|
PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, -versus- ENRIQUE LIGAN, EMELITO SOCO, ALLAN PANQUE, JOLITO
OLIVEROS, RICHARD GONCER, NONILON PILAPIL, AQUILINO YBANEZ, BERNABE SANDOVAL,
RUEL GONCER, VIRGILIO P. CAMPOS, JR., ARTHUR M. CAPIN, RAMEL BERNARDES,
LORENZO BUTANAS, BENSON CARESUSA, JEFFREY LLENOS, ROQUE PILAPIL, ANTONIO M.
PAREJA, CLEMENTE R. LUMAYNO, NELSON TAMPUS, ROLANDO TUNACAO, CHERRIE ALEGRES,
BENEDICTO AUXTERO, EDUARDO MAGDADARAUG, NELSON M. DULCE, and ALLAN BENTUZAL,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 146408 Present: QUISUMBING,* J., Chairperson, CARPIO,** CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA,*** TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Philippine Airlines as
Owner, and Synergy Services Corporation (Synergy) as Contractor, entered into
an Agreement[1]
on July 15, 1991 whereby Synergy undertook to “provide loading, unloading,
delivery of baggage and cargo and other related services to and from
[petitioner]’s aircraft at the Mactan Station.”[2]
The
Agreement specified the following “Scope of Services” of Contractor Synergy:
1.2 CONTRACTOR shall
furnish all the necessary capital, workers, loading, unloading and delivery
materials, facilities, supplies, equipment and tools for the
satisfactory performance and execution of the following services (the Work):
a. Loading and unloading of
baggage and cargo to and from the aircraft;
b. Delivering of baggage from
the ramp to the baggage claim area;
c. Picking up of baggage from
the baggage sorting area to the designated parked aircraft;
d. Delivering of cargo unloaded
from the flight to cargo terminal;
e. Other related jobs (but not
janitorial functions) as may be required and necessary;
CONTRACTOR shall perform and execute the aforementioned
Work at the following areas located at Mactan
Station, to wit:
a. Ramp Area
b. Baggage Claim Area
c. Cargo Terminal Area, and
d. Baggage Sorting Area[3] (Underscoring supplied)
And it expressly provided that Synergy
was “an independent contractor and . . . that there w[ould] be no employer-employee relationship between
CONTRACTOR and/or its employees on the one hand, and OWNER, on the other.”[4]
On the duration of the Agreement,
Section 10 thereof provided:
10. 1 Should
at any time OWNER find the services herein undertaken by CONTRACTOR to be
unsatisfactory, it shall notify CONTRACTOR who shall have fifteen (15) days
from such notice within which to improve the services. If CONTRACTOR fails to improve the services
under this Agreement according to OWNER’S specifications and standards, OWNER
shall have the right to terminate this Agreement immediately and without
advance notice.
10.2
Should CONTRACTOR fail to improve the services within the period
stated above or should CONTRACTOR breach the terms of this Agreement and
fail or refuse to perform the Work in such a manner as will be
consistent with the achievement of the result therein contracted for or in any
other way fail to comply strictly with any terms of this Agreement, OWNER at
its option, shall have the right to terminate this Agreement and to make
other arrangements for having said Work performed and pursuant thereto shall
retain so much of the money held on the Agreement as is necessary to cover the OWNER’s costs and damages, without prejudice to the right
of OWNER to seek resort to the bond furnished by CONTRACTOR should the money in
OWNER’s possession
be insufficient.
x x
x x (Underscoring
supplied)
Except for respondent
Benedicto Auxtero (Auxtero), the rest of the respondents, who appear to have
been assigned by Synergy to petitioner following the execution of the July 15,
1991 Agreement, filed on March 3, 1992 complaints before the NLRC Regional
Office VII at Cebu City against petitioner, Synergy
and their respective officials for underpayment, non-payment of premium pay
for holidays, premium pay for rest days, service incentive
leave pay, 13th month pay and allowances, and for regularization
of employment status with petitioner, they claiming to be “performing
duties for the benefit of [petitioner] since their job is directly connected
with [its] business x x x.”[5]
Respondent Auxtero
had initially filed a complaint against petitioner and Synergy and their respective
officials for regularization of his employment status. Later alleging that he was, without valid
ground, verbally dismissed, he filed a complaint against petitioner and Synergy
and their respective officials for illegal dismissal and reinstatement with
full backwages.[6]
The
complaints of respondents were consolidated.
