FIRST DIVISION
ATTY.
GIL A. VALERA, CPA-LCB, G.R. No. 167278
Deputy Commissioner,
Revenue Collection Monitoring Group,
Bureau of Customs,
Petitioner,
Present:
-
versus -
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
rep. by Hon. ORLANDO
C. CASIMIRO,
Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and AZCUNA, and
Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO),
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
in
his capacity as Acting Ombudsman;
PNP-CIDG, rep. by Director General
Eduardo
S. Matillano (public complainant);
ATTY. ADOLFO CASARENO (private
complainant); Hon.
CESAR V. PURISIMA,
Secretary
of Finance, Department of
Finance;
Hon. ALBERTO D. LINA,
Commissioner
of Customs, Bureau of
Customs;
Hon. ROBERTO D. GEOTINA, Promulgated:
Deputy
Commissioner for Internal
Administration
Group, Bureau of Customs;
and HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
(Fourth Division),
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
Public office is a public trust.[1] Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.[2] With the numerous ills and negative
perception surrounding the revenue collection agencies of the government, this
mandate of our fundamental law becomes all the more relevant to the present
petition. Petitioner, a Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision[3]
rendered by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision[4] of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement
Offices (OMB-MOLEO) finding him guilty of grave misconduct, and decreeing his
dismissal from the service with all the accessory penalties appertaining
thereto.
The records show that petitioner Gil
A. Valera was appointed by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as Deputy
Commissioner of Customs in charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group on
On December 21, 2001, he filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for and on behalf of the Bureau of
Customs, a collection case with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment for the collection of P37,195,859.00 in unpaid
duties and taxes against Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (SAMC), which
utilized fraudulent tax credit certificates in the payment of its duties. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
01-102504, was raffled off to Branch 39 of the RTC of Manila.
On P37,195,859.00
duties and taxes sought to be collected in the civil case.
On
Investigation
conducted disclosed that Atty. Gil A. Valera was appointed as Deputy
Commissioner, Bureau of Customs by the President on
On January 30, 2002, while in the
performance of his official functions, Atty. Gil A. Valera had compromised the
case against the Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation in Civil Case No.
01-102504 before Branch 39, RTC Manila without proper authority from the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs in violation of Section 2316 TCCP
(Authority of the Commission to make Compromise) and without the approval of the
President, in violation of Executive Order No. 156 and Executive Order No.
38. Such illegal acts of Atty. Gil A.
Valera indeed caused undue injury to the government by having deprived the
government of its right to collect the legal
interest, surcharges, litigation expenses and damages and gave the Steel Asia unwarranted benefits in the total
uncollected amount of FOURTEEN MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN PESOS AND SEVENTY
CENTAVOS (P14,762,467.70), which is violative of Sections 3(e) and
(g) respectively of RA 3019.
Further investigation disclosed that Atty. Gil A. Valera while being a Bureau of Customs official directly and indirectly had financial or pecuniary interest in the CACTUS CARGOES SYSTEMS a brokerage whose line of business or transaction, in connection with which, he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity by way of causing the employment of his brother-in-law, Ariel Manongdo, thus, violating 3(h) of RA 3019 and RA 6713 and Section 4, RA 3019 as against Ariel Manongdo.
Finally, investigation also
disclosed that on April 21, 2002 Atty. Gil A. Valera traveled to Hongkong with
his family without proper authority from the office of the President in
violation of Executive Order No. 298 (foreign travel of government personnel)
dated May 19, 1995, thus, he committed an administrative offense of Grave
Misconduct.[5]
The administrative aspect of the
complaint was docketed as OMB-C-A-03-0379-J.
On
On
On
On
The OMB-MOLEO perfected an appeal from
this decision on
In the meantime, the adjudication of OMB-C-A-03-0379-J
continued and the respondent Deputy Ombudsman issued a Decision[10] finding
the petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and decreeing his
dismissal from the service, with all the accessory penalties appertaining
thereto. It was found that petitioner committed grave
misconduct based on the following charges:
(i)
compromising the
case against SAMC in Civil Case No. 01-102504 before Branch 39, RTC Manila,
without proper authority from the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs in
violation of Section 2316[11]
of the Tariff and Customs Code, and without the approval of the President in
violation of Section 4(d) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 156 as amended by E.O.
