SECOND DIVISION
|
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, - versus - DEANG MARKETING CORPORATION
and BERLITA DEANG, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 177931
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ.
Promulgated: December
8, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Philippine
National Bank (petitioner) assails the February 26, 2007 Decision[1]
and the May 16, 2007 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals, which set aside the Orders of May 16, 2006 and August 9,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court (
Respondents
Deang Marketing Corporation and Berlita Deang filed before the P36,483,699.45.
Summons was
served on petitioner on
On
The following
day, May 16, 2006 or eight days prior to the slated hearing of respondents’ Motion
to Declare [Petitioner] in Default, the trial court issued an Order denying said
motion and granting petitioner’s Motion
for Extension of Time to File Answer. To
the trial court’s Order respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
In the
meantime, petitioner filed its Answer to the Complaint on
The trial
court, by Order of August 9, 2006,[8]
denied respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of its May 16, 2006 Order
denying their Motion to Declare petitioner in default and granting the latter’s
Motion for Extension.
Respondents subsequently
assailed the trial court’s Orders of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated
SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of
.
. . DECLARING PNB IN DEF
.
. . ANNULLING AND S
The petition fails.
Petitioner’s Motion
for Extension of Time to File Answer was laden with glaring lapses.
Petitioner had,
following the reglementary 15-day period after service of summons (unless a
different period is fixed by the court),[11]
until
It is a basic
rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a pleading must
be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended.[12] The court’s discretion to grant a motion for
extension is conditioned upon such motion’s timeliness, the passing of which
renders the court powerless to entertain or grant it.[13] Since the motion for extension was filed
after the lapse of the prescribed period, there was no more period to
extend.
Petitioner was
not candid enough to aver in the Motion for Extension that the period
had lapsed, as it still toyed with the idea that it could get away with
it. The allegations therein were crafted
as if the said motion was timely filed.
Notably, the
By petitioner’s
allegation in its Motion for Extension, it received the summons on
In requesting
for a 30-day extension or until June 11, 2006 to file answer, petitioner
apparently reckoned the date from which the extension would start on May 12,
2006, which was not the last day of the 15-day period sought to be
extended, it being May 5, 2006. By
computation, petitioner actually sought more than 30 days, contrary to the
period of extension it purportedly requested.
The counting of the period was erroneous, even if one uses the material
dates alleged by petitioner.[14] Petitioner clearly disregarded elementary
rules[15]
and jurisprudence[16]
on the matter.
The flaws in
petitioner’s moves/representations reinforce respondents’ claim that the Motion
for Extension was “cunningly” dated
More. Petitioner served and filed the Motion for Extension
through a private courier,
In denying
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of its grant of petitioner’s Motion for
Extension, the trial court ruled that it was inclined to reconsider or lift an
order of default.[23] By such ruling, the trial court preempted the
dictates of orderly procedure by unduly anticipating and signifying a slant
toward the remedies and arguments yet to be availed of and raised by
petitioner.
Petitioner
can not harp on Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm. on Higher Educ.[24] which
it cites. In that case, the Answer had
already been filed– albeit after the 15-day period, but before
the defendants were declared in default.
In the present case, had the hearing on the Motion to Declare Petitioner
in Default pushed through on May 24, 2006, the trial court would have readily noticed
that no Answer had yet been filed on said date, the Answer having been filed,
as earlier stated, only on May 25, 2006.
Neither can petitioner
harp on Sps. Ampeloquio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,[25] for
the Court therein held that it is within the discretion of the trial court to
permit the filing of an answer even beyond the reglementary period, provided
that there is justification
for the belated action and there is no showing that the defendant
intended to delay the case. Thus, in
that case, the therein defendant-respondent deferred the submission of a
prepared Answer as it awaited the trial court’s resolution on its motion to
dismiss, which resolution had, it turned out, been priorly issued, a copy of
which was, however, mistakenly addressed to another counsel.
In the present
case, no satisfactory reason was adduced to justify the tardiness of the Answer
and no compelling reason was given to justify its admission. The intention to delay was rather obvious.
It is not amiss
to mention at this juncture that the Court’s attention has been drawn to the
fact that petitioner’s counsel even notarized the Verification of
respondents’ Complaint as well as the Corporate Secretary’s
Certificate as early as
Moreover,
petitioner’s handling counsel belongs to its Legal Department which monitors
its pending cases and oversees a network of lawyers.
On petitioner’s
counsel’s belated and trite allegation of heavy volume of work which called for
the filing of the Motion for Extension, nowhere is it therein claimed that there
was heavy volume of work in other equally important cases.[26] With the implication that petitioner had been
all the while preparing an Answer, it defies comprehension how petitioner still
attributes the delay to “inadvertence,” “honest oversight” and “simple
remission” in its having allegedly misplaced the Motion for Extension.[27]
The Court thus
finds petitioner’s negligence inexcusable, as the circumstances behind and the reasons
for the delay are detestable.
Rules of
procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must
be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The bare invocation of “the interest of
substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this
Court to suspend procedural rules.[28]
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to
effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not mean,
however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit
the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness,
caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence,
it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are
contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to
the substantive rights of the litigants.
Litigation is not a game of
technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly
resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only
when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain his
failure to abide by the rules.[29]
(Underscoring supplied)
Given the foregoing
circumstances, Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr., in his Dissenting Opinion, still
finds “exceptional circumstances” that warrant this Court to suspend its rules
and accord liberality to petitioner, citing Section 11, Rule 11 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the
court may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, it is
unimaginable how “such terms as may be just” may be applied in petitioner’s
favor. Under the stated premises, to
grant the petition along the lines of liberality is to countenance the context
of fibs and flaws.
