EN BANC
|
MIKE A. FERMIN, Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM
DILANGALEN, Respondents. X
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
X MIKE A. FERMIN, Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM
DILANGALEN, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 179695 G.R. No. 182369 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA,* TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: December 18, 2008 |
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NACHURA, J.:
These consolidated petitions provide a
welcome avenue for the Court to dichotomize, once and for all, two popular
remedies to prevent a candidate from running for an elective position which are
indiscriminately interchanged by the Bench and the Bar, adding confusion to the
already difficult state of our jurisprudence on election laws.
For the
Court’s resolution are two petitions for certiorari
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No.
179695, which assails the June 29, 2007 Resolution[1]
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 2nd Division in SPA No.
07-372, and the September 20, 2007 Resolution[2]
of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the
said division resolution; and (2) G.R. No. 182369, which challenges the
February 14, 2008 Resolution[3]
of the COMELEC 1st Division in SPR No. 45-2007, the March 13, 2008
Order[4]
of the COMELEC En Banc denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, and the March 26, 2008 Entry of
Judgment[5]
issued by the Electoral Contests and Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the
Commission in the said case.
The relevant facts and proceedings
follow.
After the creation of Shariff
Kabunsuan,[6]
the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), on
Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in
both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay
Payan, Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident
of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6
months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his
registration record to the said barangay.[9] In
the meantime, the creation of
Thereafter,
on
On
1. THE PETITIONER is of legal age, a
registered voter, resident and incumbent Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of
Northern Kabuntalan, holding office at Barangay Paulino Labio in the
Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan where he may be served summons and other
legal processes.
2. THE PETITIONER is a candidate for
election as Mayor in the same
3. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he
swore to the truth of his statement in his Certificate of Candidacy of being a
resident of the Municipality for the last 38 years, when in truth and in fact
he simply transferred his registration from the Municipality of Kabuntalan on
13 December 2006, wherein he stated that he has relocated to that municipality
a year and six months earlier, or no earlier than June 2005.
4. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he
swore to the truth of his statement in his Certificate of Candidacy of being a
resident of the Municipality for the last 38 years, when in truth and in fact
he has stayed for at least 33 years in Barangay Payan, Municipality [of] Kabunt[a]lan.
5. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he
swore to the truth of his statement in his Application for Transfer that he is
a resident of Barangay Indatuan on 13 December 2006, wherein he stated that he
has relocated to that municipality a year and six months earlier, or on or
about June 2005, when in truth and in fact he has never resided much less
domiciled himself in Indatuan or anywhere else in the Municipality of Northern
Kabuntalan earlier than 14 May 2006.
6. THE RESPONDENT perjured himself when he
swore to the truth of his statement in his Certificate of Candidacy of being a
resident of the Municipality for the last 38 years, when in truth and in fact
he has never resided in the Municipality, but was simply visiting the area
whenever election is [f]ast approaching.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that, [in consideration] of the Respondent not possessing the residence required for candidacy, and having perjured himself in a number of times, the Commission disqualify the Respondent.[14]
Elections were held without any
decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said case. After the counting and
canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor with 1,849 votes over
Fermin’s 1,640.[15] The
latter subsequently filed an election protest (Election Case No. 2007-022) with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13 of Cotabato City.[16]
G.R. No. 179695
On
The COMELEC En Banc, on
Thus, petitioner instituted G.R. No. 179695 before this Court
raising the following issues:
A.