No. 38;[12]
(ii)
causing the employment of his brother-in-law
with the Cactus Cargoes Systems, Inc. whose principal business involves
transactions with the Bureau of Customs in violation of Section 3(d) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019;[13]
and
(iii)
traveling to Hongkong without conforming with
the guidelines on the application to travel abroad for private purposes of
public officials.[14]
The petitioner questioned this
decision before the Court of Appeals, via a petition for review, and the case
was raffled off to the 4th Division and docketed as CA G.R. SP. No.
86281.
The 4th Division of the
Court of Appeals refrained from ruling on the first charge against the
petitioner in deference to this Court in G.R. No. 164250. It however found enough evidence to
substantiate the second and third charges and issued and promulgated its
assailed decision affirming the decision of respondent Deputy Ombudsman finding
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct.
It held as follows:
After careful consideration of the matter, this Court finds it more prudent to defer from deciding the matters raised in connection with the first ground raised by petitioner in deference to the Supreme Court which is now tackling the very same issues. Respondents themselves argued that:
“Needless
to state, the Office of the Ombudsman lost no time in bringing the foregoing
matters to the attention of the Honorable Supreme Court in a petition for
review (G.R. No. 164250). Since then,
the Supreme Court has motu proprio
elevated the case from the Second Division to the Court En Banc, apparently because of the serious nature of the issues
raised against the honorable Special First Division.” (Rollo, p. 292)
It should also be considered that a ruling of the Supreme Court on the applicability of Section 2316 of the TCC is determinative of the existence of a basis to the charges made against petitioner.
Coming now to the second ground raised, petitioner asserted that the respondents erred in finding him liable for the employment of his brother-in-law Ariel N. Manongdo with CCSI, claiming that there is no evidence that he had any participation in the employment of said brother-in-law, to wit:
“But,
nothing is contained in the decision under review, particularly under the
heading ‘evidence for the complainant’, which shows that petitioner did
anything or performed any act or participated in any way, directly or
indirectly, in the employment of his brother-in-law, Ariel N. Manongdo, with
CCSI. Simply put, the finding of fact is
also a conclusion of law with no fact or iota of evidence to support the
discussion and conclusion in the decision under review.” (Rollo, p. 48)
Respondents countered that petitioner not only used his “official ascendancy” (Rollo, p. 348) to cause the employment of his brother-in-law with CCSI, but they further claimed that the joint-affidavit (Rollo, pp. 88-93) of the elements of the Criminal Investigation Detection Group (CIDG) showed that petitioner was a co-owner of CCSI as shown by the fact that he invited his close friends and relatives to the blessing of the brokerage firm. The relevant portion of said joint-affidavit stated that:
“12. Further, during the conduct of our
surveillance on the lifestyle of Atty. Valera, we received information that he
has sent text messages to his close friends and relatives for the blessing of
his brokerage. The text of the message
is as follows” ‘ON WED, INVITE KO KAYO SA BLESSING NG BROKERAGE KO. ROOM 604,
GLC Bldg., TM KALAW cor MABINI 6 TO
13. Atty. Gil A. Valera’s visitors were mostly
his classmates from
14. Our investigation disclosed that the GLC
Bldg. is owned by a certain Mr. GERARDO L. CONTRERAS. According to Ms. JENNIE ESGUERRA, the
building administrator, party on the 6th Floor was the inauguration
of the CACTUS CARGOES SYSTEMS represented by its Marketing Coordinator, Mr.
ARIEL MONONGDO (sic). Our information
was that Monongdo is the brother-in-law of Atty. Valera. Attached are the SEC Registration of Cactus
Cargo Inc., (Annex ‘36’) and the Contract of Lease signed by Mr. Ariel Monongdo
the Marketing Manager of Cactus with the building administrator (Annex ‘37’).”
(Rollo, pp. 91-92)
Respondents also asserted that CCSI is a customs brokerage firm which necessarily deals on a regular basis with petitioner’s office, more particularly:
“The
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards (R.A. No. 6713), under Section 7, subpar.
(b)(3) thereof, is very specific in criminalizing the act of ‘(r)ecommend(ing)
any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or
pending official transaction with their office.’ On the other hand, Section 3 (d) of the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (sic) (R.A. No. 3019) punishes as criminal
offense a public officer’s act of ‘(a)ccepting or having any member of his
family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official
business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its
termination.” (Rollo, pp. 349-350)
Parenthetically, petitioner also argued that this charge was also held by the Special First Division to be “too trivial”. However, the Court considers that statement to have been made in relation to the question of whether or not the deputy ombudsman had the power to order petitioner’s preventive suspension. That is, that statement should not be read to be a disposition of the question on the merits.