Obviously grasping straws in its
final pitch to win the court’s leniency, petitioner employed a ploy to conceal
not just the lapse of time but also the serious lapses of non-compliance with
basic rules. The scheme insults the intelligence
of the Court. While the Court frowns
upon default judgments, it does not condone gross transgressions of the rules
and perceptible vestiges of bad faith.
Good faith is
central to the concept of “excusable neglect” justifying failure to answer.[30] An attempt to cover up the procedural lapses
and obscure the technical imperfections negates good faith on the part of the
party imploring the accommodating arm of the court.
In his
Dissenting Opinion, Justice Velasco proffers that the complaint centers on the
interpretation of a contract which can only be determined if the parties are
heard in the course of trial.
There
is no arguing that all complaints of whatever nature can only be determined if
the parties are heard. There is,
however, a standing rule set in place for a declaration of default, in cases
where there is no justification for the belated action, and there is showing
that the defendant intended to delay the case.
In this case, the party lackadaisically squandered its opportunity to
file a responsive pleading and, worse, made deceptive moves in an obvious
attempt to redeem itself.
The
Court is duty-bound to observe its rules and procedures and uphold the noble
purpose behind their issuance. Rules are
laid down for the benefit of all and should not be made dependent upon a
suitor’s sweet time and own bidding.[31]
In
preliminarily assessing the merits of the case, the Court is merely tasked to
consider whether the reception of defendant’s evidence would serve a practical
purpose, considering that respondents had, during the pendency of the case,
concluded the ex-parte presentation of evidence.[32]
Accordingly,
after carefully reviewing petitioner’s Answer and Pre-Trial Brief, the Court finds
that to re-open the presentation of evidence just to ventilate the defense of mere
denial – that there exists no dacion en pago –and to present the
written agreement, the existence of which is already admitted by respondents,
would serve no practical purpose.
If
petitioner is confident that the complaint lacks merit, then it need not worry
because once the defendant is declared in default, the plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. Favorable relief can be granted only after it
has been ascertained that it is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts
proven by the presenting party.[33] In any event, petitioner, even if declared in
default, is not deprived of his right to appeal the decision of the trial
court.[34]
To emphasize, the
case does not involve any outright deprivation of life, liberty or
property. Contrary to what is being
depicted, intimated or romanticized, petitioner does not stand to lose P36,483,699.45
regardless of the characterization of the commercial transaction entered into
by the parties. The amount is secured by
mortgages over prime real properties, which is precisely the subject of the
alleged dacion en pago.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISU
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-16, penned by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 49-53.
[8]
[9] Rollo, p. 16.
[10]
[11] Rules of Court, Rule 11, Sec. 2; vide Rule 16, Sec. 1.
[12] Vda. de Victoria v. Court of Appeals,
G.R.. No. 147550,
[13] Vide Phil. Long Distance
Telephone Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57079,
[14] Even
if the original 15-day period to file pleading were to begin on
[15] A.M.
No. 00-2-14-SC (
[16] Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 166980, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 332, 340 citing Luz v. National Amnesty Commission, G.R. No. 159708, September 24, 2004, 439 SCRA 111, which states that the extension should be tacked to the original period, to commence immediately after the expiration of such period. The court has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension from a date later than the expiration of such period, not even if the expiry date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.
[17] CA rollo, p. 112.
[18] Vide Opposition to the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, records, Vol. 1, p. 71.
[19] Vide Rules of Court, Rule 13, Secs. 3, 5 & 7.
[20] Records, Vol. 1, p. 51. The written explanation in the motion erroneously indicates that petitioner availed of the mode of “registered mail.”
[21] While distance is an acceptable explanation
why the motion was not served personally upon respondents’ counsel in
[22] Industrial
Timber Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111985,
[23] Rollo, p. 129.
[24] 408 Phil. 483 (2001).
[25] 389 Phil. 13 (2000).
[26] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 49-50.
[27] Vide
id. at 70-71, 133; The November 29, 2006
Affidavit of Atty. Elenita G.C. Quinsay (rollo, pp. 97-98) reads:
x x x x
5. That due to heavy volume of work vis-à-vis the need to coordinate
with the PNB branch concerned regarding the history of the accounts, the
undersigned found it imperative to ask for an extension of time to file answer,
thus, she instructed her secretary to prepare a motion for Extension of time to
file answer, intended to be filed in court before the reglementary period
within which to file answer would elapsed;
6. The Motion was prepared earlier but due to the afore-stated
stated reasons, the same was signed by the undersigned in the late hours of
7. That in order to expedite the mailing of the said Motion,
undersigned volunteered to use her car in carrying the motion to the post
office for mailing, however, the post office closed earlier than 5:00 PM, so
undersigned has no recourse but to send it via LBC;
8. That on her way to the
9. While driving, undersigned hastily picked up the Motion and
inserted the same in one of the folders she is bringing along with records of
Civil Case No. 12868;
10. When she reached the
x x x x
The Court notes petitioner’s allegation that it was not until
[28] Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000).
[29] Sebastian v. Hon. Morales, 445 Phil.
595, 605 (2003).
[30] Villareal v. CA, 356 Phil. 826, 846 (1998).
[31] Far
Corporation v. Magdaluyo, G.R. No. 148739,
[32] Vide
records, Vol. 2.
[33] Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank, G.R.
No. 151098,
[34] Crisologo
v. Globe Telecom, Inc., G.R. No. 167631,