Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
BENGUET CORPORATION, G.R. No. 163101
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
and
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT VELASCO,
JR., JJ.
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD
and J.G. REALTY AND MINING Promulgated:
CORPORATION,
Respondents. February 13, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The
instant petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the annulment of the
December 2, 2002 Decision[1]
and March 17, 2004 Resolution[2] of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Mining Adjudication Board
(DENR-MAB) in MAB Case No. 0124-01 (Mines Administrative Case No. R-M-2000-01) entitled
Benguet Corporation (Benguet) v. J.G. Realty and Mining Corporation (J.G. Realty). The December 2, 2002 Decision upheld the March 19,
2001 Decision[3] of the
MAB Panel of Arbitrators (POA) which canceled the Royalty Agreement with Option
to Purchase (RAWOP) dated June 1, 1987[4]
between Benguet and J.G. Realty, and excluded Benguet from the joint Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) application over four mining claims. The
March 17, 2004 Resolution denied Benguet’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
On
In
the RAWOP, Benguet obligated itself to perfect the rights to the mining claims
and/or otherwise acquire the mining rights to the mineral claims. Within 24
months from the execution of the RAWOP, Benguet should also cause the
examination of the mining claims for the purpose of determining whether or not
they are worth developing with reasonable probability of profitable production.
Benguet undertook also to furnish J.G.
Realty with a report on the examination, within a reasonable time after the
completion of the examination. Moreover, also within the examination period,
Benguet shall conduct all necessary exploration in accordance with a prepared
exploration program. If it chooses to do so and before the expiration of the
examination period, Benguet may undertake to develop the mining claims upon
written notice to J.G. Realty. Benguet must then place the mining claims into
commercial productive stage within 24 months from the written notice.[6] It
is also provided in the RAWOP that if the mining claims were placed in
commercial production by Benguet, J.G. Realty should be entitled to a royalty
of five percent (5%) of net realizable value, and to royalty for any production
done by Benguet whether during the examination or development periods.
Thus,
on
a. The fact that your company has failed to
perform the obligations set forth in the RAWOP, i.e., to undertake development
works within 2 years from the execution of the Agreement;
b. Violation of the Contract by allowing high
graders to operate on our claim.
c. No stipulation was provided with respect to
the term limit of the RAWOP.
d. Non-payment of the royalties thereon as
provided in the RAWOP.[7]
In response, Benguet’s Manager for
Legal Services, Reynaldo P. Mendoza, wrote J.G. Realty a letter dated March 8,
1999,[8] therein
alleging that Benguet complied with its obligations under the RAWOP by
investing PhP 42.4 million to rehabilitate the mines, and that the commercial
operation was hampered by the non-issuance of a Mines Temporary Permit by the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) which must be considered as force majeure, entitling Benguet to an
extension of time to prosecute such permit. Benguet further claimed that the
high graders mentioned by J.G. Realty were already operating prior to Benguet’s
taking over of the premises, and that J.G. Realty had the obligation of
ejecting such small scale miners. Benguet also alleged that the nature of the
mining business made it difficult to specify a time limit for the RAWOP.
Benguet then argued that the royalties due to J.G. Realty were in fact in its
office and ready to be picked up at any time. It appeared that, previously, the
practice by J.G. Realty was to pick-up checks from Benguet representing such
royalties. However, starting August 1994, J.G. Realty allegedly refused to
collect such checks from Benguet. Thus, Benguet posited that there was no valid
ground for the termination of the RAWOP. It also reminded J.G. Realty that it
should submit the disagreement to arbitration rather than unilaterally
terminating the RAWOP.
On June 7, 2000, J.G. Realty filed a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP[9] with
the Legaspi City POA, Region V, docketed as DENR Case No. 2000-01 and entitled J.G. Realty v. Benguet.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 01, 1987 [RAWOP] and its Supplemental Agreement is hereby declared cancelled and without effect. BENGUET is hereby excluded from the joint MPSA Application over the mineral claims denominated as “BONITO-I”, “BONITO-II”, “BONITO-III” and “BONITO-IV”.
SO
ORDERED.