Now, to dispose of the matter, it should be noted that the findings of the respondent Deputy Ombudsman regarding the second charge was based on two (2) grounds: first, the alleged act of using petitioner’s influence to obtain employment for his brother-in-law and, second, the mere fact of employment of his brother-in-law in a company which has regular business with petitioner’s office.
While the evidence regarding the alleged use of influence by the petitioner to cause the employment of his brother-in-law maybe a little tenuous, the Court finds basis to the second ground. The Court notes that petitioner did not deny that CCSI has regular transactions with his office. Neither did he deny that Ariel Monongdo is his brother-in-law. Under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, mere acceptance by a member of his family of employment with a private enterprise which has pending official business with the official involved is considered a corrupt practice. It is clear, therefore, that mere acceptance by Ariel Manongdo, a family member, of the employment with CCSI rendered petitioner liable under the law. The Court, therefore, agrees with respondent Deputy Ombudsman when he held that:
“Moreover,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) prohibits the public
officer’s act of accepting or having any member of his family accept employment
in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the
pendency thereof or within one year after its termination. Ariel N. Manongdo, as brother-in-law of
respondent
Coming now to the matter of his travel to Hongkong which is the subject matter of the third objection raised by petitioner, he first argued that his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him had been violated. He asserted that while the Matillano Complaint charged him with violating E.O. No. 278, the questioned Decision was based on E.O. No. 39.
The Court does not agree with this assertion. It should be remembered that the present case is an administrative case while Section 14 of Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution refers strictly to criminal prosecution. Said Constitutional provision reads:
“SECTION
14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.”
It is well-settled that in an administrative case, due process is served when the respondent was given an opportunity to be heard (Utto v. Comelec, 375 SCRA 523 [2002]). In the instant case, petitioner cannot deny that he was given all the opportunity to present his side of the story. Thus, the Court agrees with respondents when they argued:
“It
is, thus, unfortunate that instead of demonstrating that he either complied
with the requirement of presidential authority to travel that petitioner, as a
lawyer, presumably knows to have existed (sic), or that he was legitimately
exempted therefrom, petitioner instead resorted to the unavailing technicality
that the complaint did not properly identify by the correct number [the] EO in
point. Petitioner invokes the right to
be informed of charges against an accused which, needless to state, has
specific application to criminal charges.
Needlessly, however, even in criminal cases, what matters is not the
title of the law violated but rather the allegations of acts constituting a
crime. In his case, the allegation in
the complaint was simply that petitioner did not comply with the requirement
for presidential authority to travel abroad.
It certainly fully informed him of his infraction. After the issue was joined on such factual
allegation, identifying and enforcing the applicable law by the public
respondent simply followed as part and parcel of its quasi-judicial function.”
(Rollo, p. 35)
Turning now to his defense that his foreign travel should not be taken against him because at the time he made the travel with his family, he was a private citizen because he was prevented by a temporary restraining order issued by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 69855 (in the case entitled Rosqueta versus Hon. Judge Juan Nabong) from assuming office and from dispossessing then Deputy Commissioner Rosqueta of the position of Deputy Commissioner.
The
Court cannot subscribe to this argument.
Under the theory proposed by petitioner, there was in effect an interegnum as to his government service
during the effectivity of the TRO. But
it cannot be denied that once CA-G.R. SP No. 69855 was decided and petitioner
was allowed to assume his position, the effectivity of his appointment
retroacted to the original date of appointment.
While the temporary restraining order was in effect, he nevertheless
continued to assert on his right to the office.
The Court also notes that petitioner did not even present any evidence
to show that he had dissociated himself from the office at the time in
question. As pointed out by the respondents’ Comment:
“For
that matter, petitioner cannot claim that he suffered a gap in his public
service during the period covered by the so-called TRO. He certainly was not dissociated from office during such period. He continued to be a public officer,
notwithstanding, such that the application on him of the presidential authority
to travel can not be deemed to have been then suspended.” (Rollo, p. 356)
x x x
In
fine, while the Court refrained from tackling the first charge against petitioner,
the Court finds that as to the second and third charges, respondent Deputy
Ombudsman did not err in finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct.[15]
On September 30, 2005, without going
into the issue of petitioner’s guilt, the Court En Banc rendered a decision in G.R. No. 164250 ruling that the
power to place a public officer or employee under preventive suspension pending
an investigation is lodged only with the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsmen and
affirmed the nullification and setting aside by the appellate court of the
preventive suspension order of the Special Prosecutor.
