THIRD DIVISION
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Joaquin Quimpo, Sr.,
substituted by Heirs of Joaquin Quimpo, Sr., Petitioners, - versus - Consuelo Abad
Vda. de Beltran,
Ireneo Abad, Danilo Abad,
Marites Abad, Anita and Helen Abad, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 160956
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: February 13, 2008
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RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This
Petition for Review on Certiorari
assails the July 22, 2003 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56187, and the October 16, 2003
Resolution denying the motion for its reconsideration.
Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad (Eustaquia)
was the owner of several parcels of land in
Parcel I - Residential
land situated at Abucayan,
Parcel II – Coconut
land situated at Abucayan,
Parcel III – Residential land situated at San Jose Street, Goa, Camarines Sur covering an area of 1,395 square meters; and
Parcel IV – Abaca
and coconut land situated at Abucayan,
Eustaquia died intestate in 1948
leaving these parcels of land to her grandchild and great grandchildren,
namely, Joaquin Quimpo and respondents Consuelo, Ireneo, Danilo, Marites, Anita
and Helen, all surnamed Abad.
In 1966, Joaquin and respondents
undertook an oral partition of parcel III (
In 1989, Danilo, Marites, Anita and
Helen wanted to take possession of the portions allotted to them, but Joaquin
prevented them from occupying the same. Joaquin also refused to heed respondents’
demand for partition of parcels I and II, prompting respondents to file a
complaint for judicial partition and/or recovery of possession with accounting
and damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camarines
Joaquin denied the material
allegations in the complaint, and averred, as his special and affirmative
defenses, lack of cause of action and prescription. He asserted absolute ownership over parcels
III and IV, claiming that he purchased these lands from Eustaquia in 1946,
evidenced by deeds of sale executed on
During the pendency of the case,
Joaquin died. Accordingly, he was
substituted by his wife, Estela Tena-Quimpo and his children, namely, Jose,
Adelia, Joaquin, Anita, Angelita, Amelia, Arlene, Joy and Aleli, all surnamed
Quimpo (the Quimpos).
On
The RTC disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Consuelo Vda. de Beltran, Ireneo Abad, Marites Abad, Danilo Abad, Anita Abad and Helen Abad and against defendant Joaquin Quimpo, substituted by the latter’s wife Estela Tena and their children, Amparo, Jose, Amelia, Joaquin Jr., Adelia, Arlene, Anita, Joy, Angelita and Aleli, all surnamed Quimpo, as follows:
1. Ordering the above-named substituted defendants, and the plaintiffs to execute their written agreement of partition with respect to parcel Nos. III and IV more particularly described in paragraph 7 of the complaint, and for them to execute an agreement of partition with respect to parcel Nos. I and II, both parcels are more particularly described in paragraph 7 of the complaint;
2. Declaring the plaintiffs Danilo Abad, Marites Abad, Anita Abad and Helen Abad the owner of six (6) hectares a portion included in parcel No. IV also described in paragraph 7 of the complaint, and therefore, entitled to its possession and ordering the said substituted defendants to deliver that portion to them as their share thereto;
3.
Ordering the above-named substituted defendants to pay
plaintiffs the sum of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as reasonable attorney’s fees and the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00)
also of Philippine Currency, as litigation expenses and for the said defendants
to pay the costs.
The counterclaim, not being proved, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling. Sustaining the RTC, the CA
declared that it was plausible that Eustaquia’s consent was vitiated because
she was then 91 years old and sickly. It
was bolstered by the fact that the deeds of sale only surfaced 43 years after
its alleged execution and 23 years from the time of the oral partition. The CA also rejected petitioners’ argument
that the action was barred by prescription and laches, explaining that
prescription does not run against the heirs so long as the heirs, for whose
benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the
co-ownership. The CA found no repudiation on Joaquin’s part. It, therefore, concluded that respondents’
action could not be barred by prescription or laches.
The
Quimpos, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari imputing
the following errors to the CA:
1) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS DID NOT ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP OVER [THE] SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND BY WAY OF DEEDS OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN THEIR FAVOR;
2) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT CO-OWNERSHIP EXISTS AMONG PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND;
3) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE PROVEN THEIR FILIATION TO THE ORIGINAL OWNER OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND BY MERE SCANT EVIDENCE;
4) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT LACHES HAS TIME–BARRED THE RESPONDENTS FROM ASSAILING THE ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND; AND
5) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES.[7]
The Quimpos insist on the validity of
the deeds of sale between Joaquin and Eustaquia. They assail the probative value and weight
given by the RTC and the CA in favor of the respondents’ pieces of evidence
while refusing to give credence or value to the documents they presented. Specifically, they contend that the notarized
deeds of sale and the tax declarations should have adequately established
Joaquin’s ownership of parcels III and IV.
