G.R.
No. 173473 – PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus BETH TEMPORADA.
Promulgated: ________________
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SEPARATE OPINION
CORONA, J.:
A man cannot suffer more
punishment than the law assigns, but he may suffer less. – William Blackstone[1]
For when lenity and cruelty play for a
kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner. – William Shakespeare[2]
The
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is one of the more complicated
and confusing topics in criminal law. It befuddles not a few students of law,
legal scholars and members of the bench and of the bar.[3] Fortunately,
this case presents a great opportunity for the Court to resolve with finality a
controversial aspect of the application and interpretation of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. It is an occasion for the Court to perform its duty to formulate
guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines or rules.[4]
In the process, the matter can be clarified, the public may be educated and the
Court can exercise its symbolic function of instructing bench and bar on the
extent of protection given by statutory and constitutional guarantees.[5]
The
fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal laws, including the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule
for the accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that
the accused ought to be presumed innocent until and unless his guilt is
established beyond reasonable doubt.[6]
Intimately
intertwined with the in dubio pro reo
principle is the rule of lenity. It is the doctrine that “a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal
statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.”[7]
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when
this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law “to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness.”[8]
Since the goal of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to look kindly on the
accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more
favorable to the accused.
It is on the basis of this basic principle
of criminal law that I respectfully submit this opinion.
The Bone of Contention
The
members of the Court are unanimous that accused-appellant Beth Temporada was
correctly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment and estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 and the
Court of Appeals. However, opinions differ sharply on the penalty that should
be imposed on accused-appellant for estafa. In particular, there is a debate on
how the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied in a case like this where there
is an incremental penalty when the amount embezzled exceeds P22,000 (by
at least P10,000).
In
this connection, the relevant portion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who
shall defraud another by any means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall in no case exceed twenty years. In such case, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor to reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.
x x x x x x x x x
On
the other hand, the relevant portion of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in
imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code,
or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x
Jurisprudence
shows that there are two schools of thought on the incremental penalty in
estafa vis-à-vis the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Under the first school of
thought, the minimum term is fixed at prision correccional while the
maximum term can reach up to reclusion
temporal. This is the general interpretation. It was resorted to in People v. Pabalan,[9] People v. Benemerito,[10]
People v. Gabres[11]
and in a string of cases.[12]
On the other hand, under the second school of
thought, the minimum term is one degree
away from the maximum term and therefore varies as the amount of the thing stolen or embezzled rises or falls. It
is the line of jurisprudence that follows People
v. De la Cruz.[13]
Among the cases of this genre are People
v. Romero,[14]
People v. Dinglasan[15]
and Salazar v. People.[16]
The Court is urged in this case to adopt a
consistent position by categorically discarding one school of thought. Hence, our
dilemma: which of the two schools of thought should we affirm?
The First School of Thought Is
More Favorable To The Accused
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in
imposing a sentence, the court must determine two penalties composed of the “maximum”
and “minimum” terms, instead of imposing a single fixed penalty.[17]
Hence, the indeterminate sentence is composed of a maximum term taken from the
penalty imposable under the Revised Penal Code and a minimum term taken from
the penalty next lower to that fixed in the said Code.
The maximum term corresponds to “that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the [Revised Penal] Code.” Thus,
“attending circumstances” (such as mitigating, aggravating and other relevant
circumstances) that may modify the imposable penalty applying the rules of the
Revised Penal Code is considered in determining the maximum term. Stated
otherwise, the maximum term is arrived at after taking into consideration the
effects of attendant modifying circumstances.
On the other hand,
the minimum
term “shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the [Revised Penal] Code for the offense.” It is based on
the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense without
considering in the meantime the modifying circumstances.[18]
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa (except estafa under Article 315(2)(d))[19]
is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if
the amount of the fraud is over P12,000 but does not exceed P22,000.
If it exceeds P22,000, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Moreover, where the amount embezzled is more
than P22,000, an incremental penalty of one year shall be added for every
additional P10,000.
Thus, the Revised Penal Code imposes
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (or a period of four years, two
months and one day to eight years) if the amount of the fraud is more than P12,000
but not more than P22,000. If it exceeds P22,000, the penalty is
imposed in its maximum period (or a period of six years, 8 months and 21 days
to eight years) with an incremental penalty of one year for each additional P10,000
subject to the limitation that the total penalty which may be imposed shall in
no case exceed 20 years.
Strictly speaking, the circumstance that the
amount misappropriated by the offender is more than P22,000 is a
qualifying circumstance. In People v.