Petitioner
now comes before us praying that he be absolved of the charges against him and
that the decision of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals which
effectively affirmed the decision of the OMB-MOLEO be annulled and set aside.
We shall now put a finis to this
controversy that has raged bitterly for the past several months and shun
further delay so as to ensure that this case would really attain finality and resolve
whether petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct in connection with
administrative case OMB-C-A-03-0379-J.
First, we discuss the definition of grave
misconduct as established by jurisprudence:
Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by a public officer.[16] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of
the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or
disregard of established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.[17]
At the onset, the Court would like to
point out that in an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required
for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.[18] We reiterate the well-settled rule that, when
supported by substantial evidence and absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness, findings of fact of administrative agencies,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive
upon this Court.[19] After a
thorough examination of the evidence on record, we find no reason to depart
from this rule.
With respect to the second and third
charges against the petitioner, the 4th Division of the Court of
Appeals agreed with the findings of the OMB-MOLEO. The petitioner utterly failed to show that the
factual findings of the respondent, affirmed by the appellate court, were
attended with arbitrariness or abuse. The
Matillano letter-complaint as well as its supporting affidavits made clear
allegations under oath that petitioner recommended his brother-in-law, Ariel
Manongdo, for employment with Cactus Cargoes Systems, Inc. (CCSI), a customs
brokerage firm which necessarily deals on a regular basis with petitioner’s
office. Further, the Matillano letter-complaint
also categorically asserted that petitioner traveled to Hongkong without
obtaining the proper clearance. These
allegations under oath constitute substantial evidence required in
administrative proceedings.
On the other hand, petitioner did not
deny that Ariel Manongdo is his brother-in-law or that CCSI has regular
transactions with his office. Neither did he deny that he failed to comply with
the requirement of presidential authority to travel abroad. It is thus unfortunate that instead of
demonstrating that he is innocent of the charges, the petitioner instead
resorted to unavailing technicalities to disprove the allegations. The Supreme
Court cannot weigh once more the evidence submitted not only before the Office
of the Ombudsman but also before the Court of Appeals. All told, we are convinced that there is
substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for the second and third charges
against him.
Be that as it may, petitioner raises
some legal issues regarding these charges which we shall settle.
Anent the second charge, petitioner
contends that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019,[20] a
brother-in-law is not included within the scope of the word “family” and
therefore, he cannot be found liable under the said law. In arguing so, petitioner refers to the
definition of the word “family” found under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 6713,
which states:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the term:
x x x
(g) "Family of public officials or
employees" means their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18)
years of age.
This contention deserves scant
consideration.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 6713 is
unequivocal in that its definition of terms is limited to as used in the Act. Under R.A. No. 6713, the term “family” was
used only once under Section 4, par.
(h),[21]
which implores public officials and employees and their families to observe “simple
living.” The restrictive definition accorded
to the word “family” under the law is logical since children of public
officials and employees who are above eighteen and already emancipated by law
and freed from parental authority should not be bound by this standard where
their emancipation may lead them to an otherwise private lifestyle or one which
is not beholden to the public trust.
This otherwise perfect logic would result
in irrationality if we follow the contention of petitioner that the definition
of “family” under R.A. No. 6713 should also apply to R.A. No. 3019. It makes no rhyme nor reason to suppose that
public officials and employees are prohibited from having their children under eighteen
years accept employment in a private enterprise having pending official
business before their office, and yet are allowed to have their children over
eighteen years, which is the employable age, to do so.
What petitioner fails to mention is
that R.A. No. 6713 itself prohibits the act of public officials and employees
during their incumbency to recommend any
person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or
pending official transaction with their office.[22] Certainly, the definition of the word “family”
under said law would unduly limit and render meaningless Section 3(d) of R.A.
No. 3019 if applied to the latter. In
fact, family relation is defined under Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019[23]
which, according to the said section, “shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree.” Thus, we need not look beyond the provisions
of R.A. No. 3019 to hold that a brother-in-law falls within the definition of
family under Section 3(d) thereof.