WHETHER
OR NOT THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY PETITIONER FROM SEEKING THE MAYORALTY POST OF
THE
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ONE (1) YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT AS PROVIDED BY ART. 56, PAR. NO. 3, RULE XIII, RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO IS APPLICABLE TO PETITIONER, WHO TRANSFERRED HIS VOTER'S REGISTRATION RECORD DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE FROM BARANGAY PAYAN TO BARANGAY INDATUAN IN THE SAME MUNICIPALITY OF KABUNTALAN.[20]
Petitioner
contends that the Dilangalen petition is a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).[21]
Following Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646, the same must be filed within 5 days
from the last day for the filing of CoC, which, in this case, is March 30, 2007,
and considering that the said petition was filed by Dilangalen only on April
20, 2007, the same was filed out of time. The COMELEC should have then
dismissed SPA No. 07-372 outright.[22]
Petitioner further argues that he has
been a resident of Barangay Indatuan
long before the creation of
In his comment, private respondent
counters that the petition it filed is one for disqualification under Section
68 of the OEC which may be filed at any time after the last day for filing of
the CoC but not later than the candidate’s proclamation should he win in the
elections. As he filed the petition on
Private respondent likewise posits
that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement for
him to be able to run for an elective office in
G.R. No. 182369
During
the pendency of G.R. No. 179695 with the Court, Dilangalen filed, on September
27, 2007, with the RTC of Cotabato a motion to dismiss Election Case No. 07-022
on the ground that Fermin had no legal standing to file the said protest, the
COMELEC En Banc having already
affirmed his disqualification as a candidate; and this Court, in the
abovementioned case, did not issue an order restraining the implementation of
the assailed COMELEC resolutions.
The
RTC, however, denied this motion on
Assailing
the RTC’s denial of his motions, Dilangalen filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[27]
docketed as SPR No. 45-2007 with the COMELEC. On February 14, 2008, the COMELEC
1st Division set aside the aforesaid orders of the trial court for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, prohibited the said court
from acting on and proceeding with the protest, and ordered it to dismiss the
same.[28]
The COMELEC En Banc, on
These
developments prompted Fermin to file another certiorari petition before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 182369. In this petition, Fermin raises the following issues for
our resolution:
A.
Whether
or not public respondent has departed from the accepted and usual course of its
rules of procedure, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision by
the Honorable Court.
B.
Whether
or not public respondent in taking cognizance of the certiorari and prohibition not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in (sic) excess [of jurisdiction].
C.
Whether
or not public respondent, in ordering Judge Ibrahim to dismiss the election
protest case, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in (sic) excess of jurisdiction.
D.
Whether
or not public respondent, in not uniformly observing its process in the service
of its resolution and/or order, had denied to petitioner the equal protection
of the law.
E.
Whether
or not the petition for certiorari
and prohibition is dismissible in view of the pendency of another action and
whereby the result of the first action is determinative of the second action in
any event and regardless of which party is successful.
F.
Whether
or not there is forum shopping.
G.
Whether
or not the public respondent, acting not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
has authority to issue TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction as ancillary remedy of
the original action for certiorari
and prohibition.
H.
Whether or not public respondent has jurisdiction to divest the Court of Judge Ibrahim of its jurisdiction on the election protest case.[31]
The
Court, on
The Issues
The
primordial issues in these consolidated cases may be encapsulated, as follows:
(1)
Whether or not the Dilangalen petition is one under Section
68 or Section 78 of the OEC;
(2)
Whether or not it was filed on time;
(3)
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when
it declared petitioner as not a resident of the locality for at least one year
prior to the May 14, 2007 elections; and
(4)
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when
it ordered the dismissal of Election Case No. 07-022 on the ground that Fermin
had no legal standing to file the protest.
Our Ruling
I.
Pivotal
in the ascertainment of the timeliness of the Dilangalen petition is its proper
characterization.
As
aforesaid, petitioner, on the one hand, argues that the Dilangalen petition was
filed pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC; while private respondent counters that
the same is based on Section 68 of the Code.
After
studying the said petition in detail, the Court finds that the same is in the
nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78[33]
of the OEC. The petition contains the essential allegations of a “Section 78”
petition, namely: (1) the candidate made a representation in his certificate;
(2) the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the
substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for
which he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false
representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his
qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.[34] It likewise appropriately raises a question
on a candidate’s eligibility for public office, in this case, his possession of
the one-year residency requirement under the law.
Lest
it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of
qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of
the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate
states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible
for the office he/she seeks. Section 78
of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional[35] and statutory[36] provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If
the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is
false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate.[37]
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section
253[38]
of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate,[39] with
the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the wining candidate.