Bayot,[20]
this Court defined a qualifying circumstance as a circumstance the effect of
which is “not only to give the crime committed its proper and exclusive name
but also to place the author thereof in
such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that especially prescribed
for said crime.” Applying the definition to estafa where the amount
embezzled is more than P22,000, the amount involved ipso jure places the offender in such a situation as to
deserve no other penalty than the imposition of the penalty in its maximum
period plus incremental penalty, if warranted.[21]
In other words, if the amount involved is more than P22,000, then the offender
shall be sentenced to suffer the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty with an incremental penalty of one year per additional P10,000.
However, People
v. Gabres considered the circumstance that more than P22,000 was
involved as a generic modifying circumstance which is material only in the
determination of the maximum term, not of the minimum term:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum term of the penalty shall be “that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed” under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be “within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed” for the offense.” The penalty next lower should be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of
the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without any reference to the periods into which into which it might be subdivided.
The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.
The fact that the amounts involved in the
instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances
in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with
the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since
the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charged against accused-appellant
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next
lower would then be prision correccional minimum
to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two months
while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6)
years and one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00,
plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00. (emphasis
supplied)
If the circumstance that more than P22,000
was involved is considered as a qualifying circumstance, the penalty prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code for it will be the maximum period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period.
This has a duration of six years, 8 months and 21 days to eight years. The
penalty next lower (which will correspond to the minimum penalty of the
indeterminate sentence) is the medium period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, which has a duration of five
years, five months and 11 days to six years, eight months and 20 days.[22]
If the circumstance is considered simply as a modifying circumstance (as
in Gabres), it will be disregarded in
determining the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence. The starting point
will be prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum and the
penalty next lower will then be prision
correccional in its minimum to medium periods, which has a duration of six
months and one day to four years and two months.
From the foregoing, it is more favorable to the accused if the
circumstance (that more than P22,000 was involved) is to be considered as
a modifying circumstance, not as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, I submit
that the Gabres rule is preferable.
On the contrary, the second school of thought is invariably prejudicial to the accused.
By fixing the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to one degree away
from the maximum term, the minimum term
will always be longer than prision correccional in its minimum to medium
periods.
Worse, the
circumstance (that more than P22,000 was embezzled) is not a modifying
circumstance but a part of the penalty, if adopted, will mean that the minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence will never be lower than the medium period of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum
period, the penalty next lower to the maximum period of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period.
The Second School Of Thought
And Its Shortcomings
The primary defect of the so-called second
school of thought is that it contradicts the in dubio pro reo principle. It also violates the lenity rule.
Instead, it advocates a stricter interpretation with harsher effects on the
accused. In particular, compared to the first school of thought, it lengthens
rather than shortens the penalty that may be imposed on the accused. Seen in
its proper context, the second school of thought is contrary to the avowed
purpose of the law that it purportedly seeks to promote, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
The second school of thought limits the
concept of “modifying circumstance” to either a mitigating or aggravating
circumstance listed under Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. It
contends that the respective enumerations under the said provisions are
exclusive and all other circumstances not included therein were intentionally
omitted by the legislature. It further asserts that, even assuming that the circumstance
that more than P22,000 was embezzled may be deemed as analogous to
aggravating circumstances under Article 14, the said circumstance cannot be
considered as an aggravating circumstance because it is only in mitigating
circumstances that analogous circumstances are allowed and recognized.[23]
The second school of thought then insists that, since the circumstance that more
than P22,000 was involved is not among those listed under Article 14,
the said circumstance is not a modifying circumstance for purposes of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The second school of thought therefore
strictly construes the term “attending
circumstances” against the accused. It refuses to recognize anything
that is not expressed, takes the language used in its exact meaning and admits
no equitable consideration.
To the point of being repetitive, however,
where the accused is concerned, penal statutes should be interpreted liberally,
not strictly.
The fact that there are two schools of thought
on the matter by itself shows that there is uncertainty as to the concept of
“attending” or “modifying” circumstances. Pursuant to the in dubio pro reo principle, the doubt must be resolved in favor of
the accused and not against him.
Moreover, laws must receive sensible
interpretation to promote the ends for which they are enacted.[24]
The meaning of a word or phrase used in a statute may be qualified by the
purpose which induced the legislature to enact the statute. The purpose may
indicate whether to give a word or phrase a restricted or expansive meaning.[25]
In construing a word or phrase, the court should adopt the interpretation that
best serves the manifest purpose of the statute or promotes or realizes its
object.[26]
Where the language of the statute is
fairly susceptible to two or more constructions, that which will most tend to
give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for
which the statute was enacted should be adopted.[27]
Taken in conjunction with the lenity
rule, a doubtful provision of a law that seeks to alleviate the effects of
incarceration ought to be given an interpretation that affords lenient treatment
to the accused.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is intended to
favor the accused, particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment.[28]
The reduction of his period of
incarceration reasonably helps “uplift and redeem valuable human material, and
prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness.” The law, being penal in character, must receive an interpretation
that benefits the accused.[29]
This Court already ruled that “in cases
where the application of the law on indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable
to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his prison sentence, said law
on indeterminate sentence should not be applied.”[30]
In the same vein, if an interpretation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
unfavorable to the accused and will work to increase the term of his
imprisonment, that interpretation should not be adopted. It is also for this reason that the claim that the power of
this Court to lighten the penalty of lesser crimes carries with it the
responsibility to impose a greater penalty for grave penalties is not only wrong
but also dangerous.