Proceeding now to the legal issue with
respect to the third charge, it is advanced by petitioner that a public
official reverts to his quo ante status
as a private citizen upon being subjected to a temporary restraining order directing
him to refrain from holding his office. Hence,
he need not comply with the requirements for traveling abroad during said
period.
We are not persuaded.
We agree with the appellate court
that petitioner suffered no gap in his public service while the temporary
restraining order was in effect. The
nature of a temporary restraining order which would have the effect of
preventing a public officer from discharging his office is provisional until a
preliminary injunction is issued by the court hearing the case. Because of its temporary character, it would
not have the effect of divesting such officer of the public character of his
office.
It cannot be denied that once CA-G.R.
SP No. 69855 was decided and petitioner was allowed to re-assume his office,
the effectivity of his appointment retroacted to the original date of his appointment.
He certainly remained as a public officer
during such period and it was incumbent upon him, especially since he was
continuously asserting his right to the office, to comply with the guidelines
on the application to travel abroad for private purposes[24]
of public officials.
We now come to the pivotal first charge
facing petitioner that was left unresolved by the Court of Appeals in deference
to this Court – that of compromising the case against SAMC without prior
authorization from the Commissioner of Customs in violation of Section 2316[25]
of the Tariff and Customs Code, and without prior approval of the President as
required by Section 4(d)[26]
of E.O. No. 156 as amended by E.O. No. 38.
Prefatorily, we emphasize that violations
or disregard of regulations governing the collection of government funds are
administratively sanctionable. Intended
to raise revenue for government operations, these regulations must be followed
strictly.
On the first provision of the special
law alleged to have been violated by petitioner, Title VI Book II of the Tariff
and Customs Code entitled “ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS” is divided as
follows:
1.
Part 1 – Search,
Seizure and Arrest,
2.
Part 2 –
Administrative Proceedings,
3.
Part 3 – Judicial
Proceedings,
4.
Part 4 –
Surcharges, Fines and Forfeitures,
5.
Part 5 –
Disposition of Property in Customs Custody, and
6.
Part 7 – Fees and
Charges. (Note: No Part 6)
According to
petitioner, Sections 2301 up to 2316 are provisions found under Part 2 and
pertain to administrative proceedings, while Sections 2401 and 2402 are
provisions found under Part 3 and pertain to judicial proceedings. Section
2316 provides:
Section 2316. Authority of Commissioner to make Compromise.—Subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Finance, the Commissioner of Customs may compromise any case arising under
this Code or other laws or part of laws enforced by the Bureau of Customs
involving the imposition of fines, surcharges and forfeitures unless otherwise
specified by law.
While Section 2401 as amended, which
was made by petitioner as basis for his entering into the compromise agreement,
provides:
Section 2401. Supervision and Control over
Criminal and Civil Proceedings.—Civil and criminal actions and proceedings
instituted in behalf of the government under the authority of this Code or
other law enforced by the Bureau shall be brought in the name of the government
of the Philippines and shall be
conducted by customs officers but no civil or criminal action for the
recovery of duties or the enforcement of any fine, penalty or forfeiture under
this Code shall be filed in court without the approval of the Commissioner.
Thus, for petitioner, since the case
wherein the compromise agreement was entered into was already pending before a
regular court, the requirement of prior authority of the Commissioner of
Customs to enter into a compromise is not necessary.
This contention must fail.
Basic is the maxim in statutory
construction that a statute must be read or construed as a whole or in its
entirety. All parts, provisions, or
sections, must be read, considered or construed together, and each must be
considered with respect to all others, and in harmony with the whole.[27]
A reading of the provisions cited by
the petitioner will show that there is really no conflict between them. Section 2401 covers the matter of the
institution and filing of civil and criminal actions by customs officers, which
is subject to the approval of the Commissioner if filed for the recovery of
duties or the enforcement of any fine, penalty or forfeiture under the
Code. It does not cover the compromise
of such civil or criminal actions, while Section 2316 is the provision that deals
with such a situation. In fact, the
latter is categorical in providing an encompassing scope for the strict
conditions for any compromise. Its
coverage includes “any case arising
under this code or other laws or
part of laws enforced by the Bureau of Customs involving the imposition of
fines, surcharges and forfeitures unless otherwise specified by law.” Doubtless, civil cases for collection of
customs taxes and duties, including the one in the case at bar, would fall
under this coverage.
To be sure, the adoption of petitioner’s
interpretation of these provisions would result in absurdity that could not
have been intended by Congress.