Therefrom,
Benguet filed a Notice of Appeal[11] with
the MAB on April 23, 2001, docketed as Mines Administrative Case No.
R-M-2000-01. Thereafter, the MAB issued the assailed
The Issues
1. There was serious and palpable error when the
Honorable Board failed to rule that the contractual obligation of the parties
to arbitrate under the Royalty Agreement is mandatory.
2. The Honorable Board exceeded its jurisdiction
when it sustained the cancellation of the Royalty Agreement for alleged breach
of contract despite the absence of evidence.
3. The Questioned Decision of the Honorable
Board in cancelling the RAWOP prejudice[d] the substantial rights of Benguet
under the contract to the unjust enrichment of JG Realty.[12]
Restated,
the issues are: (1) Should the controversy have first been submitted to
arbitration before the POA took cognizance of the case?; (2) Was the
cancellation of the RAWOP supported by evidence?; and (3) Did the cancellation
of the RAWOP amount to unjust enrichment of J.G. Realty at the expense of
Benguet?
The Court’s Ruling
Before we dwell on the substantive
issues, we find that the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet
resorted to an improper remedy.
The
last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the “Philippine
Mining Act of 1995” states, “A petition for review by certiorari and question
of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].”
However,
this Court has already invalidated such provision in Carpio v. Sulu Resources Development Corp.,[13]
ruling that a decision of the MAB must first be appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, before recourse to this Court
may be had. We held, thus:
To summarize, there are
sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB Decision under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, mandates that “[n]o law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its
advice and consent.” On the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that
decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a “petition for review by
certiorari.” This provision is obviously an expansion of the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not consented.
Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court would unnecessarily burden it.
Second, when the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to the CA
pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decisions, such
transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive
and vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved party’s right to appeal is
preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which the appeal is to be
made or decided. The parties still have a remedy and a competent tribunal to
grant this remedy.
Third, the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and
final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition
for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of
government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under
this definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies
enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of
Circular No. 1-91––“among these agencies are”––indicate that the enumeration is
not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other
quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed
included therein.
Fourth, the Court
realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by RA No. 7902,
factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial
bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has
more elbow room to resolve them. By including questions of fact among the
issues that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA,
Section 3 of Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43 explicitly expanded
the list of such issues.
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, “[a]n appeal under this
Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner
herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.” Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies even
only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts
dictates that direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not
be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the
appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of
our primary jurisdiction.[14]
The
above principle was reiterated in Asaphil
Construction and Development Corporation v. Tuason, Jr. (Asaphil).[15]
However, the Carpio ruling was not
applied to Asaphil as the petition in
the latter case was filed in 1999 or three years before the promulgation of Carpio in 2002. Here, the petition was filed on April 28, 2004
when the Carpio decision was already
applicable, thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.
Petitioner having failed to properly
appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become final and
executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.
Even if we entertain the petition
although Benguet skirted the appeal to the CA via Rule 43, still, the December
2, 2002 Decision and March 17, 2004 Resolution of the DENR-MAB in MAB Case No.
0124-01 should be maintained.
First Issue: The case should have first
been brought to
voluntary arbitration before the POA
Secs.
11.01 and 11.02 of the RAWOP pertinently provide:
11.01 Arbitration
Any
disputes, differences or disagreements between BENGUET and the OWNER with
reference to anything whatsoever pertaining to this Agreement that cannot be
amicably settled by them shall not be cause of any action of any kind whatsoever
in any court or administrative agency but shall, upon notice of one party to
the other, be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3)
members, one to be selected by BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER and
the third to be selected by the aforementioned two arbitrators so appointed.
x
x x x
11.02
Court Action
No
action shall be instituted in court as to any matter in dispute as hereinabove
stated, except to enforce the decision of the majority of the Arbitrators.[16]
Thus,
Benguet argues that the POA should have first referred the case to voluntary
arbitration before taking cognizance of the case, citing Sec. 2 of RA 876 on
persons and matters subject to arbitration.
