THIRD DIVISION
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NEGROS
ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOPA), Petitioner, -
versus - HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 52, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 179878 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: December
24, 2008 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
What’s
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
seeking the reversal of the Resolutions[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2007 and 16 August 2007, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02651 outrightly dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros
Oriental Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA) against private respondent Aniceto
Manojo Campos (Campos).
On
On
On
On
On
On
1. Failure of the Petitioner to state
in its Verification that the allegations in the petition are “based on
authentic records”, in violation of Section 4, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC (May 1, 2000), which
provides:
“ – x x x - A pleading is verified by an
affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.
A pleading required to be verified which
contains a verification based on “information and belief,” or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.”
2. Failure of the petitioner to append
to the petition relevant pleadings and documents, which would aid in the
resolution of the instant petition, in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, such as:
a. Ex-parte Motion to Set the Case for
Pre-Trial dated
b. Notice of Pre-Trial;
c. Motion for Leave to File Third Party
Complaint;
d. Orders dated
e. Motion to Suspend the Proceedings dated
f.
Motion
to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute; and
g. Motion for Reconsideration to the Order
dated
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, provides:
“When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The
petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order
or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46.”
3.
Failure of petitioner’s counsel to indicate in the petition his current IBP
Official Receipt Number, in violation of Bar Matter No. 1132 and/or A.M. No.
287, which reads as follows:
“The Court resolved, upon recommendation of the Office
of the Bar Confidant, to GRANT the request of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte to require all lawyers to indicate
their Roll of Attorneys Number in all papers or pleadings submitted to the
various judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in addition to the requirement of
indicating the current Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and the IBP Official
Receipt or Lifetime Member Number.”[2]
On
Hence, this
Petition for Review on Certiorari,
where NOPA raises the following issue and arguments:
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS
VERIFICATION THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND FAILURE TO ATTACH THE NECESSARY
DOCUMENTS ON ITS PLEADINGS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[3]
ARGUMENTS
1. The
requirement that a pleading be verified is merely formal and not
jurisdictional. The court may give due
course to an unverified pleading where the material facts alleged are a matter
of record and the questions raised are mainly of law such as in a petition for
certiorari.[4]
2. Petitioner had attached to its
Petition for Certiorari clearly
legible and duplicate original or a certified true copy of the judgment or
final order or resolution of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain
copies thereof and such material portions of the record as would support the
petition.[5]
3. Substantial compliance of the rules,
which was further supplied by the petitioner’s subsequent full compliance
demonstrates its good faith to abide by the procedural requirements.[6]
4. The resolution of the important
jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioner before the PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA
would justify a relaxation of the rules.[7]
The
original Verification in the original Petition for Certiorari filed by NOPA states as follows:
1. That I am the President and Chairman
of the Board of Directors of
NOPA
claims that this Court has in several cases allowed pleadings with a
Verification that contains the allegation “to the best of my knowledge” and the
allegation “are true and correct,” without the words “of his own knowledge,”
citing Decano v. Edu,[9]
and Quimpo v. De la Victoria.[10] NOPA claims that the allegations in these
cases constitute substantial compliance with the Rules of Court, and should
likewise apply to the case at bar.
NOPA
is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated before
SEC. 4. Verification.—Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and
correct of his knowledge and belief.
As amended, said Section
4 now states:
SEC.
4. Verification.—Except when
otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
Clearly,
the amendment was introduced in order to make the verification requirement
stricter, such that the party cannot now merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the
pleading. He cannot even merely state
under oath that he has knowledge that
such statements are true and correct.
His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records.
Unlike,
however, the requirement for a Certification against Forum Shopping in Section
5, wherein failure to comply with the requirements is not curable by amendment
of the complaint or other initiatory pleading,[11]
Section 4 of Rule 7, as amended, states that
the effect of the failure to properly verify a pleading is that the pleading
shall be treated as unsigned:
A pleading required to be
verified which contains a verification based on “information
and belief,” or upon “knowledge,
information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Unsigned
pleadings are discussed in the immediately preceding section of Rule 7:
SEC.
3. Signature and address. – x x x.
x x
x x
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the
court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if
it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for
delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading
in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or
fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject
to appropriate disciplinary action. (5a)
A
pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party’s
knowledge and belief produces no legal
effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the
deficiency to be remedied. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in
the exercise of this discretion, refused to allow the deficiency in the
Verification to be remedied, by denying NOPA’s Motion for Reconsideration with
attached Amended Petition for Certiorari.
May
an appellate court reverse the exercise of discretion by a lower court? The old case of Lino Luna v. Arcenas[12] states that it can, but only in exceptional cases when there is grave abuse of
this discretion or adverse effect on the substantial rights of a litigant:
Discretionary power
is generally exercised by trial judges in furtherance of the convenience of the
courts and the litigants, the expedition of business, and in the decision of
interlocutory matters on conflicting facts where one tribunal could not easily
prescribe to another the appropriate rule of procedure.
The general rule, therefore, and indeed one of the fundamental principles of
appellate procedure is that decisions
of a trial court which "lie in discretion" will not be reviewed on
appeal, whether the case be civil or criminal at law or in equity.