Following his logic, the Commissioner of Customs has to actively
participate and seek the approval of the Secretary of Finance in compromising
administrative collection cases; whereas, customs officers without even seeking
authority from the Commissioner or approval from the Secretary of Finance can
proceed to bargain off much larger collection cases in courts. Clearly, the Court cannot countenance the
abuse and corruption engendered by this misreading of the law.
Petitioner next claims that there was
no violation of Section 4(d)[28]
of E.O. No. 156 as amended by E.O. No. 38, when he entered into the compromise
agreement without the express approval of the President.
E.O. No. 156, as amended by E.O. No.
38, created a Special Task Force to investigate and prosecute the
irregularities relative to the "tax credit scam" committed at the
center of the Department of Finance and to recover and collect revenues lost by
the government through the "scam." Section 4(d) thereof provides:
Section 4. Powers,
Duties and Functions. The Task Force shall have the following powers,
duties and functions:
x x x
d) To recommend the settlement of cases
for approval of the President, subject to appropriate rules on the settlement
of claims by the government;
In the case at bar, and during the
time relevant to this case,[29] specifically
on May 10, 2002, the then Chairman of the Task Force, Department of Finance
Undersecretary Cornelio Gison, reported to the then Department of Finance
Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho the successful collection by petitioner of P37,195,859.00
in the SAMC case. On
Petitioner invokes the principle of
qualified political agency wherein these acts of the Special Task Force
Chairmen – who both approved the compromise agreement and lauded him for his accomplishment
in the recovery efforts against the original grantees and buyers of
fraudulently secured tax credit certificates – should be considered as approval
by the President herself, especially since she did not disapprove of nor
reprobate their acts.
This argument is likewise unavailing.
E.O. No. 156, as amended by E.O. No.
38, is clear in its requirement that in
cases involving tax credit scams the
favorable recommendation for approval by the Special Task Force and the approval
by the President of the Republic are both required. The approval by the Chairmen of the Special
Task Force is still subject to approval of the President. Prior presidential approval is the highest
form of check and balance within the Executive branch of government and cannot
be satisfied by mere failure of the President to reverse or reprobate the acts
of subordinates. To sanction otherwise
would be to ask the Court to reward passivity and render nugatory the fundamental
safeguard required under the law.
The Court notes that in Civil Case
No. 01-102504, SAMC defrauded the government of the amount of P37,195,859.00
in unpaid duties and taxes with the use of fraudulent tax credit certificates that
were directly and originally procured by its officials on the basis of inexistent
supporting documents. The legal interest, surcharges, litigation expenses and
damages of this principal amount totaled a staggering P14,762,467.70,
which petitioner effectively waived through his entering into a compromise
agreement with SAMC. We find lamentable
the utter disregard of the legal requirements for entering into a compromise
displayed by petitioner which is further aggravated by the fact that there were
already sufficient properties of SAMC that were attached in the said case to
satisfy not only the principal amount owed but also the penalties, surcharges
and interests.
No amount of reasoning can infuse an
empty plea to justify this bloodletting. Fundamental it is in law that taxes
being the lifeblood of the government,[31]
such must be continuously replenished and carefully preserved—and no public
official should maintain a standard lower than utmost diligence in keeping our
revenue system flowing. It is not for
any government official to deem it within his complete control to let precious
blood flow to the private sphere where it would have been rightfully and
lawfully collected by the public through the government.
Persons
appointed to the revenue collection agencies of the government, like
petitioner, ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and
integrity in the public service and must at all times be above suspicion. Because of the nature of their office, the
officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs should serve as the primary
role models in the faithful observance of the constitutional canon that public
office is a public trust. Petitioner, being a Deputy Commissioner of the
Revenue Collection Monitoring Group, should know that his actuations reflect
adversely on the integrity and efficiency of his office and erode the faith and
confidence of our people in its daily administration. We find that the totality of petitioner’s
acts constitutes flagrant disregard of established rules constitutive of grave
misconduct.
One final note. It appears that
petitioner is no longer a Deputy Commissioner of Customs.[32] This
fact, however, does not render this petition moot and academic. As held in Gallo v. Cordero:
.
. . [T]he jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had
ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the
charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against
a judge or any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal
conduct during his last days in office? xxx If innocent, respondent official
merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which
he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.[33]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE
CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[1] Const., Art. XI, § 1.
[2] Const., Art. XI, § 1.