On
the other hand, in denying such argument, the POA ruled that:
While
the parties may establish such stipulations clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, the same must not be contrary to law and public
policy. At a glance, there is nothing wrong with the terms and conditions of
the agreement. But to state that an aggrieved party cannot initiate an action
without going to arbitration would be tying one’s hand even if there is a law
which allows him to do so.[17]
The
MAB, meanwhile, denied Benguet’s contention on the ground of estoppel, stating:
Besides,
by its own act, Benguet is already estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of
the Panel of Arbitrators to hear and decide the case. As pointed out in the
appealed Decision, Benguet initiated and filed an Adverse Claim docketed as
MAC-R-M-2000-02 over the same mining claims without undergoing contractual
arbitration. In this particular case (MAC-R-M-2000-02) now subject of the
appeal, Benguet is likewise in estoppel from questioning the competence of the
Panel of Arbitrators to hear and decide in the summary proceedings J.G.
Realty’s petition, when Benguet itself did not merely move for the dismissal of
the case but also filed an Answer with counterclaim seeking affirmative reliefs
from the Panel of Arbitrators.[18]
Moreover,
the MAB ruled that the contractual provision on arbitration merely provides for
an additional forum or venue and does not divest the POA of the jurisdiction to
hear the case.[19]
In
its July 20, 2004 Comment,[20] J.G.
Realty reiterated the above rulings of the POA and MAB. It argued that RA 7942
or the “Philippine Mining Act of 1995” is a special law which should prevail
over the stipulations of the parties and over a general law, such as RA 876. It
also argued that the POA cannot be considered as a “court” under the contemplation
of RA 876 and that jurisprudence saying that there must be prior resort to
arbitration before filing a case with the courts is inapplicable to the instant
case as the POA is itself already engaged in arbitration.
On this issue, we rule for Benguet.
Sec.
2 of RA 876 elucidates the scope of arbitration:
Section 2. Persons and matters subject to arbitration.––Two or more persons or parties may submit
to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy existing between
them at the time of the submission and which may be the subject of an action,
or the parties to any contract may in such contract agree to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them. Such submission or
contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law for the revocation of any contract.
Such submission or contract may include question[s] arising
out of valuations, appraisals or other controversies which may be collateral,
incidental, precedent or subsequent to any issue between the parties. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In
RA 9285 or the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,” the Congress
reiterated the efficacy of arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute
resolution by stating in Sec. 32 thereof that domestic arbitration shall still
be governed by RA 876. Clearly, a
contractual stipulation that requires prior resort to voluntary arbitration
before the parties can go directly to court is not illegal and is in fact
promoted by the State. Thus, petitioner correctly cites several cases whereby
arbitration clauses have been upheld by this Court.[21]
Moreover,
the contention that RA 7942 prevails over RA 876 presupposes a conflict between
the two laws. Such is not the case here. To reiterate, availment of voluntary
arbitration before resort is made to the courts or quasi-judicial agencies of
the government is a valid contractual stipulation that must be adhered to by
the parties. As stated in Secs. 6 and 7 of RA 876:
Section 6. Hearing by court.––A party aggrieved by the failure, neglect
or refusal of another to perform under an agreement in writing providing for
arbitration may petition the court for an order directing that such arbitration
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days notice in
writing of the hearing of such application shall be served either personally or
by registered mail upon the party in default. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement or such failure to comply therewith is not in issue,
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement. If the making of the agreement or
default be in issue the court shall proceed to summarily hear such issue. If
the finding be that no agreement in writing providing for arbitration was made,
or that there is no default in the proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall
be dismissed. If the finding be that a written provision for arbitration was
made and there is a default in proceeding thereunder, an order shall be made
summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance
with the terms thereof.
x x x x
Section 7. Stay of civil action.––If
any suit or proceeding be brought upon an issue arising out of an agreement
providing for the arbitration thereof, the court in which such suit or
proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such
suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall stay the action or
proceeding until an arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement: Provided, That the applicant, for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration. (Emphasis supplied.)
In
other words, in the event a case that should properly be the subject of
voluntary arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial
agencies, on motion of the defendant, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall
determine whether such contractual provision for arbitration is sufficient and
effective. If in affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall then
order the enforcement of said provision. Besides, in BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we already ruled:
In this connection, it bears stressing that the lower court has not lost its jurisdiction over the case. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 876 provides that proceedings therein have only been stayed. After the special proceeding of arbitration has been pursued and completed, then the lower court may confirm the award made by the arbitrator.[22]
J.G.