By Decision[7]
of
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
(1) Ordering respondents PAL
and Synergy jointly and severally to pay all the complainants herein their
13th month pay and service incentive leave benefits;
x
x x x
(3) Ordering respondent
Synergy to pay complainant Benedicto Auxtero a financial assistance in the amount of P5,000.00.
The awards hereinabove enumerated in the aggregate total amount of THREE
HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY NINE PESOS AND EIGHTY SEVEN
CENTAVOS (P322,359.87) are computed in detail by our Fiscal Examiner which
computation is hereto attached to form part of this decision.
The rest of the claims are hereby ordered dismissed
for lack of merit.[8] (Underscoring supplied)
On
appeal by respondents, the NLRC, Fourth Division,
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante, dated
1. Declaring respondent Synergy Services Corporation to
be a ‘labor-only’ contractor;
2. Ordering respondent Philippine Airlines to
accept, as its regular employees, all the complainants, . . . and to give each of them the
salaries, allowances and other employment benefits and privileges of a
regular employee under the Collective Bargaining Agreement subsisting
during the period of their employment;
x x x
x
4. Declaring the dismissal of complainant Benedicto Auxtero to be illegal and ordering his
reinstatement as helper or utility man with respondent Philippine Airlines, with full backwages, allowances and other benefits and privileges
from the time of his dismissal up to his actual reinstatement; and
5. Dismissing
the appeal of respondent Synergy Services Corporation, for lack of merit.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Only
petitioner assailed the NLRC decision via petition for certiorari before this
Court.
By Resolution[11]
of
The
appellate court, by Decision of
I.
. . . IN UPHOLDING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION DECISION WHICH IMPOSED THE RELATIONSHIP OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN.
II.
. . . IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF RESPONDENT
AUXTERO DESPITE THE ABSENCE [OF] ANY FACTUAL FINDING IN THE DECISION THAT
PETITIONER ILLEGALLY TERMINATED HIS EMPLOYMENT.
III.
. . . [IN ANY EVENT IN] COMMITT[ING] A PATENT AND
GRAVE ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION WHICH COMPELLED THE PETITIONER TO EMPLOY THE RESPONDENTS
AS REGULAR EMPLOYEES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR SERVICES ARE IN EXCESS OF
PETITIONER COMPANY’S OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.[14] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner
argues that the law does not prohibit an employer from engaging an independent
contractor, like Synergy, which has substantial capital in carrying on an
independent business of contracting, to perform specific jobs.
Petitioner further argues that its
contracting out to Synergy various services like janitorial, aircraft cleaning,
baggage-handling, etc., which are directly related to its business, does not
make respondents its employees.
Petitioner furthermore argues that
none of the four (4) elements of an employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and respondents, viz: selection and engagement of an employee, payment of
wages, power of dismissal, and the power to control employee’s conduct, is
present in the case.[15]
Finally, petitioner avers that
reinstatement of respondents had been rendered impossible because it had reduced
its personnel due to heavy losses as it had in fact terminated its service
agreement with Synergy effective
The
decision of the case hinges on a determination of whether Synergy is a mere
job-only contractor or a legitimate contractor. If Synergy is found to be a mere job-only
contractor, respondents could be considered as regular employees of petitioner
as Synergy would then be a mere agent of petitioner in which case respondents
would be entitled to all the benefits granted to petitioner’s regular employees;
otherwise, if Synergy is found to be a legitimate contractor, respondents’
claims against petitioner must fail as they would then be considered employees
of Synergy.
The
statutory basis of legitimate contracting or subcontracting is provided in Article
106 of the Labor Code which reads:
ART.
106. CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR.
— Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the
performance of the former's work, the employees of
the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In
the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his
employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and
severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the
extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent
that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
The
Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the
contracting out of labor to protect the rights of workers established under the
Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriate distinctions
between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations
within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties involved
shall be considered the employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any
violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code.
There
is "labor-only"
contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does
not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, AND the workers
recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are
directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such
cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as
an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers
in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
(Emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)
Legitimate contracting and labor-only
contracting are defined in Department Order (D.O.) No.