At
this point, we must stress that a “Section 78” petition ought not to be
interchanged or confused with a “Section 68” petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in
different eventualities. Private respondent’s insistence, therefore, that
the petition it filed before the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a
disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact captioned a “Petition
for Disqualification,” does not persuade the Court.
The
ground raised in the Dilangalen petition is that Fermin allegedly lacked one of
the qualifications to be elected as mayor of Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., he had not established residence
in the said locality for at least one year immediately preceding the election. Failure
to meet the one-year residency requirement for the public office is not a ground for the “disqualification”
of a candidate under Section 68. The provision only refers to the commission of prohibited acts and the
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country as grounds
for disqualification, thus:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications.—Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Likewise, the other provisions of law
referring to “disqualification” do not include the lack of the one-year
residency qualification as a ground therefor, thus:
Sections 12
of the OEC
SEC. 12. Disqualifications.—Any
person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
The
disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service or sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified.
Section
40 of the Local Government Code (LGC)[40]
SECTION 40. Disqualifications—The
following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a)
Those
sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b)
Those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c)
Those
convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d)
Those
with dual citizenship;
(e)
Fugitive
from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f)
Permanent
residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
(g)
The
insane or feeble-minded.
Considering
that the Dilangalen petition does not state any of these grounds for
disqualification, it cannot be categorized as a “Section 68” petition.
To
emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on
Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false.
The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified
under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person
whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v. Abaya,[41]
this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under
Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because
he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because
he/she is never considered a candidate.[42]
In
support of his claim that he actually filed a “petition for disqualification”
and not a “petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC,” Dilangalen takes
refuge in Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,[43]
specifically Section 1[44]
thereof, to the extent that it states, “[a]ny candidate who does not possess
all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law x x x may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,” and
COMELEC Resolution No. 7800[45]
(Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Authority to Hear and Receive
Evidence in Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May 14, 2007
National and Local Elections), which states in Section 5(C)(1) and (3)(a)(4)
that:
Sec. 5. Procedure in filing petitions.—For purposes of the preceding section, the following procedure shall be observed:
x x x x
C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SOME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
1) A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the OEC and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification may be filed on any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
x x x x
3) The petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualification or possessing some grounds for disqualification, shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies with the concerned office mentioned in Sec. 3 hereof, personally or through a duly authorized representative by any person of voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties on the grounds that any candidate does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the constitution or by existing law, or who possesses some grounds for disqualification,
3.a. Disqualification under existing election laws:
1. For not being a citizen of the
2. For being a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country;
3. For lack of the required age;
4. For
lack of residence;
5. For not being a registered voter;
6. For not being able to read and write;
7. In case of a party-list nominee, for not being a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days immediately preceding the day of the election. [Emphasis supplied.]
We
disagree. A COMELEC rule or resolution
cannot supplant or vary the legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds
for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate
proceedings to raise the said grounds. In other words, Rule 25 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the dissimilar requirements of the law for
the filing of a petition for disqualification under Section 68, and a petition
for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC under Section 78 of the
OEC.[46]
As aptly observed by the eminent constitutionalist, Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, in his separate opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections:[47]
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, §1 the following:
Grounds
for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who
commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC
rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but
also in their consequences are proceedings for “disqualification” different
from those for a declaration of “ineligibility.” “Disqualification”
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §12 and §68
of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are
for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from
continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to
eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its
progress. “Ineligibility,” on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding
public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of
ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses
the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a
public office and vice-versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest," through the use of "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a candidate’s qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming office even though in the end he prevails.[48]
Furthermore,
the procedure laid down in the said Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
cannot be used in “Section 78” proceedings, precisely because a different rule,
Rule 23,[49]
specifically governs petitions to deny due course to or cancel CoCs.
II.