Realty’s contention, that prior resort to arbitration is unavailing in the
instant case because the POA’s mandate is to arbitrate disputes involving
mineral agreements, is misplaced. A distinction must be made between voluntary
and compulsory arbitration. In Ludo and
Luym Corporation v. Saordino, the Court had the occasion to distinguish
between the two types of arbitrations:
Comparatively, in Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC, compulsory arbitration has been defined both as “the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party.” While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor department’s personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for under labor laws.[23] (Emphasis supplied.)
There
is a clear distinction between compulsory and voluntary arbitration. The
arbitration provided by the POA is compulsory, while the nature of the
arbitration provision in the RAWOP is voluntary, not involving any government
agency. Thus, J.G. Realty’s argument on this matter must fail.
As
to J.G. Realty’s contention that the provisions of RA 876 cannot apply to the
instant case which involves an administrative agency, it must be pointed out
that Section 11.01 of the RAWOP states that:
[Any
controversy with regard to the contract] shall not be cause of any action of
any kind whatsoever in any court or administrative
agency but shall, upon notice of one party to the other, be referred to a
Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3) members, one to be selected by
BENGUET, another to be selected by the OWNER and the third to be selected by
the aforementioned two arbiters so appointed.[24]
(Emphasis supplied.)
There
can be no quibbling that POA is a quasi-judicial body which forms part of the
DENR, an administrative agency. Hence,
the provision on mandatory resort to arbitration, freely entered into by the
parties, must be held binding against them.[25]
In
sum, on the issue of whether POA should have referred the case to voluntary
arbitration, we find that, indeed, POA has no jurisdiction over the dispute
which is governed by RA 876, the arbitration law.
However,
we find that Benguet is already estopped from questioning the POA’s
jurisdiction. As it were, when J.G.
Realty filed DENR Case No. 2000-01, Benguet filed its answer and participated in
the proceedings before the POA, Region V.
Secondly, when the adverse March 19, 2001 POA Decision was rendered, it
filed an appeal with the MAB in Mines Administrative Case No. R-M-2000-01 and
again participated in the MAB proceedings. When the adverse December 2, 2002
MAB Decision was promulgated, it filed a motion for reconsideration with the
MAB. When the adverse March 17, 2004 MAB
Resolution was issued, Benguet filed a petition with this Court pursuant to
Sec. 79 of RA 7942 impliedly recognizing MAB’s jurisdiction. In this factual
milieu, the Court rules that the jurisdiction of POA and that of MAB can no
longer be questioned by Benguet at this late hour. What Benguet should have
done was to immediately challenge the POA’s jurisdiction by a special civil
action for certiorari when POA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute. To redo the proceedings fully participated in
by the parties after the lapse of seven years from date of institution of the
original action with the POA would be anathema to the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Second Issue: The cancellation of the
RAWOP
was supported by evidence
The cancellation of the RAWOP by the POA
was based on two grounds: (1) Benguet’s failure to pay J.G. Realty’s royalties
for the mining claims; and (2) Benguet’s failure to seriously pursue MPSA
Application No. APSA-V-0009 over the mining claims.
As to the royalties, Benguet claims
that the checks representing payments for the royalties of J.G. Realty were
available for pick-up in its office and it is the latter which refused to claim
them. Benguet then thus concludes that
it did not violate the RAWOP for nonpayment of royalties. Further, Benguet
reasons that J.G. Realty has the burden of proving that the former did not pay
such royalties following the principle that the complainants must prove their
affirmative allegations.
With regard to the failure to pursue
the MPSA application, Benguet claims that the lengthy time of approval of the
application is due to the failure of the MGB to approve it. In other words, Benguet
argues that the approval of the application is solely in the hands of the MGB.
Benguet’s arguments are bereft of
merit.