We have seen that
where such rulings have to do with minor matters, not affecting the substantial
rights of the parties, the prohibition of review in appellate proceedings is
made absolute by the express terms of the statute; but it would be a monstrous travesty on justice to declare that
where the exercise of discretionary power by an inferior court affects
adversely the substantial legal rights of a litigant, it is not subject to
review on appeal in any case wherein a clear and affirmative showing is made of
an abuse of discretion, or of a total lack of its exercise, or of conduct
amounting to an abuse of discretion, such as its improper exercise
under a misapprehension of the law applicable to the facts upon which the
ruling is based.
In its very nature,
the discretionary control conferred upon the trial judge over the proceedings
had before him implies the absence of any hard-and-fast rule by which it is to
be exercised, and in accordance with which it may be reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the
courts is not a willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It
is a sound, judicial discretion which should always be exercised with due
regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and justice.
As was said in the case of The Styria vs. Morgan (186
There being no
"positive law or fixed rule" to guide the judge in the court below in
such cases, there is no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide a court
of appeal in reviewing his action in the premises, and such courts will not
therefore attempt to control the exercise of discretion by the court below
unless it plainly appears that there was "inconsiderate action" or
the exercise of mere "arbitrary will," or in other words that his
action in the premises amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But the
right of an appellate court to review judicial acts which lie in the discretion
of inferior courts may properly be invoked upon a showing of a strong and clear
case of abuse of power to the prejudice of the appellant, or that the ruling
objected to rested on an erroneous principle of law not vested in discretion.[13]
The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no
effect on the substantial rights of a litigant.
NOPA’s Petition for Certiorari
is seeking the reversal of the Orders of the RTC denying NOPA’s Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of failure to pay the proper docket fees. The alleged deficiency in the payment of
docket fees by
There
is therefore no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of
Appeals’ exercise of discretion in the case at bar. While the payment of docket fees is
jurisdictional, it is nevertheless unmistakably also a technicality. Ironically, in seeking the leniency of this
Court on the basis of substantial justice, NOPA is ultimately praying for a Writ
of Certiorari enjoining the action for
breach of contract from being decided on the merits. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander. A party cannot expect its
opponent to comply with the technical rules of procedure while, at the same
time, hoping for the relaxation of the technicalities in its favor.
There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Court of Appeals warranting this Court’s reversal of the exercise of
discretion by the former. However, even
if we decide to brush aside the lapses in technicalities on the part of NOPA in
its Petition for Certiorari, we
nevertheless find that such Petition would still fail.
NOPA seeks in its Petition for Certiorari for the application of this Court’s ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals,[14] wherein
we ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby
vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based
on the amount sought in the amended pleading.
In denying[15]
NOPA’s Motion to Dismiss, the RTC cited Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[16]
wherein we modified our
ruling in Manchester and decreed that
where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time,
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made on the
justification that, unlike in
In United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont
Bank) v. Ros,[17] we discussed how
This Court wonders how the petitioner could possibly
arrive at the conclusion that the private respondent was moved by fraudulent
intent in omitting the amount of damages claimed in its Second Amended
Complaint, thus placing itself on the same footing as the complainant in Manchester,
when it is clear that the factual milieu of the instant case is far from that
of Manchester.
First, the
complainant in P410.00, notwithstanding
its claim for damages in the amount of P78,750,000.00,
while in the present case, the private respondent paid P42,000.00
as docket fees upon filing of the original complaint.
Second, complainant's counsel in P78,750.00 but omitted the same in its prayer in order to
evade the payment of docket fees. Such fraud-defining circumstance is absent in
the instant petition.
Finally, when the court took cognizance of the issue
of non-payment of docket fees in Manchester, the complainant therein
filed an amended complaint, this time omitting all mention of the amount of
damages being claimed in the body of the complaint; and when directed by the
court to specify the amount of damages in such amended complaint, it reduced
the same from P78,750,000.00 to P10,000,000.00, obviously to
avoid payment of the required docket fee. Again, this patent fraudulent
scheme is wanting in the case at bar.
This Court is not
inclined to adopt the petitioner's piecemeal construction of our rulings in
All told, the rule is
clear and simple. In case where the
party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket
fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional
docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun
Insurance and not the strict regulations set in Manchester will apply.
In the case at bar, Campos filed an amount of P54,898.50
as docket fee, based on the amounts of P10,000,000.00 representing the
value of unwithdrawn molasses, P100,00.00 as storage fee, P200,00.00
as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P500,000.00
as attorney’s fees. The total amount
considered in computing the docket fee was P10,900,000.00. NOPA alleges that P100,000.00 and an
excess amount of storage fee in the amount of P502,875.98 in its prayer
and, hence, the amount that should have been considered in the payment of
docket fees is P11,502,875.98.
The amount allegedly deliberately omitted was therefore only P602,875.98
out of P11,502,875.98, or merely 5.2% of said alleged total.
Since the circumstances of this case clearly show
that there was no deliberate intent to defraud the Court in the payment of
docket fees, the case of Sun should be applied, and the Motion to
Dismiss by NOPA should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Antonio L. Villamor with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring. Rollo, pp. 45-47 and 160-163.
[2] Rollo, pp. 46-47.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] G.R. No. L-30070,
[10] 150-B Phil. 124, 131-132 (1972).
[11] SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. —The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing
requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts
of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.
[12] 34 Phil. 80 (1916).
[13]
[14] G.R. No. L-75919,
[15] Rollo, pp. 133-137.
[16] G.R. Nos. 79937-38,
[17] G.R. No. 171532,