Having thus determined that the
Dilangalen petition is one under Section 78 of the OEC, the Court now declares
that the same has to comply with the 25-day statutory period for its filing. Aznar v. Commission on Elections[50]
and Loong v. Commission on Elections[51] give ascendancy to the express mandate
of the law that “the petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.” Construed in relation to reglementary periods
and the principles of prescription, the dismissal of “Section 78” petitions
filed beyond the 25-day period must come as a matter of course.
We find it necessary to point out that
Sections 5 and 7[52] of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,[53]
contrary to the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend
the period for filing “Section 78” petitions. While Section 7 of the said law
makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the
denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates[54] (retired
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections[55]
explains that “the ‘procedure hereinabove provided’ mentioned in Section 7
cannot be construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a
procedure but for the effects of disqualification cases, [but] can only refer
to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates x
x x.”), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing
“Section 78” petitions under the OEC is changed to 5 days counted from the last
day for the filing of CoCs. The clear language of Section 78 certainly cannot be
amended or modified by the mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of
a procedure specifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the
rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored
and will not be so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators
is manifest.[56] In
addition, it is noteworthy that Loong,[57] which upheld the 25-day period for filing “Section 78” petitions, was
decided long after the enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we therefore find
as contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states:
Sec. 2. Period
to File Petition.—The petition must be filed within five (5) days following
the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy.
As the
law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC “may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.”
Accordingly, it is necessary to determine
when Fermin filed his CoC in order to ascertain whether the Dilangalen petition
filed on
The record in these cases reveals that
Fermin filed his CoC for mayor of
III.
However, the
Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it precipitately
declared that Fermin was not a resident of
In its assailed
In the petitioner’s memorandum, an authenticated
copy of the respondent’s oath of office subscribed and sworn to before Datu
Andal Ampatuan,
Obviously,
the COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to support its finding that
petitioner was not a resident of Barangay
Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office subscribed and sworn to
before Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a
resident of Barangay Payan,
Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006. However,
this single piece of evidence does not necessarily support a finding that petitioner
was not a resident of
Neither does this evidence support the
allegation that petitioner failed to comply with the residency requirement for
the transfer of his voting record from Barangay
Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Given
that a voter is required to reside in the place wherein he proposes to vote only
for six months immediately preceding the election,[62]
petitioner’s application
for transfer on
The foregoing considered, the Court
finds that the Dilangalen petition does not make out a prima facie case. Its dismissal is therefore warranted. We
emphasize that the mere filing of a petition and the convenient allegation
therein that a candidate does not reside in the locality where he seeks to be
elected is insufficient to effect the cancellation of his CoC. Convincing
evidence must substantiate every allegation.[63]
A litigating party is said to have a prima
facie case when the evidence in his favor is sufficiently strong for his
opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima
facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence and
can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side.[64]
IV.
In light of the foregoing
disquisition, the COMELEC’s order for the dismissal of Fermin’s election
protest is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, considering that the same is
premised on Fermin’s alleged lack of legal standing to file the protest, which, in turn, is based
on Fermin’s alleged lack of residency qualification. With our disposition
herein that the Dilangalen petition should be dismissed, a disquisition that Fermin
has no standing as a candidate would be reckless and improper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions for
certiorari are GRANTED. The
assailed issuances of the COMELEC are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
|
(on official leave) RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
|
(on official leave)
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
|
RUBEN T.
REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 179695), pp. 36-39.
[2]
[3] Rollo (G.R. No. 182369), pp. 67-76.
[4]
[5]
[6] The Court, in the recently
promulgated Sema v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 177597,
[7] Rollo (G.R. No. 179695), pp. 51-53.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo (G.R. No. 182369), p. 271.
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 179695), pp. 55-56.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, approved on
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 179695), pp. 12-15.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 182369), pp. 97-98.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
[34] Salcedo
II v. Commission on Elections, 371 Phil. 377, 388-389 (1999).
[35] Art. VI, Sec. 3 which provides that:
Section 3. No person shall be a
Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day
of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write,
a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two
years immediately preceding the day of the election.
Art.
VI, Sec. 6 which provides that:
Section 6. No person shall be a
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years
of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the election.