The
contention has no merit. Well-entrenched
is the rule that the Supreme Court’s role in a petition under Rule 45 is
limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court. Factual findings of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive
on the parties. Since such findings are
generally not reviewable, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all
over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, unless the
factual findings complained of are devoid of support from the evidence on
record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[8]
Petitioners fail to convince us that the CA committed reversible error in affirming the trial court and in giving no weight to the pieces of evidence they presented.
The stated consideration for the sale
are P5,000.00 and P6,000.00, respectively, an amount which was so
difficult to raise in the year 1946.
Respondents established that at the time of the purported sale Joaquin
Quimpo was not gainfully employed. He
was studying in
In
Rongavilla v. Court of Appeals,[9]
reiterated in Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corp,[10]
we held that a deed of
sale, in which the stated consideration has not been, in fact, paid is a false
contract; that it is void ab initio. Furthermore, Ocejo v. Flores,[11]
ruled that a contract of purchase and sale is null and void and produces no
effect whatsoever where it appears that the same is without cause or
consideration which should have been the motive thereof, or the purchase price
which appears thereon as paid but which in fact has never been paid by the
purchaser to the vendor.
Likewise, both the trial court and the
CA found that Eustaquia was 91 years old, weak and senile, at the time the deeds of sale were executed. In other words, she was already mentally
incapacitated by then, and could no longer be expected to give her consent to
the sale. The RTC and CA cannot,
therefore, be faulted for not giving credence to the deeds of sale in favor of
Joaquin.
Petitioners also presented Tax Declaration
Nos. 3650,[12] 3708,[13]
and 3659[14] to
substantiate Joaquin’s claim of absolute dominion over parcels III and IV. But we note that these tax declarations are
all in the name of Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad.
These documents, therefore, do not support their claim of absolute
dominion since 1946, but enervate it instead.
Besides, the fact that the disputed property may have been declared
for taxation purposes in the name of Joaquin Quimpo does not necessarily prove
ownership for it is well settled that a tax declaration or tax receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership.[15]
The CA, therefore, correctly found this proof inadequate to establish Joaquin’s
claim of absolute dominion.
For forty-three (43) years, Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their
portions of the
In Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot,[16] we held, viz.:
[P]artition may be inferred from circumstances
sufficiently strong to support the presumption.
Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be
presumed. It has been held that
recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon
for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient
evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by deed or by
proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded.
Furthermore, in Hernandez v. Andal,[17] we explained that:
On general principle, independent and in spite of
the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it
has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a
parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law,
equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been
consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of
ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize
and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number
of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into
possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the
partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper
case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has
been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel
of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land
divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and
acts of individual ownership were exercised.
And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be
valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as
between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also
be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of
ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part
performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a
parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a
partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of
equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the
parties.
The CA, therefore, committed no
reversible error in sustaining the oral partition over parcels III and IV and
in invalidating the deeds of sale between Eustaquia and Joaquin.
Similarly, we affirm the CA ruling
that respondents are co-owners of the subject four (4) parcels of land, having
inherited the same from a common ancestor – Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad. Petitioners’ assertion that respondents
failed to prove their relationship to the late Eustaquia deserves scant
consideration.
During
the pre-trial, Joaquin Quimpo admitted that:
Eustaquia Perfecto Abad and Diego Abad had
two (2) children by the names of Leon Abad and Joaquin Abad; that Leon Abad has
three (3) children namely: Anastacia, Wilfredo and Consuelo, all surnamed Abad;
that Joaquin Abad has only one (1) child, a daughter by the name of Amparo;
that Wilfredo has four (4) children, namely, Danilo, Helen, Marites and Anita;
Amparo has one child, son Joaquin Quimpo, x x x [18]
Consuelo was the grandchild of
Eustaquia, while respondents Danilo, Helen, Marites, Anita and also Joaquin
Quimpo were Eustaquia’s great grandchildren.
As such, respondents can rightfully ask for the confirmation of the oral
partition over parcels III and IV, and the partition of parcels I and II. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that
any co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless
a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership.
This action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to
laches.[19]
Finally, petitioners challenge
the attorney’s fees in favor of respondents.
The grant of attorney’s fees
depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the
court. It may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to
incur expenses to protect its interest by reason of an unjustified act by the
other,[20] as in this case.
In fine, we find no reversible error
in the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
56187, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* In lieu of Associate Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special
Order No. 484 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos (deceased), with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (retired) and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 29-39.
[2] Rollo, p. 29.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Fagonnil-Herrera v. Fagonil, G.R. No. 169356, August
28, 2007.
[9] 355 Phil. 721 (1998).
[10] 429 Phil. 225. 233 (2002).
[11] 40 Phil 921 (1920).
[12] Rollo, p. 208.
[13]
[14]
[15] Rivera
v. Court of Appeals, 314 Phil. 57
(1995).
[16] 385 Phil. 720, 736-737 (2000).
[17] 78 Phil. 196, 203 (1947).
[18] Amended Pre-trial Order, rollo, p. 89.
[19] Bravo-Guerero
v. Bravo, G.R. No. 152658,
[20] Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. John Bordman Ltd. Of Iloilo, Inc., G.R. No. 159831,