finish Grade School. Likewise, the delay
of eight months in the filing of the complaint should not work against
respondent because it took time for him to obtain the services of a counsel.
The
appellate court did not lend credence to petitioners’ claim that respondent
voluntarily resigned since the issue was only raised for the first before the
NLRC. A change of theory on appeal –
from abandonment of work in the Labor Arbiter to voluntary resignation on
appeal, is prohibited. It likewise
declared as without basis the petitioners’ claim that Javilgas was operating a
rival machine shop, since petitioners failed to prove with sufficient evidence
the veracity of said claim. The Court of
Appeals disregarded the documents submitted by the petitioners to the NLRC for
the first time (business permit and photographs) which they claim would show
that respondent was operating his own machine shop during the period of his
employment with Padilla Machine Shop.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied hence, the
instant petition raising the following issues:
1. The Court
of Appeals erred in holding that upon the petitioners rested the burden of
proving that the termination of the respondent was for a valid cause, despite
their consistent position that the latter was never terminated from employment;
2. The Court
of Appeals erred in holding that the said consistent position adopted by
petitioners – that they never dismissed Javilgas – is not sufficient to negate
the charge of illegal dismissal;
3. The Court
of Appeals erred in disregarding documentary evidence presented for the first
time on appeal; and,
4. The Court
of Appeals erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the respondent who was being
represented pro bono by the Office of
Legal Aid of the
Petitioners
did not offer any evidence to disprove the allegation that Rodolfo Padilla
informed Javilgas by phone to stop reporting to work. On the contrary, Rodolfo admitted that he
“advised” Javilgas to “concentrate
on his (Javilgas’) shop if he has no more time for the company (Padilla Machine
Shop).”[7] Moreover, it was
only in the NLRC that the documents and photographs purporting to show that
Javilgas was conducting business inimical to the interests of Padilla Machine
Shop were submitted.
In
illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to show that
the employee was dismissed for a valid and just cause.[8]
Petitioners have failed to discharge themselves
of the burden. With respect to Javilgas’
claim of illegal dismissal, petitioners merely alleged that –
13. From that
time on, Complainant (Javilgas), did not anymore report for work and left
Respondent’s (Rodolfo) business for the second time without any advance notice
of terminating his services as required by law;
14. This
Complainant requested Respondent to compute all the SSS/Medicare deductions on
his weekly/daily salaries for he is planning to have a refund of these
deductions;
x x x x
Petitioner
Rodolfo, however, did not elaborate or show proof of the claimed abandonment. Instead, he concluded that Javilgas “abandoned
his corresponding duties and responsibilities x x x when he established and
created his own machine shop outfit x x x.”[9]
For
abandonment to exist, it is essential (a) that the employee must have failed to
report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason;
and, (b) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts.[10]
The establishment of his own shop is not enough proof that Javilgas intended to
sever his relationship with his employer.
Moreover, it
was only in 2003 that Rodolfo allegedly confirmed his suspicion that Javilgas
was operating his own machine shop. Rodolfo
admits that it was only when the case was on appeal to the NLRC that his
suspicion was confirmed. Thus, in the
petition for review on certiorari[11]
with this Court, petitioners claim that –
During the pendency of this case on appeal with the NLRC,
because of the vehement denial of complainant, Rufino Javilgas that he has
never operated a machine shop which is doing the same business with
(petitioners)(,) Mr. Rodolfo Padilla and the undersigned counsel went to the
residence of (respondent), Rufino Javilgas at Barangay Sta. Clara, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan on January 3, 2003, and right then and there, Mr. Padilla and the
undersigned counsel saw personally the machine shop being operated by Mr.
Rufino Javilgas. x x x (Words in parentheses supplied)
This only
proves that in April 2002, when Rodolfo allegedly “advised” Javilgas to “concentrate
on his (Javilgas’) shop if he has no more time for the company (Padilla Machine
Shop),” petitioners had nothing but unfounded suspicions.
In Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc.,[12]
we sustained the employer’s denial as against the employees’ categorical
assertion of illegal dismissal. In that
case, several employees who allegedly refused to sign a memorandum[13]
from their employer, detailing the commission of alleged anomalies that
resulted in the overpricing and overcharging of customers, filed an illegal
dismissal case three days after receiving the said memorandum. They claimed that they were illegally
dismissed and were told not to report for work anymore; the employer denied
this and asserted that the workers (who appeared to be the suspects in the
anomalies) were merely given three to five days off to decide whether or not to
agree to share the loss suffered by it as a result of the anomalies. The Court, in ruling that there was no illegal
dismissal, held that:
The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that
respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that
the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The
rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases
finds no application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the
petitioners.