Nowhere does the Indeterminate Sentence Law
prescribe that the minimum term of the penalty be no farther than one degree
away from the maximum term. Thus, while it may be true that the minimum term of
the penalty in an indeterminate sentence is generally one degree away from the
maximum term, the law does not mandate that its application be rigorously and
narrowly limited to that situation.
The Proper Indeterminate
Penalties In These Cases
From the above disquisition, I respectfully
submit that the prevailing rule, the so-called first school of thought, be followed.
With respect to the indeterminate sentence that may be imposed on the accused,
I agree with the position taken by Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
Accordingly, I vote that the decision of the
Court of Appeals be AFFIRMED with
the following modifications:
(1) in
Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum;
(2) in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the accused be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, to 10
years, 8 months and 21 days of prision
mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases and
(3) in
Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional as minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum.
Associate Justice
[1] Commentaries on the Laws of England 92.
[2] King Henry The Fifth, Act 3, Scene 6, Line 11.
[3] A survey of criminal law jurisprudence will show that among the portions of the ruling of trial courts and the appellate court that are most commonly corrected by this Court is the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In fact, even this Court has grappled with the matter. (See People v. Moises, [160 Phil. 845 (1975)] overruling People v. Colman [103 Phil. 6 (1958)]; People v. Gonzales [73 Phil. 549 (1942)] overturning People v. Co Pao [58 Phil. 545 (1933)] and People v. Gayrama (60 Phil. 796 (1934)] and People v. Mape [77 Phil. 809 (1947)] reversing People v. Haloot [64 Phil. 739 (1937)] which followed the Co Pao ruling.)
[4] See Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 219 Phil. 402 (1985).
[5] Id.
[6] See Section 14 (2), Constitution.
[7] Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (2004), p. 1359.
[8] People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933).
[9] 331 Phil. 64 (1996).
[10] 332 Phil. 710 (1996).
[11] 335 Phil. 242 (1997).
[12] These cases include People v. Hernando, 375 Phil. 1078 (1999), People v. Menil, 394 Phil. 433 (2000), People v. Logan, 414 Phil. 113 (2001), People v. Gallardo, 436 Phil. 698 (2002), Garcia v. People, 457 Phil. 713 (2003) and Vasquez v. People, G.R. No. 159255, 28 January 2008, 542 SCRA 520.
[13] 383 Phil. 213 (2000).
[14] 365 Phil. 531 (1999).
[15] 437 Phil. 621 (2002).
[16] 439 Phil. 762 (2002).
[17] People v. Ducosin, supra.
[18] People v. Gonzales, supra note 3.
[19] The penalty for estafa under Article 315(2)(d) is provided under PD 818 (Amending Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by Increasing the Penalties for Estafa Committed by Means of Bouncing Checks).
[20] 64 Phil. 269 (1937).
[21] This is similar to the effect of the circumstance that the offender intended to aid the enemy by giving notice or information that is useful to the enemy in the crime of correspondence with hostile country under Article 120(3) of the Revised Penal Code (which necessitates the imposition of reclusion perpetua to death) or of the circumstance that the offender be a public officer or employee in the crime of espionage under Article 117 of the Revised Penal Code (which requires the imposition of the penalty next higher in degree than that generally imposed for the crime).
[22] See Article 61(5) of the Revised Penal Code. If the penalty is any one of the three periods of a divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that period next following the given penalty. Thus, the penalty immediately inferior to prision mayor in its maximum period is prision mayor in its medium period (People v. Co Pao, supra note 3). If the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, the penalty next lower in degree is reclusion temporal in its minimum period (People v. Gayrama, supra note 3). The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a felony is a degree. If the penalty prescribed for a felony is one of the three periods of a divisible penalty, that period becomes a degree, and the period immediately below is the penalty next lower in degree (Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, Fifteenth Edition [2001], p. 700).
[23] In particular, Article 13(10) expressly provides that “any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned” are treated as mitigating. Article 14, however, does not have a similar provision.
[24] Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946).
[25] Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
[26] Muñoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 (1909).
[27] Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485 (1909).
[28] People v. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515 (1951).
[29] Id.
[30] Id.