Art.
VII, Sec. 2 which provides that:
Section 2. No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Art.
VII, Sec. 3 which pertinently provides that:
Section 3. There shall be a
Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be
elected with and in the same manner as the President. x x x x
[36] Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code which provides:
SECTION
39. Qualifications.—
(a)
An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor,
vice-governor, or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(c)
Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component
cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age on election day.
(d)
Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e)
Candidates for the position of punong
barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f)
Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan
must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21)
years of age on election day.
[37] Salcedo
II v. Commission on Elections, supra note 34, at 454.
[38] Sec. 253 of the OEC provides:
Sec. 253. Petition
for quo warranto.—Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or
barangay officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
[39] Salcedo
II v. Commission on Elections, supra note 34, at 387.
[40] Republic Act No. 7160, which became
effective on
[41] 370 Phil. 642 (1999).
[42]
[43] Approved on
[44] Rule 25, Sec. 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure reads in full:
SECTION 1. Grounds
for Disqualification.—Any candidate who
does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to
be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate. [Italics supplied.]
[45] Promulgated on
[46] Loong
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93986, December 22, 1992, 216 SCRA
760, 767, cited by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his
Dissenting Opinion in Aquino v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 400,
445-447.
[47] G.R. No. 119976,
[48]
[49] Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Rule 23 – Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
Section 1. Grounds for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy.—A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for any elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the Commission by any citizen of voting age or a duly registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any material representation contained therein as required by law is false.
Sec. 2. Period to File Petition.—The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy.
Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding.—The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
Sec. 4. Delegation of Reception of Evidence.—The
Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine
Bar to hear the case and to receive evidence.
[50] G.R. No. 83820,
[51] G.R. No. 93986,
[52] Sections
5 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646 reads:
“Sec. 5. Procedure in
Cases of Nuisance Candidates. - (a) A verified petition to declare a duly
registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly
authorized representative with the Commission by any registered candidate for
the same office within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.
“(b) Within three (3) days
from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue summons to the
respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures,
if any.
“(c) The respondent shall be
given three (3) days from receipt of the summons within which to file his
verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition, serving copy thereof
upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be raised as
affirmative defenses.
“(d) The Commission may
designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the case and receive
evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of oral
testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers together
with affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence. The
hearing officer shall immediately submit to the Commission his findings,
reports, and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of such
submission of evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within
five (5) days from receipt thereof.
“(e) The decision, order, or
ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy
thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme
Court.
“(f) The Commission shall
within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available means, disseminate its
decision or the decision of the Supreme Court to the city or municipal election
registrars, boards of election inspectors and the general public in the
political subdivision concerned.
“x x x x
“Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy. - The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply
to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as
provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.”
[53] Entitled “AN ACT INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN THE
ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;” approved on
[54] Section 69 of the OEC provides that:
“The Commission may, motu propio or
upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has
been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause
confusion among voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention
to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and
thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.”
[55] G.R. No. 120265,
[56] Tan v. Pereña, G.R. No. 149743, February
18, 2005, 452 SCRA 53, 68.
[57] Supra note 46.
[58] Rollo
(G.R. No. 182369), p. 271.
[59] Supra note 1.
[60]
[61] Supra note 36.
[62] Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8189 or “The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996” provides:
Sec. 9. Who may Register.
- All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are
at least eighteen (18) years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose
to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election, may
register as a voter.
Any person who temporarily
resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his
occupation, profession, employment in private or public service, educational
activities, work in the military or naval reservations within the Philippines,
service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Police Forces, or
confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law,
shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.
Any person, who, on the day of registration may not
have reached the required age or period of residence but, who, on the day of
the election shall possess such qualifications, may register as a voter. (Emphasis
ours.)
[63] See Mutilan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 171248, April 2,
2007, 520 SCRA 152, 163; Pasandalan v.
Commission on Elections, 434 Phil. 161, 173 (2002).
[64] Republic
v. Sandiganbayan, 325 Phil. 762, 809 (1996).