Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R.
No. 179922
Petitioner,
Present:
-
versus -
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as
FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA,
and
DE
CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES,
JJ.
SANDOVAL
CARLOS or
FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL VDA.
DE
CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
CARLOS
II,
Respondents.
December 16, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the
marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family
Code, except cases commenced prior to
We pronounce these
principles as We review on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set
aside the summary judgment[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (
The Facts
The events that led to
the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos
and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They
left six parcels of land
to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No.
6137 of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil
Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090,
being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated
in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela
49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW,
con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de
un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150)
METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela
50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con
la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150)
METROS CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix
Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo,
in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first
three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of
Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (
Parcel No. 4 was
registered in the name of petitioner.
The lot is now covered by
On
In 1994, petitioner
instituted a suit against respondents before the
On
Meanwhile, in a separate
case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4]
2,331 square
meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in
favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was
later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was
incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on
Petitioner and
respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally
divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995,
petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of
property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of
the
In his complaint,
petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained
that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise
sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad
with respect to the subject real properties.
He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued
in the name of respondents. He argued
that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums
received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner
claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On
On the grounds of lack of
cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, be granted.
But before the parties
could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of
the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also
submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos
and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On
Petitioner also
incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in
Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe,
before the
Subsequently, the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report
and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the
parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, defendant’s (respondent’s) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiff’s (petitioner’s) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as
follows:
1. Declaring
the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized
at Silang, Cavite on
2. Declaring
that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering
defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00
together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the
instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring
plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the
portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by
5. Declaring
the Contract, Annex “K” of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval
null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel
6. Declaring
the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering
the cancellation of
8. Ordering
the cancellation of
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of
plaintiff’s evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents
appealed to the CA. In the appeal,
respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo
II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is
entered REMANDING
the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO
ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary
judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the
aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary
judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of
appellee. Not being an action “to
recover upon a claim” or “to obtain a declaratory relief,” the rule on summary
judgment apply (sic) to an action to
annul a marriage. The mere fact
that no genuine issue was
presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify
a misinterpretation of the rule. The
first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly
prohibit the rendition of decree
of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee’s argument that the foregoing
safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in
the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on
“Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.” (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of
the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record
shows that the finding of the court a quo for
appellee would still not be warranted.
While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among
the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the
Civil Code the failure to reflect the
serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the
marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although
irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the
contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval’s affirmation of the existence of said
marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit
executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the
impugned marriage, to wit:
“That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage
license issued at Silang, Cavite on
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court,
We are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the
foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be
properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract – the
primary evidence of marriage – is not proof that a marriage did not take place,
neither should appellants’ non-presentation of the subject marriage license be
taken as proof that the same was not procured.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it
must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the
party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said
of the trial court’s rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo
Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in
appellant Felicidad Sandoval’s statements.
Although it had effectively disavowed appellant’s prior claims regarding
the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that
he is the illegitimate son of appellee’s brother, to Our mind, did not
altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellant’s illegitimate
filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to
inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the
case, We find appellee’s bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was
merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on
the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minor’s total
forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous
statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval’s declaration regarding the
illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in
the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo
Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his
household. The least that the trial
court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the
merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining
to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.[8]
On
Issues
In this petition under
Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting
aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying
petitioner’s Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof,
with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully
submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and
101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from
that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of
substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a
manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and
reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule
19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the
pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting
aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications
of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.[9]
(Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a
marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues,
including the capacity of one who is
not a spouse in bringing the
action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
must be proved. Neither judgment on the
pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed.
So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner
faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19[10] of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:
SECTION 1.
Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading,
the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.
He argues that the CA
should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment,
instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided.
The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the
Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In
disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on
summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the
applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our
perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a
quo for appellee would
still not be warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered
by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession
of judgment shall be
allowed.
(Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court’s pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity
or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or
declaration of its nullity
or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.[14]
(Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary
judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty
to intervene in the case. The
participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public
prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.[15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code
ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and
intervene for the State. It is at this
stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of
evidence. Concomitantly, even if there
is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the
evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further
bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the
public prosecutor, viz.:
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the
public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to
prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly,
only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General
will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.[16]
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the
spouses by stating:
(a) Who may file. –
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring
supplied)
Section
2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an
aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they
do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed
in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.[17]
(Underscoring supplied)
The
new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They
are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of
marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their
matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence,
they alone can and should decide when to
take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The
innovation incorporated in A.M. No.
The advent of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the
deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving
spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M.
No.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before
As has been
emphasized, A.M. No.
Petitioner
commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on
The marriage
having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of its celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may
bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We
respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code
cannot be construed as a license for
any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.[25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real
party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest.[26]
Interest
within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue
to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.[27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v.
Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
True, under the
New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate “proper
interest” can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on
a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
x x x x
In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and
the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court
for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed
III. The case must be remanded
to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that
when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II.
Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law.[30]
Upon Teofilo’s death in 1992, all his
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance
are transmitted to his compulsory heirs.
These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving
spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined
who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate
parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in
Article 287 of the Civil Code.[31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as
compulsory heirs. But although a collateral
relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory
heir, he
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code
provide:
Indeed,
only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes
collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted child or children of the deceased
precludes succession by collateral relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.[33]
If
respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven
not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner
would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a
brother and sister, acquire successional right over
the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The
records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his
parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and
proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to
the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted
to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code.
This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to
the entire estate.
It
bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the
nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that
Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If
Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son
of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found
to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral
relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus,
the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine
the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the
IV.
Remand of the case regarding the question of
filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to
vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action
before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or
interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning
the filiation of respondent Teofilo II.
This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court
has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as
error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
resolution of the case.[36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been
conducted in the case, petitioner’s bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II
was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total
forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the
illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such
declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by
Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child,
to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is
stressed that Felicidad’s declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo
II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a
child born or conceived within a valid marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial
court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance,
recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was
made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and
void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the
appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The
case is REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court in
regard to the action on the status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the
validity or nullity
of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to
be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo
Carlos, the
3. The disposition of the
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this
case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 47-63. Dated
[2] Civil Case No. 95-135.
[3] Rollo, pp. 49-51.
[4] Docketed as Civil Case No. 11975, CA decision, p. 6.
[5] Rollo, p. 55.
[6] CA rollo, pp. 48-49.
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, pp. 24-25.
[10] Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 34, Sec. 1.
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. However, in
actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
[11] CA rollo, p. 61.
[12]
Sec. 25. Effectivity. – This Rule shall take effect on
[13] G.R. No. 152154,
[14] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 143.
[15] Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No.
139676,
[16] Id. at 187-188, citing Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577,
[17] Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R.
No. 173614,
[18] Id. at
427-428, citing Modequillo v. Brava, G.R. No. 86355,
[19]
[20]
A.M. No.
[21] Supra note 17.
[22] Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, id.
at 428.
[23]
[24] See Republic
v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, and Tecson-Dayot v. Dayot, G.R. No.
179474,
[25] Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., G.R.
No. 155394,
[26]
Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298,
[27] Id. at 358, citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 152574,
[28] G.R. No. 167109,
[29] Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, id.
at 614-615.
[30] Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725,
[31] Paragraphs 4 & 5 are no longer
controlling. The distinctions
among different classes
of illegitimate children under
the Civil Code have been removed. All of them fall in the category of
illegitimate children, as provided under Article 165 of the Family Code:
Article 165. Children conceived
and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided
in this Code.
[32]
See Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 117740,
[33] Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[34] Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
[35] Reyes v. Sotero, supra note 32; Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
[36] Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion, G.R. Nos.
157696-97,
[37]