18-02, Series of 2002 (Rules Implementing Articles 106 to 109 of the Labor
Code, as amended) as follows:
Section 3. Trilateral relationship in
contracting arrangements. In legitimate contracting, there
exists a trilateral relationship under which there is a contract for a specific
job, work or service between the principal and the contractor or subcontractor,
and a contract of employment between the contractor or subcontractor and its
workers. Hence, there are three parties involved in these arrangements, the
principal which decides to farm out a job or service to a contractor or
subcontractor, the contractor or subcontractor which has the capacity to
independently undertake the performance of the job, work or service, and the
contractual workers engaged by the contractor or subcontractor to
accomplish the job, work or service.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting. Labor-only
contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For this purpose, labor-only
contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor
merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service
for a principal, and any of the
following elements are [sic]
present:
(i)
The contractor or
subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which
relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees
recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are
performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the
principal; OR
(ii)
The contractor does
not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the
contractual employee. (Emphasis,
underscoring and capitalization supplied)
“Substantial capital or investment”
and the “right to control” are defined in the same Section 5 of the Department
Order as follows:
"Substantial
capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed
capitalization in the case of corporations, tools, equipment, implements,
machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor
or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service
contracted out.
The
"right to control" shall refer to the right reserved to the
person for whom the services of the contractual workers are performed,
to determine not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means
to be used in reaching that end. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
From
the records of the case, it is gathered that the work performed by almost all
of the respondents – loading and unloading of baggage and cargo of passengers –
is directly related to the main business of petitioner. And the equipment used by respondents as
station loaders, such as trailers and conveyors, are owned by petitioner.[17]
Petitioner
asserts, however, that mere compliance with substantial capital requirement
suffices for Synergy to be considered a legitimate contractor, citing Neri v. National Labor Relations Commission.[18] Petitioner’s
reliance on said case is misplaced.
In Neri,
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both determined that Building Care Corporation
had a capital stock of P1 million fully subscribed and paid for.[19] The corporation’s status as independent
contractor had in fact been previously confirmed in an earlier case[20] by
this Court which found it to be serving, among others, a university, an
international bank, a big local bank, a hospital center, government agencies,
etc.”
In
stark contrast to the case at bar, while petitioner steadfastly asserted before
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that Synergy has a substantial capital to engage
in legitimate contracting, it failed to present evidence thereon. As the NLRC held:
The decision of the Labor Arbiter merely mentioned on
page 5 of his decision that respondent SYNERGY has substantial capital, but
there is no showing in the records as to how much is that capital. Neither
had respondents shown that SYNERGY has such substantial capital. x x x[21] (Underscoring supplied)
It
was only after the appellate court rendered its challenged Decision of September
29, 2002 when petitioner, in its Motion for Reconsideration of the decision, sought
to prove, for the first time, Synergy’s substantial capitalization by attaching
photocopies of Synergy’s financial statements, e.g., balance sheets, statements
of income and retained earnings, marked as “Annexes ‘A’ – ‘A-4.’”[22]
More
significantly, however, is that respondents worked alongside petitioner’s regular
employees who were performing identical work.[23] As San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa[24] and Dole
For
labor-only contracting to exist, Section 5 of D.O. No. 18-02 which requires any
of two elements to be present is, for convenience, re-quoted:
(i)
The contractor or
subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which
relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the
employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are
performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the
principal, OR
(ii)
The contractor
does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work
of the contractual employee. (Emphasis and CAPITALIZATION supplied)
Even
if only one of the two elements is present then, there is labor-only
contracting.
The
control test element under the immediately-quoted paragraph (ii), which was not
present in the old Implementing Rules (Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997),[26] echoes
the prevailing jurisprudential trend[27]
elevating such element as a primary determinant of employer-employee
relationship in job contracting agreements.
One who claims to be an independent
contractor has to prove that he contracted to do the work according to his own
methods and without being subject to the employer’s control except only as to
the results.[28]
While
petitioner claimed that it was Synergy’s supervisors who actually supervised
respondents, it failed to present evidence thereon. It did not even identify who were the Synergy supervisors assigned at the workplace.
Even the parties’ Agreement does not
lend support to petitioner’s claim, thus:
Section 6.
Qualified and Experienced
Worker: Owner’s Right to Dismiss Workers.