Sec. 14.05 of the RAWOP provides:
14.05 Bank Account
OWNER
shall maintain a bank account at ___________ or any other bank from time to
time selected by OWNER with notice in writing to BENGUET where BENGUET shall
deposit to the OWNER’s credit any and all advances and payments which may
become due the OWNER under this Agreement as well as the purchase price herein
agreed upon in the event that BENGUET shall exercise the option to purchase
provided for in the Agreement. Any and
all deposits so made by BENGUET shall be a full and complete acquittance and
release to [sic] BENGUET from any
further liability to the OWNER of the amounts represented by such deposits. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Evidently,
the RAWOP itself provides for the mode of royalty payment by Benguet. The fact
that there was the previous practice whereby J.G. Realty picked-up the checks
from Benguet is unavailing. The mode of payment is embodied in a contract
between the parties. As such, the contract must be considered as the law
between the parties and binding on both.[26]
Thus, after J.G. Realty informed Benguet of the bank account where deposits of
its royalties may be made, Benguet had the obligation to deposit the checks. J.G.
Realty had no obligation to furnish Benguet with a Board Resolution considering
that the RAWOP itself provided for such payment scheme.
Notably, Benguet’s claim that J.G.
Realty must prove nonpayment of its royalties is both illogical and unsupported
by law and jurisprudence.
The allegation of nonpayment is not a
positive allegation as claimed by Benguet. Rather, such is a negative
allegation that does not require proof and in fact transfers the burden of
proof to Benguet. Thus, this Court ruled
in Jimenez v. National Labor Relations Commission:
As a
general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the
plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on
the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove
non-payment. The debtor has the burden
of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by
payment.[27] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the obligation
of Benguet to pay royalties to J.G. Realty has been admitted and supported by
the provisions of the RAWOP. Thus, the burden to prove such obligation rests on
Benguet.
It
should also be borne in mind that MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 has been
pending with the MGB for a considerable length of time. Benguet, in the RAWOP, obligated
itself to perfect the rights to the mining claims and/or otherwise acquire the
mining rights to the mineral claims but failed to present any evidence showing
that it exerted efforts to speed up and have the application approved. In fact,
Benguet never even alleged that it continuously followed-up the application
with the MGB and that it was in constant communication with the government
agency for the expeditious resolution of the application. Such allegations
would show that, indeed, Benguet was remiss in prosecuting the MPSA application
and clearly failed to comply with its obligation in the RAWOP.
Third Issue: There is no unjust
enrichment in the instant case
Based
on the foregoing discussion, the cancellation of the RAWOP was based on valid
grounds and is, therefore, justified. The necessary implication of the
cancellation is the cessation of Benguet’s right to prosecute MPSA Application
No. APSA-V-0009 and to further develop such mining claims.
In
Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio
Realty and Development Corporation, we defined unjust enrichment, as
follows:
We have held that “[t]here is unjust
enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience.” Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that “[e]very person
who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.” The principle of unjust enrichment
under Article 22 requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited
without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is
derived at another’s expense or damage.
There
is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to
such benefit.[28] (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly,
there is no unjust enrichment in the instant case as the cancellation of the RAWOP,
which left Benguet without any legal right to participate in further developing
the mining claims, was brought about by its violation of the RAWOP. Hence,
Benguet has no one to blame but itself for its predicament.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition, and AFFIRM
the December 2, 2002 Decision and March 17, 2004 Resolution of the DENR-MAB in
MAB Case No. 0124-01 upholding the cancellation of the
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 25-38.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
G.R. No. 148267,
[14]
[15]
G.R. No. 134030,
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] BF Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 120105,
March 27, 1998, 288 SCRA 267; Puromines v.
CA, G.R. No. 91228, March 22, 1993, 220 SCRA 281; General Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Union Insurance Society of
Canton, et al., G.R. Nos. 30475-76, November 22, 1989, 179 SCRA 530; Gascon v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 78389,
October 16, 1989, 178 SCRA 582; Bengson
v. Chan, No. L-27283,
[22] Supra at 285.
[23]
G.R. No. 140960,
[24] Rollo, p. 90.
[25] Chan v. CA, G.R. No. 147999,
[26] Civil Code, Arts. 1159 & 1308.
[27]
G.R. No. 116960,
[28]
G.R. No. 138088,