We have reviewed the Memorandum of respondent Dizon and
find nothing therein to indicate that any of the employees of respondent
corporation, including the petitioners, would be considered terminated from
employment if they refused to share in the P23,997.58 loss. Petitioners and
other employees of respondent corporation were merely required to affix their
signatures in the Memorandum on the space opposite their respective names, to
confirm that they had read and understood the same. As elucidated by the
NLRC in the assailed Resolution:
Read in its entirety, the Memorandum reflects the GOOD
FAITH of the employer in resolving a discovered anomaly. First, it is a
declaration of AMNESTY and FORGIVENESS; it did not name names; it did not state
that the guilty ones will be pursued and punished. Second, it asked for
SHARING among the employees for the loss due to the discovered anomaly.
Third, it indicated a POSITIVE BUSINESS DIRECTION as it exhorted the employees
from participating in similar anomalies henceforward.[14]
Petitioners,
in like manner, consistently deny that Javilgas was dismissed from service;
that he abandoned his employment when he walked out after his conversation with
Rodolfo and never returned to work again. But denial, in this case, does not
suffice; it should be coupled with evidence to support it. In the Machica
case, the memorandum, among others, represented clear and convincing proof that
there was no intention to dismiss the employees; it constituted evidence in
support of the employer’s denial.
In the instant
case, petitioners failed to adduce evidence to rebut Javilgas’ claim of
dismissal and satisfy the burden of proof required.
As regards
the eight-month hiatus before Javilgas instituted the illegal dismissal case,
we sustain the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Javilgas filed the complaint
within a reasonable period during the three-year period provided under Article
291 of the Labor Code.
Finally, there
is no merit in petitioners’ claim that attorney’s fees may not be awarded to
the respondent since his case was being handled pro bono by the U.P. Office of Legal Aid, which provides free legal
assistance to indigent litigants. In
this jurisdiction, there are two concepts of attorney’s fees. In the ordinary
sense, attorney’s fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer
by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney’s fees
may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing
party to the prevailing party,[15] and not counsel. In its extraordinary sense, attorney’s fees as
part of damages is awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of
the Civil Code,[16] among which
are the following which obtain in the instant case:
(7) In actions
for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions
for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
x x x x
(11) In any
other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89164 which reinstated the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter finding that respondent Rufino Javilgas was illegally dismissed
from service and its Resolution of December 21, 2006 denying the motion for reconsideration
are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 30-41. Penned by Associate
Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin
S. Villarama, Jr. and Lucas P. Bersamin.
[2]
[3] CA
rollo, p. 68.
[4] Rollo, pp. 76-77. Penned by Labor Arbiter Ermita T.
Abrasaldo-Cuyuca.
[5]
[6]
G.R. No. 81471,
[7] Rollo, p. 14.
[8] Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. v.
Diamse, G.R. No. 169299,
[9] CA
rollo, p. 135.
[10] ACD Investigation Security Agency, Inc. v.
Daquera, G.R. No. 147473, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 494, 499.
[11] Rollo, p. 9.
[12]
G.R. No. 168664,
[13]
The memorandum read:
To: ALL PERSONNEL
CONCERNED
Subject: San Francisco Mirror Corp.
Ang
dating customer na ito ay hindi na bumibili ng mga fuels (Diesel at Gasolina)
mula pa noong OCTOBER 2000. Ang dahilan ay nagkaroon ng PANDARAYA sa mga
transactions. (Tingnan at basahin ang nakalakip na letter ng San Francisco
Mirror Corp.) Ang PANDARAYA at SABWATAN ay pinatunayan ng San Francisco Mirror
Corp. sa mga sulat na pag-amin ng kanilang empleyado.
Dahil
sa nangyaring ito, ang naging resulta ay ang mga sumusunod:
1) Umalis ang San Francisco sa atin,
nawalan ng “good customer” ang istasyon
2) Inalis/tinanggal ang mga
empleyadong kasama sa pandaraya at sabwatan
3) Sinabihan ang ibang customers
tungkol sa sabwatan sa pandaraya at nasira ang “Goodwill” ng istasyon
4) Ang utang nila P47,991.15 naiwan
noong October 2000 pa ay nitong
5) Dahil sa wala namang aamin sa
pandarayang ito, ang mga may kaugnayan o nakakaalam sa nangyari ay mag-share sa
hindi binayaran ng customer
______________________
Roosevelt Servicenter Inc.
Nabasa
ko at naintindihan ang memo tungkol sa SAN FRANCISCO MIRROR CORP. na kasama sa
pahina 1.
[14] Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc.,
supra note 12 at 544-545.
[15] Compania Maritima, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 128452, November 16, 1999, 318 SCRA 169, 175-176.
[16] Padillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
119707,