CONTRACTOR
shall employ capable and experienced workers and foremen to carry out the
loading, unloading and delivery Work as well as provide all equipment,
loading, unloading and delivery equipment, materials, supplies and tools
necessary for the performance of the Work. CONTRACTOR shall upon OWNER’S
request furnish the latter with information regarding the qualifications of the
former’s workers, to prove their capability and
experience. Contractor shall require all its workers, employees, suppliers
and visitors to comply with OWNER’S rules, regulations, procedures and
directives relative to the safety and security of OWNER’S premises, properties
and operations. For this purpose, CONTRACTOR shall furnish its
employees and workers identification cards to be countersigned by OWNER
and uniforms to be approved by OWNER. OWNER may require CONTRACTOR to
dismiss immediately and prohibit entry into OWNER’S premises of any person
employed therein by CONTRACTOR who in OWNER’S opinion is incompetent or
misconducts himself or does not comply with OWNER’S reasonable
instructions and requests regarding security, safety and other matters
and such person shall not again be employed to perform the services hereunder
without OWNER’S permission.[29]
(Underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied; emphasis supplied)
Petitioner in fact admitted that it
fixes the work schedule of respondents as their work was dependent on the
frequency of plane arrivals.[30] And as the NLRC found, petitioner’s managers
and supervisors approved respondents’ weekly work assignments and respondents and
other regular PAL employees were all referred to as “station attendants” of the
cargo operation and airfreight services of petitioner.[31]
Respondents
having performed tasks which are usually necessary and desirable in the air
transportation business of petitioner, they should be deemed its regular
employees and Synergy as a labor-only contractor.[32]
The
express provision in the Agreement that Synergy was an independent contractor
and there would be “no employer-employee relationship between [Synergy] and/or
its employees on one hand, and [petitioner] on the other hand” is not legally
binding and conclusive as contractual provisions are not valid determinants of the
existence of such relationship. For it is the totality of
the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case[33]
which is determinative of the parties’ relationship.
Respecting
the dismissal on
Auxtero, having been declared to be a regular employee of
petitioner, and found to be illegally dismissed from employment, should be
entitled to salary differential[37] from
the time he rendered one year of service until his dismissal, reinstatement
plus backwages until the finality of this decision.[38] In view, however, of the long period of time[39]
that had elapsed since his dismissal on
As
regards the remaining respondents, the Court affirms the ruling of both the
NLRC and the appellate court, ordering petitioner to accept them as its regular
employees and to give each of them the salaries, allowances and other
employment benefits and privileges of a regular employee under the pertinent Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
Petitioner
claims, however, that it has become impossible for it to comply with the orders
of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, for during the pendency
of this case, it was forced to reduce its personnel due to heavy losses caused
by economic crisis and the pilots’ strike of
And petitioner informs that “the
employment contracts of all if not most of the respondents . . . were terminated by Synergy effective
Other
than its bare allegations, petitioner presented nothing to substantiate its impossibility
of compliance. In fact, petitioner
waived this defense by failing to raise it in its Memorandum filed on
Finally,
it must be stressed that respondents, having been declared to be regular
employees of petitioner, Synergy being a mere agent of the latter, had acquired
security of tenure. As such, they could only
be dismissed by petitioner, the real employer, on the basis of just or
authorized cause, and with observance of procedural due process.
WHEREFORE, the
Court of Appeals Decision of
Petitioner
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. is ordered
to:
(a) accept respondents ENRIQUE LIGAN,
EMELITO SOCO, ALLAN PANQUE, JOLITO OLIVEROS, RICHARD GONCER, NONILON PILAPIL,
AQUILINO YBANEZ, BERNABE SANDOVAL, RUEL GONCER, VIRGILIO P. CAMPOS, JR., ARTHUR
M. CAPIN, RAMEL BERNARDES, LORENZO BUTANAS, BENSON CARESUSA, JEFFREY LLENOS,
ROQUE PILAPIL, ANTONIO M. PAREJA, CLEMENTE R. LUMAYNO, NELSON TAMPUS, ROLANDO
TUNACAO, CHERRIE ALEGRES, EDUARDO MAGDADARAUG, NELSON M. DULCE and ALLAN
BENTUZAL as its regular
employees in their same or substantially equivalent positions, and pay the
wages and benefits due them as regular employees plus salary differential corresponding to the difference
between the wages and benefits given them and those granted to petitioner’s
other regular employees of the same rank; and
(b) pay respondent BENEDICTO AUXTERO salary
differential; backwages from the
time of his dismissal until the finality of this decision; and separation
pay, in lieu of reinstatement, equivalent to one (1) month pay for every
year of service until the finality of this decision.