[3] Rollo, pp. 63-79; penned by Justice Jose
C. Reyes, Jr., concurred in by Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Perlita
J. Tria Tirona, dated February 28, 2005.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
a. “within three (3) days from filing” –
Section 27(2), R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989,”
and/or
b.
“within five (5) days from receipt thereof” – Section 8, Rule III,
Administrative Order No. 07 [
[9] Rollo, pp. 225-253.
[10] Supra note 4.
[11] Section
2316 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides:
Section 2316. Authority
of Commissioner to make Compromise.—Subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Finance, the Commissioner of Customs may compromise any case
arising under this Code or other laws or part of laws enforced by the Bureau of
Customs involving the imposition of fines, surcharges and forfeitures unless
otherwise specified by law.
[12] Section 4(d) of Executive Order No. 156 dated October
7, 1999, entitled "CREATING A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO REVIEW, INVESTIGATE,
AND GATHER EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTE IRREGULARITIES
COMMITTED AT THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND OTHER
GOVERNMENT OFFICES OR AGENCIES UNDER OR ATTACHED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE," as amended by Executive
Order No. 38, provides:
SEC. 4. Powers,
Duties and Functions. The Task Force shall have the following powers, duties
and functions:
x x x
d) To
recommend the settlement of cases for approval of the President, subject to
appropriate rules on the settlement of claims by the government;
[13]
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019, entitled “ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT,”
enacted on
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x
(d) Accepting or having any member of his
family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official
business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its
termination.
[14] A Memorandum dated
3. Request
shall be submitted at least ten (10) days prior to the expected date of
departure supported by the following documentary requirements:
k. Letter
request for travel abroad.
l.
Indorsement from Legal Service Chief/District Collector.
m. Clearance from Legal Service.
n. Application
for Leave.
o. Affidavit
of support from sponsor who will shoulder such travel.
p. Last year
income tax return and assets & liabilities of sponsor.
q. Affidavit
of official or employee if he/she will shoulder expenses.
r. Last year
income tax return and assets & liabilities of official or employee if
he/she will shoulder expenses.
s. Affidavit
stating that the travel will not exceed ten (10) days. No request for extension shall be entertained
unless it is extremely necessary.
t. Request
shall be approved on a case to case basis dependent on the justification
submitted.
4. No application for travel abroad shall be approved
unless all the documents required are submitted. Failure on the part of the official or
employee to report back on duty after the expiration of the authorize travel
abroad shall be considered AWOL.
[15]
[16] Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Organo,
G.R. No. 149549,
[17] Civil Service Commission v. Juliana Ledesma,
G.R. No. 154521, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 589.
[18] Avancena v. Liwanag, 454 Phil. 20, 25
(2003).
[19] King v. Megaworld Properties and Holdings,
Inc., G.R. No. 162895,
[20] Supra note 13.
[21] Section
4, par. (h) of R.A. No. 6713, provides:
SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public
Officials and Employees.—xxx
(h)
Simple living. — Public officials and employees and their families shall
lead modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not
indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
[22]
Section 7, par. (b)(3) of R.A. No. 6713.
[23] Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
SEC. 4. Prohibition
on private individuals. — (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family
or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or
take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application,
request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to
intervene. Family relation shall include
the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree.
The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship,
social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise
to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
[24] Supra note 14.
[25] Supra note 12.
[26] Section 4(d) of Executive Order No. 156 dated October
7, 1999, entitled "CREATING A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO REVIEW, INVESTIGATE,
AND GATHER EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTE IRREGULARITIES
COMMITTED AT THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND OTHER
GOVERNMENT OFFICES OR AGENCIES UNDER OR ATTACHED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE," as amended by Executive
Order No. 38, provides:
Section 4. Powers, Duties and Functions. The Task
Force shall have the following powers, duties and functions:
x x x
d) To
recommend the settlement of cases for approval of the President, subject to
appropriate rules on the settlement of claims by the government;
[27]
[28] Supra note 26.
[29] Section
5 of E.O. No. 156, as amended by E.O. No. 38, provides:
SECTION 5. Section
6 of the same issuance shall read as follows:
Section 5. Term.
The Task Force shall exist for another two years to expire on
[30] Supra note 6.
[31]
[32] Rollo of G.R. No. 164250, p. 579.
[33] 315 Phil. 210 (1995), citing Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, 312 Phil. 693 (1995), which cited Perez v. Abiera, 159-A Phil. 580, 581
(1975).