There
being no data from which this Court may determine the monetary liabilities of
petitioner, the case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter solely for that purpose.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(ON
OFFICIAL LEAVE)
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Acting Chairperson |
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA Associate
Justice |
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On
official leave per Special Order No. 485 dated
** Acting Chairperson.
*** Additional
member pursuant to Special Order No. 485 dated
[1] NLRC records, Vol. I, pp. 168-177.
[2] Rollo, p. 136.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Ibid.; vide also NLRC records, Vol. 1, p. 151.
[7] Rollo, pp. 302-316.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] CA rollo, p. 179.
[12] Rollo, pp. 7-17. Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz and concurred in by then Presiding Justice Salome Montoya and Associate Justice Renato Dacudao.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] G.R. Nos. 97008-09,
[19]
[20] Citing Associated Labor Unions-TUCP v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 101784,
[21] Rollo, p. 285.
[22] Vide Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration of CA Decision of
[23] Id. at 348-349; vide NLRC records, Vol. 1, pp. 105 and 223; Position Papers for Petitioner, NLRC records, Vol. 1, pp. 83-92 and pp. 156-167; Affidavit of Benedicto A. Auxtero, NLRC records, Vol. 1, p. 185; Memorandum for petitioner, NLRC records, Vol. 1, pp. 206-216.
[24] G.R. No. 149011,
x x x x
More. Private respondents had been working in the aqua processing plant inside the SMC compound alongside regular SMC shrimp processing workers performing identical jobs under the same SMC supervisors. This circumstance is another indicium of the existence of a labor-only contractorship.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
[25] G.R. No. 161115,
[26] Section 4(f) of Rule VIII-A of the
Implementing Rules of Book III, as added by Department Order No. 10, Series of
1997, merely provides:
(f) “Labor-only
contracting” prohibited under this Rule is an arrangement where the contractor
or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job,
work or service for a principal, and the following elements are present:
(i) The
contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to
actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and
responsibility; and
(ii) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by
such contractor or subcontractor are performing
activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.
[27] Vide Neri v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 18; Aurora Land Projects Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 334 Phil. 44, 48 (1997); Escario v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 124055, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 257; Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 126586, February 2, 2000, 324 SCRA 469; National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119121, August 14, 1998, 294 SCRA 209.
[28] Acevedo v. Advanstar Company, Inc., G.R. No. 157656, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 656, 668 citing New Golden City Builders and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 463 Phil. 821 (2003); San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, supra note 24 at 421.
[29] Rollo, p. 170.
[30] NLRC records, Vol. 1, p. 6.
[31]
[32] Aboitiz Haulers, Inc. v. Dimapatoi, G.R. No. 148619, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 271, 287 citing Guinnux Interiors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 75, 78-79 (1997); Manila Water Company Inc. v. Peña, G.R. No. 158255, July 8, 2004, 434 SCRA 53, 60-61.
[33] San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, supra note 24 at 422-423 (citation omitted).
[34] NLRC records, Vol. 1, p. 185.
[35] Floren Hotel v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 155264, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 128, 144; Masagana Concrete Products v. NLRC, 372 Phil. 459 (1999).
[36] Northwest Tourism Corp. v. Court of Appeals, Former Special Third Division, G.R. No. 150591, June 27, 2005, 461 SCRA 298, 309; ACD Investigation Security Agency, Inc. v. Daquera, G.R. No. 147473, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 494; Premier Development Bank v. NLRC, 354 Phil. 851 (1998).
[37] Vide Cinderella Marketing Corporation v. NLRC, 353 Phil. 284 (1998); ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 164156, September 2006, 503 SCRA 204; Kimberly-Clark (Phils.), Inc., v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 156668, November 23, 2007 for jurisprudence on regularization differential.
[38] Star Paper Corporation v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 154006, November 2, 2006, 506 SCRA 556, 568; Tan v. Lagrama, G.R. No. 151228, August 15, 2002, 387 SCRA 393, 406; Prudential Bank and Trust Co. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 141093, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 316, 332.
[39]
[40] Northwest Tourism Corp. v. Court of Appeals, Former Special Third Division, G.R. No. 150591, June 27, 2005, 461 SCRA 298, 311; F.F. Marine Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division, G.R. No. 152039, April 8, 2005, 455 SCRA 154, 174.
[41] Rollo, p. 53.
[42]
[43] Vide rollo, pp. 382-396.
[44] Rollo, pp. 327-341